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Abstract
A sizeable stream of theoretical and empirical research in corporate ﬁnance reveals
that corporate investment and ﬁnancing activities in capital markets occur in waves
through time, which are accompanied with many abnormal phenomena surrounding
and after the announcement of events. Motivated by existing studies in ﬁrm-level and
aggregate-level liquidity, which suggest the inﬂuence of (aggregate) liquidity on the
activity and quality of corporate events, the purpose of this thesis is to investigate
and understand the role of aggregate liquidity in explaining existing phenomena
associated with corporate investment and ﬁnancing events including mergers and
acquisitions (M&A), initial public oﬀerings (IPOs), seasoned equity oﬀerings (SEOs),
and, ﬁnally, corporate asset sales.
Liquidity is an important and special asset for ﬁrms operating in imperfect cap-
ital markets. At aggregate level, corporate holdings of liquidity and the market
provision of liquidity play important roles in capital markets, which inevitably af-
fect the decision making and performance of corporate events. In this research, I
investigate whether corporate investment and ﬁnancing events occurring during high
aggregate liquidity markets are fundamentally diﬀerent from those occurring during
low aggregate liquidity markets.
Empirical evidences in this research show that the activity and quality of major
corporate investment and ﬁnancing events are substantially inﬂuenced by aggregate
liquidity. Moreover, many of the market anomalies concentrate in certain aggregate
liquidity conditions. For M&A, I ﬁnd that there are more acquisitions in high-
liquidity periods, and acquirers buying during high-liquidity markets have signiﬁ-
cantly higher pre-announcement returns, but lower post-merger abnormal returns.
For IPOs and SEOs, results show that there are many more public equity oﬀerings in
high-liquidity periods than in low-liquidity periods. Oﬀering ﬁrms selling securities
during high-liquidity markets have signiﬁcantly higher occurrences of underpricing
(discounting) and suﬀer larger long-run underperformance. For asset sales, high-
liquidity divesting ﬁrms have better performance measured by ﬁrm characteristics
and post-sale returns.
xv
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A growing body of research documents that industrial ﬁrms hold liquid assets, deﬁned
as cash and marketable securities, and tend to do so for an extensive period of time
(e.g. Opler, Pinkowika, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) and Bates, Kahle, and Stulz
(2009)). This corporate liquidity demand has attracted considerable attention from
academic research and media coverage. For instance, an article in the Wall Street
Journal states that “The piles of cash and stockpile of repurchased shares at big
U.S. companies have hit record level.”1 As ongoing entities, corporations are usually
concerned that they might run out of funds to take advantage of existing investment
opportunities, strengthen existing developments, or simply stay alive. In contrast to
a perfect capital market, a ﬁrm’s desire to reserve liquidity is driven by its inability
to pledge all of the expected income from investments. Due to this partial non-
pledgeability of investment returns, ﬁrms will require a cushion again any future
liquidity shocks (see Holmström and Tirole (1996, 1998, 2001)). Thus, the corporate
holdings of liquidity play strategic and important roles in the corporate decisions of
investment and ﬁnancing.
In corporate ﬁnance, a substantial amount of studies have examined corporate
investment and ﬁnancing activities and the related abnormal performance of event
1“Capital Pains: Big Cash Hoards”, by Ian McDonald, Wall Street Journal, July 21, 2006, p.
C1.
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ﬁrms in ﬁnancial markets. Signiﬁcant evidence has been found in academic litera-
ture in the past thirty years; research in this ﬁeld can be roughly divided into the
following two parts. First, many studies investigate the information conveyed by
these corporate investment and ﬁnancing events and examine the reaction of ﬁnan-
cial markets. In particular, shareholders’ returns, which initiate these investment
and ﬁnancing activities, are examined. For instance, acquiring ﬁrms in corporate
takeovers and oﬀering ﬁrms in equity issuances are documented with signiﬁcantly
negative stock performance in the long-term post-event periods.2 Second, many
studies demonstrate that the aggregate activity and performance of corporate events
change greatly through time.3 Evidence also shows that the volume of acquisitions
and equity issuances changes greatly through time.
Given the existence of these puzzles, enormous eﬀort has been dedicated to ex-
plaining these market anomalies associated with corporate investment and ﬁnancing
activity. Previous studies have suggested various explanations and theories.4 Al-
though some of them found strong indicators for these market anomalies, there are
still extensive debates on the existence and reasons for these puzzling phenomena; so
far, theoretical and empirical evidences are far from comprehensive. Brealey, Myers,
and Allen (2008) state that explaining “ﬁnancial fashions” is one of the main unsolved
questions in corporate ﬁnance.
Considering the universal need to hoard liquid assets, I observe that aggregate
liquidity (demand and supply) is cyclical through time. At aggregate level, the cor-
porate liquidity holding and market liquidity supply recurrently experience periods
of expansion and contraction. This pattern of aggregate liquidity cannot be easily
2For studies on post-acquisition performance, see Franks, Harris, and Titman (1991), Agrawal,
Jaffe, and Mandelker (1992), and Loughran and Vijh (1997). For studies on post-issuance perfor-
mance, see Ritter (1991), Loughran and Ritter (1995), and Spiess and Aﬄeck-Graves (1995).
3See, for example, Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001), Lowry and Schwert (2002), Lowry
(2003), and Harford (2005).
4Typical studies include Rau and Vermaelen (1998), Brav, Geczy, and Gompers (2000), Eckbo,
Masulis, and Norli (2000), Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004), Lyandres, Sun, and Zhang
(2008), and Bouwman, Fuller, and Nain (2009).
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overlooked, as these macro factors carry potentially important implications with re-
gard to ﬁrms’ subsequent investments and external ﬁnancing. Similarly, early studies
such as Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993) applied the macro factor of business cy-
cle to analyse common stock oﬀering. Further, Holmström and Tirole (2001) have
developed a liquidity-based asset pricing model (LAPM), and show that aggregate
liquidity has systematic implications on the pricing of ﬁnancial assets. The variation
of asset pricing due to the variations of aggregate liquidity in turn aﬀects corporate
decision making and subsequent performance.
While fully recognising the achievements of previous research in providing expla-
nations for abnormal phenomena in corporate investment and ﬁnancing activities, I
consider these shortcomings and unsolved puzzles in the literature as an invitation
to explore possible alternative factors and explanations. Despite the importance
of corporate liquidity reserves and market liquidity supply, limited attention has
been given to exploring the inﬂuences of corporate liquidity on corporate decisions.5
Moreover, no previous research has investigated the eﬀects of aggregate liquidity on
corporate events, or examined whether the performance of event ﬁrms is related to
aggregate liquidity factors.
The main objective of this thesis, therefore, is to investigate the role of aggregate
liquidity on major corporate investment and ﬁnancing events including mergers and
acquisitions (M&A), initial public oﬀerings (IPOs), seasoned equity oﬀerings (SEOs),
and, ﬁnally, corporate asset sales. Aggregate liquidity factors consist of aggregate
corporate liquidity demand (ACLD) and aggregate market liquidity supply (AMLS).
For ACLD, I follow Greenwood (2005), and use data reported in the Federal Reserve
Flow of Funds to construct a measure of aggregate corporate accumulation of liquid
asset as a fraction of total corporate investment spending. For AMLS, I follow
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2008), and use the U.S. Debt/GDP ratio.
5Typical studies include Harford (1999), Opler, Pinkowika, Stulz, and Williamson (1999),
Mikkelson and Partch (2003), and Oler (2008).
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Construction methods and reasons are discussed in detail in Chapter 3; both liquidity
measures are applied to test their association with these major corporate investment
and ﬁnancing activities. Moreover, I examine whether aggregate liquidity can explain
various abnormal phenomena related with corporate events. Overall, I classify each
sample of event ﬁrms based on aggregate liquidity data and examine the performance
and characteristics of event ﬁrms in various liquidity conditions.
The purpose of this research is not to provide an exclusive factor for market
anomalies associated with the aforementioned four major corporate decisions. Sim-
ply, I intend to explore and examine an alternative explanation, which could even-
tually help to close the gap between our understanding of corporate ﬁnance and
documented empirical anomalies related to corporate investment and ﬁnancing ac-
tivities. Speciﬁcally, this research aims to empirically investigate whether corporate
investment and ﬁnancing events undertaken during markets with high aggregate liq-
uidity are fundamentally diﬀerent from those undertaken in low aggregate liquidity
environments. After this brief tour of the main ideas and purposes of this thesis, I
will describe the background and motivation of this research in some more detail.
1.1 Research Background and Motivation
In this thesis, the demand and supply of aggregate liquidity are linked with the cor-
porate decisions of investment and ﬁnancing, which creates a number of important
questions, as follows. Why are M&A, IPOs, SEOs, and asset sales chosen as rep-
resentatives of corporate investment and ﬁnancing events? Why are there potential
correlations between aggregate liquidity and corporate events? And why does the
aggregate liquidity inﬂuence the performance of ﬁrms undertaking corporate events?
To address the correlation between corporate decisions and aggregate liquidity,
it is important to construct samples of proper and typical corporate events. In this
thesis, I choose M&A, IPOs, SEOs, and asset sales based on the following reasons.
4
First, acquisitions and equity issuances are the major, and most likely, largest in-
vestment and external ﬁnancing events undertaken by companies. In practice, such
kinds of investment and ﬁnancing activities can greatly change the size of a com-
pany, as well as the cost of capital; the releasing of information related to them has
a substantial inﬂuence on the ﬁnancial markets in both the short- and long-term. It
is reasonable to believe that, before taking these investment and ﬁnancing decisions,
management has analysed the inﬂuence of liquidity demand and supply, if not been
driven by them.
Second, in academic literature, there is a large amount of studies focusing on
M&A, IPOs, SEOs, and asset sales in corporate ﬁnance. Extensive attention has been
devoted to almost every aspects, whereby many studies have documented anomalies
associated with corporate events and delivered some explanations for these abnormal
phenomena. In the literature of M&A, early research in the 1980s investigates the
stock performance of target ﬁrms and acquiring ﬁrms at the time of announcement.
More recent studies focus more on the long-term stock and operating performance
of acquiring ﬁrms after acquisitions.6 Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Agrawal and
Jaﬀe (2000) provide a comprehensive survey on the wealth eﬀects of announcement
and the post-acquisition performance of takeovers, respectively. For equity issuances,
a great deal of attention is devoted to the debates regarding short-run underpric-
ing, long-run underperformance, and ﬂuctuations in the volume and underpricing of
issuances through time.7 Ritter and Welch (2002) and Ritter (2003) greatly sum-
marise previous major studies on equity issuances literature. Further, in asset sales
literature, valuation eﬀects of divestiture announcements and motivations for asset
sales have been investigated widely.8
6See, for example, Franks, Harris, and Titman (1991), Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker (1992),
Loughran and Vijh (1997), and Rau and Vermaelen (1998).
7Some notably studies include Smith (1986), Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist (1994), Ritter
(1991), Loughran and Ritter (1995), Spiess and Aﬄeck-Graves (1995), and Lowry (2003).
8See, for example, Hite, Owers, and Rogers (1987), Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz (1995), and Bates
(2005).
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Third, corporate decisions on asset sales is selected because of its unique relations
with both M&A and equity issuances; divesting ﬁrms in asset sales are similar to
target ﬁrms in acquisitions. The major diﬀerence is that target ﬁrms lose control of
the company after an acquisition, where the divesting ﬁrms only liquidate part of
their assets to gain external funds. Thus, the market reaction to the announcement
of these events should be similar, where, in general, positive abnormal returns sur-
rounding the announcement are realised. Moreover, in terms of corporate external
ﬁnancing, asset sales is an alternative path for ﬁrms to raise funds in capital markets
other than IPOs and SEOs. In equity issuances, ﬁrms sell securities (equity or bond)
to outside investors to obtain funds, while in asset sales, ﬁrms sell assets (company
divisions, plants) to obtain capital. Therefore, considering the inﬂuence of aggre-
gate liquidity on asset sales not only shows the correlations between them, but also
complements our understanding of M&A and equity issuances.
Inspired by previous studies found in liquidity literature, the second question,
which is about the correlations between aggregate liquidity and corporate decisions,
can be answered from two standpoints. In particular, studies considering ﬁrm-level
liquidity and aggregate-level liquidity both provide threads for establishing correla-
tions between aggregate liquidity and corporate events. Note that the liquidity this
thesis relates to the value of ﬁnancial instruments used to transport wealth across
time and to back up promises of future payments. It represents those cash equivalent
assets that can be quickly reallocated at no extra, or at very low, cost.
At the firm-level of liquidity, a large amount of studies consider the beneﬁts and
costs associated with liquidity holdings by corporations. Substantial evidence points
out the strategic role of liquid assets in corporate decisions relating to investment and
external ﬁnancing. For instance, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) argue that an increase
in cash simultaneously increases fundamental value and relaxes ﬁnancial constraints,
which causes the clustering of mergers in booms. Through empirical analysis, Har-
ford (1999) shows that ﬁrms that have built up large liquidity reserves are more
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active in the acquisition market, and their acquisitions are value-decreasing. Fur-
ther, Mikkelson and Partch (2003) and Oler (2008) report that holdings of liquidity
can even predict ﬁrms’ performance. As indicated in Opler, Pinkowika, Stulz, and
Williamson (1999): “...holding an additional dollar of liquid assets reduces the prob-
ability of being short of liquid assets, and decreases the costs of being short of cash”.
When a ﬁrm experiences a liquidity shortage, it might have to withdraw current
investments, cut back dividends, or raise funds by selling securities or assets. Main-
taining suﬃcient liquid assets reduces the probability of these ‘unwilling’ events, and
allows ﬁrms to take advantage of existing investment opportunities. Consistent with
this argument, a recent report in Forbes states that “If you’ve got enough money, you
can launch an acquisition binge and boldly snap up the technologies that will sell well
when the economy rebounds.”9 For example, IBM, the technology company with the
largest liquidity reserves, can aﬀord to snap up server company Sun Microsystems,
with cash, and still have $6 billion in cash left over.
As early as Keynes (1936), much of the early literature investigated the transac-
tion cost motive as a beneﬁt of liquidity reserves.10 However, the beneﬁts of holding
liquid assets are much broader than simply saving transaction costs. Another well-
documented beneﬁt is the precautionary motive for holding cash. In the presence
of capital market imperfections, liquidity can be served as a buﬀer stock to ﬁnance
ﬁrms’ investments, even when other sources of funding are insuﬃcient. Consistent
with the precautionary motive, Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that since informa-
tion asymmetry will induce ﬁnancing constraints, ﬁrms should hold liquid assets
to ﬁnance future investment opportunities. In short, corporate liquidity holdings
beneﬁt ﬁrms by reducing the underinvestment dilemma.
However, corporate liquidity holdings also come with large potential costs, in
addition to their beneﬁts. Easterbrook (1984) suggests that frequent visits to the
9“IBM: Tech’s Cash King”, by Brian Caulfield, Forbes, March 18, 2009.
10See, for example, Baumol (1952), Miller and Orr (1966, 1968), Vogel and Maddala (1967), and
Frenkel and Jovanovic (1980).
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capital markets helps control agency problems, where plentiful internal funds reduce
the eﬀectiveness of this control mechanism. Jensen (1986) argues that ﬁrms should
reserve no extra liquidity to minimise the agency cost of free cash ﬂow, which is
derived from agency conﬂict that exists between owners and managers. As argued in
Harford (1999), the same freedom from external ﬁnancing that makes cash reserves
valuable can be abused by managers, because of their desire to reduce their personal
undiversiﬁed risk or increase the scope of their authority. These two most prominent
points of view on the beneﬁts and costs of holding liquid assets in the academic
literature suggest that ﬁrms should either hold large amounts of liquid assets or no
liquid assets whatsoever.
The trade-oﬀ between beneﬁts and costs has been more systematically examined
by a number of studies since the late 1990s. Kim, Mauer, and Sherman (1998)
ﬁnd that a ﬁrm’s decision to invest in liquid assets and the optimal amount of liq-
uidity are determined by a trade-oﬀ between the low return by holding liquid assets
and the beneﬁt of minimising the need for costly external ﬁnancing. Similarly, Opler,
Pinkowika, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) also investigate the determinants and impli-
cations of holding liquid assets. Their results indicate that ﬁrms with strong growth
opportunities and riskier activities hold more cash, while ﬁrms with the greatest
access to the capital market tend to hold less liquidity. Harford (1999) explores the
relation between a ﬁrm’s acquisition policy and its liquid asset holdings. Consistent
with the predictions of the free cash ﬂow hypothesis, he ﬁnds that liquidity-rich ﬁrms
are more likely to make acquisitions. He further argues that agency conﬂicts between
managers and stockholders, combined with large reserves of liquidity, which insulate
managers from monitoring by external markets, produce value-decreasing investment
decisions (acquisitions).
At the aggregate-level of liquidity, some theoretical and empirical research investi-
gates the importance of aggregate liquidity on various issues. Many of them suggest
the link between aggregate liquidity, especially the aggregate market liquidity supply,
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and the premium of liquid assets. In a world of imperfect capital markets, holdings of
liquid assets that have a liquidity premium are accompanied with opportunity costs.
Again, companies should balance the beneﬁts and costs of holding liquid assets,
which are aﬀected by the aggregate market’s liquidity supply. Therefore, corporate
investment and ﬁnancing decisions are also related to liquidity at the aggregate level.
Most related, Greenwood (2005), by constructing aggregate corporate liquidity
investment (demand), ﬁnds strong evidence that aggregate investment in liquid assets
as a share of total corporate investment is negatively related to subsequent U.S. stock
market returns. His results suggest that the aggregate corporate sector actively
times security issuance relative to investment needs, where liquidity accumulation
is the consequence of overvalued ﬁrms taking advantage of issuing external ﬁnance.
Eisfeldt and Rampini (2009) characterise the business cycle properties of aggregate
liquidity, arguing that the use of liquidity to hedge investment opportunities by
the corporate sector can generate a substantial liquidity premium with empirically
observed countercyclical properties.
Notably, the theoretical research of Holmström and Tirole (1996, 1998, 2001)
greatly increases our understanding on the importance of aggregate liquidity de-
mand and market liquidity supply. Holmström and Tirole (1996, 1998) establish a
theoretical model on corporate liquidity demand (advanced ﬁnancing) and link the
corporate ﬁnancing problem with the market supply of liquidity, which leads to ﬁnd-
ings regarding corporate and government liquidity policies. Starting with this aggre-
gate liquidity consideration, Holmström and Tirole (2001) establish a liquidity-based
asset pricing model (LAPM) and show that the resulting model, which is aﬀected
by aggregate liquidity, can better explain a liquidity premium in capital markets.
Besides theoretical achievements, empirical evidences have been found in Krishna-
murthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2008) and Sundaresan and Wang (2009), suggesting
that aggregate market liquidity supply and the liquidity premium are related.
In summary, liquidity has been an important element in ﬁrms’ ongoing operating
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and decision making processes. In academic research, researchers’ understanding and
attitudes toward corporate liquidity evolve through time, from stressing the beneﬁts
or costs of holding liquidity separately, to considering the trade-oﬀ between them.
Previous studies on ﬁrm-level liquidity suggest the universal needs for holding liquid-
ity and the inﬂuences of liquidity on corporate investment and ﬁnancing decisions.11
Since aggregate liquidity captures the integrated variations of liquidity, it should not
only reﬂect the consequence of ﬁrm-level liquidity on corporate decisions, but also
the variations of business and investment circumstances. In addition to studies on
ﬁrm-level liquidity, my intention in applying aggregate liquidity into corporate in-
vestment and ﬁnancing decisions is also inspired by previous research, which directly
models the factors of aggregate liquidity.12. These papers theoretically model the
importance of aggregate liquidity and establish the links between aggregate liquid-
ity and valuation. Considering the role of ﬁrm and market valuation in corporate
ﬁnance, it is reasonable to expect that aggregate liquidity also plays a crucial role in
these corporate ﬁnance decisions.
In this thesis, I empirically investigate the inﬂuences of aggregate liquidity on
four major corporate investment and ﬁnancing activities: M&A, IPOs, SEOs, and
asset sales. Originated from two streams of research on liquidity (ﬁrm-level liquidity
and aggregate-level liquidity), I ask the following questions: Are corporate invest-
ment and ﬁnancing events initiated when aggregate liquidity is high fundamentally
diﬀerent from those initiated during low aggregate liquidity periods? Can aggre-
gate liquidity factors explain the market anomalies associated with typical corporate
events? Although previous research has established some results, especially at ﬁrm-
level liquidity, there are currently no formal empirical studies on aggregate liquidity.
Such macro factors carry potential implications with regard to ﬁrms’ subsequent
11See, for example, Harford (1999), Opler, Pinkowika, Stulz, and Williamson (1999), Harford
(2005), Officer (2007), and Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009).
12See, for example, Holmström and Tirole (1996, 1998, 2001), and Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2008)
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investments and ﬁnancing decisions, which should not be easily overlooked.13 Fo-
cusing on aggregate liquidity factors also allows me to explore certain anomalies in
corporate events such as merger waves, variations in IPO and SEO volume, etc. It
is relatively diﬃcult to examine these abnormal phenomena with ﬁrm-level factors.
Moreover, aggregate market liquidity supply can be employed to examine the eﬀects
of liquidity premium on corporate events, which cannot be captured in cross-section
analysis. In the ﬁeld of asset pricing, only a limited amount of studies have investi-
gate the inﬂuences of aggregate liquidity supply. The current research is among the
ﬁrst to consider its implication on corporate decisions.
1.2 Main Findings and Contribution
Empirical evidence in this research strongly suggests that corporate investment and
ﬁnancing activities are inﬂuenced by aggregate liquidity, as the activity and perfor-
mance of corporate events undertaken during high aggregate liquidity markets are
fundamentally diﬀerent from those undertaken during low aggregate liquidity peri-
ods. Based on factors of aggregate liquidity, my basic speciﬁcation classiﬁes sample
periods into high-liquidity (30%), medium-liquidity (40%), and low-liquidity (30%)
periods (or markets), according to the prior year’s aggregate liquidity. For instance,
the M&A (IPO) market in year t is deﬁned as high-, medium-, and low-liquidity
markets based on the level of aggregate liquidity in the year t − 1. Correspond-
ingly, acquiring (issuing) ﬁrms initiating acquisitions during high-, medium-, and
low-liquidity markets are classiﬁed as high-, medium-, and low-liquidity acquirers
(issuers). Next, the performances of event ﬁrms in diﬀerent liquidity markets are
measured and compared. In fact, this method has been widely used in previous
13Some early studies such as Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993) applied macro economic factors
to analyse corporate events.
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studies.14 In contrast to these studies, I deﬁne a period of market condition accord-
ing to the aggregate liquidity data from the previous year, because both measures
of aggregate liquidity belong to the category of leading economic indicators, which
tend to rise or fall in advance of the rest of the economy.15 Unlike ﬁnancial market
data, which can be observed fairly quickly, data items for constructing aggregate
liquidity factors are usually updated quarterly or annually, normally with a certain
amount of delay. It is important to note that, although I applied the previous (t−1)
year’s aggregate liquidity factors to classify current (t) year’s corporate events, the
major empirical results remain similar and signiﬁcant when I used the current (t)
year’s aggregate liquidity factors. Therefore, the results of current research are not
sensitive to the one-year lag in aggregate liquidity measures.
To show that the results are not aﬀected by the length of sample period, for
each corporate investment and ﬁnancing event the constructed samples cover the
longest periods of available data in the database. The samples of mergers, IPOs,
SEOs, and asset sales are all collected from the Thomson One Banker Data Analysis
Database. This database is exactly the same as the Securities Data Corporation
(SDC) Database, which is the most widely used data source for major corporate
events.16 The data coverage for merger sample (4, 162 deals), IPO sample (5, 529
deals), SEO sample (6, 100 deals), and asset sale sample (2, 793 deals) is one of the
largest in the each corresponding literature.17 The sample period of each sample is
split into high-, medium-, and low-liquidity markets in order to compare the activity
and performance of ﬁrms that announced events under those diﬀerent aggregate
14See, for example, Ritter (1984), Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993), Bayless and Chaplinsky
(1996), Helwege and Liang (2004), Yung, Çolak, and Wang (2008), and Bouwman, Fuller, and Nain
(2009).
15For discussion on leading, coincident, and lagging economic indicators, see p.576-582 and Table
17.2 in Bodie, Kane, and Marcus (2008).
16Discussion with Thomson One Banker employees verified that both databases are the same.
17For comparison, Loughran and Ritter’s (1995) sample contains 4, 753 IPOs and Brav, Geczy,
and Gompers’s (2000) sample includes 4, 622 IPOs. In addition, the samples in Loughran and
Ritter (1995), Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2000) and Brav, Geczy, and Gompers (2000) consist of
3, 702, 4, 766, and 4, 526 SEOs, respectively.
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liquidity circumstances.
In the empirical analysis, I examine the correlations between aggregate liquidity
and the aggregate activity of corporate investment and ﬁnancing events. The results
from such an analysis can help in understanding the causes and consequences of the
ﬂuctuation of takeover, IPO, and SEO volume. Moreover, besides comparing the
activity of corporate decisions in diﬀerent states of aggregate liquidity, I systemati-
cally examine the short-run and long-run performance of event ﬁrms, as well as the
variation of typical ﬁrm characteristic variables. By linking aggregate liquidity with
event ﬁrm performance, this research provides preliminary eﬀorts in analysing the
inﬂuence of aggregate liquidity on the performance of corporate events.
The main ﬁndings in this thesis are as follows. First, the aggregate activity of
corporate events is signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the variation of aggregate liquidity. In
general, there are more (less) investment and ﬁnancing activities initiated in the pe-
riods of high (low) aggregate liquidity. I have found substantial evidences that there
are more acquisitions and equity issuances in high- and medium-liquidity markets
than in low-liquidity periods. The activity of corporate events increases in the value
of aggregate liquidity for most of the cases, and remains robust after controlling for
various deal characteristics. For instance, I have controlled other macro economic
factors such as GDP growth and stock market index in multivariate regression anal-
ysis. Why there are more corporate activities in high aggregate liquidity status?
At aggregate-level, suﬃcient liquidity is usually accompanied by better business and
investment environments, which consequently induces more corporate activities. In
addition, high-liquidity markets provide more easy money for ﬁrms to undertake in-
vestment or ﬁnancing, even though these deals are more likely to be value-decreasing
decisions.
Second, the performances of event ﬁrms show strong correlations with aggregate
liquidity. High-liquidity events have much larger probability of experiencing over-
or under-performance, while low-liquidity events tend to have normal performance.
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More importantly, many of the ’pervasive’ market anomalies associated with cor-
porate decisions are mainly driven by deals initiated in certain aggregate liquidity
conditions. The diﬀerences in performance, measured in both the short- and long-
term, between event ﬁrms announcing decisions in high-liquidity markets and those
announcing decisions in low-liquidity markets are economically and statistically sig-
niﬁcant. Therefore, empirical results indicate that many of the well-documented ab-
normal performances can be captured by aggregate liquidity factors, which strongly
suggests that corporate investment and ﬁnancing events announced in high-liquidity
markets are fundamentally diﬀerent from events initiated in low-liquidity markets. In
particular, for M&A, I ﬁnd that there are more acquisitions in high-liquidity states,
and acquirers buying during high-liquidity markets have higher returns before and
around the announcement date. Interestingly, although ﬁrms that acquire when
the market is suﬃciently liquid produce signiﬁcantly higher short-run returns than
ﬁrms that acquire when the markets are short of liquidity, they generate signiﬁcantly
lower long-run abnormal stock performance, as measured by BHAR and CTPR. For
IPOs and SEOs, the results show that there are many more public equity oﬀerings
in high- and medium-liquidity periods than in low-liquidity periods. Oﬀering ﬁrms
selling securities during high-liquidity markets have a signiﬁcantly higher degree of
underpricing (or discounting) and suﬀer signiﬁcantly larger long-run underperfor-
mance following public issuances.
In summary, this research contributes to the current literature in four ways. First,
it increases our understanding of how corporate investment and ﬁnancing activities,
in aggregate, are aﬀected by the aggregate liquidity environments. In this study,
aggregate liquidity is documented to be an important market condition factor in
explaining the anomalies associated with corporate events; no previous study has
empirically investigated the importance of aggregate liquidity. This research is a
preliminary eﬀort to analyse the inﬂuence of aggregate liquidity on four major cor-
porate investment and ﬁnancing decisions. My research aligns with the stream of
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research in corporate ﬁnance: market-timing theory. In the literature, the theory of
market valuation is applied to explain the acquisition activities and subsequent per-
formance of acquiring ﬁrms (see, e.g., Shleifer and Vishny (2003), Rhodes-Kropf and
Viswanathan (2004), Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005), Dong, Hir-
shleifer, Richardson, and Teoh (2006), and Bouwman, Fuller, and Nain (2009)), and
to explain activity and performance equity issuances (see, e.g., Bayless and Chap-
linsky (1996), Lowry (2003), and Helwege and Liang (2004)). Compared to these
studies, instead of using market valuation or volume factors, my research partitions
market conditions through time based on factors of aggregate liquidity, and then
examines the performance of event ﬁrms.
Second, the results contribute to understanding the role of corporate liquidity
reserves. Previous research suggests that high holdings of liquidity can increase
agency problems by causing value-decreasing investments (see Jensen (1986) and
Harford (1999)). However, Opler, Pinkowika, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) and
Mikkelson and Partch (2003) show that corporate cash reserves are not harmful,
perhaps, even beneﬁcial to ﬁrm performance. Suﬃcient holdings of liquid assets
increase ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial ﬂexibility. This research complements this trend of research
with measures of aggregate liquidity. Consistent with agency problem theories, the
empirical results show that high-liquidity holding and supply (at aggregate level)
usually lead to value-decreasing investment and ﬁnancing decisions, where most of
the event ﬁrms experience negative long-term performance in the post-event periods.
Third, this research sheds light on the importance of aggregate market liquidity
supply on corporate investment and ﬁnancing activities. Inspired by studies exam-
ining the eﬀects of changing supply of aggregate liquidity on liquidity premium in
capital markets,18 I use aggregate market liquidity supply (AMLS) as an additional
measure of aggregate liquidity to examine whether changing the liquidity premium
18See, for example, Holmström and Tirole (2001), Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2008),
and Sundaresan and Wang (2009).
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has an inﬂuence on corporate decisions. This liquidity factor is constructed to rep-
resent the liquidity condition in the supply side of the economy.
Finally, by employing extensive sample periods, this research provides further
empirical evidences on the performance of event ﬁrms in major corporate investment
and ﬁnancing events. The sample period and sample size of M&A, IPOs, SEOs, and
asset sales are among the largest in the corresponding literature. I have collected
all available transaction deals in the SDC for each corporate event after screening
some criteria. The performance of all event ﬁrms in each sample are consistent with
the previous ﬁndings in the literature; empirical results based on such a long sample
period further complement early documented empirical ﬁndings.
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. In Chapter 2, I review the
related literature for this research. In Chapter 3, I describe the construction methods
used for aggregate liquidity measures (ACLD and AMLS) and argue the reasons for
choosing these measures. Moreover, I also brieﬂy review the empirical methodology
for this study. Chapter 4 examines the sample of mergers with aggregate liquidity
factors. Chapter 5 examines the sample of IPOs and the sample of SEOs with
aggregate liquidity factors. In Chapter 6, aggregate liquidity factors are applied to
explain corporate asset sales. Chapter 7 summarises and concludes the ﬁndings in
this thesis. Limitations and potential future research ideas are also stated.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
This chapter provides a literature review on research related to this thesis. Since I
explore the potential correlations between aggregate liquidity and typical corporate
investment and ﬁnancing events, several ﬁelds of research in ﬁnance, especially in
corporate ﬁnance, are covered. In particular, I review studies in the ﬁeld of cor-
porate liquidity demand, market liquidity supply, mergers and acquisitions (M&A),
public securities issuance (IPOs and SEOs), and, ﬁnally, asset sales and corporate
divestitures.
It is important to note that given the large and burgeoning literature on various
aspects of each of these research areas, comprehensive coverage is unlikely without a
book-length research review. Moreover, it is better to concentrate mostly on those
aspects associated with the main focuses of this thesis. Therefore, the literature
review in this chapter can be broadly separated into two parts. Part A contains
research on corporate liquidity demand and market liquidity supply. For corporate
liquidity demand, I start with ﬁrm-level liquidity studies, which suggest the strategic
role of liquid assets in the making of investment and external ﬁnancing decisions by
corporations. Next, I review studies concentrating on aggregate corporate liquidity
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demand and aggregate market liquidity supply. Part B contains studies on various
aspects of mergers and acquisitions (M&A), initial public oﬀerings (IPOs), seasoned
equity oﬀerings (SEOs), and corporate asset sales. Instead of providing full coverage
on these topics, I mainly focus on studies which examine the market anomalies
associated with these corporate events.1 In the following chapters, aggregate liquidity
measures are tests as potential factors for these abnormal performances.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2.2, studies
on corporate liquidity demand, both at ﬁrm-level and aggregate-level, are reviewed.
Section 2.3 summarises studies in market liquidity supply. Section 2.4 reviews related
prior works in M&A. In Section 2.5, short-term and long-term reactions to IPOs and
SEOs are summarised, with additional discussions on the motivations and volume of
equity issuance. Section 2.6 reviews studies in asset sales and corporate divestitures.
2.2 Corporate Liquidity Demand
There is substantial evidence that corporations accumulate liquid assets and hold
them for a substantial period of time. This corporate liquidity demand has attracted
many researchers’ attentions. Many eﬀorts have been devoted to answering questions
such as why do ﬁrms hold so many liquid assets? What are the beneﬁts and costs
of holding liquidity? Most liquidity studies focus on the corporate liquidity demand
at the ﬁrm-specify level. Very few, however, investigate the importance of liquidity
demand at the aggregate level. This section reviews studies which investigate (1) the
determinants of corporate liquidity holdings at the ﬁrm-level and (2) the importance
of liquidity at the aggregate level.
Liquidity is a complex concept. In this thesis, the term ‘liquidity’ refers to the
value of ﬁnancial instruments used to transport wealth across time and to back
1Such concentration is more related to the purpose of this thesis. In empirical analysis, I
explicitly examine the influence of aggregate liquidity on the performance (market anomalies) of
corporate events.
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up promises of future payments. It represents those liquid assets which can be
quickly reallocated at very low cost. In the vast amount of literature written on the
subject of liquidity, many studies investigate the relationship between asset prices
and liquidity.2 However, in these papers, ‘liquidity’ refers to the ease of trading a
security, which is diﬀerent from the deﬁnition of liquidity within the present study.
2.2.1 Determinants of Corporate Liquidity
Under perfect capital market assumptions, holdings of liquid assets are irrelevant
to corporations. If there is a liquidity shortage, a ﬁrm can always raise funds to
cover this demand at zero cost, which means that holdings of liquid assets have no
opportunity cost. However, when various imperfections are introduced, such that it
is costly for the ﬁrm to raise funds at short notice, then there is a trade-oﬀ between
the marginal costs of holding liquid assets and the marginal beneﬁts of holding those
assets. As stated in Opler, Pinkowika, Stulz, and Williamson (1999), “holding an
additional dollar of liquid assets reduces the probability of being short of liquid
assets, and decreases the costs of being short of cash”. Therefore, corporations have
substantial demand for liquidity, and the level of optimal liquidity holdings is widely
examined by the trade-off model in the literature.3
The trade-oﬀ model suggests that managers should set the ﬁrm’s liquidity hold-
ings at a level such that the marginal beneﬁts and costs of holding liquid assets are
equal. Holding liquidity has beneﬁts that arise from diﬀerent facets. First, ﬁrms
do not have to pay transaction costs to frequently raise funds and do not have to
liquidate assets or sell securities to make payments. Keynes (1936) describes these
beneﬁts as the transaction cost motive for holding cash (e.g. Baumol (1952) and
2See, for example, Pástor and Stambaugh (2003), Acharya and Pedersen (2005), Chordia, Sarkar,
and Subrahmanyam (2005), Amihud, Mendelson, and Pedersen (2006), Liu (2006), Bekaert, Harvey,
and Lundblad (2007), and Beber, Brandt, and Kavajecz (2009).
3Alternative views on the trade-off model are the pecking order model and financing hierarchy
model. Existing studies and evidence in the literature broadly support the trade-off model.
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Miller and Orr (1966, 1968)). Second, and more speciﬁcally, ﬁrms can utilise their
reserves of liquid assets to ﬁnance activities and investments if other sources of fund-
ing are too costly, which is referred to as the precautionary motive for holding cash
(e.g. Frenkel and Jovanovic (1980)).
Besides beneﬁts, there are also the costs involved with holding liquid assets. First,
the direct cost of holding liquidity is the lower rate of return because of a liquidity
premium and the tax expense on the interest income. Foley, Hartzell, Titman,
and Twite (2007) ﬁnd that U.S. corporations facing higher repatriation taxes hold
higher levels of cash and, consequently, hold this cash abroad. Another cost of
holding liquidity is agency problems between managers and shareholders, whereby
management may not use the liquid assets in the best interests of the ﬁrm.
Early studies that explore the optimal amount of liquidity holdings for corpora-
tions suggest that ﬁrms should either hold large amounts of liquidity or no liquid
assets at all, because these studies either consider the beneﬁts of holding liquid assets
or the costs of those holdings, instead of both sides. Myers and Majluf (1984) ar-
gue that since information asymmetry will induce ﬁnancing constraints, ﬁrms should
hold liquid assets to ﬁnance future investment opportunities with internal funds. Hu-
berman (1984) develops a model to examine an interior optimal level of investment
liquid assets, and concludes that ﬁrms should invest in liquid assets to fund future
investment opportunities. These studies provide support for the precautionary mo-
tive for holding liquid assets. However, both of them fail to include the oﬀsetting
costs of holding liquid assets in their model, and only consider the beneﬁts of those
holdings. Not surprisingly, in this setting, it is optimal to hold large amounts of
liquid assets. These suggestions for the optimal amount of liquidity are incomplete.
In contrast, considering the costs of liquidity holding, Jensen (1986) argues that
ﬁrms should reserve no extra liquidity to minimise the agency cost of free cash ﬂow.
In favour of Jensen’s (1986) free cash ﬂow theory, Blanchard, Lopez-De-Silanes,
and Shleifer (1994) ﬁnd that ﬁrms receiving cash windfalls spend their new-found
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cash ineﬃciently. Similarly, Easterbrook (1984) suggests that ﬁrms should pay out
dividends to revisit the capital market frequently, which would help control the
agency conﬂict between shareholders and managers. Without the beneﬁts obtained
from liquid assets, these studies imply that it is optimal for ﬁrms to carry no liquid
assets.
Most of the following theoretical studies include both the beneﬁts and costs of
holding liquid assets to develop predictions about the determinants of corporate liq-
uidity. Kim, Mauer, and Sherman (1998) argue that the optimal amount of liquidity
is determined by a trade-oﬀ between the cost of the low return earned on liquid
assets and the beneﬁt of minimising the need for costly external ﬁnancing. They
ﬁnd that the optimal liquidity investment is positively related to the cost of external
ﬁnancing, the variance of future cash ﬂows, and the return on future investment
opportunities. Holmström and Tirole (2000) ﬁnd that ﬁrms have desires to hoard
liquidity in advance, and the ﬁrms’ demand for liquid assets depends on whether and
how much the asset will deliver when the ﬁrm needs cash.
The beneﬁts of holding liquid assets (transaction motive, precautionary motive)
and the costs of holding liquid assets (agency motive, tax motive) have been widely
examined. Among these topics, precautionary motive and agency motive have at-
tracted the biggest attentions. Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) model the
precautionary demand for cash, and ﬁnd that ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms have a
propensity to save cash out of cash ﬂows, which is referred to as the cash flow sensi-
tivity of cash,4 while unconstrained ﬁrms’ cash savings are not related to cash ﬂows.
Khurana, Martin, and Pereira (2006) ﬁnd the sensitivity of cash holdings to cash ﬂows
decreases with ﬁnancial development with data for 35 countries, which supports ﬁnd-
ings in Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004). Han and Qiu (2007) show that an
increase in the volatility of cash ﬂow increases cash holdings for ﬁrms that are ﬁnan-
4The cash flow sensitivity of cash contrasts with the cash flow sensitivity of investment, which
examines the effects of financial constraints on corporate investment demand. See, for example,
Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) and Kaplan and Zingales (1997).
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cially constrained, but has no determinate eﬀect on other ﬁrms. Acharya, Almeida,
and Campello (2007) examine both the propensity to save out of cash ﬂow and the
propensity to issue debt. They ﬁnd that constrained ﬁrms prefer higher cash to lower
debt if their hedging needs are high, but lower debt to higher cash if their hedging
needs are low.
In line with the agency problem motive, Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes
(2003) ﬁnd cross-country evidence suggesting that ﬁrms hold more cash in countries
with greater agency problems, where shareholders’ rights are not well protected.
Further to these results, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2006) show that the
value of corporate cash holdings is less in countries with greater agency problems,
because of the greater ability of controlling shareholders to extract private beneﬁts
from cash holdings in such countries. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) investigate
how corporate governance impacts ﬁrm value, and show that the value of cash is
less when agency problems between insiders and outside shareholders are greater.
Finally, Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008) provide evidence suggesting that ﬁrms
with weaker corporate governance structures actually have smaller cash reserves, and
weakly controlled managers choose to spend cash quickly on acquisitions and capital
expenditures, rather than hoard it.
Empirical evidence related to corporate liquidity demands and optimal holdings
of liquid assets has been found. Notably, Opler, Pinkowika, Stulz, and Williamson
(1999) examine the determinants and implications of cash holdings and marketable
securities by publicly traded U.S. ﬁrms. In time-series and cross-section tests, they
ﬁnd evidence supportive of a static trade-oﬀ model of liquidity holdings. In particu-
lar, they ﬁnd that ﬁrms with strong growth opportunities and riskier cash ﬂows hold
relatively more liquidity, while ﬁrms with the greatest access to the capital markets
tend to hold lower ratios of cash to total non-cash assets. Similarly, Bates, Kahle,
and Stulz (2009) systematically examine the potential costs and beneﬁts of holding
liquidity. They ﬁnd that increasing cash ratios are the result of a secular trend rather
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than the outcome of the recent build-up in cash holdings of some large ﬁrms. They
conclude that the precautionary motive for cash holdings plays an important role in
explaining the increase in the average cash ratio, where the agency considerations
fail to do so.
For international evidence, Pinkowitz and Williamson (2001) examine the cash
holdings of ﬁrms from the U.S., Germany, and Japan. Ozkan and Ozkan (2004)
investigate the empirical determinants of the corporate cash holdings of U.K. ﬁrms,
where the ﬁrms’ growth opportunities, cash ﬂows, leverage, and bank debt are found
to be important determinants of cash holdings. Instead of using ﬁnancial statement
data to study corporate liquidity, Lins, Servaes, and Tufano (2008) examine corporate
liquidity by conducting a comprehensive survey of CFOs for a broad range of both
public and private ﬁrms from 29 countries. They ﬁnd that lines of credit are very
important liquidity instruments relative to cash holdings, and are strongly related
to ﬁrms’ needs for external ﬁnancing to fund future investment opportunities.
2.2.2 Related Liquidity Studies
The importance of corporate liquidity demand has been examined in connection
with diﬀerent areas of research. Mikkelson and Partch (2003) test whether policies
of persistent large holdings of cash can predict ﬁrms’ performances by examining
the operating performance and other characteristics. They ﬁnd that the operating
performance of holders of large amounts of liquid assets is greater than the perfor-
mance of ﬁrms matched on size and industry, or with transitory large holdings of
cash. Their ﬁndings suggest that persistent large liquidity reserves support invest-
ment without hindering corporate performance. Similarly, Opler, Pinkowika, Stulz,
and Williamson (1999) ﬁnd no evidence to indicate that ﬁrms with large holdings of
cash have better operating performance.
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Harford, Mikkelson, and Partch (2004) investigate whether large cash reserves are
beneﬁcial in industry downturns. They conclude that, during downturns, liquidity
reserves have important eﬀects, providing a beneﬁcial source of internal ﬁnancing
for continued investment, which result in better operating performance and post-
downturn sales growth. In connection with market returns, Oler and Picconi (2008)
investigate the eﬀect of a ﬁrm’s deviation from an optimal cash level on contempo-
raneous and future market returns. They argue that holding more or less than the
optimal cash level should have adverse eﬀects on a ﬁrm’s stock returns. Their results
suggest that the market does not fully adjust for a ﬁrm’s suboptimal cash holdings
in the current year, but does adjust in future years as the eﬀects become manifest.
Many studies investigate corporate liquidity holdings in association with typi-
cal corporate events such as acquisitions. Harford (1999) ﬁnds strong evidence that
cash-rich ﬁrms are more likely than other ﬁrms to attempt acquisitions. In ad-
dition, cash-rich ﬁrms are more likely to make diversifying acquisitions and their
targets are less likely to attract other bidders. By examining stock performance in
announcement periods, Harford (1999) shows that returns to unexpected acquisi-
tion announcements by cash-rich ﬁrms are negative. He concludes that these results
are consistent with the predictions of Jensen’s (1986) free cash ﬂow hypothesis. As
an extension to Harford (1999), Oler (2008) investigates whether the market fully
recognises the implications of acquiring ﬁrms’ liquidity levels, by examining post-
acquisition performance. He ﬁnds that post-acquisition abnormal stock returns and
returns on net operating assets both signiﬁcantly decrease in acquiring ﬁrms’ cash
levels. In general, Oler (2008) shows that acquisitions where the acquirer has a high
cash balance are likely to underperform in the long-run. Pinkowitz (2002) ﬁnd that
the probability a ﬁrm will be acquired decreases with liquidity holdings, which sug-
gests that the market for corporate control does not monitor corporate cash holdings.
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2.2.3 Aggregate Liquidity Considerations
While ﬁrm-level corporate liquidity demand and optimal holdings of liquid assets
have been explored broadly, much less attention has been given to the corporate
liquidity demand at aggregate level. Although ﬁrm-level liquidity considerations can
generate insights into the various issues discussed above, they cannot capture the
movement of liquidity demand for the entire market. Moreover, the consideration
of aggregate corporate liquidity demand from the production side of the economy
is also very practical. A great deal of the existing literature studying the demand
for liquidity has focused on the consumers’ (investors’) side of the economy.5 How-
ever, due to the nature of an insuﬃcient investor section, liquidity consideration by
corporate sector will have stronger predictions. As stated in Eisfeldt and Rampini
(2009), ﬁrms (production sectors of the economy) may be a more important and
quantitatively relevant source of liquidity demand. Additionally, because ﬁrms are
subject to larger liquidity shocks and rely more heavily on external ﬁnancing than
consumers, they have stronger desires for liquidity.
Theoretical studies by Holmström and Tirole (1996, 1998, 2000, 2001) enlarge
our understanding on aggregate liquidity. Holmström and Tirole (1996, 1998) es-
tablish a theoretical model on corporate liquidity demand (advanced ﬁnancing) and
link corporate ﬁnancing problems with the market supply of liquidity, which leads
to ﬁndings regarding corporate and government liquidity policies. The amount of
liquid assets reserved is determined by the trade-oﬀ between the costs, if the project
is terminated halfway through, and the beneﬁts of a higher initial investment. More-
over, they ﬁnd that in the presence of pure aggregate uncertainty, whereby the whole
aggregate production section faces a liquidity shortage, ﬁnancial securities that can
service corporate liquidity demand can be sold at a liquidity premium. Starting
with this aggregate liquidity consideration, Holmström and Tirole (2001) explicitly
5See, for example, Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Huang (2003), Allen and Galem (2004), Eisfeldt
(2004), Garleanu and Pedersen (2004).)
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incorporate a costly external ﬁnance friction constraint into an equilibrium asset
pricing model, and generate a liquidity-based asset pricing model (LAPM). They
show that the resulting model, which is aﬀected by aggregate liquidity, can better
explain liquidity premium in the capital markets.
Following on the work of Holmström and Tirole (1998, 2001), some researchers
started to understand the importance of aggregate liquidity. Greenwood (2005),
by constructing aggregate corporate liquidity investment measures, ﬁnds strong evi-
dence that, for the corporate sector, aggregate investment in liquid assets as a share
of total corporate investment is negatively related to subsequent U.S. stock mar-
ket returns. He ﬁnds that the liquidity investment share, compared to scaled price
variables, is a more stable predictor of returns and performs well in out-of-sample
predictability tests. The results also support that the aggregate corporate sector
actively times security issuance relative to investment needs. Eisfeldt and Rampini
(2009) characterise the business-cycle properties of aggregate liquidity, arguing that
the use of liquidity to hedge investment opportunities can generate a substantial
liquidity premium with empirically observed countercyclical properties.
2.3 Market Liquidity Supply
Unlike corporate demand for liquidity, the public provision of liquidity has attracted
less attention in the literature. To the best of my knowledge, in relation to liquidity
premium, the studies in market liquidity supply all consider the aggregate supply of
liquidity by public sector or government. First, it does not make a great deal of sense
to consider the supply of liquidity by a single ﬁrm. Second, the eﬀects of too much or
little liquidity supply can only be realised in the setting of aggregate liquidity. Most
related studies are Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2008) and Sundaresan
and Wang (2009), which explore the supply of liquidity at the aggregate level and
liquidity premium. Since it is diﬃcult to measure the absolute value of liquidity
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premium empirically, each research constructs a diﬀerent setting to partially capture
the liquidity premium and aggregate liquidity supply.
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2008) document a strong negative cor-
relation between the U.S. Debt/GDP ratio and credit spreads (between corporate
bond yields and Treasury bond yields), arguing that this reﬂects a downward-sloping
demand for Treasury debt. In particular, a hypothetical rise in the Debt/GDP ratio
from its current value of 0.37 to a new value of 0.38 will decrease the spread be-
tween corporate bond yields and Treasury bond yields between 1.8bps. They argue
that this credit spread reﬂects a convenience yield (liquidity premium) that investors
attribute to Treasury debt. By measuring changes in the supply of Treasury debt,
they trace out that the demand for convenience by investors stems from the surety
of Treasuries, the superior trading liquidity of Treasuries.
The negative correlation between aggregate liquidity supply and liquidity pre-
mium is also suggested in Holmström and Tirole (1998). They systematically inves-
tigate the private and public supply of liquidity with a model in which ﬁrms have a
demand for liquidity. They link the ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing problems with the market supply
of liquidity and examine the government’s role in supplying and managing liquidity.
Holmström and Tirole (1998) show that, when there is only aggregate uncertainty,
the government can improve welfare by issuing bonds, which should command a
liquidity premium over private claims. They suggest that the government should
manage debt so that liquidity is loosened when the aggregate liquidity shock is high,
and tightened when the liquidity shock is low. Holmström and Tirole (2001), by
applying this concept into the asset pricing model, show that the liquidity premium
monotonically decreases in the supply of liquidity.
Sundaresan and Wang (2009) focus on the liquidity premium and supply-demand
of liquidity ahead of the millennium data change (Y2K), which is viewed as a period
of potential aggregate liquidity shortage. Financial institutions around the world
expected Y2K to cause an aggregate liquidity shortage. By using the implied volatil-
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ities of Y2K options (supplied by the Federal Reserve Bank) and the on/oﬀ-the-run
spread, they demonstrate that the Fed’s action eased the fears of bond dealers,
contributing to a drop in the liquidity premium of Treasury securities. More impor-
tantly, their analysis suggests a link between the liquidity premium of government
debt and the central bank’s provision of liquidity, which is obviously consistent with
the ﬁndings in Holmström and Tirole (2001) about the correlation between liquidity
premium and aggregate liquidity supply.
Some related empirical studies have also documented this correlation. Longstaﬀ
(2004) examines a ﬂight-to-liquidity premium in Treasury bond prices, by comparing
them with the prices of bonds issued by Refcorp, a U.S. government agency. He ﬁnds
a large liquidity premium in Treasury bonds, which is also related to the amount
of Treasury debt available to investors in the market. Greenwood and Vayanos
(2008) examine empirically how the maturity structure of government debt aﬀects
bond yields and excess returns. They ﬁnd that the relative supply of long-term
government bonds is positively related to the term spread. The positive correlation
remains, even after controlling for well-known predictors.
2.4 Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A)
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) is one the biggest research areas in corporate ﬁ-
nance. Many interesting phenomena associated with M&A have been recognised over
the past ﬁfty years. In general, as summarised in Bouwman, Fuller, and Nain (2009),
research on M&A reveals that: takeover activity comes in waves; announcement-day
returns are signiﬁcantly positive for target ﬁrms but may be signiﬁcantly positive
or negative for bidding ﬁrms; and post-acquisition long-horizon returns to acquiring
ﬁrms are negative and higher for cash oﬀers and tender oﬀers than for stock oﬀers
and mergers.
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2.4.1 Definitions and Motivations
The M&A market is often referred to as the takeover market, in which acquiring
ﬁrms compete to take control of the operations of target ﬁrms. Essentially, an
acquisition involves one company taking over another company. A merger is one
form of corporate acquisition, where two companies decide to combine into a single
entity. Companies can grow either via merging their business or a successful tender
oﬀer, which is an alternative form of corporate acquisition. A tender offer is a bid
by one company for a block of another company’s outstanding common stock.6 As
stated in Halpern (1983), mergers occur when an acquiring ﬁrm and a target ﬁrm
agree to combine under legal procedures established in the states in which the merger
participants are incorporated.
In the vast swathe of literature on M&A, researchers have suggested various mo-
tivations for merger activity. I brieﬂy summarise the synergy and agency motives for
takeovers.7 Based on economic rationality, the most important goal for managers is
to maximise shareholders’ value; managerial takeover activities are expected to in-
crease the wealth of shareholders. In order to achieve this goal, the synergies between
both participants in takeovers must be created. Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993)
indicate that synergy is the primary motive in value maximisation acquisitions. Syn-
ergy, which plays an important role in justifying takeover activity, is deﬁned as the
ability to achieve a global value higher than the sum of each company independently.
Asquith (1983) ﬁnds that target ﬁrms have unique resources that provide synergy
when combined across ﬁrms. Dennis and McConnell (1986) show that mergers are
value-creating activities for combined bidding and target ﬁrms. Empirical evidences
found in these papers are consistent with the synergy hypothesis of mergers.
6A successful tender offer is frequently followed by a merger proposal, while sometimes tender
offers may turn into hostile takeovers when the board of directors of the target company does not
approve this offer.
7There are many other motivations for takeovers in the literature, including the information
hypothesis (e.g. Dodd and Ruback (1977)), the hubris hypothesis (e.g. Roll (1986)), etc.
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In contrast to maximising the wealth of shareholders, managers’ motives to un-
dertake takeovers may be driven by their desires to maximise their own personal
interests. Shleifer and Vishny (1988) support that acquisitions are normally the eas-
iest and quickest way for managers to achieve their personal goals. Morck, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1990) argue that managers pursue personal beneﬁts from the oper-
ation as well as the market value of the ﬁrm when companies make acquisitions.
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) investigate the motives for corporate takeovers
and ﬁnd that agency is the primary motive in takeovers with negative total gains,
which are non-value maximisation takeovers.
2.4.2 Announcement Effect of Takeovers
Many previous studies have estimated the eﬀects of takeover announcements on the
stock prices of bidding ﬁrms and target ﬁrms. Research in this ﬁeld can be clas-
siﬁed into several categories based on estimation periods (i.e. pre-announcement,
announcement date, and eﬀective date) and estimation targets (i.e. bidding ﬁrms,
target ﬁrms, and combined ﬁrms). In general, corporate takeovers generate positive
gains inasmuch that the shareholders of target ﬁrms beneﬁt generously from M&A
and the shareholders of bidding ﬁrms break even through takeovers. This section
summarises literature mostly related to my research in M&A. Since I mainly consider
the eﬀects of merger announcements on acquiring ﬁrms surrounding the announce-
ment date, I therefore focus on studies that investigate the returns of bidding ﬁrms
before and around the announcement date of acquisitions.
A Bidding Firm Returns in Pre-Announcement Period
Mandelker (1974) shows that bidding ﬁrms have positive pre-announcement returns,
where cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) start to rise from thirty months prior to
the merger. On average, stockholders of acquiring ﬁrms earn an abnormal return of
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approximately 6% in the thirty months preceding the merger, which suggests that the
informational impact of a forthcoming merger took place about thirty months before
the eﬀective date. By using a larger sample, Ellert (1976) ﬁnds that shareholders of
bidding ﬁrms earn signiﬁcantly positive abnormal returns at least four years before
the eﬀective date of mergers. In contrast to most of the following research, both
studies consider the outcome (eﬀective) date as the event date, instead of using the
announcement date.
Taking announcement date as the event date, many papers ﬁnd consistent results.
Dodd and Ruback (1977) estimate the stock market reaction to tender oﬀers, and ﬁnd
that stockholders of bidding ﬁrms earn signiﬁcantly positive abnormal returns for the
twelve months prior to tender oﬀers. Asquith (1983) ﬁnds that the CAR for both
successful and unsuccessful bidding ﬁrms over the pre-announcement event window
(−480,−20) are 14.3% and 2.2%, respectively. Schipper and Smith (1983) ﬁnd that
the CAR of acquiring ﬁrms starts to increase thirty months before the announcement
month. The increase in CAR from month −24 through to the event month is over
20%, with an increase in the year before the acquisitions of about 13.5%. Malatesta
(1983) studies the wealth eﬀect of merger activity by measuring abnormal dollar
returns and abnormal rates of return. He ﬁnds that the cumulative abnormal dollar
return for acquiring ﬁrms falls by approximately 27.56 million dollars over the ﬁve
months prior to the announcement date. Based on these results, Malatesta (1983)
argues that a merger is a negative net present value project for acquiring ﬁrms.
B Bidding Firm Returns in Announcement Period
Dodd and Ruback (1977) estimate stock market reactions to tender oﬀers, both suc-
cessful and unsuccessful. They ﬁnd that in the month of the oﬀer, only successful bid-
ders earn signiﬁcantly positive abnormal returns. In particular, their evidence shows
that shareholders of successful (unsuccessful) bidding ﬁrms earn a 2.83% (0.5%)
abnormal return in the month of the tender oﬀer announcement. Dodd (1980) inves-
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tigates the daily market reaction to the announcement and subsequent acceptance
or rejection of merger proposals. In contrast to the abnormal returns to target ﬁrms,
the evidence indicates a small but signiﬁcantly negative return to bidding ﬁrms.
Asquith (1983) estimates abnormal stock returns throughout the entire merger
process for both successful and unsuccessful merger bids. The two-day excess re-
turns are 0.2% for successful acquiring ﬁrms and 0.5% for unsuccessful acquiring
ﬁrms. Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins (1983) ﬁnd positive (0.9%) and statistically sig-
niﬁcant (t-statistic is 4.68) abnormal returns around the announcement date when
investigating the wealth eﬀects of merger programmes. Instead of using the market
model, Dennis and McConnell (1986) apply the market-adjusted model to calculate
abnormal returns. They ﬁnd insigniﬁcant abnormal returns of acquiring ﬁrms around
the announcement date. In fact, most studies, except for Dodd (1980) and Asquith,
Bruner, and Mullins (1983), document that abnormal returns to acquiring ﬁrms are
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
2.4.3 Long-term Post-Acquisition Performance
Parallel to the research on announcement eﬀects, a relatively smaller amount of
studies have investigated long-term post-acquisition returns. Previous research shows
that the long-term performance of the acquiring ﬁrms following acquisitions is mainly
negative, and this is a controversial issue. Many papers point out that the eﬃcient
market hypothesis (EMH) is rejected when detecting the long-term stock price per-
formance after acquisitions. Jensen and Ruback (1983) comment that: “These post-
outcome negative abnormal returns are unsettling because they are inconsistent with
market eﬃciency and suggest that changes in stock prices overestimate the future
eﬃciency gains from mergers.” At this point, I mainly review some notable studies
on the post-merger performance of acquiring ﬁrms. Research on the performance
following tender oﬀers is excluded because I only consider a sample of mergers in
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empirical analysis in Chapter 4.8
Agrawal and Jaﬀe (2000) review twenty-two articles that have examined the stock
price performance of acquiring ﬁrms following acquisitions. They conclude that stud-
ies, starting with Franks, Harris, and Titman (1991), show strong evidence of ab-
normal underperformance following mergers.9 Agrawal, Jaﬀe, and Mandelker (1992)
ﬁnd that stockholders of acquiring ﬁrms suﬀer a statistically signiﬁcant loss of about
10% over ﬁve years following mergers; these results are robust after controlling for
ﬁrm size eﬀect and beta estimation problems. Loderer and Martin (1992) document
signiﬁcantly negative abnormal returns for acquiring ﬁrms in the three years follow-
ing mergers. Using 788 mergers during 1970 and 1989, Loughran and Vijh (1997)
ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant ﬁve-year buy-and-hold return of −15.9%. By using a
larger sample of mergers, Rau and Vermaelen (1998) ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant
three-year abnormal return of −4.04%. More recently, Mitchell and Staﬀord (2000)
report that 2, 068 acquisitions from 1961 to 1993 deliver a negative value-weighted
BHAR of −3.80%.
The existence of anomalies following mergers is further supported by empirical
evidence found in U.K. companies. When using a sample of 1, 800 U.K. takeovers,
Franks and Harris (1989) report a signiﬁcant return of −12.6% for two-year post-
merger performance. Limmack (1991) ﬁnds two-year abnormal returns between
−4.67% and −14.96% under three diﬀerent models, all of which are statistically
signiﬁcant. Gregory (1997) reports signiﬁcant negative returns for large U.K. bid-
ders for domestic bidding. Long-run negative returns to shareholders have also been
found in cross-border acquisitions (see Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) and Conn, Cosh,
Guest, and Hughes (2005)).
8The post-acquisition returns to acquiring shareholders are higher for tender offers. Abnormal
returns are predominantly positive, not negative following tender offers. For evidence on tender
offers, see Dodd and Ruback (1977), Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker (1992), Loderer and Martin
(1992), and Loughran and Vijh (1997).
9Studies before Franks, Harris, and Titman (1991) also found evidence consistent with post-
acquisition underperformance. See, for example, Langetieg (1978), Firth (1980), Malatesta (1983)
and Franks and Harris (1989).
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Overall, previous studies in the last two decades of the 20th Century ﬁnd strong
evidence that acquiring ﬁrms suﬀer long-term negative performance following merg-
ers. All together, these studies cover a long time period as well as takeovers in the
U.S. and U.K. However, in the meantime, there are some criticisms of long-term
return studies in general (see, e.g., Kothari and Warner (1997), Barber and Lyon
(1997), Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999)), which suggest that something more than
the announcement of an acquisition is at work here.
A number of other studies explore potential explanations for post-acquisition
anomalies. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) suggest the performance extrapolation hy-
pothesis, which states that both the market and the managers of bidding ﬁrms ex-
trapolate its past performance when assessing the value of a new acquisition. They
argue that bidding ﬁrms with a high book-to-market value (value ﬁrms) have sig-
niﬁcantly higher long-term abnormal returns (5.4%) than ﬁrms with a low book-to-
market value (glamour ﬁrms, only 0.1%), regardless of the method of payment (cash
and equity) and type of acquisition (mergers and tender oﬀers). Similarly, results
have been reported in Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) that bidders with high book-
to-market value perform more soundly than those with low book-to-market value.
Further, some papers even consider the size eﬀect in acquiring ﬁrms’ long-term per-
formance (see Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004)).
2.4.4 Method of Payment
Loughran and Vijh (1997) is the ﬁrst to systematically investigate the relation-
ship between post-acquisition returns and the method of payment in acquisitions.
They suggest that the method of payment may be related to the target managers’
private information about their stock price, which is based on the early work of
Myers and Majluf (1984). In a world where managers possess private information
that shareholders do not, Myers and Majluf (1984) show that ﬁrms tend to issue
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stock when their shares are overvalued and pay cash if their stocks are undervalued.
Consequently, ﬁrms’ share prices should drop upon the news of an equity issuance.
Loughran and Vijh (1997) therefore suggest that acquiring ﬁrms that issue stocks
are overvalued, and the stock price should decline following such acquisitions. They
report that, during a ﬁve-year period following the acquisitions, ﬁrms that complete
stock mergers earn signiﬁcantly negative excess returns of −25%, whereas ﬁrms that
complete cash tender oﬀers earn signiﬁcantly positive excess returns of 61.7%.
As indicated in Agrawal and Jaﬀe (2000), the diﬀerences between equity and cash
ﬁnancing acquisitions have been examined by several papers before Loughran and
Vijh (1997). The following are some examples. Dodds and Quek (1985) report an
abnormal return of −7.20% in the 60 months following equity-ﬁnanced acquisitions
and a return of −4.40% following cash-ﬁnanced acquisitions over the same time
period. Franks, Harris, and Titman (1991) show average post-merger performance
over 36 months of 0.26% per month for cash oﬀers and −0.17% per month for equity
oﬀers. Gregory (1997) also ﬁnds that average abnormal returns are lower for equity-
ﬁnanced acquisitions. Each of these results is consistent with Loughran and Vijh’s
(1997) predictions that the managers of acquiring ﬁrms are likely to choose stock
payment when their stock is overvalued and cash payment when it is undervalued.
Besides being used to explain the post-acquisition underperformance of acquiring
ﬁrms, the method of payment, which is an M&A ﬁnancing decision, has been analysed
widely in the literature. For the announcement eﬀects of M&A, Travlos (1987),
Amihud, Lev, and Travlos (1990), Servaes (1991), and Brown and Ryngaert (1991)
document signiﬁcantly negative average announcement returns to acquirers when
the method of payment is stock rather than cash.10 For cross-border acquisitions,
Conn, Cosh, Guest, and Hughes (2005) exhibit that the major means of payment in
cross-border acquisitions is cash, which is also preferred by the domestic acquisitions
of private target ﬁrms. Amihud, Lev, and Travlos (1990), Martin (1996), and Ghosh
10See Faccio and Masulis (2005) for a more detailed review on these studies.
and Ruland (1998) empirically investigate the determinants of method of payment
and the importance of acquirers’ management stockholdings. More recently, Faccio
and Masulis (2005) study the M&A payment choices of European bidders for publicly
and privately held targets. Consistent with earlier evidence, they ﬁnd that several
deal and target characteristics signiﬁcantly aﬀect the method of payment choice.
2.5 Securities Issuance
This section brieﬂy discusses the securities issuance process, focusing on initial public
oﬀerings (IPOs) and seasoned equity oﬀerings (SEOs). An IPO is the means by which
a company issues common stocks or shares to the general public for the ﬁrst time.
These transactions are often done by younger companies seeking capital to expand,
but can also be done by large privately-owned companies looking to become publicly
traded. An SEO is an equity issuing by a ﬁrm that is already publicly traded in the
markets. In contrast to SEOs, IPOs can be considered unseasoned equity oﬀerings
or new issues. In academia and industry, SEOs are also referred to as ‘follow-on
oﬀerings’ or ‘secondary oﬀerings’, which reﬂects that SEOs are public equity issues
after IPOs.11
Instead of providing a thorough analysis on every topic covering securities is-
suance, which is impossible without a book-length discussion, the purpose of this
section is to review empirical anomalies associated with IPOs and SEOs, which are
further examined with aggregate liquidity factors in Chapter 5. In particular, notable
studies on short-term underpricing, long-term underperformance, and ﬂuctuations in
volume and the underpricing of issuances are summarised. As argued earlier, I intend
to investigate whether these market anomalies related with equity issuances can be
explained by aggregate liquidity. Due to the similarity of IPOs and SEOs, many
11Note that ‘secondary offering’ is a term that can either mean follow-on offering or shares being
sold by existing shareholders, as opposed to a primary offer. In a primary offer, the issuing firm
receives proceeds, while in the other case only shareholders receive proceeds.
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studies perform analysis without separating them from each other. However, since
there are still diﬀerences between them, I treat IPOs and SEOs separately in this
review, as well as in the empirical analysis. Here, I follow the separation of empirical
patterns for IPOs and SEOs in Ritter (2003).
In the literature, three major empirical patterns for IPOs have been documented:
(1) short-run underpricing; (2) time-series ﬂuctuations in volume and underpricing;
and (3) long-run underperformance. In a review of IPO activity, pricing, and allo-
cations, Ritter and Welch (2002) brieﬂy summarise these patterns with a series of
numbers for the U.S. market. These patterns have been the focus of a large group of
theoretical and empirical papers.12 The SEO literature documents four patterns: (1)
negative announcement eﬀects; (2) the discounting of oﬀer prices; (3) large ﬂuctua-
tions in volume; and (4) long-run underperformance. An issuing ﬁrm that is already
publicly traded usually pays additional indirect costs due to negative announcement
eﬀects. The other three SEO anomalies are quite similar to those of IPOs, as both
oﬀerings exist in the same class of corporate ﬁnancing activities. However, SEOs
usually have lower price uncertainty due to the existence of an active secondary
market and trading equities prior to the oﬀering.
Given the burgeoning literature on various aspects of securities issuance, there
are many literature reviews on both IPOs and SEOs. For instance, the IPO studies
of Ibbotson and Ritter (1995) and Ritter (1998) discuss the process of going public
and various explanations for underpricing, and document three empirical patterns
(short-run underpricing, hot issue markets, and long-run underperformance). Ritter
and Welch (2002), by focusing on more recent literature, review diﬀerent explana-
tions for patterns in issuing activity, underpricing and long-run performance. Ritter
(2003) reviews and analyses the investment banking system and securities issuance
12Some other important aspects in IPOs, like why firms go public, mechanism designs for IPOs,
and explanations for underpricing, are also briefly covered in this section. For a detailed discussion
on these topics and other IPO issues, please refer to Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001), which
provides a book-length discussion.
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process.13 Most of this section is devoted to equity issues and evidence from the
U.S. market, because equity oﬀerings in the U.S. market are the main focus of my
research analysis.14 As stated in Ritter (2003), capital markets are increasingly glob-
ally integrated, and U.S. institutional practices are now more common throughout
the world. Note that the terms ‘securities issuance’, ‘equity oﬀers’, ‘equity issuance’
and ‘going public’ are used interchangeably in this review.
2.5.1 Motivations for Equity Offers
A central question in equity issuance is: “Why do ﬁrms go public?” The conventional
wisdom believes that going public can raise equity capital for ﬁrms and create a public
market in which insiders can cash out at a future date. At certain stages, a company
may ﬁnd it more desirable to go public by selling stocks in markets rather than
raising funds from a small number of investors. By going public, a company can
raise capital on more favourable terms because of the enhanced liquidity of publicly
traded stocks. However, there are some direct and indirect costs that come with
these beneﬁts, which aﬀect ﬁrms’ decisions on going public. The direct costs of
issuing securities are commission fees and underwriting fees. In addition to these,
indirect costs include the dilution of shares, underpricing of oﬀer prices, and the
negative announcement eﬀect in SEOs; these indirect costs are often much larger
than the direct costs.
There are many trade-oﬀs and patterns in equity issuance, but the literature
does not have a full theory that can explain the observed pattern of public listings.
Ritter (2003) documents that ﬁrms seem to face both lifecycle considerations and
market-timing considerations in the decision of whether or when to go public. The
market-condition considerations consist of time-varying debt versus equity funding
13For other surveys on securities issuance, see Smith (1986), Eckbo and Masulis (1995), Armitage
(1998), Brau and Fawcett (2006), and Ljungqvist (2006).
14Although these constraints would ordinarily cause some limitations, reviews under such condi-
tions should still sufficiently reflect the existing academic literature.
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costs and private versus public funding costs. Academic theory suggests several
motivations for going public, which can be classiﬁed into pecking order theories,
lifecycle theories, and market-timing theories.
Firstly, the pecking order ﬁnancing theory, together with the trade-oﬀ theory,
are related to the capital structure literature. The cost of capital literature argues
that ﬁrms conduct a public oﬀering when external equity will minimise their cost
of capital, thereby maximising the value of the company.15 In the trade-oﬀ theory,
ﬁrms identify optimal leverage by weighing up the marginal costs (bankruptcy and
agency costs) and marginal beneﬁts (debt tax shields and a reduction of free cash
ﬂow problems) of issuing debt. Based on asymmetric information and stock price
misvaluation, Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984) further advocate for a
pecking order model of ﬁnancing. The costs of issuing risky securities follow the
pecking order: ﬁrms ﬁnance new investments ﬁrst with retained earnings (internal
equity), then with external debt, and ﬁnally with external equity. In short, the
pecking order model predicts how ﬁrms ﬁnance themselves and determines capital
structures.
The trade-oﬀ and pecking order theories are the main theories relating to secu-
rity issuance and capital structure. Subsequent papers focus on the pecking order
model’s predictions about security issues (e.g. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and
Fama and French (2002)) and the model’s predictions about capital structures (e.g.
Titman and Wessels (1988) and Rajan and Zingales (1995)). However, an increasing
amount of evidence suggests that the opposite of their predictions is true. The trade-
oﬀ theory predicts that an increase in a ﬁrm’s stock price, which eﬀectively lowers its
leverage ratio, should lead to debt issuance. Nevertheless, substantial ﬁndings sug-
gest that ﬁrms issue equity rather than debt when stock prices are high (e.g. Marsh
(1982), Jung, Kim, and Stulz (1996), Asquith and Mullins (1986), and Mikkelson
and Partch (1986)). The pecking order theory predicts that ﬁrms rarely issue stock,
15See, for instance, Modigliani and Miller (1963) and Scott (1976).
39
which is also rejected by empirical evidence. Fama and French (2005) argue that
ﬁnancing decisions violate the central predictions of the pecking order model, and
conclude that both the trade-oﬀ model and the pecking order model have serious
problems.
Secondly, lifecycle theories may contain corporate control considerations or strate-
gic considerations. Zingales (1995) and Mello and Parsons (2000) argue that an IPO
allows insiders (founders and shareholders) to cash out investments. Furthermore,
by going public, entrepreneurs thus help facilitate the acquisition of their company
for a higher value than what they would get from an outright sale (e.g. Zingales
(1995) and Brau, Francis, and Kohers (2003)). Black and Gilson (1998) argue that
the entrepreneurs are able to regain control from venture capitalists (VCs), and the
VCs have the opportunity to exit through IPOs. Thus, many IPOs serve to beneﬁt
entrepreneurs as well as VCs. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999) argue that, early in
its lifecycle, a ﬁrm will be private, but if it grows suﬃciently large, it becomes opti-
mal to go public, since public markets may be a cheaper source of funds. Regarding
strategic consideration, Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) document that ﬁrms may
conduct IPOs to capture a ﬁrst-mover advantage.
Thirdly, the market timing theory in equity issuance is receiving more recognition
in the literature. Many recent empirical evidences are found to support the stylised
fact that ﬁrms issue equity when their stock prices are high. Lucas and McDonald
(1990) develop an asymmetric information model that illustrates how ﬁrms postpone
their equity issues when undervalued. Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993) argue that
ﬁrms avoid issuing in periods when few other good-quality ﬁrms issue. In more
recent studies, Baker and Wurgler (2002) hypothesise that ﬁrms issue equity to
“time” the market, i.e. they issue equity when it is overvalued by irrational investors.
Such equity issue timing, or “windows of opportunity”, could allow the company to
exploit overvaluation proﬁts. Dittmar and Thakor (2007) provide an alternative view
by developing a “managerial investment autonomy” theory that predicts the same
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stylised fact, because investors have a high propensity to agree with managerial
decisions when stock price is high. Another possible explanation is the “time-varying
adverse selection”, which suggests that information asymmetry is lower when the
ﬁrm’s stock price is high.
Empirically, little research exists on the question of why ﬁrms decide to go pub-
lic. This is because researchers cannot observe how many private ﬁrms could have
gone public, although they can observe the actual ﬁrms that did make the decision.
Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998) analyse the determinants of IPOs by com-
paring the ex ante and ex post characteristics of IPOs with those of private ﬁrms.
They ﬁnd that the likelihood of an IPO increases in the ﬁrm size and the industry
market-to-book ratio. Remarkably, they also ﬁnd that IPO activity follows high in-
vestment and growth. Lerner (1994) documents that industry market-to-book ratios
have substantial eﬀects on the decision to go public rather than acquiring additional
venture capital ﬁnancing. Henderson, Jegadeesh, and Weisbach (2006) examine the
extent to which ﬁrms around the world rely on alternative sources of capital, the
locations in which they raise capital, and the factors that aﬀect these choices. They
argue that market timing considerations appear to be important in security issuance
decisions in most countries. By examining the motivations for public equity oﬀers
in an international setting, Kim and Weisbach (2008) ﬁnd evidence consistent with
the view that some equity oﬀers are made to take advantage of high valuations.
2.5.2 Initial Public Offerings (IPOs)
A Evidence and Reasons for Underpricing
The best-known pattern associated with initial public oﬀerings (IPOs) is the widely
recognised IPO underpricing, which is also known as ‘IPO initial returns’ or ‘ﬁrst-day
returns’. It reﬂects the price change measured from the oﬀering price to the market
closing price on the ﬁrst trading day. The full extent of underpricing can be realised
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by the end of the ﬁrst trading day in capital markets, without restrictions on daily
price volatility.16 As an alternative to IPO percentage initial returns, academics
also like to measure the amounts of “money left on the table”, since this part of the
money is actually accrued to investors in IPOs instead of to companies. The money
left on the table is deﬁned as the number of shares sold at an IPO, multiplied by the
diﬀerence between the ﬁrst-day closing market price and the oﬀer price.
There is a large amount of empirical literature documenting the underpricing
phenomenon, the evidence for which provides a puzzle for those who otherwise believe
in eﬃcient capital markets. In general, the literature shows that underpricing is a
persistent feature of the IPO market and may have increased in magnitude over time.
Early notable papers such as Stoll and Curley (1970), Logue (1973), Reilly (1973)
and Ibbotson (1975) document that when companies go public, the shares they oﬀer
tend to be underpriced, in that the share price jumps substantially on the ﬁrst day
of trading.17
Numerous studies have conﬁrmed the new issues underpricing anomaly by using
data from the 1970s and 1980s. Smith (1986) summarises a number of papers and
ﬁnds that the estimated underpricing exists between 11% and 52%. Ibbotson, Sin-
delar, and Ritter (1988) report that the average underpricing for 2, 259 ﬁrms in the
1980 to 1984 period is 21%. In addition to these early papers, some of the following
studies using U.S. data include Carter and Manaster (1990), James and Wier (1990),
Hanley (1993), and Michaely and Shaw (1994). Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter (1994)
and Ritter (1998) examine this IPO initial return pattern over a long period. In the
U.S. markets, the equally weighted average initial return of 13, 308 IPOs from 1960 to
1996 is about 15%. Ritter and Welch (2002) examine the period of 1980 to 2001 and
ﬁnd an average ﬁrst-day return at about 19%. Moreover, many empirical studies ﬁnd
16In general, even when using later prices, say the closing price at the end of the first trading
week, there are few differences in the underpricing results.
17As documented in Ibbotson and Ritter (1995), the literature on IPO underpricing can be traced
back to a study in 1963 by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, which finds positive
average initial returns on companies going public.
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that smaller issues and lower-priced issues are underpriced more than corresponding
larger issues and higher-priced issues. Both Chalk and Peavy (1987) and Ibbotson,
Sindelar, and Ritter (1994) capture such patterns.
Besides the long-existing IPO underpricing scenario in U.S. markets through
time, the phenomenon exists in every nation with a stock market, although the
degree of underpricing varies from country to country. Notably, Loughran, Ritter,
and Rydqvist (1994) examine the short-run performance of companies going public
in twenty-ﬁve countries.18 For instance, various studies include Ritter (1987) and
Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter (1994) for the U.S., Levis (1993) for the U.K., Finn
and Higham (1988) for Australia, McGuinness (1992) for Hong Kong, Jog and Rid-
ing (1987) for Canada, Kim, Krinsky, and Lee (1993) for Korea, and McDonald and
Jacquillat (1974) for France. A review of studies on underpricing throughout diﬀerent
countries suggests that the average initial return varies substantially from country
to country. These diﬀerences in underpricing may be caused by the diﬀerences in
selling mechanisms and institutional constraints.
In short, empirical studies of IPO initial returns ﬁnd that (1) underpricing is
a persistent feature of the IPO market; (2) the magnitude of underpricing changes
through time; and (3) underpricing exists in every nation with a stock market, and
the degree varies. Ritter and Welch (2002) document that the IPOs of operating
companies are underpriced, on average, in all countries, and the oﬀerings of non-
operating companies such as closed-end funds are generally not underpriced. Based
on the remarkable and consistent empirical evidence, substantial eﬀort has been
devoted to oﬀering possible theoretical explanations for underpricing. Early studies
such as Ibbotson (1975) oﬀer a list of possible explanations for underpricing, many
of which are formally explored by other authors in later work.
Theories of underpricing can be categorised on the basis of whether asymmetric
18Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist update Table 1 of Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist (1994) in
2008 and increase the coverage to forty-five countries. The latest table is available on Jay Ritter’s
website (http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.html).
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information or symmetric information is assumed.19 Among most theories, the best
established are the asymmetric information models. Diﬀerent theories give diﬀerent
weights to the three participants in the IPO process: issuers (issuing ﬁrms), under-
writers (investment bankers) and investors. Table 2.1 summarises the theoretical
studies of IPO underpricing explanations and subsequent empirical examinations for
diﬀerent theories. I classify theories on the basis of whether asymmetric information
or symmetric information assumption is used. Theories based on asymmetric infor-
mation can be further classiﬁed into four types: (1) Winner’s curse theory (informed
investors versus uninformed investors); (2) Information revelation theory (underwrit-
ers obtain information from informed investors); (3) Principal-agent theory (issuers
are less informed than underwriters); and (4) Signalling theory (issuers are more
informed than investors).
Rock’s (1986) winner’s curse theory assumes that some investors are better in-
formed about the true value of the shares than investors in general. Under this
assumption, uninformed investors receive a full allocation of overpriced IPOs but
only a partial allocation of underpriced IPOs, which means that they are facing a
winner’s curse situation. Thus, the uninformed investors will only submit purchase
orders if IPOs are underpriced suﬃciently enough to compensate for the adverse selec-
tion problem. Some studies have attempted to test the winner’s curse model, where
evidence is consistent with the existence of a winner’s curse (e.g. Koh and Walter
(1989) and Keloharju (1993)). In Rock (1986), underpricing exists due to asymmet-
ric information between informed and uninformed investors. Actually, asymmetric
information between the issuers and potential investors, or between the underwriter
and the issuer, can also lead to IPO underpricing. Benveniste and Spindt (1989),
Benveniste and Spindt (1989), and Spatt and Srivastava (1991) argue that “book-
building” allows underwriters to obtain information from informed investors. To
19This is a more general classification, which is applied in Ritter and Welch (2002). Ljungqvist
(2006) categorises theories of underpricing into four broad headings: asymmetric information mod-
els, institutional explanation, ownership and control, and behavioural explanation.
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Table 2.1: Summary of IPO Underpricing Theories
This table presents the summary of studies on the explanations for IPO underpricing. The theories of underpricing is categorized on the basis of whether
asymmetric information (in Panel A) or symmetric information (in Panel B) is assumed. The first column lists the names of IPO underpricing theories.
The second and the fourth column list theoretical and empirical studies, respectively.
Theory Study Assumptions & Implications Empirical Evidence
Panel A: Theories based on Asymmetric Information
Winner’s Curse Rock (1986) Some investors are better informed. Unin-
formed investors must be compensated by
underpricing.
Beatty and Ritter (1986), Koh and Walter
(1989), Keloharju (1993), Lee, Taylor, and
Walter (1999)
Information Revelation Benveniste and Spindt (1989),
Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990),
Spatt and Srivastava (1991)
Underpricing awards informed investors for
passing valuation information to under-
writers.
Hanley (1993), Cornelli and Goldreich
(2001, 2003), Jenkinson and Jones (2004)
Principal-Agent Baron and Holmström (1980),
Baron (1982), Loughran and
Ritter (2004)
Issuers are less informed than underwrit-
ers. It is optimal for the issuer to permit
some underpricing.
Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989),
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003)
Signaling Theories Allen and Faulhaber (1989),
Grinblatt and Hwang (1989),
Welch (1989)
Issuer is more informed than investors.
High-quality issuers attempt to signal their
quality with underpricing.
Garfinkel (1993), Jegadeesh, Weinstein,
and Welch (1993), Michaely and Shaw
(1994), Slovin, Sushka, and Bendeck
(1994), Spiess and Pettway (1997)
Panel B: Theories based on Symmetric Information
Legal Liability Tinic (1988), Hughes and
Thakor (1992), Hensler (1995)
Issuers use underpricing to reduce possible
future litigation from investors.
Drake and Vetsuypens (1993), Lowry and
Shu (2002)
Prospect Theories Loughran and Ritter (2002) Issuers permit underpricing because they
gain larger wealth raised in IPOs.
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2005)
Price Stabilization Ruud (1993) Practice of stabilization by underwriters
results in underpricing.
Miller and Reilly (1987), Asquith, Jones,
and Kieschnick (1998)
Information Cascades Welch (1992) Underpricing induces the first few investors
to buy and cause a cascade.
Amihud, Hauser, and Kirsh (2003)
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induce truth-telling from investors, underwriters must oﬀer them a combination of
more IPO allocations and underpricing. Baron and Holmström (1980) and Baron
(1982) suggest a theory with a less informed issuer, but relative to its underwriter,
not relative to investors. The issuer may ﬁnd it optimal to permit some underpricing
to induce the underwriter to put in the requisite eﬀort for market shares.20 The
ﬁnal group of asymmetric information models assumes that issuing ﬁrms possess pri-
vate information about whether they have high or low values (see, e.g., Allen and
Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), and Welch (1989)). If issuers have
better information than investors do, underpricing may be used to signal the issuers’
high-quality.21
There are also a number of theories of underpricing that do not rely on an asym-
metric information assumption. Tinic (1988) and Hughes and Thakor (1992) suggest
a legal liability theory whereby underpricing may act in the same way as insurance
against possible future litigation from investors. Loughran and Ritter (2002) propose
a prospect theory for IPO underpricing inasmuch that issuers are satisﬁed with the
amount of money they can raise in IPOs and are not signiﬁcantly concerned with
underpricing. Ruud (1993) argues that the practice of stabilisation by underwriters
causes IPO underpricing. The information cascades model is developed in Welch
(1992). To prevent investors from not buying, even when in possession of favourable
information, issuers may want to underprice and induce cascades in which subsequent
investors want to buy, irrespective of their own information. Besides the presented
IPO underpricing theories in Table 2.1, some other potential reasons include mar-
keting function (Habib and Ljungqvist (2001)), aftermarket support (Schultz and
Zaman (1994)), and ownership considerations.22
20Empirical evidence in Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989) does not quite support this theory.
21See Jegadeesh, Weinstein, and Welch (1993) and Michaely and Shaw (1994) for empirical
findings.
22Readers interested in the underpricing issue should refer to Ljungqvist (2006) for a thorough
and up-to-date review on IPO underpricing.
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B Fluctuations in Volume and Underpricing
The second anomaly is the ﬂuctuations of IPO volume and underpricing. Periods
of high average initial returns are known as “hot issue” markets, which have been
recognised for a long time in the ﬁnancial community.23 Ibbotson and Jaﬀe (1975)
and many subsequent studies such as Ritter (1984) and Ibbotson, Sindelar, and
Ritter (1988, 1994) identify substantial ﬂuctuations in IPO volume, and document
signiﬁcant autocorrelation for both the monthly number of IPOs and monthly average
ﬁrst-day returns. For example, Ritter (1984) show that the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation
coeﬃcient for the time series of monthly average initial returns is 0.62, and is 0.88
for the time series of monthly volume. Loughran and Ritter (2002) report that every
month between March 1991 and August 1998 (November 1998 to March 2000) had
an average initial return of below (above) 30%. Moreover, both the number of IPOs
and the total of proceeds raised varied substantially over time.24 Helwege and Liang
(2004) note that “hot IPO markets have been described as having an unusually high
volume of oﬀerings, severe underpricing, frequent over-subscription of oﬀerings, and
(at times) concentrations in particular industries . . . ”.
Puzzling cycles in monthly IPO volume and average initial returns create in-
teresting questions for researchers: Why has IPO underpricing changed over time?
Why does IPO volume ﬂuctuate so much? Rational explanations for the existence
of hot issue markets are diﬃcult to come by. Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter (1994)
survey three explanations for hot issue markets: (1) changes in ﬁrm risk; (2) positive
feedback or momentum strategies; and (3) windows of opportunity. Ritter (1984) hy-
pothesises that “changing risk composition” might account for the dramatic swings
in average initial returns. If there are some periods during which it is riskier for
ﬁrms to go public, the periods with the riskier ﬁrms will have higher average initial
23The best-known investigations of these issues are the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) Report on the Special Study of Security Markets (28) and the SEC “hot issue” hearings of
1972.
24See Lowry (2003) for detailed analysis.
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returns. Loughran and Ritter (2004) empirically examine the changing risk compo-
sition explanation and ﬁnd that only a small part of the increase in underpricing can
be attributed to the changing risk composition of ﬁrms going public.
While the phenomenon of IPO volume ﬂuctuations has been recognised for a long
time, the understanding of these ﬂuctuations is limited. Many researchers attribute
time variation in IPO volume to market ineﬃciency, by arguing that IPO volume is
high because ﬁrms time the opportunities for issuances when shares are “overvalued”
(see, e.g., Ritter (1991), Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist (1994), Loughran and Ritter
(1995), and Baker and Wurgler (2000)). Notably, Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales
(1998) systematically test the relative power of several potential determinants of
IPO volume. They argue that companies time their IPOs to take advantage of
industry-wide overvaluations. To address why IPO volume ﬂuctuates so much, Lowry
(2003) compares the extent to which the aggregate capital demands of private ﬁrms,
the adverse-selection costs of issuing equity, and the level of investor optimism can
explain IPO volume ﬂuctuations. She concludes that ﬁrms’ demands for capital and
investor sentiment are the primary determinants of changes in IPO volume over time.
Pástor and Veronesi (2005) argue that the number of ﬁrms going public changes over
time in response to time variations in market conditions, which means that IPO
volume is more closely related to recent changes in stock prices than to the level of
stock prices.
C IPOs Long-run Underperformance
The third pattern associated with IPOs is their poor post-issue stock price perfor-
mance in the long horizon, which has attracted the most interest from academics
in recent years. Using a sample of 1, 526 IPOs that went public in the U.S. in the
1975–1984 period, Ritter (1991) ﬁnds that, in the three years after going public,
these ﬁrms signiﬁcantly underperform against a set of comparable ﬁrms matched by
size and industry. The average cumulative matching ﬁrm-adjusted return after 36
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months of oﬀering for the whole sample is −29.13%. Ritter (1991) also documents
that long-run underperformance is concentrated among ﬁrms that went public in the
high-volume years, particularly among relatively young ﬁrms. The work of Ritter
(1991) is a milestone academic study on testing the long-term performance of IPOs.
Before this particular work, only Stoll and Curley (1970) and Ibbotson (1975) re-
ported evidence that abnormal returns on IPOs may be negative at some point after
going public.
Many of the following papers further support the empirical evidence of IPO long-
run underperformance after issues. Loughran (1993) analyses the post-issue long-run
performance of 3, 656 ﬁrms on the Nasdaq from 1967–1987. He reports that the lower
returns on Nasdaq ﬁrms are primarily a manifestation of the poor performance of
IPOs, and the underperformance of Nasdaq-listed IPOs continues for approximately
six calendar years after issues. Loughran and Ritter (1995) examine the long-run
performance of 4, 753 operating ﬁrms going public in the U.S. from 1970 to 1990,
which are subsequently listed on either the Nasdaq, NYSE, or Amex. They ﬁnd that
ﬁrms after IPO signiﬁcantly underperform relative to non-issuing ﬁrms up to ﬁve
years after the oﬀering date. In particular, the average annual return during the ﬁve
years after issuing is only 5% per year for ﬁrms conducting IPO. A control group
of non-issuing ﬁrms, matched by ﬁrm size, produce larger average annual returns
of 12%. Moreover, Loughran and Ritter (1995) document that ﬁrms issuing during
years with little issuing activity do not underperform, whereas ﬁrms oﬀering stock
during high-volume periods severely underperform.
Besides U.S. markets, evidence on the long-run performance of IPOs has been
found in other international markets. Levis (1993) reports that 721 IPOs in the
U.K. (London Stock Exchange) between 1980 and 1988 had average ﬁrst day re-
turns of 14.3% and underperformed against a number of relevant benchmarks in the
36 months of public listing. For countries in Latin American markets, Aggarwal,
Leal, and Hernandez (1993) report that Brazilian, Chilean, and Mexican IPOs suﬀer
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long-run underperformance; the long-run average market-adjusted return is −47.0%
and −23.7% for Brazil and Chile, respectively.25 Keloharju (1993) documents that
seventy-nine Finnish IPOs also underperformed during the 36 months after-issue pe-
riod. Cai and Wei (1997) provide long-run underperformance evidence of 180 IPOs
listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange in Japan during the period 1971–1992. Chan,
Wang, and Wei (2004) study the long-run performance of A- and B-share IPOs is-
sued in China during the 1993–1998 period, and report that A shares only moderately
underperform against their benchmarks as compared with IPOs in the U.S., while
B-share IPOs signiﬁcantly outperform their benchmarks.
Although substantial evidences concerning IPO long-run underperformance have
been found around the world, intense debates rage regarding the proper measurement
technique for a long-term event study, which question the validity of IPO long-run
underperformance. Brav and Gompers (1997) show that ﬁrms that go public do
not perform worse than benchmarks matched on size and book-to-market ratios.
In addition, they argue that value weighting IPO returns dramatically reduces the
measured underperformance, as a large fraction of IPOs fall in the extreme small
growth ﬁrm category. Thus, Brav and Gompers (1997) argue that equally-weighted
return methods may overstate the underperformance of IPOs. Schultz (2003) sug-
gests a pseudo market timing explanation for IPO underperformance and argues
that if more ﬁrms go public at peak valuations, event-time analyses may indicate
that IPOs underperform, even though the ex ante expectation of these oﬀerings has
a zero return. Gompers and Lerner (2003) extend current evidences by examining
the performance of IPO ﬁrms in the U.S. from 1935 to 1972. They argue that the
performance of IPOs in a pre-Nasdaq period depends upon the method of return
measurement applied.
To explain the long-run underperformance of IPOs, some studies intend to ﬁnd
explanations from cross-sectional ﬁrm characteristics. Brav and Gompers (1997)
25The reliability of these results should be questioned due to the small sample sizes.
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investigate the long-run performance of IPO ﬁrms in a sample of 934 venture-backed
IPOs from 1972–1992 and 3, 407 non-venture-backed IPOs from 1975–1992. They
ﬁnd that venture-backed IPOs outperform non-venture-backed IPOs using an equally
weighted return. Brav and Gompers (1997) further argue that underperformance is a
characteristic of small, low book-to-market ﬁrms, regardless of whether they are IPO
ﬁrms or not. Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) examine whether discretionary accruals
predict the cross-sectional variation in post-IPO long-run underperformance. They
ﬁnd that issuers with higher discretionary accruals have poorer stock performance
in the subsequent three years. Brav, Geczy, and Gompers (2000) examine whether
a distinct equity issuer underperformance exists with 4, 622 IPOs for the period of
1975–1992. Their evidence suggests that the “anomaly” stock returns following equity
issues reﬂect a more pervasive return pattern in the broader set of publicly-traded
companies.
Some studies ﬁnd that this anomaly pattern for IPO ﬁrms in the long-term is
not limited to ﬁrms going public. Both Weiss (1989) and Peavy (1990) ﬁnd negative
long-run adjusted returns for ﬁrms after issuing closed-end funds. Wang, Chan, and
Gau (1992) investigate the price performance of the IPOs of Real Estate Investment
Trusts (REITs). They ﬁnd a −8.9% CARs during about nine months post-issue.
Hertzel, Lemmon, Linck, and Rees (2002) document that publicly listed ﬁrms that
privately place equity experience positive announcement eﬀects and signiﬁcantly un-
derperform relative to several benchmarks over the three-year period following the
oﬀering. Other than testing the long-run stock performance after IPOs, Jain and
Kini (1994) investigate the change in operating performance of ﬁrms after IPOs, and
ﬁnd a signiﬁcant decline in operating performance after oﬀerings.
In general, the evidence for IPO long-run underperformance is widely documented
and consistent. Substantial evidence has been found through time for markets in
the U.S. and many other countries. Whether long-run underpricing is a unique
phenomenon of ﬁrms going public or a more generalised pattern of stock markets due
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to stock characteristics, no consensus has been made in academic works. Moreover,
the degree of underperformance is certainly related to the approaches of empirical
measurement and the sample period of data.
2.5.3 Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs)
A Negative Announcement Effects
Beginning with Smith (1977), numerous empirical studies have documented that in
the U.S. there is a negative announcement for SEOs. This result is consistent with
announcement eﬀects for other corporate ﬁnancing activities.26 Taking an average of
papers written in the mid-1980s, Smith (1986) ﬁnds that the two-day average abnor-
mal return (AAR) is −3.14% for industrial companies and −0.75% for utilities. A
more recent review by Eckbo and Masulis (1995) shows very similar results inasmuch
that the announcement eﬀects for security oﬀerings, especially for common stock, are
negative. Table 2.2 summarises the main ﬁndings of the literature on security public
oﬀering in the U.S. (NYSE/AMEX).27 A review of the studies suggests that most
of the SEOs in the U.S. proceed via the ﬂotation method of ﬁrm commitment un-
derwritten, especially for securities other than common stock. Panel A (Panel B)
of Table 2.2 shows major studies that have examined the announcement eﬀects of
common stock oﬀerings (straight or convertible bond issuing). Most studies apply a
two-day excess return calculation to capture the eﬀect of an announcement.28
Asquith and Mullins (1986) and Masulis and Korwar (1986), being among the
ﬁrst main papers, have documented the negative announcement eﬀects for equity
26In general, as firstly documented in Smith (1986), evidence in the literature suggests that
corporate actions that use cash have positive announcement effects, and corporate actions that
raise cash have negative announcement effects.
27This table is analogous to Table 11 in Eckbo and Masulis (1995), but with more emphasis on
papers on common stock offerings.
28In most cases, the news of security offerings is announced on the day previous (t
−1) to the
announcement date (t0) and reported the next day. Thus, there is a two-day announcement period,
t
−1 and t0.
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Table 2.2: Summary of Security Public Offering Announcement Effects
This table presents main findings on the announcement effects of security public offering in the U.S. (NYSE, AMEX), classified by type of security
issued (common stock, straight or convertible preferred stock or bond), and by type of issuer (industrial firm, public utility). Panel A reports studies
on common stock offering only. Panel B report studies on other type of security offering, where method of issues is firm commitment underwritten
only. Announcement effect is calculated as two-day (the announcement day and the day prior) abnormal returns to announcements of offerings, which
is shown in percentage.
Industrial Firm Public Utility
Sample Method of Issues / Announcement Sample Announcement Sample
Study Period Type of Security Effect Size Effect Size
Panel A: Common Stock Offering
Kolodny and Suhler (1985) 1973-1981 Underwritten −2.38 (137) n.a.
Pettway and Radcliffe (1985) 1973-1980 Mixed n.a. −0.51 (366)
Asquith and Mullins (1986) 1963-1981 Underwritten −3.00 (128) −0.90 (264)
Hess and Bhagat (1986)a 1963-1978 Underwritten −4.28 (95) −1.00 (201)
Masulis and Korwar (1986)a 1963-1980 Underwritten −3.25 (388) −0.68 (584)
Mikkelson and Partch (1986) 1972-1982 Underwritten −3.56 (80) n.a.
Hansen (1988) 1963-1985 Standby Rights −2.61 (22) −1.21 (80)
Hansen and Crutchley (1990) 1975-1982 Underwritten −3.65 (109) n.a.
Eckbo and Masulis (1992) 1963-1981 Underwritten −3.34 (389) −0.80 (646)
Eckbo and Masulis (1992) 1963-1981 Standby Rights −1.03 (41) −0.53 (87)
Eckbo and Masulis (1992) 1963-1981 Rights −1.39 (26) 0.23 (27)
Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993) 1963-1983 Underwritten −2.42 (669) −0.52 (787)
Panel B: Other Type of Security
Dann and Mikkelson (1984) 1970-1979 Convertible Debt −2.31 (132) n.a.
Straight Debt −0.37 (150) n.a.
Eckbo (1986) 1964-1981 Convertible Debt −1.90 (53) −0.13 (140)
Straight Debt −0.12 (310) n.a.
Mikkelson and Partch (1986) 1972-1982 Preferred Stock −0.26 (14) n.a.
Convertible Debt −1.97 (33) n.a.
Straight Debt −0.23 (171) n.a.
Linn and Pinegar (1988) 1962-1984 Preferred Stock −1.30 (14) 0.18 (201)
Convertible Debt −2.02 (42) −1.39 (8)
Hansen and Crutchley (1990) 1975-1982 Convertible Debt −1.45 (67) n.a.
Straight Debt 0.11 (188) n.a.
a Announcement effect is calculation use the announcement date and the day after.
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public oﬀerings.29 Asquith and Mullins (1986) ﬁnd −3.00% and −0.90% abnormal
returns for industrial ﬁrms and utility ﬁrms, respectively. Similarly, Masulis and Kor-
war (1986) also ﬁnd negative announcement eﬀects for industrial ﬁrms (−3.25%) and
smaller returns for utilities (−0.68%). The negative announcement eﬀects of com-
mon stock issues via ﬁrm commitment underwritten is further conﬁrmed in Hess and
Bhagat (1986), Eckbo and Masulis (1992) and Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993).
Through diﬀerent method, Oﬃcer and Smith (1986) and Mikkelson and Partch
(1988) support the negative announcement eﬀect by reporting that common stock
oﬀer cancellations are associated with a signiﬁcantly positive announcement eﬀect
of slightly smaller magnitude than the negative eﬀect for an equity issue announce-
ment. While the negative price impact of SEO announcements for U.S. markets is
widely documented, the results for debt issues are inconsistent. There are no sig-
niﬁcant negative price impacts from straight debt issue announcements.30 However,
some previous papers found that public oﬀers of convertible debt are associated with
signiﬁcantly negative announcement eﬀects.
Why is there a negative announcement eﬀect for seasoned equity oﬀerings? The
leading explanation among academics is Myers and Majluf’s (1984) adverse selection
model.31 Myers and Majluf (1984) assumes that companies know more about them-
selves than the market, and managers want to maximise the wealth of their existing
shareholders. At any point in time, due to information asymmetry, the current mar-
ket price may be too high or too low relative to managers’ private information about
the value of assets in place.32 Rational investors will interpret an equity oﬀering an-
nouncement as conveying a manager’s opinion that the stock is overvalued, and the
29Some early studies such as Smith (1977), Marsh (1979), and Hess and Frost (1982) generally
find a small price reduction in the period surrounding the equity issues.
30See, for example, Eckbo (1986), Mikkelson and Partch (1986), and Hansen and Crutchley
(1990).
31Krasker (1986) generalises Myers and Majluf’s model and reach similar predictions.
32If managers believe that the current market price is undervalued, the firm will not issue un-
dervalued stock. In such a case, the existing shareholders lose out because some of the future gain
from being undervalued is shared by new investors. On the other hand, if managers think that the
current stock price is overvalued, the firm will issue equity if debt financing is not available.
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announcement eﬀect is negative. Empirical evidence in SEO announcement eﬀects
is largely consistent with the adverse selection theory. Security public oﬀerings have
non-positive announcement eﬀects, regardless of the type of security and average 3%
negative eﬀects for equity issues. The average market reaction to common stock is-
sues is more negative for larger sized issues. Moreover, the market reaction to SEOs
is less negative for uninsured rights than for rights with standby underwriting (see
Eckbo and Masulis (1992)) and less negative for public utility issues (see Eckbo and
Masulis (1995)).
When a ﬁrm raises external equity capital, it not only suggests that management
might have private information about the “true” value of the ﬁrm, but also that
something will be done with the funds raised. If the market interprets the issue
announcement as implying that a new positive new present value project will be
undertaken, the announcement eﬀect could be positive. Cooney and Kalay (1993)
reﬁnes Myers and Majluf’s model by (realistically) allowing for the possibility that
the project can have either a positive or a negative net present value (NPV). This
result is consistent with some empirical studies that have found an overall positive
announcement return for private equity issues (e.g. Wruck (1989) and Hertzel and
Smith (1993)). An alternative asymmetric information model is proposed by Miller
and Rock (1985), who argue that an unexpected security issue implies that future
cash ﬂows are less than expected. From this point of view, the security oﬀer an-
nouncement decreases the issuer’s market price, regardless of the direction of the
implied leverage change.
In summary, three patterns align with SEO announcement eﬀects. First, the
announcement eﬀect for a common stock oﬀering is signiﬁcantly negative and larger
than those for other types of security oﬀering. Second, industrial ﬁrms have a
stronger negative announcement eﬀect than public utilities. Third, debt issues cause
an insigniﬁcant market reaction unless there are increases in the potential amount of
outstanding common stock. Overall, and similar to the ﬁndings in Eckbo and Ma-
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sulis (1995), the market reaction to public oﬀers is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero,
but only when the ﬁnancing decision increases the potential amount of outstanding
common stock.
B SEO Discounting and Explanations
While IPO underpricing has attracted extensive attention in the literature, SEO
discounting has attracted far less. Smith (1977), to my knowledge, was the ﬁrst to
document signiﬁcant discounting for SEOs. Smith (1977) reports average close-to-
oﬀer returns (oﬀer-to-close returns) of −0.54% (0.82%) from a sample of 328 ﬁrm-
commitment oﬀers over the years 1971 to 1975. The concepts of SEO discounting
and SEO underpricing are very similar; many studies even use both terms inter-
changeably. Similar to IPOs, an SEO is applied to measure the discounting of the
oﬀer price to the market price in equity oﬀers. However, in the case of SEOs, there is
already a market price before issues. To clarify the diﬀerences between the two def-
initions, an SEO discount is calculated as the return from the closing price of stock
the day prior to the oﬀer date to the oﬀer price (close-to-oﬀer). SEO underpricing
is measured as the return from the oﬀer price to the closing price on the oﬀer date
(oﬀer-to-close).
In general, the discounting of oﬀer prices in ﬁrm underwritten SEOs is econom-
ically large and common, remaining stable at around 3.0% throughout the 1990s
(see Altınkılıç and Hansen (2003)). Subsequent studies further support the ﬁndings
in Smith (1977), many of which examine SEO announcement eﬀects. Bhagat and
Frost (1986) examine issues by public utilities and report a signiﬁcant discounting of
−0.25% for negotiated underwritten issues and −0.65% for competitive underwrit-
ten issues. Eckbo and Masulis (1992) report mean discounting of 0.44% for issues
by industrial ﬁrms and oﬀer price premium of 0.31% for oﬀers by public utilities.
Eckbo and Masulis (1992) also ﬁnd premiums in SEO underpricing for both indus-
trial (0.11) and utility (0.06) issues, which means the closing price on the oﬀer day
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is lower than the oﬀer price. Loderer, Sheehan, and Kadlec (1991) compare 1, 600
SEO pricing across markets. In their sample, they report statistically signiﬁcant dis-
counting of 1.41% and underpricing of 0.35%. Moreover, classiﬁed by markets, they
report statistically signiﬁcant discounting of −.2.96% and underpricing of −1.62%
for issuers listed on Nasdaq, but no apparent underpricing for NYSE-listed issuers.
They conclude that existing IPO underpricing models cannot be easily adopted to
explain the observed diﬀerences in SEO pricing across exchanges and industries.
Three more recent studies examine the pricing of SEOs in the 1990s. Altınkılıç
and Hansen (2003) partition discounting into its expected and unexpected compo-
nents and examine the relation between these components and stock returns. They
ﬁnd that discounting is higher for issuers with lower stock prices and for those with
greater stock return volatility, and discounting is less for banks with better reputa-
tions. Similar to Loderer, Sheehan, and Kadlec (1991), they also ﬁnd that equity
oﬀers by Nasdaq ﬁrms experience larger discounting than NYSE/Amex ﬁrms. Mola
and Loughran (2004) ﬁnd that the average oﬀering of new equity has a 3% dis-
counting and the discount has risen steadily over time. They also ﬁnd evidence of
the increased clustering of oﬀer prices at integers and conclude that clustering is
a signiﬁcant determinant of SEO discounting. Notably, Corwin (2003) provides a
comprehensive analysis of the determinants of seasoned oﬀer pricing. Using a large
sample of SEOs from 1980 through to 1998, Corwin (2003) examines the relative im-
portance of various hypotheses in explaining the cross-section of SEO discounting.
Corwin ﬁnds that discounting is positively related to oﬀer size, price uncertainty,
and underwriter pricing conventions.
C SEOs Long-run Underperformance
Similar to IPOs, ﬁrms conducting SEOs typically suﬀer a long-run underperformance
of equity for up to ﬁve years. Many studies ﬁnd that the negative post-issue per-
formance of SEOs is related with high positive returns in the years before issuing.
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Loughran and Ritter (1995) show that the average annual return for 3, 702 SEOs
during 1970 to 1990 is only 7% ﬁve years after the issues, while the return for a
matching portfolio is 15.3%. They also report that in the year prior to the oﬀerings,
the average issuer experiences a return of 72%. Loughran and Ritter (1995) thus
conclude that ﬁrms conducting SEOs underperform as severely as IPO ﬁrms, and
ﬁrms take advantage of windows of opportunity by issuing equity when they are
substantially overvalued. A concurrent paper by Spiess and Aﬄeck-Graves (1995)
examines the long-run stock returns following SEOs with a sample of 1, 247 issues
during the period 1975–1989. They argue that SEO ﬁrms substantially underperform
in a sample of industry- and size-matched ﬁrms. A three (ﬁve)-year buy-and-hold
investment strategy in SEO ﬁrms at the closing pricing of the issuing day would
leave the investor with only 85.4 (78.6) cents relative to each dollar from investment
in matched ﬁrms. Similar to evidence in IPOs, Spiess and Aﬄeck-Graves (1999)
also argue that SEO underperformance is signiﬁcantly more severe for the smallest,
youngest, and Nasdaq-listed ﬁrms, and those with the lowest book-to-market ratio.
International evidence on SEO long-run performance, although limited, is consis-
tent with that relating to the U.S. market. Evidence in the U.K. is documented by
Levis (1995), who argues that SEO ﬁrms are preceded by positive average abnormal
returns in the 12 months before the announcement, and followed by statistically sig-
niﬁcant negative performance in the 18 months after the announcement. Caia and
Loughran (1998) investigate the long-run stock and operating performance of 1, 389
SEOs listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) in Japan during 1971 and 1992.
They ﬁnd that an equally weighted portfolio of SEO ﬁrms generates a three-year buy-
and-hold return of 34% compared to 52% from ﬁrm size-matched portfolio. Jeanneret
(2005) examines the long-run stock performance of French SEOs, separating SEO
samples with the intended use of the proceeds into “ﬁnancing new investment” issuers
and “capital structure” issuers, and ﬁnds abnormal underperformance only for SEO
ﬁrms that intend to ﬁnance investment with raised funds.
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Although the underperformance of SEO ﬁrms in the long-run are widely and
consistently documented, the conclusions regarding abnormal underperformance are
hotly debated and sensitive to the methodology applied. Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli
(2000), with a sample exceeding seven thousand seasoned equity and debt oﬀerings
from 1964–1995, argue that the failure of the matched-ﬁrm technique rather than
market under-reaction to SEO announcements creates a pattern of long-run under-
performance for SEO ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, the issuer’s underperformance reﬂects lower
systematic risk exposure for issuing ﬁrms relative to matched ﬁrms. Brav, Geczy, and
Gompers (2000) examine whether a distinct seasoned equity issuer underperformance
exists with 4, 526 SEOs from 1975–1992. They document that long-run underperfor-
mance is concentrated primarily in small ﬁrms with low book-to-market values, and
is a replication of a common stock return pattern in the market. Jegadeesh (2000)
ﬁnds supporting evidence for the long-run underperformance of SEOs and argues
that the results are sensitive to the construction of benchmarks and measurement
approaches.
Besides the seasoned oﬀering of common stocks, the issuing of other securities
has been examined in many studies. Lee and Loughran (1998), using a sample of 986
convertible bond issuers from U.S operating ﬁrms during 1975 and 1990, ﬁnd poor
stock and operating long-run performance. Spiess and Aﬄeck-Graves (1999) examine
the long-run post-issue underperformance of ﬁrms making straight and convertible
debt oﬀerings from 1975 to 1989. Similar to many IPO ﬁndings, they determine
that long-run underperformance is more severe for smaller, younger and Nasdaq-
listed ﬁrms, and that it is highly related to the volume of aggregate issues. Foerster
and Karolyi (2000) investigate the long-run performance of non-U.S. ﬁrms that raise
equity capital in U.S. markets through American Depositary Receipts (ADRs). They
ﬁnd that the sample of 333 global equity oﬀerings underperform against benchmarks
by 8 to 15 per cent over the three-year post-issue period.
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2.6 Asset Sales and Corporate Divestitures
There is a large and active market for corporate assets, from individual plants and
divisions up to sales of entire corporations (liquidation). As reported in Maksimovic
and Phillips (2001), each year over the period 1974 to 1992, an average 3.89 percent of
the large manufacturing plants in the U.S. changed ownership. In expansion years,
an average of 6.19 percent of manufacturing plants are involved in mergers and
acquisitions and asset sales every year. While much of the research in the literature
has been devoted to investigating mergers and acquisitions (M&A), far less is known
about partial-ﬁrm asset sales.33 By the early 1980s, although substantial evidence
had been found in M&A, no such abundance of research exists on corporate asset
divestitures. Early studies between 1983 to 1987 examined the valuation eﬀects
of asset sales announcements. The following studies are devoted to exploring the
motivations behind asset sales and determinations for the diﬀerent performances of
divesting ﬁrms.
2.6.1 Definition of Asset Sales
Asset sales (also known as corporate divestitures) represent the sale of a segment of a
company to a third party. Operating assets, productive asset portfolios, subsidiaries,
or divisions are sold for cash, securities, or some combination thereof. Corporate di-
vestitures are very closely related to mergers and acquisitions (M&A). In practice,
corporate divestitures accounted for about 40% of acquisition activities in the 1980s.
Divestitures in the 1990s ran at about 35% of the dollar value of acquisition transac-
tions (See Weston, Mitchell, and Mulherin (2003), p347). In the research literature,
corporate divestitures can be considered as ﬁnancing solutions for liquidity or future
acquisition, and viewed as partial mergers (See Jain (1985)).
33See Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Agrawal and Jaffe (2000) for comprehensive surveys on
corporate takeovers.
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Corporate divestitures can be categorised as either sell-offs or spin-offs. Early
research, such as that undertaken by Alexander, Benson, and Kampmeyer (1984) and
Miles and Rosenfeld (1983), used this kind of classiﬁcation.34 Sell-oﬀs are deﬁned
as the selling of some of the assets of a parent ﬁrm, such as a subsidiary, division,
or product line, while the ﬁrm continues to exist in essentially the same form as
that prior to the sell-oﬀ. The divested assets are purchased and become part of
another ﬁrm. Payment is generally in the form of cash and securities. In Hite,
Owers, and Rogers (1987), similarly, a sell-oﬀ is deﬁned as the sale of a subsidiary,
division, or other operating asset to a buyer for cash, securities, and/or other future
consideration. The seller acquires liquid assets that may be used to buy operating
assets, retire debt or stock, or pay dividends. Spin-oﬀs, in comparison, are often
associated with controlled subsidiaries, and occur when a company distributes all of
the common shares it owns in a controlled subsidiary to its existing shareholders.
In spin-oﬀs, no money changes hands, and the subsidiary’s assets are not revalued.
Moreover, corporate divestitures (whether sell-oﬀs or spin-oﬀs) may occur voluntarily
or involuntarily.35 Based on the above descriptions, corporate divestitures can be
classiﬁed as one of the following four types: voluntary sell-oﬀs, voluntary spin-oﬀs,
involuntary sell-oﬀs, and involuntary spin-oﬀs.
In this research, asset sales (or corporate divestitures) precisely means voluntary
corporate sell-offs. The main focus is the ﬁnancing aspect of asset sales when ﬁrms
are facing liquidity problems. Voluntary sell-oﬀs generate liquid assets (cash or liquid
assets) in the transactions of asset sales for sellers. Moreover, they can be viewed
as positive actions taken by companies to tackle liquidity problems. However, in
spin-oﬀs, there are no buyers and no cash ﬂow implications per se. In involuntary
34The following definitions of sell-offs and spin-offs mainly follow the descriptions in Alexander,
Benson, and Kampmeyer (1984) and Miles and Rosenfeld (1983).
35Voluntary divestitures can be viewed as the result of decisions made willingly by management
for the benefit of the stockholders of the parent firm. Involuntary divestitures are typically due
to a governmental anti-trust ruling issued by either the Federal Trade Commission or the U.S.
Department of Justice in connection with a violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
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divestitures, the activities are more likely due to the anti-trust behaviours of ﬁrms
and are passivity forced by governments. In this case, voluntary sell-oﬀs are closer
to the deﬁnition for asset sales. Actually, many studies do not specially diﬀerentiate
between asset sales, corporate divestitures, and corporate sell-oﬀs. Therefore, for
convenience, I use expressions like ‘asset sales’, ‘divestitures’, and ‘sell-oﬀs’ inter-
changeably.
2.6.2 Valuation Effects of Divestiture Announcements
Substantial research was undertaken in the 1980s on asset sales, takeovers, and other
corporate activities. Most research, in that time, expanded our understanding about
the association of these corporate decisions with the welfare of the stockholders in-
volved in these transactions. In particular, for asset sales, many studies investigated
the eﬀect on shareholder wealth of the announcement by management of an invest-
ment decision to voluntarily sell assets to other ﬁrms. Previous studies investigating
the announcement eﬀects of corporate divestitures have reached a number of con-
clusions.36 For asset sales, empirical evidence suggests that announcement days are
associated with a positive stock price reaction. In pre- and post-announcement pe-
riods, share prices exhibit mixed (i.e. positive, negative or zero) performance. Con-
versely, empirical studies on spin-oﬀs have produced more uniform results, whereby
positive abnormal returns in announcement periods have been found.
A Asset Sales Announcement
While substantial work has been expended in M&A, limited eﬀorts were dedicated
to the related subject of corporate divestiture until Boudreaux (1975). Boudreaux
(1975) ﬁnds a positive stock price eﬀect for sell-oﬀs and spin-oﬀs together for the
36For empirical evidence on asset sales, see Alexander, Benson, and Kampmeyer (1984),
Boudreaux (1975), Hearth and Zaima (1984), Jain (1985), Klein (1986), Rosenfeld (1984), and
Zaima and Hearth (1985). For research on corporate spin-offs, see Hite and Owers (1983), Linn
and Rozeff (1985), Miles and Rosenfeld (1983), and Schipper and Smith (1983).
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divesting ﬁrms up to three months around the event date in the period 1965–1970.
However, he did not distinguish between sell-oﬀs and spin-oﬀs, and did not perform
statistical signiﬁcance tests in analysing the behaviour of stock returns. Table 2.3
contains a summary of some of the more important previous empirical studies on
voluntary sell-oﬀs in Panel A, and on voluntary spin-oﬀs in Panel B.37 It is noteworthy
that all the papers listed in Table 2.3 are from between 1984 and 1987, which is
quite a concentrated period for testing corporate divestiture announcement eﬀects.
Although there are some other papers in the literature from this period (see Hearth
and Zaima (1984), Linn and Rozeﬀ (1985), and Zaima and Hearth (1985)), I chose
not to discuss them in detail as they all reach similar results and their impact on
subsequent studies is relatively small.
As previously noted, announcement day eﬀects for the selling ﬁrms are associ-
ated with positive stock reaction. However, there are still some substantial variations
across studies. Alexander, Benson, and Kampmeyer (1984) examine a sample of 53
ﬁrms and ﬁnd positive, but not signiﬁcant, excess returns (only 0.17%). They also
ﬁnd that sell-oﬀs appear to be announced after a period of generally negative abnor-
mal returns.38 Jain (1985) extends the work of Alexander, Benson, and Kampmeyer
(1984) by using a much larger sample, which contains over 1, 000 ﬁrst publicly avail-
able sell-oﬀ announcements. He reports signiﬁcant positive excess returns around
the sell-oﬀ announcements, and signiﬁcant negative pre-event returns for asset sell-
ers. Instead of just considering corporate sell-oﬀ announcements, Rosenfeld (1984)
estimates the eﬀect of voluntary divestiture (sell-oﬀ or spin-oﬀ) announcements on
shareholder wealth. He ﬁnds that both sell-oﬀ and spin-oﬀ announcements tend to
have a positive inﬂuence on the stock prices of the divesting ﬁrms. He also ﬁnds that
the spin-oﬀs “outperform” the sell-oﬀs (5.56% against 2.33%) over the announce-
37Klein (1986), in the end of his paper, also provides a similar table as a summary of studies on
voluntary sell-offs, although he did not include studies on voluntary spin-offs.
38The weak announcement effects in Alexander, Benson, and Kampmeyer (1984) could be due
to the small sample size.
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Table 2.3: Summary of Empirical Studies on Divestiture Announcement Effects
This table presents summary of empirical studies on the announcement effects of corporate divestiture. Panel A and Panel B reports studies on
voluntary sell-offs and spin-offs, respectively. The results shown in the table is the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), which is calculated by using
either mean-adjusted model or market model. Day 0 of an event window is the announcement date of sell-offs or spin-offs. t-statistics are reported in
parentheses.
Sample Sample Announcement Pre-Announcement Post-Announcement
Study Methodology1 Size Period Day CAR Day CAR Day CAR
Panel A: Voluntary Sell-Offs
Alexander, Benson, MAR 53 1964–1973 +0.17% −2.54% −2.47%
and Kampmeyer (1984)a (0.68) (−1.67) (−1.16)
Hite, Owers, MM 55 1963–1978 +1.66% +0.69% n.a
and Rogers (1987)b (4.08) (0.51)
Jain (1985)c MM 1107 1976–1978 +0.70% −2.20% −0.60%
(4.04) (−4.29) (−1.13)
Klein (1986)d MM 215 1970–1979 +1.12% +1.84% +1.29%
(2.83) (1.81) (1.31)
Rosenfeld (1984)e MAR 62 1969–1981 +2.33% −0.92% +1.41%
(−4.60) (−0.61) (0.93)
Panel B: Voluntary Spin-Offs
Hite and Owers (1983)f MM 123 1962–1981 +3.30% +7.30 n.a
(13.25) (4.28)
Miles and Rosenfeld (1983)g MAR 92 1963–1980 +3.34% +5.96% +1.11%
(6.55) (2.33) (0.43)
Rosenfeld (1984)e MAR 93 1963–1981 +5.56% −1.29% −2.10%
(8.42) (−0.62) (−1.00)
Schipper and Smith (1983)h MM 93 1963–1981 +2.84% −0.67% −1.97%
(6.61) (−0.23) (−1.03)
1 MAR = Mean-Adjusted Returns Model; MM = Market Model (or Single-Index Model).
a Event windows defined as days (−1, 0), days (−30,−2), and days (+1,+30) respectively.
b Event windows defined as days (−1, 0) and days (−50,−5) respectively.
c Event windows defined as days (−5,−1), days (−60,−11), and days (+11,+60) respectively.
d Event windows defined as days (−2, 0), days (−40,−3), and days (+1,+40) respectively.
e Event windows defined as days (−1, 0), days (−30,−11), and days (+11,+30) respectively.
f Event windows defined as days (−1, 0) and days (−50, 0) respectively.
g Event windows defined as days (0,+1), days (−60,−11), and days (+11,+60) respectively.
h Event windows defined as days (−1, 0), days (−90,−2), and days (+1,+40) respectively.
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ment period, which suggests that the announcement eﬀect of spin-oﬀs has a stronger
positive inﬂuence on share prices than sell-oﬀs.
Later studies of asset sales all provide further evidence supporting the previous
evidence that, on average, initial announcements of asset sales result in signiﬁcantly
positive excess returns. Meanwhile, they try to ﬁnd determining factors of announce-
ment eﬀects, since not all divestiture announcements are accompanied by positive
price movements. In particular, these papers examine diﬀerences in announcement
day eﬀects among ﬁrms engaged in voluntary sell-oﬀs. By separating samples based
on whether the transaction price is announced, Klein (1986) ﬁnds that the announce-
ment day eﬀect is signiﬁcantly positive for the price group, but not statistically dif-
ferent from zero for the no-price group. He also ﬁnds a positive relation between
announcement day returns and the relative size of the divestiture. Hite, Owers, and
Rogers (1987) ﬁnd that, on average, the initial announcements of sell-oﬀs generate
an increase of 1.5% on selling ﬁrms’ market values. They also ﬁnd positive abnormal
returns of 1.66% for successful sellers and 1.41% for unsuccessful sellers.
B Spin-offs Announcement
The results for voluntary corporate spin-oﬀs are more consistent. Like asset sales, the
announcement of spin-oﬀs is found to have positive abnormal returns. In contrast to
asset sales, pre-announcement abnormal returns are positive for spin-oﬀs. Miles and
Rosenfeld (1983) report that spin-oﬀ announcements enhance shareholder wealth,
and that these announcements usually follow a period of positive abnormal returns.
They also argue that large spin-oﬀs have a greater positive inﬂuence on equity values
than on small spin-oﬀs. Schipper and Smith (1983) also document a signiﬁcant
positive share price reaction of 2.84% for voluntary spin-oﬀ announcements, and
suggest the gains to shareholders may arise from tax and regulatory advantages.
Hite and Owers (1983) conclude that, over the entire event period, positive gains
for ﬁrms engaging in spin-oﬀs facilitate mergers or separate diverse operating units.
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They also report positive average excess returns for all groups over the two-day
interval around the ﬁrst announcement.
Most of the papers discussed above focus on just one type of corporate event,
either an asset sell-oﬀ or a spin-oﬀ. Slovin, Sushka, and Ferraro (1995) examine the
valuation eﬀects on ﬁrms in the same industry as entities that are subject to carve-
outs (initial public oﬀerings of subsidiary equity), spin-oﬀs, and asset sell-oﬀs. They
ﬁnd that share price reactions for rivals are negative in response to equity carve-
outs. In comparison, rival stock returns are positive for spin-oﬀs and normal for
asset sell-oﬀs. Parent ﬁrms earn positive returns in response to carve-outs, spin-oﬀs,
and sell-oﬀs, while the rivals of parent ﬁrms earn normal returns in each case.
2.6.3 Motivations for Asset Sales
Corporate sell-oﬀs, like mergers and acquisitions (M&A), are informative economic
events. One important diﬀerence between acquisitions and sell-oﬀs appears to be
that sell-oﬀs are usually initiated by the sellers, whereas takeover attempts are usu-
ally initiated by the bidders (buyers). Moreover, unlike M&A, the theoretical and
empirical studies advanced to explain the motivations for asset sales and the an-
nouncement eﬀects on stockholders are relatively limited to the 1980s and early
1990s. Hite, Owers, and Rogers (1987) argue that corporate sell-oﬀs can represent
partial acquisitions from the buyer’s perspective, and expect them to have much in
common with motivations for mergers and acquisitions. By examining both success-
ful and unsuccessful asset sell-oﬀ proposals, Hite, Owers, and Rogers (1987) apply
the information hypothesis and synergy hypothesis from Bradley, Desai, and Kim
(1983) to partial asset sell-oﬀs, in order to explore the motives for asset sales. They
ﬁnd that the gains of asset sales accumulate to successful sellers and bidders, which
supports the synergy hypothesis proposed by Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1983) for
inter-ﬁrm tender oﬀers.
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In general, there are many motives for corporate asset sales such as dismantling
conglomerates, changing strategies or restructuring, selling into a better ﬁt com-
pany, discarding unwanted businesses from prior acquisitions, corporate ﬁnancing,
additional investment required, etc. The ﬁnance literature has identiﬁed several rea-
sons for corporate divestitures. Following Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling (2002),
I chose to discuss the following three prominent reasons in detail:
1. relax credit constraints or ﬁnance investments — financing explanation.
2. have speciﬁc assets operated by those who can operate them most eﬃciently
— efficiency explanation;
3. make the ﬁrm more eﬃcient by reducing its degree of diversiﬁcation — focusing
explanation;
A The Financing Explanation
One of the most important explanations for asset sales focuses on sell-oﬀs as a source
of liquid assets for ﬁrms. Hite, Owers, and Rogers (1987) argue that, in several cases,
management indicated that assets were being sold to raise capital for the expansion
of existing lines of business or to reduce high levels of debt. In other words, asset
sales can be viewed as an alternative to the sale (issue) of new securities. Compared
with public equity oﬀerings, there are some advantages for ﬁrms choosing to ﬁnance
through asset sales.39 First, direct sales of assets to another ﬁrm lower the costs
of asymmetric information in public equity oﬀerings, which means informational
asymmetries may be less important for the asset the ﬁrm wants to sell than for the
ﬁrm as a whole. When market investors buy only small fractions of a new equity
issue, they have less incentive to become informed than the managers of the acquiring
corporation in an asset sale. The acquiring management could also be expected to
39Some of these reasons are shown in Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz (1995).
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have a comparative advantage in valuing the target assets compared with investors
valuing new equity claims on the ﬁrm’s overall operations.
Second, if the ﬁrm’s debt overhang is large, selling an asset may avoid the recap-
italisation costs that would have to be paid to raise funds on the capital markets.
Third, if management pursues its own objectives, selling an asset provides funds with
potentially fewer restrictions on managerial discretion. Fourth, empirical evidences
by Mikkelson and Partch (1986), Asquith and Mullins (1986), Masulis and Korwar
(1986), and Eckbo (1986) suggest that stock prices generally react non-positively
to the announcement of a new security oﬀering. Existing empirical evidences by
Alexander, Benson, and Kampmeyer (1984), Jain (1985) and Hite, Owers, and Rogers
(1987) show that asset sale announcements are associated with positive stock price
reactions, where these gains mostly accumulate to asset-divesting ﬁrms. Therefore,
ﬁrms raising liquidity through the sales of assets can avoid negative market reaction
on their valuation.
One of the important papers in this area is Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz (1995).
The authors advance a more compelling motivation to sell assets — that asset sales
provide funds when alternative sources of ﬁnancing are too expensive,40 otherwise
known as the financing hypothesis of asset sales. The main empirical results are
consistent with the ﬁnancing hypothesis rather than with the eﬃcient deployment
hypothesis inasmuch that: ﬁrstly, ﬁrms selling assets tend to be poor performers and
have high leverage, which means that a typical ﬁrm selling assets is motivated to do
so by its ﬁnancial situation; and secondly, the stock price reaction to successful asset
sales is strongly related to use of the proceeds. In short, Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz
(1995) ﬁnd that stock price reactions on asset sale announcements are signiﬁcantly
positive, but only for those ﬁrms that plan to pay out the proceeds, which is strongly
consistent with the ﬁnancing hypothesis. Since Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz (1995),
40This is possibly because of agency costs of issuing debt or because of information asymmetries
in market equity offerings.
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some research has explored the use of proceeds generated from asset sales, such as
Bates (2005) and Lee and Lin (2008). Bates (2005) examines the allocation of cash
proceeds following subsidiary sales. He ﬁnds that retention probabilities increase in
the divesting ﬁrms’ contemporaneous growth opportunities and expected investment.
The results, he ﬁnds, cohere with the trade-oﬀ between the investment eﬃciencies
associated with retained proceeds and the agency costs of managerial discretion and
debt.
Research by Shleifer and Vishny (1992) and Brown, James, and Mooradian (1994)
stresses the importance of asset sales as a way of resolving ﬁnancial distress. Shleifer
and Vishny (1992) ﬁnd that when a ﬁrm in ﬁnancial distress needs to sell assets
to gain liquidity, its industry peers are likely to experience problems themselves,
leading to asset sales at prices below value in best use. This ﬁnding is consistent with
empirical evidence in Oﬃcer (2007). Oﬃcer (2007) realises acquisition discounts for
subsidiaries of other ﬁrms relative to acquisition multiples for comparable publicly-
traded targets. Corporate divesting ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly liquidity-constrained prior
to the sale of a subsidiary, particularly when the subsidiary is being sold for cash.
He also ﬁnds that acquisition discounts are signiﬁcantly greater when debt capital
(other ﬁnancing sources) is relatively more expensive to obtain. Brown, James, and
Mooradian (1994) ﬁnd that creditor pressure, particularly from short-term senior
lenders, plays a pivotal role in the decision to liquidate assets, and determines how
sales proceeds are used. A related study by Schlingemann, Stulz, andWalkling (2002)
argues that the liquidity of the market for corporate assets plays an important role
in the process of asset sales. Firms are more likely to divest segments from industries
with a more liquid market for corporate assets.
B The Efficiency Explanation
Hite, Owers, and Rogers (1987) emphasise the efficiency explanation as the motive
for asset sales. They ﬁnd that announcements of asset sell-oﬀ are associated with
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positive stock price performance for selling ﬁrms, and mostly for successful sellers.
Unsuccessful asset sellers experience positive abnormal returns at the bid date and
negative returns at the termination date. This is evidence in favour of the syn-
ergy hypothesis, that a termination signals the loss of real productive gains. When
looking more closely at terminated oﬀers, they ﬁnd that permanent revaluations are
maintained by the subset of unsuccessful ﬁrms that receive follow-up oﬀers. These
revaluations are again consistent with the predictions of the synergy hypothesis (or
eﬃciency explanation). The existence of eﬃciency in assets sales is measured by gains
in sell-oﬀs or the seller’s announcement returns. Alexander, Benson, and Kampmeyer
(1984), Hite, Owers, and Rogers (1987), and John and Ofek (1995) ﬁnd evidence sup-
porting that the announcement return is higher when the division is sold to a buyer
who might have a comparative advantage in managing the divested division.
Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) report that transactions of asset sales increase
economic eﬃciency, a result that is consistent with the positive valuation eﬀects for
asset sales reported by Jain (1985), Klein (1986), and Hite, Owers, and Rogers (1987).
Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) also support the eﬃciency explanation for asset sales
that ﬁrms grow and purchase assets eﬃciently across industries in which they operate.
By examining the timing of sales and the pattern of eﬃciency gains, they ﬁnd that
the transactions of asset sales, especially through sales of plants and divisions, tend
to improve the allocation of resources and are consistent with a simple neoclassical
model of proﬁt maximising by ﬁrms. In particular, Maksimovic and Phillips (2001)
ﬁnd that asset sales are more likely to occur when the assets are less productive
than industry benchmarks and when the selling division is less productive. Their
results show that most transactions in the market for assets result in productivity
gains. Recently, Yang (2008) has developed a dynamic structural model in which
a ﬁrm makes rational decisions to buy or sell assets in the presence of productivity
shocks. He shows that asset sales decisions are driven by changes in productivity
brought about by shocks: ﬁrms with rising productivity buy assets and ﬁrms with
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falling productivity sell assets. Yang (2008) is also closely related to the work by
Maksimovic and Phillips (2001, 2002).
Similarly, Warusawitharana (2008) presents and tests a model in which asset
purchases and asset sales enable the transfer of capital from less productive to more
productive ﬁrms. This theoretical development produces an endogenous selection
model that links asset purchases and sales to the fundamentals of the ﬁrms. The
key ﬁndings in Warusawitharana (2008) are that returns on assets and size strongly
inﬂuence the choice of a ﬁrm as to whether it should purchase or sell existing assets,
which is conditional on the decision to engage in a transaction. These ﬁndings indi-
cate that corporate asset purchases and sales are consistent with eﬃcient investment
decisions.
C The Focusing Explanation
The focusing explanation suggest that ﬁrms sell the unrelated asset to increase the
focus and eﬃcient operation of the core business. John and Ofek (1995) emphasise
focus as an important motive for corporate divestitures; value gains come from better
management of the assets remaining after divestiture. Empirically, they ﬁnd that the
seller’s operations become more focused in the year of the divestiture,41 and in 75%
of the cases the divested division is unrelated to the seller’s main operations. John
and Ofek (1995) interpret these ﬁndings to be consistent with the focus hypothesis,
which implies that eliminating negative synergies between the divested asset and
the remaining assets should lead to better performance for the remaining assets
after the divestiture. Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) also report that the reason most
often cited for divestitures is to change corporate focus or strategy. Berger and
Ofek (1999), by studying the precursors and outcomes of corporate refocusing, show
that the valuation consequences of diversiﬁcation strongly aﬀect the probability of
41There is an increase in the Herfindahl index and a decrease in the number of reported lines of
business
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divestiture. They ﬁnd that, after controlling for other determinants of refocusing,
ﬁrms with the greatest value losses due to diversiﬁcation are most likely to be involved
in divestitures.
2.6.4 Long-term Performance and Method of Payment
The long-term performance of divesting ﬁrms and methods of payment in asset sales
are put together for two reasons. First, unlike M&A, both areas have been far
less documented in asset sales literature. Second, of only two studies exploring
the methods of payment in asset sales, both analysed the operating performance of
buyers or sellers subsequent to asset sales.
A Long-term Stock Performance
To the best of my knowledge, only Bates (2005) and Lee and Lin (2008) have investi-
gated the long-run stock performance of divesting ﬁrms in asset sell-oﬀs. Bates (2005)
argues that the full impact of management’s decision regarding the distribution of
sale proceeds, or the reallocation of retained cash, is only partially incorporated into
security prices around a sale announcement date. He ﬁnds positive abnormal returns
up to two years subsequent to the announcement among investment sellers, and in-
terprets this as evidence that the ﬁnancial eﬃciency beneﬁt prevails over the agency
cost of managerial discretion.
Lee and Lin (2008), by using U.K. evidence, observe signiﬁcantly negative ab-
normal return performances among sellers in the 12-60 months subsequent to the
sell-oﬀ announcements, which is robust to various long-term stock performance mea-
sures. They also ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly positive association between long-term abnormal
returns and the magnitude of cash proceeds for sellers reducing corporate debt, as
well as for sellers in deeper ﬁnancial distress or with higher growth prospects. This
ﬁnding, as Lee and Lin (2008) claims, implies that asset sale activities indeed have
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a signiﬁcant impact on future shareholder wealth.
B Method of Payment
Slovin, Sushka, and Polonchek (2005) and Hege, Lovo, Slovin, and Sushka (2009)
explicitly consider the diﬀerences between stock and cash payment in asset sales.
Previous studies of asset sales document signiﬁcant gains to sellers and very little gain
to buyers, but there has been no treatment of the eﬀects of the means of payment.
Compared with the M&A literature, far less eﬀort has been put into the issue of
methods of payment in asset sales.
Slovin, Sushka, and Polonchek (2005) empirically analyse intercorporate asset
sales where equity is the means of payment, and compare the results to cash asset
sales. Their central ﬁnding is that the use of buyer equity to purchase operating
assets generates signiﬁcantly larger combined gains in wealth than cash asset sales,
and that these gains are shared between buyers and sellers (10% for buyers and 3%
for sellers). In contrast, in cash asset sales, all of the proportionately smaller gains of
1.9% go to the sellers. Combined wealth gains are larger for equity deals, but modest
for cash deals. Overall, their results imply that buyer equity is an eﬀective means
of contracting in intercorporate asset sales, and the use of equity conveys favourable
information about the value of assets and buyers.
Hege, Lovo, Slovin, and Sushka (2009) develop a two-sided asymmetric informa-
tion model of asset sales. The central prediction of their model is that there are
large gains in wealth for both buyers and sellers in equity-based asset sales, whereas
cash sales generate signiﬁcantly smaller gains that typically accrue only to sellers.
This theoretical prediction is highly consistent with the empirical ﬁndings in Slovin,
Sushka, and Polonchek (2005). Hege, Lovo, Slovin, and Sushka (2009) also proceed
empirical tests and ﬁnd consistent results with the predictions of their theoretical
model.
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Chapter 3
Liquidity Measures and Empirical
Methodology
3.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to generally discuss the measures of aggregate liq-
uidity and related empirical methodologies applied in this thesis. Since both are
consistently used in the following chapters, it is better to have a concentrated and
detailed discussion here.1 Particularly, I intend to answer the following questions in
this chapter: How are aggregate liquidity measures constructed? Why are aggregate
liquidity measures estimated by such methods? Which empirical methodologies are
applied in this thesis?
Having proper measures of aggregate liquidity is crucial for this research, because
they are key factors in examining the inﬂuences of liquidity on corporate events.
The central aggregate liquidity measures consist of the aggregate corporate liquid-
ity demand (ACLD) and the aggregate market liquidity supply (AMLS). I follow
Greenwood (2005) to construct a measure of ACLD and follow Bohn (1998) and
1In the following chapters, both aggregate liquidity measures and empirical methodologies will
only be described briefly.
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Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2008) to construct a measure of AMLS. Be-
sides introducing the construction methods, I also provide reasons for choosing these
measurements. Both measures are selected because they can better represent the
variation of liquidity demand and liquidity supply at aggregate level.
The major empirical methodology applied in the thesis belongs to the vast cat-
egory of event study methods. Each research question, since aggregate liquidity is
estimated with particular corporate events, requires measuring the stock returns and
ﬁrm characteristics of event ﬁrms.2 Using ﬁnancial data, an event study can measure
the (unanticipated) impact of a particular corporate event on the value of ﬁrms and
the wealth of shareholders. I summarise both short-term and long-term event study
methods in this chapter. Some of the descriptions are borrowed heavily from the
contributions of published papers.3 Please note that this chapter intends to provide
a summary of empirical methodologies used in the thesis. The exact empirical meth-
ods applied for each research question should be based on the brief discussion in each
chapter.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the
construction methods and reasons for employing both aggregate liquidity measures.
Section 3.3 summarises short-term methods, while Section 3.4 discusses long-term
methods.
3.2 Aggregate Liquidity Measures
This section introduces the construction of aggregate liquidity measures. Section
3.2.1 shows the measure of aggregate corporate liquidity demand (ACLD) and Sec-
2I discuss event studies that focus mainly on measuring stock price effects. Other types of event
studies in the literature include examining trading volume (e.g. Campbell and Wasley (1996)),
operating (accounting) performance (e.g. Barber and Lyon (1996)) and earnings management via
discretionary accruals (e.g. Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005)).
3For studies on short-term methods, see Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) and Mackinlay (1997).
For studies on long-term methods, see Barber and Lyon (1997), Kothari and Shanken (1997), Fama
(1998), Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999), and Mitchell and Stafford (2000).
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tion 3.2.2 shows the measure of aggregate market liquidity supply (AMLS). For both
measures, the construction methods and reasons for applying such measures are de-
scribed. Section 3.2.3 shows the empirical framework for applying aggregate liquidity
measures.
3.2.1 Aggregate Corporate Liquidity Demand (ACLD)
A How to Construct?
The measurement of aggregate corporate liquidity demand (ACLD) should reﬂect
the preference for liquid assets by corporate sector at aggregate level. In order to
satisfy this setting, I follow the method in Greenwood (2005) to construct aggregate
corporate liquidity. The ACLD is measured as the ratio of total corporate investment
in liquid assets to the total sources of funds available. At aggregate level, corporate
investments and fund raising activities should follow the following identity:
Profits−Dividends︸ ︷︷ ︸
Internal Funds
+ Equity +Debt︸ ︷︷ ︸
External Funds
= ∆L+∆F +∆I +∆W +∆Other︸ ︷︷ ︸
Uses of Funds
(3.1)
where
Profits (P ) = corporate book proﬁts plus depreciation
Dividends (Div) = net dividend payments
Equity (E), Debt (D) = equity or debt issues
∆L = changes in liquid assets
∆F = changes in ﬁxed assets
∆I = changes in inventory
∆W = changes in working capital
∆Other = residual term.
The ﬁxed capital (∆F ) includes land, plant or equipment. The residual term (∆Other)
includes inventory valuation adjustments, changes in miscellaneous liabilities, and a
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calculation discrepancy. The identity shows that after collecting proﬁts, paying taxes
and dividends, and raising external ﬁnancing in equity and debt, corporations must
choose to allocate funds between a variety of possible investment activities. They
may invest in working capital or ﬁxed capital, or simply reserve these funds in liq-
uidity.4
In equation (3.1), corporate proﬁts minus dividends plus adjustments for foreign
earnings retained abroad represent internal funds.5 External funds are deﬁned as
funds raised through equity and debt oﬀerings. Thus, total sources of funds, which
equal the internal funds from production plus external funds from equity and debt
issues, are given by the terms on the left-hand side of equation (3.1). The right-hand
side of the equation shows the total use of funds available. The underlying logic is
that, at the aggregate level of the corporate business sector, total sources of funds
must equal total use of funds, which is also the principle underlying Flow of Funds
accounts. All funds supplied by the corporate sector become the funds allocated.
Annual data on each of these variables and sub-items are collected from Table
L102 and F102 in the U.S. Federal Reserve Board’s Flow of Funds accounts for
the period from 1970 to 2006. The flow of funds accounts record the acquisition of
tangible and ﬁnancial assets throughout the U.S. economy and document the sources
of funds used to acquire those assets. The Federal Reserve gathers capital market
ﬂow data from a variety of internal and commercial sources. The flow of funds data
begins in 1945 and is updated annually. The strengths of the flow of funds data are its
consistent deﬁnitions, its availability over a long period of time and its comprehensive
coverage. A complete description of the flow of funds is available from the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Guide to the Flow of Funds Accounts.
Tables L102 and F102 show the levels and ﬂows (changes) of ﬁnancial assets and
4Note that this relationship does not hold at the firm level, where mergers and acquisitions
involving exchanges of equity complicate the decomposition.
5Corporate profits are calculated as (book) corporate profits before tax, plus the consumption
of fixed capital, minus profit tax accruals.
78
liabilities of the non-farm and non-ﬁnancial corporate business sectors in the U.S.
through time, respectively.6 The ﬁnancial sector is excluded because its business
involves inventories of marketable securities that are included in liquid assets.
Table 3.1 shows the summary statistics of variables collected from Flow of Funds
accounts, which are used to construct ACLD. Since the uses of funds are equal to
the sources of funds, all variables scaled by sources of funds (S) are to be shown as
percentages. Total sources of funds (S) is the sum of the proﬁts after paying out
dividends (P − Div), net equity issues (E), and net debt issues (D). As indicated
in Table 3.1, on average, internal funds ﬁnance over 80% of corporate investment,
and external funds only ﬁnance about 20%. These ratios vary dramatically over
the time period of 1970 to 2006. Internal funds ((P − Div)/S) reached the lowest
(53.81%) in 1973 and the peak (115.65%) in 2006. For external funds, while debt
oﬀerings ﬁnance more than 27% of corporate investments, the share of net equity
issues is negative on average and even reaches −5.22% of total investment in a typical
year. This surprisingly low ratio of equity issues occurs because the Flow of Funds
appropriately nets out equity issues with equity repurchases and retirements.
In order to measure aggregate corporate liquidity demand, it is crucial to have
a proper deﬁnition of corporate liquid assets. An ideal deﬁnition should include all
assets which can be easily converted into cash with no, or low, transaction costs.
As indicated in Greenwood (2005), an overly narrow deﬁnition of liquidity risks
the possibility of results driven by certain classes of liquid assets, rather than by
aggregating corporate investment in liquidity. On the other hand, an overly broad
deﬁnition of liquidity risks including investment items that are held for purposes other
than maintaining liquidity. Most of the items available in the Flow of Funds, which
are related to the category of liquid assets, are included, except for foreign deposits.
Similar to Greenwood (2005), I exclude foreign deposits because they are linked
to liquidity needs outside the U.S. by oﬀshore subsidiaries. Greenwood (2005) also
6In Tables L102 and F102, flows are equal to the changes in the level for balance sheet variables.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics of Variables in Sources and Uses of Funds
This table presents the summary statistics of variables in sources and uses of funds. Panel A shows the sources of corporate funds, including profits
net of dividends (P −Div), equity issues (E), debt issues (D). The sources of funds (S) is the sum of these three variables. Panel B shows the uses
of corporate funds, including changes in liquid asset (∆L), changes in fixed assets investment (∆F ), changes in inventory investment (∆I), changes
in working capital (∆W ), and a residual term (∆Other). All variables are scaled by total sources of corporate funds (S). Data is collected from the
U.S. Federal Reserve Board’s Flow of Funds accounts for the period of 1970 to 2006. All variables are given in percentage except for number and
autocorrelation.
First Third Standard Auto-
Number Mean Minimum Quartile Median Quartile Maximum Deviation Correlation
Panel A: Sources of Funds
(P −Div)/S 37 80.32 53.81 71.59 77.98 88.44 115.65 14.38 0.67
(E +D)/S 37 19.68 −15.65 11.56 22.02 28.41 46.19 14.38 0.67
E/S 37 −7.77 −63.85 −14.85 −5.22 4.12 9.75 15.02 0.59
D/S 37 27.45 −13.26 21.82 29.52 36.84 48.20 13.55 0.49
Panel B: Uses of Funds
∆L/S 37 5.16 −2.80 3.09 5.09 6.80 18.63 3.97 −0.05
∆F/S 37 80.17 58.99 70.98 80.16 85.35 103.62 10.68 0.60
∆I/S 37 4.22 −5.87 2.05 5.01 6.87 11.75 3.87 −0.06
∆W/S 37 3.58 −2.75 −0.56 2.46 5.44 27.19 5.96 0.61
∆Other/S 37 6.87 −24.19 0.53 7.85 16.66 24.69 11.55 0.34
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excludes U.S. Treasuries in his sample because they introduce severe outliers between
1945 and 1950, when U.S. business received tax refunds in the form of wartime bonds.
However, I include U.S. Treasury securities as they are liquid ﬁnancial assets heavily
held by U.S. corporations. More importantly, since the application of the ACLD
measure in my research begins at 1970, the distortions of U.S. Treasury securities in
1945 and 1946 have no eﬀects on my sample.
Under these reasons, I settle on the deﬁnition of liquidity (L) as the following
items:
Liquidity components


checkable deposits and currency
time and savings deposits
money market mutual fund shares
short-term security repurchase agreements
commercial paper
U.S. Treasury securities
These common liquid assets are used by U.S. corporations for the purpose of liquidity
reservation. Figure 3.1 shows the time series performance of levels and shares of
corporate liquidity components holding from 1970 to 2006. The corporate sector
increases liquid asset holding through time at the aggregate level. The ﬁgure reveals
the increasing importance of money market mutual fund shares and time and saving
deposits. These results correspond with the fact that many corporations now hold
more professionally managed money market shares. Panel B of Figure 3.1 reﬂects
the performance of these liquidity components by a percentage of total liquid assets,
which shows the declining shares of U.S. Treasury securities and checkable deposits
and currency. The holding ratios of security repurchase and commercial paper are
relatively stable through time.
The aggregate corporate liquidity demand is deﬁned as the liquidity investment
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Figure 3.1: Time-Series of Liquidity Components
This figure presents the time-series performance of corporate liquidity components’ holding levels
(in Panel A) and holding ratios (in Panel B). The liquidity components include checkable deposits
and currency, time and savings deposits, money market mutual fund shares, short-term security
repurchase agreements, commercial paper, and U.S. Treasury securities. Panel A shows the level
of these liquidity components. Panel B shows the ratios of liquidity components to total liquidity
level. Data is collected from the U.S. Federal Reserve Board’s Flow of Funds accounts for the
period of 1970 to 2006.
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share (∆L/S), which is measured as the change in the level of aggregate liquidity
holdings (∆L) by corporate sector in aggregate divided by the total sources of funds
(S). Panel B of Table 3.1 shows the descriptive statistic of the ACLD measure
(∆L/S). For the period 1970–2006, the liquidity investment share has an average
of 5.16% and a median of 5.09%; both the autocorrelation (−0.05) and standard
deviation (3.97) are small for ∆L/S. Throughout the entire sample period, the
ACLD (∆L/S) is mostly positive, and only falls below zero during 1990 and 2006.7 In
Chapter 4, I also employ ∆L/Lt−1 as the measure of ACLD to explore its correlations
with acquisition activity and performance. Although these have not been tabulated,
the results from ∆L/Lt−1 are very similar to those generated by ∆L/S. Thus, in this
thesis, the measure of ACLD is deﬁned as the liquidity investment share (∆L/S).
Table 3.2: Time-Series Regression Analysis
This table presents the time-series regressions of aggregate corporate liquidity demand (ACLD) on
the share of other items in the sources and uses of funds. The dependent variable in all regressions
is the ACLD (∆L/S), defined as the change in the level of aggregate liquidity holdings (∆L) in
aggregate divided by total sources of funds (S). The independent variables include the share of
sources raised by equity and debt issues ((E +D)/S), the share of sources devoted to fixed asset
investments (∆F/S), the share of sources devoted to inventory investment (∆I/S), and the share
of sources devoted to working capital (∆W/S). The sources of funds (S) is the sum of profits net
of dividends (P − Div), equity issues (E), and debt issues (D). Data is collected from the U.S.
Federal Reserve Board’s Flow of Funds accounts for the period of 1970 to 2006. t-statistics are
reported in parentheses.
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
(E +D)/S −0.048 0.001
(−1.04) (0.01)
∆F/S 0.032 0.023 0.024
(0.47) (0.35) (0.21)
∆I/S −0.151 −0.105 −0.105
(−0.82) (−0.56) (−0.54)
∆W/S −0.141 −0.142
(−1.22) (−1.02)
Constant 0.061 0.033 0.043 0.042
(5.47) (0.57) (0.74) (0.38)
Before continuing, I examine some basic properties of the ACLD time series
7Another possible measure of ACLD is the percentage change in liquidity levels (∆L/Lt−1),
which is measured as the ratio of changes in the level of aggregate liquidity holdings (∆L) to the
level of aggregate liquidity holdings in the last year (Lt−1). This liquidity measure (∆L/Lt−1)
shows a very high degree of correlation with the ∆L/S, and is also suggested in Greenwood (2005)
for robustness tests.
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(∆L/S). In particular, I test whether changes in aggregate liquidity measures can
be explained by changes in other items in sources or uses of investment funds. If,
for example, equity issues and liquidity holdings were highly correlated, then one
could question whether the relation between them drives the documented relationship
between aggregate corporate liquidity demand and corporate events.8 Although
∆L/S is related to other investment shares based on identity between the sources
and uses of funds in equation (3.1), it is important to check whether any one of these
variables individually accounts for most of the variations in liquidity.
Table 3.2 shows the results of the time series regressions of ACLD (∆L/S) on the
share of other items in the sources and uses of funds including equity and debt issues
(E +D), changes in ﬁxed asset investments (∆F ), changes in inventory investment
(∆I), and changes in working capital (∆W ). The results show that ACLD (∆L/S)
has extremely small correlations with the share of sources raised by equity and debt
issues ((E + D)/S) and the share of sources devoted for ﬁxed asset investments
(∆F/S). In addition, ∆L/S is negatively related to the share of sources devoted
for inventory (∆I/S) and working capital (∆W/S). None of these coeﬃcients are
statistically signiﬁcant. Thus, the variation of ACLD (∆L/S) cannot be explained
by any other items found in the sources and uses of funds.
B Why this Method?
Why do I follow Greenwood (2005) and use data from the U.S. Federal Reserve
Board’s Flow of Funds accounts to construct liquidity investment share (∆L/S) as
the measure of aggregate corporate liquidity demand? This question can be answered
from three perspectives. First, in academic literature, the Flow of Funds accounts
are widely used to form aggregate time series data. For example, Baker and Wurgler
(2000) examine whether the share of equity issues in the total of new equity and debt
8Greenwood (2005) applies such a regression analysis to examine whether liquidity holdings can
be explained by other potential determinants. Here, I apply such a method to examine the validity
of the aggregate liquidity measure.
84
issues is a strong predictor of U.S. stock market returns between 1928 and 1997. This
is, in certain aspects, similar to Greenwood (2005), which investigates the predictive
power of aggregate investment in liquidity as a share of total corporate investment to
subsequent U.S. stock market returns. Both papers require a proper measure of time
series data at the aggregate level. Although Baker and Wurgler (2000) use the gross
new equity and debt issues data reported by the Federal Reserve Bulletin to compute
the equity share, they also examine the equity share series constructed by using Flow
of Funds data, which yields similar coeﬃcient results and similar predictive power.
Moreover, the signiﬁcant advantage of the Flow of Funds series is that they net out
equity repurchases and debt retirements and provide net changes in equity and debt
for the economy as a whole. This property of Flow of Funds data better ﬁts my
research in aggregate liquidity, because the data series can reﬂect the actual funds
available for the corporate sector in aggregate.
Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler (2003), by using an aggregate time series data
on share of long-term debt issues to total debt issues, investigate how the maturity
of corporate debt issues is related to market conditions and predictable variation in
excess bond returns. The aggregate data is constructed from the Federal Reserve
Flow of Funds. Some previous studies, such as White (1974) and Taggart (1977),
already apply Flow of Funds data to explore aggregate debt issues. As stated in
Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler (2003), the strengths of the Flow of Funds data are
its consistent deﬁnitions, its comprehensive coverage, and its availability over a long
time span.
Second, compared with aggregated ﬁrm-level data from Compustat, there are
some advantages of using aggregate data from Flow of Funds. Notably, Opler,
Pinkowika, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) measure liquid asset holdings at ﬁrm-level
as the ratio of cash and marketable securities to total assets and marketable secu-
rities. The ﬁrm-level cash-to-assets and cash-to-sales ratios are commonly used to
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explore the determinants or value of corporate liquidity holdings.9 However, Compu-
stat measures cannot capture the liquidity holdings by new ﬁrms, or cash reduction
coincidental with ﬁrm de-listing. In addition, the Flow of Funds data certainly in-
cludes more ﬁrms than Compustat, which should better reﬂect the U.S. corporate
sector at aggregate level. Greenwood (2005) also constructs an alternative series of
aggregate liquidity using ﬁrm-level data from Compustat, where the basic results
using Compustat data line up with the Flow of Funds results.
Third, the variation of aggregate liquidity investment share (∆L/S) cannot be
explained by other theories of corporate liquidity holdings, which should reﬂect a
higher portion of motivation by corporate sector to hoard liquid assets in the event
of liquidity shortages. Many studies in corporate ﬁnance link optimal liquid as-
set holdings with time-varying investment opportunities. It is necessary, therefore,
to examine whether the measure of ACLD is driven by any other theories. Opler,
Pinkowika, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) explicitly examine whether optimal corpo-
rate liquidity holdings can be explained by transaction costs models, agency-based
models, and information models. Greenwood (2005) follows Opler, Pinkowika, Stulz,
and Williamson (1999), and ﬁnds that changes in the costs or beneﬁts of cash hold-
ings, which are related to the transactions theory, agency theory, or asymmetric
information theory of liquid asset holdings, have no explanatory power for the time
series of liquidity investment share (∆L/S). Thus, the liquidity investment share
(∆L/S) should be a proper measure of aggregate corporate liquidity demand.
3.2.2 Aggregate Market Liquidity Supply (AMLS)
A How to Construct?
The aggregate market liquidity supply (AMLS) is measured as the U.S. Debt/GDP
ratio. The debt-to-GDP ratio is measured as Public Debt at the end of the govern-
9See, for example, Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes (2003) and Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell
(2008).
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ment’s ﬁscal year, which corresponds to the end of the third quarter of each year,
divided by the GDP of the same ﬁscal year. The Debt/GDP series is downloaded
from Henning Bohn’s website, which provides Debt/GDP series for 1971 to 2003.10 I
update the Debt/GDP series until 2006 with data from the Economic Report of the
President. Bohn constructs the Debt/GDP as the ratio of publicly held Treasury
debt in the U.S. related to GDP.11 Public Debt is diﬀerent from the Gross Federal
Debt, which also includes intra-governmental obligations to social security and other
trust funds. Thus, this measure of debt includes debt held by the Federal Reserve,
which should better represent AMLS in the U.S. for the corporate sector as a whole.
The time series ofDebt/GDP ratio is applied widely in both ﬁnance and economic
research. For instance, Bohn (1998) and Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen
(2008) both use Debt/GDP in their studies. In the ﬁeld of ﬁscal policy, Bohn (1998)
explores whether the U.S. government responds properly to changes in the debt-to-
GDP ratio. He ﬁnds that the U.S. government does take corrective actions again
raising public debt by reducing non-interest outlays, which counteract the changes in
debt. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2008) show that the U.S. Debt/GDP
ratio is negatively correlated with the spread between corporate bond yields and
Treasury bond yield; they use the Debt/GDP ratio as the measure of aggregate
supply of Treasury securities. The negative correlation suggests that corporate bond
spread is high when debt supply is low, while the spread is low when the debt sup-
ply is high. Since public debt and Treasury securities are extremely liquid assets in
the market, both studies show implicitly the importance of the Debt/GDP ratio in
measuring the aggregate market supply of liquidity.
10Time series data is available on Henning Bohn’s website (http://www.econ.ucsb.edu/
~bohn/).
11Data for publicly held Treasury debt is from the WEFA database, Federal Reserve Banking
and Monetary Statistics and recent issues of the Economic Report of the President.
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B Why this Method?
Why is the ratio of U.S. Debt/GDP a proper measure for aggregate market liquidity
supply? First, the Debt/GDP reﬂects the supply of government debt and Treasury
securities, which are typical liquid assets in the ﬁnancial markets. The liquidity
property of Treasuries is important for their holders, as they can easily liquid assets
in the market. The liquidity motive is analogous to the demand for holding money,
which also oﬀers a low rate of return and yet is still held in equilibrium. This is
because, as suggested by money demand theories, of the special liquidity services
from holding money.
Second, some academic research has already found that Treasury debt carries
a liquidity premium. Longstaﬀ (2004) ﬁnds a large liquidity premium in Treasury
bonds, which means that some market investors prefer to hold highly liquid securities
such as U.S. Treasury bonds rather than less liquid securities. Longstaﬀ (2004) also
shows a potential correlation between the supply of Treasury bonds to the liquidity
premium. Both ﬁndings are consistent with the theoretical predictions in Holmström
and Tirole (1996, 1998). The links between AMLS and liquidity premium are sug-
gested in Holmström and Tirole (2001), where there is a negative correlation between
AMLS and the liquidity premium or asset prices. Based on these two reasons, the
U.S. Debt/GDP ratio certainly is a proper measure of market liquidity supply at
aggregate level, because it captures the supply of typical liquid assets in the U.S.
market by government and has a closer connection with the liquidity premium.
3.2.3 Empirical Framework
One of the major purposes of this thesis is to investigate the importance of aggregate
liquidity by linking corporate decisions on investment and ﬁnance with the factors of
aggregate liquidity. In contrast to previous studies that identify periods of corporate
events based on macroeconomic criteria (see Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993)),
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the volume of events (see Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) and Helwege and Liang
(2004)), or market valuation (see Bouwman, Fuller, and Nain (2009)), I use aggregate
liquidity to identify the periods when conditions are most favourable or unfavourable
for various corporate activities.12.
In this research, the sample period of a particular corporate event is partitioned
into high-, medium-, and low-liquidity periods based on the aggregate liquidity data
in the year prior to the announcement date of corporate events. For instance, the
M&A market in year t is deﬁned as high-liquidity (30%), medium-liquidity (40%),
and low-liquidity (30%) markets based on the level of aggregate liquidity in the year
t − 1. Following this, the performances of event ﬁrms in diﬀerent liquidity markets
are measured and compared. By using aggregate liquidity factors, the goal is to
determine whether there are fundamental diﬀerences in the performances of event
ﬁrms between high- and low-liquidity corporate investment and ﬁnancing events.
In general, the sample of corporate events is classiﬁed into diﬀerent groups based
on the market condition of certain factor. This method has been widely used in
previous studies.13 Diﬀerent from these studies, I deﬁne period of market condition
according to the aggregate liquidity data in the year before. There are two reasons
for using the prior year’s liquidity data. First, both measures of aggregate liquidity
are leading macroeconomic indicators; they reﬂect the condition of liquidity demand
and liquidity supply at aggregate level. As indicated in Bodie, Kane, and Marcus
(2008), given the cyclical nature of the business cycle, leading economic indicators are
those economic series that tend to rise or fall in advance of the rest of the economy,
helping to predict the cycle of the business situation.14 The stock market price
index is a leading indicator, as stock prices are forward-looking predictors of future
12This does not suggest that other factors are unimportant; it is only because they are not
exclusive factors and the factors of aggregate liquidity could contribute to previous findings
13See, for example, Ritter (1984), Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993), Bayless and Chaplinsky
(1996), Helwege and Liang (2004), Yung, Çolak, and Wang (2008), and Bouwman, Fuller, and Nain
(2009).
14See p.576-582 and Table 17.2 in Bodie, Kane, and Marcus (2008) for discussions on economic
indicators.
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proﬁtability. In Greenwood (2005), ACLD (∆L/S) is found to be a strong predictor
of stock market returns. Together, it is reasonable to consider aggregate liquidity
demand as a leading indicator of the business cycle. Also shown in Bodie, Kane, and
Marcus (2008), money supply is another leading indicator. Today’s monetary policy
might well aﬀect and predict future economic activity; therefore, AMLS (Debt/GDP )
certainly is a leading indicator of the economy.
Secondly, the data for constructing aggregate liquidity are mostly accounting and
economic data, reported with low frequency. Unlike ﬁnancial market data, which
can be observed fairly quickly, these data are usually updated quarterly or annually,
with a certain delay. To make sure decisions for corporate events are made based on
observable data, I use a one-year lag in applying factors of aggregate liquidity.
Finally, the results of the empirical analysis in the following chapters are not
sensitive to the one-year lag in liquidity measures. For all three corporate events,
instead of classifying the sample period with last year’s aggregate liquidity, I also
examine the inﬂuence of coincident liquidity on the activity and performance of
corporate events. The results indicate similar patterns and correlations between
aggregate liquidity and corporate events. In this research, the major results are
robust enough to apply either the prior or current year’s aggregate liquidity.
3.2.4 Summary
Table 3.3 shows the annual values of ACLD (∆L/S) and AMLS (Debt/GDP ). Com-
pared to AMLS, the ACLD has larger variations through the whole time period. The
∆L/S has a positive value in most of the years, and only falls below zero in 1990
and 2006, which means that the entire corporate sector only reduced the reservation
of liquid assets in these two years. The Debt/GDP , which has a mean value of 36%,
reached its peak in 1993 and 1994.
It is important to understand that ACLD and AMLS are independent measures of
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Table 3.3: Annual Value of Aggregate Liquidity Measures
This table presents the annual values of aggregate liquidity measures between 1970 to 2006. Aggregate corporate liquidity demand is defined as the
liquidity investment share (∆L/S), which is measured as the change in the level of aggregate liquidity holdings (∆L) divided by the total sources of
funds (S). The sources of funds (S) is the sum of profits net of dividends (P −Div), equity issues (E), and debt issues (D). Aggregate market liquidity
supply is defined as the U.S. Debt/GDP ratio, which is measured as public debt at the end of the government’s fiscal year divided by GDP of the
same fiscal year. Results are shown in percentage. Data of ∆L/S is collected from the U.S. Federal Reserve Board’s Flow of Funds accounts. Data of
Debt/GDP is downloaded from Henning Bohn’s website and updated until 2006 from the Economic Report of the President.
Year ∆L/S Debt/GDP Year ∆L/S Debt/GDP
1970 1.74 28.00 1988 0.24 40.93
1971 6.98 27.99 1989 6.63 40.65
1972 5.09 27.26 1990 −1.13 42.13
1973 6.02 26.01 1991 5.13 45.21
1974 0.84 23.85 1992 6.07 47.98
1975 8.59 25.15 1993 3.83 49.39
1976 9.64 28.31 1994 3.23 49.27
1977 2.12 27.74 1995 5.02 49.26
1978 3.17 27.24 1996 6.25 48.42
1979 3.50 25.65 1997 3.51 46.10
1980 3.05 26.05 1998 6.32 43.09
1981 0.63 25.94 1999 11.53 39.75
1982 6.04 28.68 2000 10.06 35.23
1983 8.24 32.81 2001 6.04 33.03
1984 4.50 34.09 2002 3.13 34.05
1985 5.61 36.33 2003 11.02 35.99
1986 3.86 39.54 2004 7.59 37.30
1987 1.16 40.46 2005 18.63 37.40
2006 −2.80 37.00
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aggregate liquidity. They reﬂect liquidity demand by corporate sector and liquidity
supply by market at the aggregate level, respectively. Inspired by previous studies
on corporate liquidity, which investigate the motivations for liquidity holdings (see
Opler, Pinkowika, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) and Kim, Mauer, and Sherman
(1998)) and the potential eﬀects of liquidity reserves (see Harford (1999) and Oler
(2008)), I employ the factor of aggregate liquidity demand. Additionally, inspired
by theoretical and empirical studies examining the eﬀect of liquidity supply (see
Holmström and Tirole (1998, 2001), Longstaﬀ (2004), and Sundaresan and Wang
(2009)), I also take the measure of aggregate liquidity supply into consideration.
Since both aggregate liquidity measures originate from diﬀerent aspects, the per-
formance of each factor is not necessarily similar. More importantly, the prediction
of aggregate liquidity on corporate events can be diﬀerent, because, in this research,
AMLS (Debt/GDP ) is not considered a substitute for ACLD (∆L/S). Both mea-
sures are applied and examined to explore the potential correlations between aggre-
gate liquidity and corporate investment and ﬁnancing events from diﬀerent angles.
My major intention is not to examine whether AMLS and ACLD produce the same
predictions on corporate events, but simply to investigate whether and how aggre-
gate liquidity inﬂuences the activity of corporate events and the performance of event
ﬁrms.
3.3 Short-term Event Study Methods
3.3.1 Definition and Structure
It is necessary to lay down some deﬁnitions and introduce the procedure for an event
study. Some of the deﬁnitions in this section are borrowed from Mackinlay (1997).
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A Event Window
The event window is an event of interest and the period over which the security
prices of the ﬁrms involved in this event will be examined. For instance, with an
acquisition announcement, the event window will include the single day when the
merger deal is announced. It is customary to deﬁne the event window as larger
than the speciﬁc period of interest. In particular, the period of interest is often
expanded to multiple days. It is possible to include days before and after the event
into the period of interest, which may capture the price eﬀects of the announcement
around the event date. For example, if the announcement of events happens after
the stock market closes on the recorded announcement day, which is quite often the
case with seasoned equity oﬀerings, the event window including the day of and the
day after the announcement can capture the price eﬀects. Furthermore, in the case
of an acquisition announcement, if the merger information is leaked or expected,
researchers can enlarge the pre-event period to investigate this possibility.
Figure 3.2: Time Line for an Event Study
This figure presents the timing sequence for an event study. Defining t = 0 as the event date, (T1,
T2) represents the event window. (T0, T1) is the estimation (pre-event) window. (T2, T3) is defined
as the post-event window. Even if the event being considered is an announcement on a given date,
it is typical to set the length of event window to be larger than one.
✉ ✉ ✉ ✉
t = 0
Estimation
Window
Event
Window
Post-event
Window
T0 T1 T2 T3
✲
The estimation window is the period prior to the event window for estimating
parameters. Generally, the event period itself is not included in the estimation period
to prevent the event from inﬂuencing the normal estimation of parameters. Figure
3.2 illustrates the timing sequence of an event study. With the parameter estimated
in the estimation window (T0, T1), the abnormal returns can be calculated for event
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window (T1, T2). With the event study structure set, the remaining question is
how to design the estimation framework for abnormal returns. The presentation of
the empirical results follows the designation of the econometric methods. Ideally,
the empirical results will lead to an understanding of the sources and causes of the
eﬀects of the event under study.
B Measure of Abnormal Return
The abnormal return is the actual ex post return of security over the event window
minus the normal return of ﬁrm (or benchmark) over the event window. The normal
return is deﬁned as the expected return without conditioning on the event taking
place. For security i and event date t, the abnormal return is measured as:
ARit = Rit − E(Rit|Xt) (3.2)
where
ARit = abnormal returns for period t
Rit = actual returns for period t
E(Rit|Xt) = normal (expected) returns for period t
Xt = conditioning information for the normal return model
There are two common choices for modelling the normal return: the constant
mean return model (Xt is a constant) and the market model (Xt is the market
return).15 The constant mean return model assumes that the mean return of a given
security is constant through time. Let µi be the mean return for asset i. Then, the
constant mean return model is:
Rit = µi + ζit (3.3)
15Here, I follow the definition and classification in Mackinlay (1997).
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where Rit is the period t return on security i and µit is the period t disturbance term
for security i with an expectation of zero and variance σ2ζi . Brown and Warner (1980,
1985) ﬁnd that the constant mean return model often yields results similar to those
of more sophisticated models.
However, in the literature, the constant mean return model is not widely used
as the market model or the market-adjusted model. The market model assumes
a stable linear relation between the market return and the security return, and
relates the return of any given security to the return of the market portfolio (index).
The advantage of the market model is that it removes the portion of return that is
related to variation in the market return, which means the variance of the abnormal
return is reduced. This will lead to an increased ability to detect the eﬀects of an
announcement in the market.
I will now brieﬂy discuss these two short-horizon event study methods: mar-
ket model and market-adjusted model. These two methods are the most commonly
used short-term methodologies in corporate ﬁnance literature. The market-adjusted
model can be used to avoid data availability problems.16 For some events, it is not
feasible to have a pre-event estimation period for the expected model parameters,
such as initial public oﬀerings (see, e.g., Ritter (1991)). Based on the ﬁndings in
Brown and Warner (1980, 1985), there should be no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between
the results from these two models.17
3.3.2 Market Model
The market model is frequently used in empirical studies to measure the adjustment
of security returns to new information, which represents the impact of event-speciﬁc
16The market-adjusted model can be viewed as a restricted market model with α constrained to
zero and β constrained to one.
17There are some other models for short-run event studies such as multi-factor models and eco-
nomic models. Because these models only increase very limited gains for event studies and have
not been used in the thesis, they are not included in this section. Please refer to Mackinlay (1997)
for a further discussion on event study models.
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information. The model arises as an implication of the assumption that the joint
distribution of returns on securities is multivariate normal. To investigate the an-
nouncement eﬀect of events, the market model is constructed by the following steps.
First, the rate of return on a security over a particular holding period (estimation
window T0 to T1) is measured as:
R˜it = αi + βiR˜mt + ε˜it (3.4)
where
R˜it = rate of return on security i for period t
R˜mt = rate of return on market index for period t
αi, βi = regression coeﬃcients vary from one security to another
ε˜it = stochastic error term.
Model (3.4) is estimated on a set of data relative to the event date (estimation
window), with event observation days surrounding the event date deleted. Note that
the estimation date can be either before or after the event date depending on the
research purpose, while the pre-event period is mostly used as an estimation window.
Under general conditions, ordinary least squares (OLS) is a consistent estimation
procedure for market model parameters. Thus, OLS is used to estimate αi and βi.
They are calculated by regressing daily returns of security i on the market index
over the estimation window period. Given the estimated market model parameters
αˆi and βˆi, the abnormal return to the security of ﬁrm i for period t (event window
T1 to T2) is calculated as:
ARit = Rit − (αˆi + βˆiRmt) (3.5)
where
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ARit = abnormal returns of security i for period t
Rmt = rate of return on market index for period t
αˆi, βˆi = OLS estimated market model coeﬃcients.
Any observations of an abnormal return must be aggregated over the event win-
dow and across observations of the event to examine the event announcement eﬀects.
Speciﬁcally, the aggregation is along two dimensions — through time and across se-
curities.18
The average abnormal return (AAR) for a particular time t relative to the zero
event date is calculated as the sum of the abnormal returns at point t in the event
window divided by the number of securities in the sample. In particular, given the
event time, t = T1, . . . , T2, and N ﬁrms, the average abnormal return for time t is:
AARt =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ARit (3.6)
The average abnormal returns can then be aggregated over the event window. The
cumulative average abnormal return (CAR) is measured as the sum of the average
abnormal returns over a speciﬁc time period (event window) relative to the event
date:
CAR(T1,T2) =
T2∑
t=T1
AARt (3.7)
Equivalently, the CAR can also be formed by cumulating through time of each
security over event window then aggregating through the securities in the sample.
Deﬁne ĈARi(T1,T2) as the sample CAR from T1 to T2 for ﬁrm i. The CAR from T1
to T2 is the sum of the included abnormal returns in event window for security i,
ĈARi(T1,T2) =
T2∑
t=T1
ARit (3.8)
18It is assumed that the abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns will be independent
across securities.
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Then the CAR(T1,T2) is the sum of ĈARi(T1,T2) for the event window divided by the
number of securities in the sample,
CAR(T1,T2) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ĈARi(T1,T2) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
T2∑
t=T1
ARit (3.9)
3.3.3 Market-Adjusted Model
For short-horizon event studies, I apply the market-adjusted model by following
Brown and Warner (1985). There are three reasons for using the market-adjusted
model instead of the market model. First, the use of models sometimes depends
on the data availability. When the pre-event estimation period for market model
parameters is not feasible, the market-adjusted model can still be used. Second,
for some event announcement samples such as takeovers and seasoned equity oﬀer-
ings there are repeated event markers through time. Speciﬁcally, multiple events are
carried out by the same ﬁrms within a relatively short period, say one year. This
phenomenon is quite common for acquiring ﬁrms in corporate takeovers and oﬀer-
ing ﬁrms in seasoned equity oﬀerings. In these cases, there is a high probability of
multiple announcements in the estimation period. Any abnormal returns caused by
these announcements will bias the estimated parameters for the market model, which
will make beta estimations less meaningful. Third, it has been shown in Brown and
Warner (1980) that, for short-window event studies, weighting the market return by
the ﬁrm’s beta does not signiﬁcantly improve estimation results.
The daily abnormal return for a ﬁrm is calculated by deducting the equally-
weighted (or value-weighted) return of market index from the ﬁrm’s security return:
ARit = Rit −Rmt (3.10)
where
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ARit = abnormal returns of security i for period t
Rit = rate of return on security i for period t
Rmt = rate of return on market index for period t
The deﬁnitions of AAR and CAR are analogous to those for market model abnor-
mal returns. CAR can be calculated by (1) ﬁrst aggregating ARit across securities
then cumulating through time, or (2) ﬁrst cumulating ARit through time then ag-
gregating across securities.
3.3.4 Test Statistics
Given the excess abnormal returns based on the market model and market-adjusted
model, the statistical signiﬁcance of abnormal returns can be assessed. The null
hypothesis to be tested is that the cross-sectional average abnormal return (AAR) in
the event window is zero, and that the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAR)
over the event window (or diﬀerent periods) are zero.
Based on the discussion on aggregating abnormal returns, two methods can be
employed to cumulate ARit into CAR(T1,T2). Although it is quite obvious that the
CAR(T1,T2) generated from both methods are the same, the test statistic results are
diﬀerent. The test statistics for these two procedures depend on the second step of
aggregating abnormal returns. When the CAR is calculated by ﬁrst aggregating ARit
across securities then cumulating through time, the time-series standard deviation
test is used. When the CAR is calculated by ﬁrst cumulating ARit through time then
aggregating across securities, the cross-sectional standard deviation test is used.
A Time-Series Standard Deviation Test
The test statistics for any event time t is the ratio of the AAR in the event time (or
day) t to its estimated standard deviation, where the standard deviation is estimated
from the time series of the portfolio’s AAR over the estimation period (usually the
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pre-event period). The time-series standard deviation test uses a single variance
estimate for the entire portfolio. Therefore, the time-series standard deviation test
does not take account of unequal return variances across securities. Additionally, it
avoids the potential problem of the cross-sectional correlation of security returns.
The test statistics for any event time t AARt is:
tAARt =
AARt
σˆAAR
(3.11)
where
AARt =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ARit (3.12)
σˆAAR is the estimated variance of AARt. AAR is the average AARt through estima-
tion period.19 N is the number of securities that are available in the sample. M is
the estimation period of M = T1 − T0 + 1. T0 and T1 are the beginning and ending
times of the estimation period, respectively.
The test statistics that assess the statistical signiﬁcance of abnormal return per-
formance over a multi-day period T = T2 − T1 + 1 (cumulative average abnormal
returns CAR(T1,T2)) is:
tCAR =
CAR(T1,T2)
σˆAAR ∗ T 1/2 (3.13)
where
CAR(T1,T2) =
T2∑
t=T1
AARt. (3.14)
B Cross-Sectional Standard Deviation Test
In a cross-sectional standard deviation test, the portfolio test statistics for time t in
event period is:
tAARt =
AARt
σˆAARt/
√
N
(3.15)
19σˆAAR is shown as σˆ
2
AAR =
∑T1
t=T0
(AARt−AAR)
2
M−2 . AAR is shown as AAR =
1
M
∑E2
t=E1
AARt.
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and the test statistics for CAR(T1,T2) is
tCAR =
CAR(T1,T2)
σˆCAR(T1,T2)/
√
N
(3.16)
where σˆ2AARt and σˆ
2
CAR(T1,T2)
are the estimated variance of tAARt and CAR(T1,T2),
respectively.20
C Summary
To sum up, two procedures can be utilised to cumulate abnormal returns observa-
tions. Although it is quite obvious that CAR(T1,T2) generated from both methods
are the same, their test statistic methods are diﬀerent. Table 3.4 summarises the
calculation methods and test statistics for short-term CAR. It is noteworthy that,
although I classify the market model and market-adjusted model into event studies
for short-term analysis, they can also be applied to test long-horizon security perfor-
mance. Previous studies such as Brown and Warner (1980) and Kothari and Warner
(1997) use the market model and market-adjusted model on monthly security data
for long-horizon event study analysis.
3.4 Long-term Performance Measures
There have been long debates about the proper estimations of long-horizon abnormal
returns. The important components of measuring long-term abnormal stock price
performance include an estimator of abnormal performance and a means for deter-
mining the distribution of returns. Beginning with Ritter (1991), the most popular
method for measuring long-term abnormal performance is buy-and-hold abnormal
returns (BHAR). Although many concerns have been raised, it is still widely used
20σˆ2 is shows as σˆ2AARt =
1
N−1
∑N
j=1(ARjt− 1N
∑N
i=1Ait)
2. σˆ2CAR(T1,T2)
is shown as σˆ2CAR(T1,T2)
=
1
N−1
∑N
j=1(CARj,(T1,T2) − 1N
∑N
i=1 CARi,(T1,T2))
2.
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Table 3.4: Summary of Short-term CAR Methods
This table presents summary of the calculation and test statistic methods for short-term cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). There are two methods
to cumulative ARit into CAR(T1,T2). When the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAR) is calculated by first aggregating ARit across securities
then cumulating through time, the time-series standard deviation test is used. When the CAR is calculated by first cumulating ARit through time then
aggregating across securities, the cross-sectional standard deviation test is used.
Type Method Description
Panel A: By Security by Time, Time-Series Standard Deviation Test
CAR Aggregate across securities︸ ︷︷ ︸
AARt =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ARit
=⇒ Cumulate through time︸ ︷︷ ︸
CAR(T1,T2) =
T2∑
t=T1
AARt
Statistics tAARt =
AARt
σˆAAR
and tCAR =
CAR(T1,T2)
σˆAAR ∗ T 1/2
Panel B: By Time by Security, Cross-Sectional Standard Deviation Test
CAR Cumulate through time︸ ︷︷ ︸
ĈARi(T1,T2) =
T2∑
t=T1
ARit
=⇒ Aggregate across securities︸ ︷︷ ︸
CAR(T1,T2) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ĈARi(T1,T2)
Statistics tAARt =
AARt
σˆAARt/
√
N
and tCAR =
CAR(T1,T2)
σˆCAR(T1,T2)/
√
N
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in studies on ﬁnancial economics and corporate ﬁnance. Another well-recognised
methodology is calendar-time portfolio returns (CTPR), advocated by Fama (1998)
and Mitchell and Staﬀord (2000). Note that, despite extensive literature, there are
no obviously better models for measuring long-term abnormal performance. Both
BHAR and CTPR have low power against economically interesting null hypotheses
and some misspeciﬁcation.
3.4.1 Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns
Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR), also known as the characteristic-based
matching approach, have been widely used to measure long-term abnormal per-
formance in corporate ﬁnance. Early studies by Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Ver-
maelen (1995), Barber and Lyon (1997), and Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999) provide
supporting evidence for BHAR. An appealing feature of using BHAR is that buy-
and-hold returns better resemble investors’ actual investment experience than the
periodic rebalancing employed in other approaches. Barber and Lyon (1997) argue
that BHAR is an appropriate estimator because it “precisely measures investor expe-
rience.” BHAR is calculated as the long-term buy-and-hold return of a sample ﬁrm
less the long-term buy-and-hold return of a reference portfolio:
BHAR(T1,T2) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(BHRi,(T1,T2) − BHRpi,(T1,T2)) (3.17)
where
BHRi,(T1,T2) =
T2∏
t=T1
(1 +Rit)− 1. (3.18)
BHRpi,(T1,T2) =
T2∏
t=T1
(1 +Rpit)− 1. (3.19)
BHRi,(T1,T2) is the buy-and-hold returns for ﬁrm i over period T1 to T2. BHRpi,(T1,T2)
is the buy-and-hold returns for ﬁrm i’s reference portfolio over period T1 to T2. N
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is the number of ﬁrms in the sample. T2 − T1 is the horizon in months over which
abnormal returns are calculated. BHAR captures the value of investment in the
average sample ﬁrm relative to an appropriate benchmark over the horizon of interest.
For the sample of event ﬁrms, the mean BHAR is calculated as the equally-weighted
or value-weighted average BHAR of the individual ﬁrms.
A Reference Portfolios and Returns
In the literature, diﬀerent kinds of benchmark can be applied in BHAR, which can be
classiﬁed into three types: (1) market index (e.g. S&P 500 index, Nasdaq composite,
CRSP value-weighted index, CRSP equal-weighted index); (2) control ﬁrm (e.g. size
control ﬁrm, industry control ﬁrm, size/industry control ﬁrm ); (3) reference portfolio
(e.g. size portfolio, book-to-market portfolio, size and book-to-market portfolio).
Table 3 in Barber and Lyon (1997) provides a summary of research analysing long-
run abnormal stock returns following corporate events, as well as the benchmarks
used in each of the studies. Among the summarised studies, only three papers use
the control ﬁrm approach, namely Ritter (1991), Loughran and Ritter (1995), and
Spiess and Aﬄeck-Graves (1995). Even for more recent research, very few use the
control ﬁrm approach for benchmark estimation. Meanwhile, as reviewed in their
table, the majority of studies construct reference portfolios as benchmarks, which
shows the importance of the reference portfolio approach in BHAR. Therefore, in
the following, I will only discuss using the market index and reference portfolios as
benchmarks.
When the market index is used as a benchmark, the buy-and-hold returns for
ﬁrm i’s reference portfolio are calculated as: BHRpi,(T1,T2) =
∏T2
t=T1
(1 + Rmt) − 1,
where Rmt is the rate of return for the market index in month t, BHRpi,(T1,T2) is the
buy-and-hold returns for ﬁrm i’s reference portfolio over period T1 to T2. This is
a very straightforward estimation approach. Market index variations over the same
holding period are taken out; however, since all securities in the sample of event
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ﬁrms are matched with the same benchmark, disregarding the characteristics of each
ﬁrm, only for diﬀerent periods, this approach certainly has some drawbacks.
The advantage of the reference portfolio approach is that diﬀerent benchmarks
are constructed according to the uniqueness of each ﬁrm. The underlying assumption
is that the reference portfolio matched on a ﬁrm’s characteristics (e.g. size and book-
to-market) perfectly proxy for the expected (normal) return on a security. Abnormal
returns estimated under this method can better reﬂect the eﬀects of corporate events
in the long-horizon. However, it does require the correct construction of benchmark
portfolios. Barber and Lyon (1997) and Kothari and Warner (1997) document simi-
lar evidence and show that the common estimation procedures of reference portfolios
can produce biased BHAR estimates. In particular, bias arises from new listings, re-
balancing of benchmark portfolios, and the skewness of multi-year abnormal returns.
Proposed corrections include carefully constructing benchmark portfolios to elimi-
nate known bias and conducting inferences via a bootstrapping procedure. I will
discuss some of these issues in the following subsection and explore how the above
corrections can be achieved under diﬀerent settings.
In the thesis, I mainly apply the size and book-to-market portfolio approach
to construct reference portfolios for BHAR. Although there are several paths for
constructing reference portfolios, the size and book-to-market portfolio approach is
probably the most popular one in the literature. Reference portfolios are constructed
by matching each ﬁrm in the corporate event sample to a portfolio of ﬁrms that belong
to the same size and book-to-market quintile as the event ﬁrm. As argued by Lyon,
Barber, and Tsai (1999), ﬁrms from non-random samples should be compared to the
general population on the basis of characteristics that are the best at explaining the
cross-section of returns.
Size and book-to-market portfolios are created in line with Fama and French
(1993), as follows:
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1. I calculate the ﬁrm size (market value of equity) in June of each year t for all
ﬁrms. The market value of equity is calculated using the price and common
shares outstanding at the end of June.
2. In June of each year t, I rank all NYSE ﬁrms on CRSP on the basis of ﬁrm
size, and form size quintile portfolios based on these rankings.
3. AMEX and Nasdaq ﬁrms are placed into the appropriate NYSE size quintiles
based on their June market value of equity.
4. Within each size quintile, ﬁrms are sorted into quintiles based on their book-
to-market ratios in year t− 1.
5. The book-to-market ratio in year t−1 is calculated as the book value of equity
for the ﬁscal year ending in calendar year t− 1, divided by the market equity
at the end of December of year t− 1.
6. The book value of equity is stockholder’s equity (item 216) minus preferred
stock plus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit (item 35),
if available, minus post-retirement beneﬁt asset (item 330), if available. If
stockholder’s equity is missing, I use common equity (item 60) plus preferred
stock par value (item 130). If these variables are missing, I use book assets
(item 6) less liabilities (item 181). Preferred stock is preferred stock liquidating
value (item 10), or preferred stock redemption value (item 56), or preferred
stock par value (item 130) in that order of availability.21
Event ﬁrms are assigned to twenty-ﬁve portfolios formed on size and book-to-
market, using size quintile and book-to-market quintile breakpoints (from Kenneth
French’s website). For ﬁrms that have undertaken events in the period from July of
year t to June of year t+1, I determine the size and book-to-market quintiles at the
21These item codes are used in Compustat database to identity variables.
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ﬁscal year-end of calendar year t − 1. Many of the following discussions on BHAR
are borrowed from Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999) and Bouwman, Fuller, and Nain
(2009) to analyse and compare diﬀerent reference portfolio measures.
There are two ways to calculate the long-term returns for size and book-to-market
reference portfolios. The ﬁrst method calculates, in each month, the mean return for
each portfolio, and then compounds over (T2 − T1) months:
BHRrebpi,(T1,T2) =
T2∏
t=T1
[
1 +
∑Nt
j=1Rjt
Nt
]
− 1 (3.20)
where T1 is the beginning time, T2 is the ending time, T2 − T1 is the period of
investment (in months), Rjt is the return on security j in month t, and Nt is the
number of securities in month t. This is a more “traditional” way.
As argued in Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999), although research in ﬁnancial eco-
nomics commonly uses long-horizon reference portfolio returns calculated in this
manner, they do not accurately reﬂect the returns earned on a passive buy-and-hold
strategy of investing equally in the securities that constitute the reference portfolio.
First, this portfolio return assumes monthly rebalancing to maintain equal weights.
This leads to an inﬂated long-horizon return on the reference portfolio, which can
likely be attributed to bid-ask bounce and non-synchronous trading. This is referred
to as the rebalancing bias in Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999). Second, this portfolio
return includes newly listed ﬁrms subsequent to portfolio formation (time T1). Since
it is likely that ﬁrms that go public make up a signiﬁcant portion of newly listed
ﬁrms, the result is a downwardly biased estimate of the long-horizon return from
investing in a passive (i.e. not rebalanced) reference portfolio in time T1. They refer
to this as the new listing bias. In reference to the rebalanced nature of this return
calculation, I denote the return calculated in this manner with the superscript “reb.”
The second method of calculating the long-horizon returns on a reference portfolio
involves ﬁrst compounding the returns on securities constituting the portfolio, and
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then summing across securities:
BHRbhpi,(T1,T2) =
NT1∑
j=1
[∏T2
t=T1
(1 +Rjt)
]
− 1
NT1
(3.21)
where NT1 is the number of securities traded in month T1, the beginning period for
the return calculation. The return on this portfolio represents a passive, equally-
weighted investment in all securities constituting the reference portfolio in time T1.
There is no investment in ﬁrms listed subsequent to period T1, nor is there monthly
portfolio rebalancing. Consequently, the reference portfolio return calculated this
way is free from new-listing bias and rebalancing bias. Related to the buy-and-hold
nature of this return calculation, I denote the return calculated in this manner with
the superscript “bh.”
Although this method of creating reference portfolios eliminates new-listing bias
and rebalancing bias, it introduces a diﬀerent problem. An event ﬁrm is assigned to
an appropriate size and book-to-market portfolio at the time of the event announce-
ment and, subsequently, the abnormal returns of the sample ﬁrm are measured rel-
ative to this group of ﬁrms for the entire horizon of interest. Insofar as the size and
book-to-market characteristics of ﬁrms change over time, this method introduces
inaccuracies in size and book-to-market matching. Calculating portfolio returns in
this way prevents sample ﬁrms from being reassigned to new portfolios if size and
book-to-market characteristics change.
B BHAR t-Statistics
To test the null hypothesis that the mean BHAR is equal to zero for a sample of N
ﬁrms, the conventional t-statistic method is employed:
t =
BHAR(T1,T2)
σˆ(BHAR(T1,T2))/
√
N
(3.22)
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where BHAR(T1,T2) is the sample mean of BHAR(T1,T2) and σˆ(BHAR(T1,T2)) is the
cross-sectional sample standard deviation of BHAR for the sample of N ﬁrms.
Barber and Lyon (1997) document that long-horizon BHAR are positively skewed
and that this positive skewness leads to negatively biased t-statistics. Lyon, Barber,
and Tsai (1999) argue that inference should not be based on the normality assump-
tion. Abnormal returns calculated using the control ﬁrm approach or buy-and-hold
reference portfolios eliminate the new listing and rebalancing biases. Barber and
Lyon (1997) also document that the control ﬁrm approach eliminates the skewness
bias. Instead, to eliminate the skewness bias when using buy-and-hold reference
portfolios, one can use the skewness-adjusted test statistic and bootstrap the critical
values in order to draw an inference. The skewness-adjusted t-statistic is measured
as follows:
t =
√
N(S +
1
3
γˆS2 +
1
6N
γˆ) (3.23)
where
S =
BHAR(T1,T2)
σˆ(BHAR(T1,T2))
and γˆ =
∑N
i=1(BHARi,(T1,T2) − BHAR(T1,T2))
Nσˆ(BHAR(T1,T2))
3
(3.24)
Note that γˆ is an estimate of the coeﬃcient of skewness and
√
NS is the conventional
t-statistic.
3.4.2 Calendar-Time Portfolio Regression
A widely-used approach for measuring long-term stock performance is to track the
performance of an event portfolio in calendar time and estimate risk-adjusted abnor-
mal performance. The calendar-time portfolio regression (CTPR) approach was ﬁrst
introduced to ﬁnancial economics literature by Jaﬀe (1974) and Mandelker (1974),
and has since been advocated by many studies. The distinguishing feature of CTPR
is its calculation of calendar-time portfolio returns for ﬁrms experiencing an event,
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and the calibration of abnormal performance in multi-factor regression. Notably,
Fama (1998) strongly advocates a monthly CTPR approach for measuring long-term
abnormal performance. Compared with BHAR, the CTPR approach is less suscepti-
ble to the bad model problem, and any cross-sectional correlations of the event ﬁrms
will be automatically accounted for in the portfolio variance at each point in calen-
dar time. Mitchell and Staﬀord (2000) demonstrate the existence of a cross-sectional
correlation of event ﬁrm abnormal returns, and, therefore, suggest the calendar-time
approach.
To implement the CTPR approach, a time series of portfolio returns is con-
structed for a sample of ﬁrms’ experiences of a corporate event (e.g. takeovers,
IPOs, or SEOs).22 In each calendar month over the entire sample period, a port-
folio is constructed comprising all ﬁrms experiencing the event with the previous
T months. The number of ﬁrms included in a portfolio is unlikely to be constant
through time. In general, the portfolios are rebalanced monthly to drop all ﬁrms that
reach the end of their T -month period and add all ﬁrms that have just announced
a transaction. Equally-weighted or value-weighted portfolio returns are calculated
in each calendar month. The time series of the portfolio returns net of the risk-free
return over the sample period is regressed on the three Fama and French (1993)
factors,
Rpt −Rft = αp + βp(Rmt −Rft) + spSMBt + hpHMLt + ǫt (3.25)
or the Fama and French (1993) three factors and Carhart (1997) momentum factor
as follows:
Rpt −Rft = αp + βp(Rmt −Rft) + spSMBt + hpHMLt + upUMDt + ǫt (3.26)
where Rpt is the equal- or value-weighted return for calendar month t for the portfolio
of event ﬁrms that experienced the event within previous T months, Rft is the risk-
22The description here is based on Mitchell and Stafford (2000) and Kothari and Warner (2007).
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free rate, Rmt − Rft is the excess return on the market portfolio, SMBt is the
diﬀerence between the return on the portfolio of “small” and “big” stocks, HMLt is
the diﬀerence between the return on the portfolio of “high” and “low” book-to-market
stocks, UMPt is the diﬀerence between the return on the portfolio of past one-year
“winners” and “losers”23, and βp, sp, hp, and up, are sensitivities (betas) of the event
portfolio to the four factors.
Within this framework, the intercept αp measures the average monthly abnormal
return on the portfolio of event ﬁrms, which is zero under the null hypothesis of
no abnormal performance. A positive intercept indicates that after controlling for
market, size, and book-to-market factors in returns, a sample of event ﬁrms has
a performance better than expected. Since αp is the average monthly abnormal
performance over the T month post-event period, it can be multiplied by the number
of months (e.g. 12, 24, or 36) to reﬂect annualised abnormal performance.
Similar to BHAR, recent evidence on the implications of using the CTPR ap-
proach is mixed. Brav and Gompers (1997), Fama (1998), and Mitchell and Staﬀord
(2000) favour the CTPR approach. As stated in Barber and Lyon (1997), for mea-
suring long-term abnormal performance, the CTPR approach (three- or four-factor
model) has the advantage of not requiring size or book-to-market data for event
ﬁrms. Therefore, ﬁrms without available data on these ﬁrm characteristics can still
be included in the long-horizon analysis. Secondly, some large ﬁrms or ﬁrms with
low book-to-market ratios may in fact have common stock returns that more closely
mimic those of small ﬁrms or ﬁrms with high book-to-market ratios. In other words,
returns of non-event ﬁrms matched on size and book-to-market might not fully rep-
resent the expected stock returns. The factor regression approach allows for this
possibility since the pattern of returns determines whether the returns on a ﬁrm’s
common stock more closely mimic the returns of small ﬁrms and/or high book-to-
market ﬁrms.
23UMPt is the Carhart’s (1997) momentum factor.
111
However, the calendar-time portfolio approach has some disadvantages. Loughran
and Ritter (2000) argue against using CTPR because it might be biased toward
ﬁndings’ results consistent with market eﬃciency. One typical thread of research in
corporate ﬁnance is that corporate managers positively time corporate events to ex-
ploit mispricing or market opportunities. By forming a calendar-time portfolio, the
CTPR approach under-weights managers’ timing decisions and over-weights other
observations. Therefore, Loughran and Ritter (2000) argue that empirical tests that
weight ﬁrms equally should have more power than tests that weight each time period
equally. Since the CTPR approach weights each period (month) equally, it has less
power to detect abnormal performance if corporate events cluster in certain periods
due to managers’ timing.24 Fama (1998) suggests weighting calendar months by
the number of event observations in each calendar month to overcome this potential
problem.
24The waves of corporate events have been widely documented in literature.
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Chapter 4
Liquidity-Based Merger Valuation
and Performance
4.1 Introduction
A substantial amount of theoretical and empirical studies in mergers and acquisi-
tions (M&A) have explored many phenomena (patterns) associated with corporate
takeovers. As summarised in Bouwman, Fuller, and Nain (2009), in general, ag-
gregate acquisition activity occurs in waves through time; the abnormal returns in
announcement periods are signiﬁcantly positive for target ﬁrms, but may be signiﬁ-
cantly positive or negative for bidder ﬁrms; and post-acquisition returns to acquiring
shareholders are signiﬁcantly negative.1 Substantial eﬀorts have been employed to
explain these takeover phenomena; many studies explore potential factors from other
ﬁelds in ﬁnance to explain these long-existing puzzles and have made signiﬁcant
achievements.2
1Announcement day returns and post-acquisition returns are higher for cash-financed acqui-
sitions and lower for stock-financed acquisitions. For merger waves, see Andrade, Mitchell, and
Stafford (2001) and Harford (2005). For announcement day returns, see Asquith (1983) and Jensen
and Ruback (1983). For post-acquisition long-term returns, see Franks, Harris, and Titman (1991),
Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker (1992), Loughran and Vijh (1997), and Rau and Vermaelen (1998).
2See Rau and Vermaelen (1998) for the acquirer’s valuation effects. See Asquith, Bruner, and
Mullins (1983) and Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) for the acquisition’s size effects. See
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In corporate ﬁnance, there is considerable evidence that ﬁrms hold substantial
amount of liquid assets (e.g. Opler, Pinkowika, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) and
Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009)). Theoretical research in Holmström and Tirole
(1998, 2001) shows that ﬁrms have substantial desires for liquid assets which serve
as cushions against any future liquidity shocks.3 Given the universal need of hoard-
ing liquidity, we observe however that aggregate liquidity show cyclical variations
through time. This pattern of aggregate liquidity can not be easily overlooked as
this macro factor do carries potentially important implications on corporate invest-
ment decisions. Moreover, some previous studies such as Harford (1999) and Oler
(2008) suggest that the corporate liquidity holdings have strong inﬂuences on the
acquisition decisions and the performance of acquiring ﬁrms.
Inspired by the importance of aggregate liquidity in ﬁnancial markets (e.g. Green-
wood (2005) and Harford (2005)) and by studies suggesting the importance of liq-
uidity in corporate investment and ﬁnancing activity (e.g. Harford (1999) and Oler
(2008)), I investigate whether aggregate liquidity factors inﬂuence the activity and
performance of acquisitions. In particular, I ask the following questions: Are acquisi-
tions announced during high aggregate liquidity period fundamentally diﬀerent from
those initiated during low aggregate liquidity periods? Can the valuation and perfor-
mance of acquiring ﬁrms be explained by aggregate liquidity factors? The purpose
of this research is to examine a potential factor (aggregate liquidity) for a number
of commonly recognised anomalies in M&A. Similar to some previous studies,4 I
suspect the “commonly” existence of market anomalies related with M&A is just
a consequence of some acquisitions’ extreme performance. In the present research,
aggregate liquidity factors are applied to distinguish acquisition participants, and
the performance and activity of acquisitions initiated in various status of aggregate
Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005) and Bouwman, Fuller, and Nain (2009) for
market valuation effects.
3In contrast to perfect market models, firms desire to hold cash is driven by the their inability
to pledge all of the expected income from incremental investment to the investors.
4See, for example, Rau and Vermaelen (1998) and Bouwman, Fuller, and Nain (2009).
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liquidity are measured and compared.
Using a sample of 4, 162 mergers announced in the U.S. between January 1, 1980
and December 31, 2003, I examine whether there are fundamental diﬀerences in
the activity and performance between mergers announced in high-liquidity markets
and those announced in low-liquidity markets. The measures of aggregate liquidity
include aggregate corporate liquidity demand (ACLD) and aggregate market liquid-
ity supply (AMLS). In order to construct ACLD, by following Greenwood (2005), I
use data reported in the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds to form a measure of the
aggregate corporate accumulation of liquid assets as a fraction of total corporate
investment spending. For AMLS, I follow Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen
(2008) and use the U.S. Debt/GDP ratio. Based on factors of aggregate liquidity,
the basic speciﬁcation classiﬁes the sample period of M&A into high-, medium-, and
low-liquidity periods according to the prior year’s aggregate liquidity (and I refer
to acquisitions that are announced during those periods as high-, medium-, or low-
liquidity acquisitions, respectively). Next, I compare the activity and performance
of acquisitions initiated in high- and low-liquidity takeover markets.
To empirically examine the performance of acquiring ﬁrms, I use several stock
performance measures. Speciﬁcally, I apply cumulative abnormal returns (CAR)
to measure pre-announcement and announcement abnormal returns, and buy-and-
hold abnormal returns (BHAR) and calendar-time portfolio regressions (CTPR) to
measure long-horizon post-merger performance. The short-term stock performance
(announcement CAR) and long-term stock performance (post-acquisition BHAR and
CTPR) of acquiring ﬁrms that announce acquisitions under diﬀerent market circum-
stances of liquidity are also compared. Both pre- and post-merger performance are
measured to examine whether the market’s initial reactions and post-event reactions
to acquiring ﬁrms’ stock are consistent. The major focus of this research is to exam-
ine diﬀerences between the activity and performance of high-liquidity acquisitions
and low-liquidity acquisitions. Although these empirical methods for stock perfor-
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mance all have certain insuﬃciencies, I would expect the probability of measurement
biases systematically aﬀecting the diﬀerences in performance between high- and low-
liquidity subsamples to be relatively small.
The distribution of acquisitions through time reveals a positive correlation be-
tween aggregate liquidity and merger activity. I ﬁnd that more acquisitions are
announced in high aggregate liquidity (both demand and supply) markets, while
low-liquidity periods have less acquisition announcements. For the whole sample,
there are 1, 856 (1, 794) deals initiated in high-liquidity demand (supply) periods.
However, only 695 (582) acquirers announce acquisitions when aggregate liquidity
demand (supply) is low. In order to test the robustness of this correlation, I control
for various deal characteristics, namely the target ﬁrms’ public status (i.e. public,
private, subsidiary), the method of payment (i.e. cash, stock, mixed), and trans-
action values (i.e. large (30%), medium (40%) or small (30%)). The correlation
remains strong after controlling for these factors. Moreover, when the sample is par-
titioned by aggregate liquidity and method of payment, more (less) acquisitions with
stock payment take place than with cash payment when aggregate liquidity is high
(low). Stock-ﬁnanced acquisitions show a stronger correlation with liquidity than
cash-ﬁnanced acquisitions.
The results of merger performance are as follows. First, both pre-announcement
CARs are higher when acquiring ﬁrms announce in high-liquidity markets, and lower
for those announcing in low-liquidity markets. For instance, high-liquidity demand
(supply) acquisitions have pre-announcement returns of 4.28% (1.38%), while the ab-
normal returns for low-liquidity demand (supply) acquisitions are −0.67% (−0.40%).
The diﬀerences between the two are statistically signiﬁcant. Second, while all ac-
quiring ﬁrms have a smaller positive CAR during announcement dates (three-day
CAR is 0.84%), high-liquidity acquisitions remain with larger abnormal returns than
low-liquidity acquisitions. Third, and interestingly, although high-liquidity acquir-
ers generate higher announcement returns for their shareholders in announcement
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periods than low-liquidity acquirers, the results of post-merger performance stand
in sharp contrast to these. Speciﬁcally, high-liquidity acquisitions substantially un-
derperform against low-liquidity acquisitions in the three years periods following the
completion of acquisitions, as measured by BHAR and CTPR. Acquiring ﬁrms un-
dertaking acquisitions during low-liquidity periods even have long-run returns close
to zero. The three-year BHAR diﬀerence between high- and low-liquidity demand
(supply) acquisitions is −16.35% (−13.35%), and is signiﬁcant at 1% level. Thus,
high-liquidity mergers destroy value for shareholders in the long run, while low-
liquidity mergers do not. These patterns remain robust after controlling for various
deal characteristics, and are further supported by the results taken from the multi-
variate regression analysis. Overall, the main ﬁndings in this research suggest that
low-liquidity acquisitions are fundamentally diﬀerent from low-liquidity acquisitions.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 explains the
development of the hypotheses in this study and reviews some related literature. Sec-
tion 4.3 provides descriptions for the sample of mergers and empirical methodology.
Section 4.4 tests the merger activity and its correlation with aggregate liquidity. In
Section 4.5, both the short- and long-run performances of acquisitions are examined.
Section 4.6 concludes this chapter.
4.2 Related Literature and Hypotheses Development
4.2.1 Liquidity and Merger Activity
Theoretical and empirical research on mergers and acquisitions (M&A) reveals that
merger activity comes in waves (see Brealey, Myers, and Allen (2008)). Mitchell and
Mulherin (1996) investigate the industry-level patterns in takeover and restructuring
activity from 1982 to 1989. They document clear evidence of the clustering of merger
waves within industries, and argue that these inter-industry patterns are directly
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related to various technological, economic, or regulatory shocks to those industries.
Andrade, Mitchell, and Staﬀord (2001) review previous ﬁndings and show that there
have been three major takeover activity waves since the early 1960s, and the merger
activity in the 1990s seems to be even more dramatic and widespread.
Early studies provided many possible reasons for takeover waves. The debates
about the cause of merger waves were advanced by research on stock market valu-
ations, which seems to be the most successfully supported theory in the literature.
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) argue that stock market valuations drive a substantial
portion of merger activity, which subsequently cause the clustering of merger activity
in waves. They suggest that takeover bidders would like to use their overvaluation
stocks to purchase target ﬁrms, especially when the overall market valuation is high.
In essence, overvaluation in the whole market or in certain industries would lead
to merger activity clustering in time. Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) also
suggest the correlation between market valuation and aggregate merger waves by
modelling rational managerial behaviour and uncertainty about sources of misvalua-
tion. At the peak of market valuation, the clustering of transactions with overvalued
acquisitions creates a merger wave. Many follow-up empirical evidences supporting
the theory of market valuation have been found. In favour of market valuation the-
ories, suggested by Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan
(2004), Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005) show that market misval-
uation aﬀects the level of aggregate merger activity, the decision to be an acquirer
or target, and the method of transaction. Further empirical evidences consistent
with the explanation of stock valuation are also shown in Ang and Cheng (2006)
and Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh (2006), who use accounting data to
estimate fundamental market valuation.
Another explanation for merger waves is that industries responding to shocks
reorganise through takeovers and thereby create a clustering of merger activity (see,
e.g., Mulherin and Boone (2000), Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001, 2002), and Maksi-
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movic and Phillips (2001)). These studies suggest the neoclassical theory of merger
waves; however, previous research in both streams of research only provide evidence
consistent with their theories, rather than considering both neoclassical and mis-
valuation theories, and then formally rejecting one. Having recognised this, Harford
(2005) systematically examines whether a clustering of mergers at the aggregate level
is due to a combination of industry shocks, or whether due to market timing (mis-
valuation). Consistent with the neoclassical explanation of merger waves, he ﬁnds
that economic, regulatory, and technological shocks drive industry merger waves.
Motivated by recent studies on corporate liquidity and aggregate liquidity, this re-
search suggests a role for aggregate liquidity in explaining aggregate merger activity.
Firstly, at ﬁrm-level, Harford (1999) shows that ﬁrms that have built up large liquid-
ity reserves are more active in the acquisition market, and their acquisitions are more
likely to be value-decreasing. Therefore, when the whole market is suﬃcient with liq-
uid assets, bidding ﬁrms have a strong preference for attempting acquisitions, which
subsequently leads to a clustering of mergers in that period. Similarly, Shleifer and
Vishny (1992) hypothesise that an increase in cash simultaneously increases funda-
mental value and relaxes ﬁnancial constraints, which causes the clustering of mergers
in booms. Secondly, at aggregate-level, Harford (2005) argues that merger waves re-
quire both an economic motivation for transactions and relatively low transaction
costs to generate a large volume of transactions, which is measured by a macro-level
liquidity factor. Only when suﬃcient capital liquidity exists to accommodate the
reallocation of assets will an industry shock generate a merger wave. Eisfeldt and
Rampini (2006) also show that the variation in capital liquidity has an inﬂuence on
the degree of total capital reallocation. Thirdly, Holmström and Tirole (2001) and
Greenwood (2005) show potential correlations between aggregate liquidity and mar-
ket valuations. Greenwood (2005) ﬁnds that aggregate investment in liquid assets
as a ratio of aggregate corporate available funds is signiﬁcantly negatively related to
subsequent U.S. stock market returns. Thus, in line with market valuation theories
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in M&A, aggregate liquidity should also play an important role in explaining merger
activity.
It is worth noting that Holmström and Tirole’s (2001) liquidity-based asset pric-
ing model, which shows that the factor of aggregate liquidity has an inﬂuence on
market valuation, is based on a rational theory of moral hazard. The market valu-
ation theory in M&A by Shleifer and Vishny (2003) is established on a behavioural
explanation. In this research, instead of trying to theoretically integrate these two
distinct theories, I simply utilise the predictions of these two theories to suggest
a potential correlation between aggregate liquidity and acquisitions. Empirical hy-
potheses are formed based on the implication of liquidity theory (aggregate liquidity
aﬀects market valuation) and valuation theory (market valuation aﬀects merger ac-
tivity and performance).
In summary, high corporate liquidity reserves and market provision for liquidity
provide suﬃcient liquid capital for asset reallocation and reduce ﬁnancing constraints
for investments, which enhances the probability of making acquisitions. So, when
the aggregate liquidity is high, the collective actions of ﬁrms in the M&A markets
create the clustering of merger activities and aggregate merger waves. Thus, I expect
the takeover activity to be high when aggregate liquidity is high.
4.2.2 Liquidity and Merger Performance
A substantial amount of studies in M&A focus on the stock performances of target
ﬁrms and acquiring ﬁrms surrounding announcement dates (see, e.g., Asquith (1983),
Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins (1983), and Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988)) and in
post-acquisition periods (see, e.g., Franks, Harris, and Titman (1991), Agrawal, Jaﬀe,
and Mandelker (1992), Loughran and Vijh (1997), Rau and Vermaelen (1998), and
Agrawal and Jaﬀe (2000)). Evidence for the announcement period wealth eﬀect on
target ﬁrms is found to be signiﬁcantly positive, but either positive or negative for
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acquiring ﬁrms depending on diﬀerent takeover characteristics, including method of
payment, type of target, etc. On average, acquirers break even in days around merger
announcements. For long-term performance, empirical results show that acquiring
ﬁrms have statistically signiﬁcant negative abnormal returns up to three (or even
ﬁve) years after acquisitions, which is widely known as the ’puzzle of post-merger
underperformance’.
Harford (1999) explicitly examines the likelihood of acquisitions and corporate
liquidity reserves. He ﬁnds that ﬁrms with high liquidity reserves are more likely
to become acquirers than other ﬁrms, and acquisitions by cash-rich ﬁrms are value-
decreasing based on negative stock price reactions to announcements. He further
argues that such poor performance by cash-rich ﬁrms is consistent with the agency
costs of free cash ﬂow hypothesis.5 Oler (2008), building on Harford’s (1999) ﬁnd-
ings, investigates whether the announcement period market response with respect to
the acquirer’s liquidity reserves is complete. He proposes that if the initial market
response is not complete, then long-term post-acquisition returns will be predictable
based on the acquirer’s liquidity level. Evidence in Oler (2008) suggests that ac-
quirers with high liquidity balances on the announcement date of acquisitions often
suﬀer negative post-acquisition returns.
Meanwhile, other works have tried to ﬁnd explanations for long-horizon post-
acquisition returns from predictors of stock market returns such as book-to-market
ratio and ﬁrm size. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) consider the long-term underper-
formance of bidders in mergers and long-term overperformance of bidders in tender
oﬀers. They ﬁnd that the underperformance of acquiring ﬁrms in mergers is caused
predominantly by the poor post-acquisition performance of low book-to-market ﬁrms.
Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) document evidence for the existence of a
size eﬀect in acquisition announcement returns and conclude that the announcement
5Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986) argue that the agency conflict between owners
and managers is most severe in the presence of large free cash flows, and acquisitions are a primary
method by which managers can spend free cash.
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return for acquiring-ﬁrm shareholders is roughly two percentage points higher for
small acquirers. Regarding the method of payment in takeovers, Loughran and Vijh
(1997) suggest that the long-term post-acquisition returns for acquirers are higher
for cash oﬀers and tender oﬀers than for stock oﬀers and mergers.
Although originating from diﬀerent areas, these studies show that some predictors
of stock market returns can actually be utilised to explain acquisition phenomena
and produce fruitful results. Since aggregate liquidity is found to be an important
predictor of stock market returns (see Greenwood (2005)), I expect aggregate liq-
uidity to have explanation and prediction power for acquiring ﬁrms’ performance
around and after acquisitions. Inspired by studies on ﬁrm liquidity (Harford (1999)
and Oler (2008)) and aggregate liquidity (Greenwood (2005) and Harford (2005)),
I suggest that aggregate liquidity can also be used to explain abnormal phenomena
associated with merger performance. If cash-rich ﬁrms are more likely to undertake
value-decreasing acquisitions (see Harford (1999)), high aggregate liquidity periods
should have more such acquisitions with poor long-term performance.
Some other studies, instead of focusing on acquirers’ liquidity levels, explore the
eﬀect of target ﬁrms’ liquidity reserves. They argue that if the market for corpo-
rate control monitors liquidity holdings, cash-rich ﬁrms should be targeted more
frequently, controlling for other factors (see Pinkowitz (2002)).6 Faleye (2004) ﬁnds
that proxy ﬁght targets hold 23% more cash than comparable non-targets, and the
probability of a contest signiﬁcantly increases in excess cash holdings. However,
Harford (1999) and Pinkowitz (2002) argue that the likelihood of a ﬁrm becoming
a takeover target is signiﬁcantly negatively related to the holdings of excess liquid-
ity. Although not directly related to corporate liquidity issues, Schlingemann (2004)
analyses the relation between bidder gains and the source of ﬁnancing funds avail-
able. He documents that ﬁnancing decisions during the year before a takeover play
6However, some studies document that the takeover market does not account for firms’ exces-
sive liquidity. See, for example, Ambrose and Megginson (1992), Song and Walkling (1993), and
Comment and Schwert (1995).
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an important role in explaining the cross section of bidder gains after controlling for
the form of payment.
4.3 Data Description and Methodology
Section 4.3.1 introduces the construction criteria and provides summary statistics for
the sample of mergers. Section 4.3.2 describes how aggregate liquidity is implemented
to classify high-, medium-, and low-liquidity markets.
4.3.1 The Sample of Mergers
The sample of mergers comes from the Thomson One Banker Mergers and Acquisi-
tions (M&A) Database, which is exactly the same as the Securities Data Corporation
(SDC) Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) Database. Both databases are maintained
by the Thomson Financial Services.7
I selected a list of completed U.S. acquisitions for domestic targets from the SDC,
with announcement dates and eﬀective dates lying between January 1, 1980 and De-
cember 31, 2003, respectively. Since the SDC has a very limited cover of U.S. M&A
transactions before 1980, I therefore choose 1980 as the starting point of the sample.
Ending the sample at 2003 ensures three years’ post-merger stock returns are avail-
able from the CRSP database. In the literature, Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz
(2004, 2005) choose a similar sample period when using the SDC database. Data
associated with merger deals was collected from the SDC, including acquirers’ names
and CUSIP codes, the announcements and eﬀective dates of transactions, the trans-
action values, method of payments (i.e. cash, stock, and mixed), and target ﬁrms’
public statuses (i.e. public, private and subsidiary). Acquiring ﬁrms’ stock returns
were drawn from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). However, since
7Discussion with Thomson One Banker employees verified that both databases are the same.
For simplicity, I will quote the database in the following discussion as the ‘SDC M&A Database’
or ‘SDC’.
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the SDC does not provide the CRSP PERMNO number for the acquiring ﬁrms, I
searched for PERMNO in CRSP by matching on CUSIP codes.
Figure 4.1: Annual Number of Merger Deals, 1980 to 2003
This figure presents the number of merger deals and number of acquiring firms in each year from 1980
to 2003. The sample of mergers contains 4, 162 completed U.S. domestic acquisitions between 1980
and 2003 listed on SDC, where the publicly traded acquiring firm is listed on the NYSE, AMEX,
or Nasdaq, and gains control of a public, private, or subsidiary target firm whose transaction value
is at least $100 million.
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For merger transactions to be included into the sample, further requirements are:
1. The sample includes successful bids for at least 50% of the target’s equity, and
the transaction is listed as completed.
2. The transaction value is equal to or greater than $100 million, and is deﬁned
as the total value of consideration paid by the acquiring ﬁrms, excluding fees
and expenses.8
3. Acquired target ﬁrms are public or private U.S. ﬁrms, or non-public subsidiaries
of a public or private ﬁrm.
8I employ a one hundred million dollar cut-off to avoid results being driven by small deals. In
fact, 49% of my sample firms have a deal value above $250 million, 27% above $500 million, and
14% above $1 billion.
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4. Acquiring ﬁrms are U.S. ﬁrms publicly traded on the American Stock Exchange
(AMEX), New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), or Nasdaq.
5. Acquiring ﬁrms have daily stock returns around announcement dates and three
years’ monthly returns after the takeover completion date listed on the CRSP.
6. Neither the acquirer nor the target ﬁrm is a ﬁnancial or utilities institution,
because their business involves inventories of marketable securities.
The ﬁnal sample of mergers after these criteria contains 4, 162 merger transac-
tions. Figure 4.1 shows the amount of merger deals in each year between 1980 and
2003. It is obvious that the activity of mergers was high in the late 1980s and slowed
down between 1990 and 1993. From that point, the U.S. merger market experienced
a signiﬁcant boom from 1995 up until 2001. Figure 4.1 also shows the annual number
of acquiring ﬁrms in the sample period.9 There are only small diﬀerences between
the number of merger deals and the number of acquirers in the 1980s. However,
the gap increased signiﬁcantly since 1993 and reached its peak in the late 1990s.
Note that in this chapter, the terms ‘bidder’ and ‘acquirer’ are used interchangeably,
because each transaction in the sample leads to a completed acquisition.
Table 4.1 reports the distribution of merger deals through years based on the an-
nouncement date of transactions. The amount of mergers increases steadily through
time, and has a peak period between 1995 and 2001. Column 3 shows the number of
acquiring ﬁrms in each year. The total number of acquirers in the sample is 1, 955,
which means that quite a few acquiring ﬁrms in the sample undertook multiple ac-
quisitions.10 For the whole sample, the average transaction value is $893.8 million
and the median transaction value is $245.7 million. The large diﬀerence between
the mean and median values shows that there are more ﬁrms with small transaction
9In each year, multiple merger deals carried out by the same firm are counted as one acquiring
firm.
10Since several acquisitions in different years were undertaken by the same acquiring firm, the
total number of acquiring firms is not equal to the sum of the number of acquirers in each year.
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Table 4.1: Yearly Distribution of the Merger Sample
This table presents the number of mergers, number of acquirers, mean (median) value of transactions (in millions of dollar), the number of mergers
classified by method of payment (i.e. pure cash, pure stock, and mixed) and target firms’ public status (i.e. public, private, and subsidiary) in each
calendar year. The sample of mergers contains 4, 162 completed U.S. domestic acquisitions between 1980 and 2003 listed on SDC, where the publicly
traded acquiring firm is listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq, and gains control of a public, private, or subsidiary target firm whose transaction value
is at least $100 million. Mean (median) value of transaction is the average (median) transaction value in millions of U.S. dollar as reported by SDC.
Pure cash or stock payment refer to transactions that are known to be paid in 100% cash or stock, respectively. Mixed payment transactions include
combinations of cash, stocks, and derivative securities. Transactions with unknown type of payment and missing data are omitted from the columns
under method of payment.
Number of Transaction Value ($mil) Method of Payment Target Firms’ Public Status
Year Number Acquirers Mean Median Cash Stock Mixed Public Private Subsidiary
1980 14 13 379.1 270.3 1 1 10 5 4 5
1981 36 30 321.1 226.1 2 1 30 21 5 10
1982 31 31 277.0 200.0 0 0 30 11 6 14
1983 43 38 318.9 193.0 0 0 41 21 9 13
1984 68 63 323.5 188.8 5 2 55 32 3 30
1985 99 94 696.2 264.0 43 10 27 51 6 41
1986 132 117 439.5 250.0 33 13 27 53 25 54
1987 96 89 487.3 222.1 28 11 26 43 12 41
1988 99 93 563.5 230.0 38 6 23 42 17 38
1989 77 73 612.4 190.0 29 12 18 35 6 34
1990 51 48 621.6 185.5 13 15 14 19 8 24
1991 57 53 354.2 202.4 16 10 24 24 10 22
1992 68 67 357.6 202.2 17 18 22 29 18 21
1993 105 90 786.6 205.0 23 26 35 36 17 50
1994 157 135 630.9 186.9 51 42 36 57 40 58
1995 211 185 652.4 227.1 40 70 69 97 47 64
1996 311 259 691.7 228.0 65 77 114 124 83 100
1997 457 355 661.9 255.0 87 102 179 168 128 159
1998 485 382 1, 092.1 232.3 96 121 170 173 151 157
1999 482 371 1, 486.7 294.9 96 171 141 194 152 129
2000 458 358 1, 511.2 347.4 58 217 127 167 197 91
2001 235 203 1, 234.9 300.0 57 49 93 83 72 76
2002 206 178 745.7 211.1 71 27 74 58 65 79
2003 184 164 471.4 179.6 64 15 60 45 60 74
Total 4, 162 1, 955 893.8 245.7 933 1, 016 1, 445 1, 588 1, 141 1, 384
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values and less with extremely large transaction values.
Table 4.1 also shows the amount of merger deals in each year separated by pay-
ment methods and target ﬁrms’ public status. Based on the method of payment,
the whole sample is separated into 933 pure cash payment deals, 1, 016 pure stock
payment deals, and 1, 445 mixed payment transactions. Pure cash or stock payment
refers to transactions that are known to be paid in 100% cash or stock, respectively.
Mixed payment transactions include combinations of cash, stocks, and derivative
securities. Based on target ﬁrms’ public status, the merger transactions are classi-
ﬁed into 1, 588 deals with public targets, 1, 141 deals with private targets and 1, 384
deals with subsidiary targets. Note that the summed number of acquisitions in each
subgroup, classiﬁed by either the method of payment or target ﬁrms’ public status,
is diﬀerent from the total number of acquisitions (4, 162), which is due to the missing
data from the SDC.
4.3.2 The Implementation of Aggregate Liquidity
In this chapter, I will utilise the constructed measures of aggregate corporate liquidity
demand (ACLD) and aggregate market liquidity supply (AMLS) to examine the
correlations between aggregate liquidity and acquisitions.11 In particular, I want to
examine whether acquisitions announced in high-liquidity markets are fundamentally
diﬀerent from those announced in low-liquidity markets. Therefore, the ways in which
I measure and implement the aggregate liquidity to analyse the merger activity and
performance are important; a proper empirical methodology should be used to link
both sides.
The basic speciﬁcation is to classify the sample period of mergers as high-,
medium-, or low-liquidity markets (or periods) based on the aggregate liquidity mea-
sures in the prior year, where acquisitions announced in each liquidity market are
11Section 3.2 in Chapter 3 thoroughly describes the construction of aggregate liquidity measures.
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referred to as high-, medium-, or low-liquidity acquisitions. Firstly, the M&A mar-
ket in a particular year (t) is classiﬁed as a high-liquidity (30%), medium-liquidity
(40%), or low-liquidity (30%) market based on the aggregate liquidity measures the
year before (t − 1). For the sample period of 1980 to 2004, I have 7 high-liquidity,
10 medium-liquidity, and 7 low-liquidity years (markets). Under this classiﬁcation,
there are two sets of high-, medium-, and low-liquidity markets, based on ACLD
(∆L/S) and AMLS (Debt/GDP ), respectively.12 Secondly, acquisitions announced
in high-, medium-, or low-liquidity M&A markets are deﬁned as high-, medium-, or
low-liquidity (demand or supply) acquisitions.
In summary, merger deals are put into high-, medium-, or low-liquidity portfolios
based on the corresponding measures of aggregate liquidity in the year before the
announcement of mergers. For example, if the M&A market in year t is considered a
high- (low-) liquidity demand market based on ACLD (∆L/S) in the prior year t−1,
then mergers with an announcement date in year t are put into high- (low-) liquidity
demand portfolios. The aggregate liquidity in the year before a takeover plays an
important role in explaining merger activity and performance. Since the sample of
mergers has a sample period of 1980 to 2003, the time period of aggregate liquidity
measures is 1979 to 2002. Table 4.2 presents the summary statistics of aggregate
liquidity measures and variables in flow of funds for the period of 1979 to 2002. The
basic statistical properties of ACLD and AMLS align closely with the results shown
in Section 3.2.
In the M&A literature, a similar sample classiﬁcation method has been applied to
examine the correlations between aggregate market conditions and takeovers. Many
existing studies in the ﬁeld of stock market-driven acquisitions (see Shleifer and
12For ACLD (∆L/S), high-liquidity markets include the years: 2000, 2001, 1984, 1990, 1999,
1997, 1993; medium-liquidity markets include the years: 2002, 1983, 1992, 1996, 1985, 1987, 1994,
1998, 1980; and low-liquidity markets include the years: 1995, 2003, 1981, 1988, 1982, 1989, 1991.
For AMLS (Debt/GDP ), high-liquidity markets include the years: 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1993,
1998, 1992; medium-liquidity markets include the years: 1999, 1991, 1989, 1990, 1988, 2000, 1987,
1986, 2001, 1985; and low-liquidity markets include the years: 2003, 2002, 1984, 1983, 1981, 1982,
1980.
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics of Aggregate Liquidity, 1979 to 2002
This table presents the descriptive statistics for aggregate liquidity measures between 1979 and 2002. The sample of aggregate liquidity measures include
24 years’ annual aggregate corporate liquidity demand (∆L/S), which is measured as the ratio of changes in aggregate corporate liquidity (∆L) to
aggregate sources of corporate funds (S), and annual aggregate market liquidity supply (Debt/GDP ), which is measured as the ratio of U.S. publicly
held Treasury debt relative to U.S. GDP in that year. The sources of funds (S) is the sum of corporate internal funds (P − Div), equity issues (E),
and debt issues (D). Panel A reports the number of observations, time-series mean, median, extreme values, first and third quartile, autocorrelation for
aggregate liquidity measures. Panel B report the same analysis results for the ratio of each flow of funds variables, including internal funds (P −Div),
external funds (E +D), net equity issues (E), net debt issues (D), changes in fixed investment (∆F ), changes in inventory investment (∆I), changes in
working capital (∆W ), and changes in residual term (∆Other), to the aggregate sources of funds (S). All variable results are given in percentage terms
except for number and autocorrelation. Data is collected from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts and Henning Bohn’s website.
First Third Standard Auto-
Number Mean Minimum Quartile Median Quartile Maximum Deviation Correlation
Panel A: Aggregate Liquidity Measures
Aggregate Corporate Liquidity Demand
∆L/S 24 4.69 −1.13 3.15 4.76 6.21 11.53 2.93 0.27
Aggregate Market Liquidity Supply
Debt/GDP 24 38.92 25.65 33.29 40.11 45.88 49.39 7.75 0.89
Panel B: Flow of Funds
Sources of Funds
(P −Div)/S 24 81.47 69.73 73.81 79.07 86.59 108.69 9.88 0.44
(E +D)/S 24 18.53 −8.69 13.41 20.93 26.19 30.27 9.88 0.44
E/S 24 −8.57 −28.00 −16.29 −7.36 −0.32 5.36 9.93 0.58
D/S 24 27.10 −13.26 22.02 29.69 37.10 46.14 14.88 0.51
Uses of Funds
∆F/S 24 81.80 69.44 73.59 81.17 87.92 103.62 8.88 0.50
∆I/S 24 3.86 −5.31 1.78 4.80 6.49 11.75 3.73 0.05
∆W/S 24 1.83 −2.75 −1.05 0.78 2.61 15.53 4.73 0.67
∆Other/S 24 7.83 −10.17 1.62 8.00 16.55 24.69 9.87 0.36
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Vishny (2003), Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004), and Rhodes-Kropf, Robin-
son, and Viswanathan (2005)) show a signiﬁcantly positive correlation between merger
waves (activity) and stock market valuation. Notably, Bouwman, Fuller, and Nain
(2009) investigate whether acquisitions occurring during booming markets (high P/E
ratio of the S&P 500 index) are fundamentally diﬀerent from those occurring during
depressed markets (low P/E ratio of the S&P 500 index). They classify time periods
into high-, neutral-, or low-valuation markets based on the detrended P/E ratio,
and refer to deals initiated during those periods as high-, neutral-, and low-market
acquisitions.
The classiﬁcation method applied in this research is very similar to that used in
Bouwman, Fuller, and Nain (2009), except that the sample of mergers is separated
based on annual aggregate liquidity data from the prior year.13 Unlike market val-
uation measures (e.g. market indexes and P/E ratio), which are instantly reﬂected
with high frequency, the available data on liquidity demand by corporate sector or
liquidity supply by government does not change very much monthly, or even quar-
terly. Moreover, most of these accounting and economic variables are only updated
annually. Therefore, I can only construct annual aggregate liquidity measures and
separate merger deals on annual frequency. Another diﬀerence is that I apply the
prior year’s aggregate liquidity to classify takeover markets, instead of the current
year’s ratio. Firstly, accounting and economic data, used to construct ACLDs and
AMLSs, are usually realised and released to the public at the end of each year. Man-
agers can only make takeover decisions based on the prior year’s data. Secondly, in
the M&A literature, such empirical classiﬁcation has also been applied when deal-
ing with accounting and economic data. Schlingemann (2004) analyses the relation
between bidder gains and the source of ﬁnancing funds available, documenting that
ﬁnancing decisions during the year before a takeover play an important role in ex-
13Bouwman, Fuller, and Nain (2009) categorise each month by the detrended market P/E of that
month.
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plaining the cross section of bidder gains.
4.4 Merger Activity and Aggregate Liquidity
Why do merger activity and volume change greatly through time? Can aggregate
liquidity be applied to explain the merger waves? This section is going to investigate
these questions by classifying merger markets as high-, medium-, and low-liquidity
markets based on aggregate liquidity.
4.4.1 Distribution of Mergers by Aggregate Liquidity
A Single Aggregate Liquidity Separation
Table 4.3 shows the number and mean transaction value of mergers announced in
high-, medium-, and low-liquidity M&A markets, which are classiﬁed by measures of
ACLD (∆L/S) and AMLS (Debt/GDP ). For the whole sample, there is an obvious
positive correlation between aggregate liquidity and merger activity, measured by the
number of deals or mean transaction value.14 There are 1, 856 mergers announced in
high-liquidity demand markets, which have a mean transaction value of $1, 152 mil-
lion. For the corresponding medium- and low-liquidity demand markets, the number
of mergers (mean transaction) drops to 1, 611 ($754) and 695 ($529), respectively.
The right-hand side of Table 4.3 shows the distribution of merger sample by AMLS
(Debt/GDP ). While high-liquidity supply markets contain 1, 794 deals, there are
only 582 mergers in low-liquidity supply periods. The diﬀerences in merger amounts
between high- and low-liquidity conditions are positive and over 1, 000 for both liq-
uidity measures, and the diﬀerences in mean transaction value are $623 millions for
ACLD (∆L/S) and $257 millions for AMLS (Debt/GDP ).
In order to exclude the possibility that this correlation is driven by other factors, I
14Although have not been tabulated in the table, the results of the median transaction value
show the same pattern.
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Table 4.3: Merger Sample Distribution by Aggregate Liquidity and Deal Characteristics
This table presents the number and mean transaction value of mergers for various aggregate liquidity portfolios, which are further divided into target
firms’ public status (i.e. public, private, subsidiary), method of payment (i.e. cash, stock, mixed), and transaction value (i.e. large (30%), medium (40%),
small (30%)). The sample of mergers contains 4, 162 completed U.S. domestic acquisitions between 1980 and 2003 listed on SDC, where the publicly
traded acquiring firm is listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq, and gains control of a public, private, or subsidiary target firm whose transaction
value is at least $100 million. Merger deals announced in the next year (t + 1) of the lowest (or highest) 30% aggregate corporate liquidity demand
(∆L/S) and aggregate market liquidity supply (Debt/GDP ) years (t) are put into the low (or high) liquidity demand portfolios and liquidity supply
portfolios, respectively. The left (right) panel reports the results for aggregate liquidity demand (supply) portfolios based on ∆L/S (Debt/GDP ). Mean
transaction value is shown in millions of U.S. dollars and reported in brackets. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Superscripts a, b, and c indicate
significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Liquidity Demand (∆L/S) Liquidity Supply (Debt/GDP )
High Medium Low Differences in High Medium Low Differences in
All (30%) (40%) (30%) Mean (H-L) (30%) (40%) (30%) Mean (H-L)
All Firms 4, 162 1, 856 1, 611 695 1, 794 1, 786 582
[894] [1, 152] [754] [529] [623a] (4.49) [775] [1, 135] [518] [257b] (2.00)
Sorted by Target Firms’ Public Status
Public 1, 588 699 614 275 684 711 193
[1, 666] [2, 188] [1, 430] [868] [1, 319a] (3.86) [1, 442] [2, 075] [955] [487] (1.33)
Private 1, 141 577 413 151 484 505 152
[318] [378] [275] [209] [169a] (5.99) [280] [382] [229] [50.4b] (2.38)
Subsidiary 1, 384 559 569 256 609 550 225
[491] [666] [379] [357] [309b] (2.21) [428] [618] [350] [77.6] (1.50)
Sorted by Method of Payment
All Cash 933 339 405 189 379 411 143
[480] [493] [485] [445] [47.6] (0.69) [489] [519] [342] [147a] (2.62)
All Stock 1, 016 582 320 114 456 514 46
[1, 381] [1, 541] [1, 326] [719] [821b] (2.17) [1, 018] [1, 642] [2, 059] [−1, 041] (−0.79)
Mixed 1, 445 644 547 254 625 520 300
[1, 112] [1, 523] [893] [545] [978a] (4.49) [1, 056] [1, 595] [394] [661a] (4.84)
Sorted by Transaction Value
Large 1, 248 635 445 168 503 614 131
[2, 509] [2, 963] [2, 208] [1, 586] [1, 377a] (3.35) [2, 253] [2, 901] [1, 649] [604] (1.15)
Medium 1, 666 724 655 287 710 719 237
[260] [267] [256] [250] [17.81a] (3.46) [260] [263] [251] [8.85] (1.59)
Small 1, 248 497 511 240 581 453 214
[125] [126] [125] [123] [2.78b] (2.14) [126] [126] [121] [4.41a] (3.27)
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separate the whole sample and each aggregate liquidity sample into subsamples based
on a variety of known deal characteristics, namely the target ﬁrms’ public status (i.e.
public, private, subsidiary), the method of payment (i.e. cash, stock, mixed), and
transaction values (i.e. large (30%), medium (40%) or small (30%)), to ascertain
the persistence and robustness of the preliminary results. Table 4.3 also reports the
number and mean transaction values of the mergers in each subsample; in general, the
positive correlation between aggregate liquidity and merger activity remains strong.
High-liquidity portfolios contain more merger deals and have larger mean transaction
values than corresponding low-liquidity portfolios. For instance, there are 699 (577)
acquisitions of public (private) target ﬁrms when aggregate liquidity demand (∆L/S)
is high. However, only 275 (151) acquisitions of public (private) target ﬁrms are
initiated when liquidity demand is low. Furthermore, for each subsample separated
by transaction values, high-liquidity markets remain with a larger amount of merger
deals than low-liquidity markets. The high and low diﬀerentials of transaction value
concentrate in the merger subsample with high transaction values.
Subsamples partitioned by aggregate liquidity measures and method of payment
generate interesting results. The method of payment in mergers release important
information about the true value of acquiring and target ﬁrms. On average, cash
payments are widely perceived as a positive information signal, while stock payments
are believed to convey negative information. For instance, as interpreted by market
valuation theories, high market valuation leads to more mergers with stock payments,
where ﬁrms take advantage of existing opportunities by using overvalued stock as
a payment method. For the whole sample, there are 933 acquisitions with cash
payment and 1, 016 with stock payment. However, the diﬀerences in the number
and transaction values between high and low liquidity portfolios are much larger
for mergers with pure stock payment. In particular, when liquidity demand is high,
there are more acquisitions with stock payment (582) and less transactions with cash
payment (339). In contrast, when liquidity demand is low, there are less deals with
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stock payment (only 114). The results by aggregate liquidity supply also demonstrate
such a pattern. Meanwhile, the diﬀerences in transaction values are $48 million for
the cash payment subsample and $822 million for the stock payment subsample.
At ﬁrm-level, the scarcity of liquidity usually implies that ﬁrms will prefer stock-
ﬁnanced acquisitions rather than cash-ﬁnanced acquisitions. Although the results
in Table 4.3 seem to be opposite to this prediction, there are no contradictions be-
tween them. First, when aggregate liquidity is scarce, the economic and investment
activities in the whole market should be relatively smaller, which means there are
less acquisitions between ﬁrms. In such diﬃcult periods, those companies carrying
out acquisition performance are more likely to be of good quality, and even ﬁrms
with consistently suﬃcient cash holdings; they can take advantage of the bad per-
formance of rivals through cash acquisitions. Second, these high quality acquirers
make acquisition decisions under serious considerations, so they are more likely to
make better decisions than acquirers who make acquisitions in high-liquidity mar-
kets. Consistent with ﬁndings in the M&A literature that suggest cash oﬀers deliver
better short- and long-run performance, there should be more acquisitions with cash
payments when aggregate liquidity is low. Third, when aggregate liquidity is low,
both acquirers and targets might experience lower stock performance at the same
time. Thus, for acquirers with suﬃcient liquidity reserves, it is reasonable for them
to choose cash-ﬁnanced acquisitions.
To sum up, the results in Table 4.3 strongly support that higher (lower) aggregate
liquidity is accompanied by higher (lower) merger activity in M&A markets. This
pattern is signiﬁcant for both aggregate liquidity measures, and remains robust after
controlling some deal characteristics. Moreover, when aggregate liquidity is high,
there are more stock payment deals than cash payment deals, while in low-liquidity
markets, more mergers are undertaken with pure cash payment.
B Multi Aggregate Liquidity Separation
To further investigate the correlation between aggregate liquidity and merger activity,
I separate merger samples by using both measures of aggregate liquidity. First, I sort
the period of merger sample (1980–2003) into two groups (50%, 50%) according to the
prior year’s ACLD (∆L/S). Next, I sort each set of observations by the prior year’s
AMLS (Debt/GDP ). Based on the announcement date, merger deals are classiﬁed
into four aggregate liquidity portfolios: high demand-high supply, high demand-low
supply, low demand-high supply, and low demand-low supply. Since ACLD and
AMLS are positively related to merger activity, therefore classifying merger deals
according to both demand and supply factors should generate stronger patterns.
Figure 4.2 shows the distribution of merger samples by applying both ACLD and
AMLS . Panel A depicts the number of mergers in each liquidity portfolio. In low
∆L/S and low Debt/GDP M&A markets, the amount of mergers is low. When
both ACLD and AMLS are high, there are 1, 474 merger deals, which is about three
times greater than in low-low liquidity periods (460). Moreover, Panel A shows that
the diﬀerence in the number of mergers between high and low liquidity demand is
greatest when liquidity supply is low. Similarly, the diﬀerence in the number of
mergers between high and low liquidity supply is greatest when liquidity demand is
low. In short, the amount of mergers is highest in a high-high liquidity portfolio,
and the number decreases with either liquidity demand or liquidity supply. Panel
B depicts the mean transaction value of each constructed liquidity portfolio, where
similar patterns have been found.
Recall that mergers with stock payments have stronger positive correlations with
aggregate liquidity when compared with cash payment mergers. In terms of market
valuation explanations, ﬁrms prefer to pay for acquisitions with overvalued stocks
rather than cash when the valuation is high. Table 4.3 shows this pattern with a sin-
gle aggregate liquidity separation. I further examine these correlations by grouping
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of Mergers by Aggregate Liquidity Measures
This figure presents the distribution of mergers by both aggregate corporate liquidity demand
(∆L/S) and aggregate market liquidity supply (Debt/GDP ) for the whole merger sample. The
sample of mergers contains 4, 162 completed U.S. domestic acquisitions between 1980 and 2003
listed on SDC, where the publicly traded acquiring firm is listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq,
and gains control of a public, private, or subsidiary target firm whose transaction value is at least
$100 million. Merger deals are first sorted into high or low liquidity demand groups according to
prior-year ∆L/S, then each group of mergers is further sorted into high or low liquidity supply
groups according to prior-year Debt/GDP . Panel A shows the number of mergers in each liquidity
portfolio. Panel B shows the mean transaction value of each liquidity portfolio.
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Figure 4.3: Distribution of Mergers by Aggregate Liquidity and Method of Payment
This figure presents the distribution of mergers by both aggregate corporate liquidity demand (∆L/S) and aggregate market liquidity supply (Debt/GDP )
for the subsample with pure cash payment (in Panel A) and the subsample with pure stock payment (in Panel B). The sample of mergers contains 4, 162
completed U.S. domestic acquisitions between 1980 and 2003 listed on SDC, where the publicly traded acquiring firm is listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or
Nasdaq, and gains control of a public, private, or subsidiary target firm whose transaction value is at least $100 million. Merger deals are first sorted
into high or low liquidity demand groups according to prior-year ∆L/S, then each group of mergers is further sorted into high or low liquidity supply
groups according to prior-year Debt/GDP . The number of mergers is depicted in the figure.
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together merger deals with aggregate liquidity demand and supply measures. The
merger sample with pure cash (or stock) payments is ﬁrst sorted into high and low
liquidity demand groups by prior year ∆L/S, and then each group is further sorted
into high and low liquidity supply groups by prior year’s Debt/GDP . The positive
correlation between merger activity and aggregate liquidity measures should be more
signiﬁcant for stock payment mergers than for cash payment mergers.
Panel A (Panel B) of Figure 4.3 presents the distribution of cash (stock) pay-
ment acquisitions according to aggregate liquidity. When both aggregate liquidity
measures are high, there are more stock payment mergers (409) than cash payment
mergers (301). However, when both aggregate liquidity measures are low, there
are much less mergers with stock payments (38) than with cash payments (138).
The diﬀerences between high-high liquidity portfolios and low-low liquidity portfo-
lios are 371 for the stock payment subsample, but only 163 for the cash payment
subsample. This pattern cannot be explained by diﬀerences in the sample size, since
the amount of cash payment mergers (933) is similar to that of the stock payment
mergers (1, 016). Therefore, the distribution of mergers by applying both aggregate
liquidity measures simultaneously strengthens the evidence realised in a single liq-
uidity separation. Merger activity is positively related to aggregate liquidity, and
the degree of correlation is stronger for mergers with stock payments.
4.4.2 Regression Analysis
In this section, I investigate the correlation between aggregate liquidity and merger
activity by using regression analysis. Table 4.4 shows the results of univariate OLS
regressions and multivariate regression, where other economic and market factors
are used. The dependent variable is the log of the annual number of mergers in the
sample. The explanatory variables include aggregate liquidity measures (∆L/S and
Debt/GDP ), GDP growth rate, P/E ratio of the S&P 500 index, and the log of the
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Table 4.4: Regression Analysis of Merger Activity
This table presents the ordinary least squares regressions of the log of the annual number of mergers on the aggregate liquidity and various other factors.
The sample of mergers contains 4, 162 completed U.S. domestic acquisitions between 1980 and 2003 listed on SDC, where the publicly traded acquiring
firm is listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq, and gains control of a public, private, or subsidiary target firm whose transaction value is at least
$100 million. Panel A shows the results of univariate regressions. The sample of mergers is partitioned into several subsamples based on target firms’
public status (i.e. public, private, subsidiary) and method of payment (i.e. cash, stock, mixed). Panel B shows the results of multivariate regressions.
Liquidityt−1 is the aggregate liquidity demand (∆L/S) in column 1-3 or aggregate liquidity supply (Debt/GDP ) in column 4-6. GDP Growtht−1 is
the percentage change of U.S. GDP level. P/E Ratiot−1 is the P/E ratio of the S&P 500. S&P500 Indext−1 is the log of the S&P 500 Composite
Index level. The explanatory variables are measured at the end of year t− 1. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Superscripts a, b, and c indicate
significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Panel A: Univariate Analysis
Targets’ Public Status Method of Payment
All Public Private Subsidiary Cash Stock Mixed
Liquidity Demandt−1 5.84
b 5.45b 7.66c 4.59c 0.69 6.16 5.59b
(2.13) (2.07) (2.04) (1.75) (0.27) (1.60) (2.48)
Liquidity Supplyt−1 3.36
a 3.26a 4.00a 3.26a 1.23 4.77b 1.67c
(3.79) (3.90) (3.09) (4.07) (0.94) (2.62) (1.85)
Panel B: Multivariate Analysis
Liquidity Demand Liquidity Supply
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Liquidityt−1 4.61
c −0.74 0.44 2.62b 1.61b 1.40b
(1.86) (−0.37) (0.25) (2.58) (2.41) (2.11)
GDP Growtht−1 −7.77b −2.60 0.33 −4.54 −0.67 1.77
(−2.61) (−1.15) (0.14) (−1.41) (−0.31) (0.77)
P/E Ratiot−1 0.03
a 0.03a
(5.09) (5.65)
S&P500 Indext−1 1.00
a 0.92a
(5.47) (5.81)
Intercept 2.37a 1.65a −0.57 1.35b 0.94b −0.97c
(9.21) (7.35) (−1.01) (2.50) (2.69) (−1.86)
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S&P 500 index.15 These explanatory variables are measured at the end of year t−1.
As shown in Panel A of Table 4.4, the coeﬃcients of regression are positive and
statistically signiﬁcant for the complete sample of mergers and most subsamples
sorted by various deal characteristics. The positive coeﬃcient suggests a positive
correlation between aggregate liquidity and merger activity, which has been found
in previous univariate analyses where the sample is split into liquidity portfolios.
For the whole sample, the coeﬃcient is 5.84 for liquidity demand and 3.36 for liq-
uidity supply; both values are statistically signiﬁcant at 5% level. Stock-ﬁnanced
acquisitions show a stronger correlation with aggregate liquidity than cash-ﬁnanced
acquisitions. For instance, the coeﬃcient between stock oﬀers (cash oﬀers) and liq-
uidity supply is 4.77 (1.23) and signiﬁcant at 5% level (insigniﬁcant). Panel B shows
the correlation between aggregate liquidity and merger activity after controlling for
other factors. For aggregate liquidity supply, the coeﬃcients remain statistically
signiﬁcantly positive after controlling for GDP growth, P/E ratio, or the S&P 500
index. For aggregate liquidity demand, column 4 reports that the correlation between
liquidity and activity is 2.62 and signiﬁcant at 5% level.
Overall, empirical tests by comparing high- and low-liquidity acquisitions, and
by running linear regressions, show that aggregate liquidity and merger activity are
positively correlated. Higher aggregate liquidity is accompanied by higher merger
activity in the aggregate level, especially for stock-ﬁnanced acquisitions.
4.5 Merger Performance and Aggregate Liquidity
As an extension of previous discussions on merger activity and aggregate liquidity,
this section examines the eﬀects of liquidity on merger valuation and performance.
In particular, this section applies aggregate liquidity to investigate the abnormal
15P/E ratio of the S&P 500 index is collected from Robert J. Shiller’s website (http://www.
irrationalexuberance.com/index.htm).
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stock performance of acquiring ﬁrms around announcement dates in a short-horizon
(in Section 4.5.1) and after the eﬀective date in a long-horizon (in Section 4.5.2).
4.5.1 Announcement Effect Study
By following Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) and Dong, Hirshleifer, Richard-
son, and Teoh (2006), I apply the market-adjusted model to estimate the cumulative
abnormal returns (CAR) of acquiring ﬁrms’ stock for several event windows. For the
pre-announcement period, I choose twenty-day (−20,−1) and forty-day (−40,−1)
event windows, which start twenty (forty) trading days prior to and end one trading
day before the announcement date of mergers. For the periods around the announce-
ment date, I use event windows (−5,+5), (−2,+2), and (−1,+1), where date 0 is
the announcement date.
First, daily abnormal returns (AR) are calculated based on the market-adjusted
model:
ARit = Rit −Rmt (4.1)
where Rit is ﬁrm i’s stock return on date t and Rmt is the return of the equally-
weighted CRSP index on date t. Next, daily ARs are accumulated through event
dates and across samples. I do not use the market model which estimate market
parameters based on a time period before each acquisition, because the presence of
frequent acquirers in the sample of mergers (see Table 4.1) suggests a high probability
of other acquisition announcements by the same ﬁrm in the estimation periods. Any
abnormal returns caused by these announcements will bias estimated parameters and
make beta estimations less meaningful.
A Pre-Announcement Period
Table 4.5 shows the acquiring ﬁrms’ pre-announcement CARs for the whole sample.
On average, acquiring ﬁrms have positive CAR of 1.38% and 2.48% over one month
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and two months before the announcement date of acquisitions, respectively. Both
values are statistically signiﬁcant at 1% level. These results are consistent with the
general ﬁndings in the M&A literature that acquiring ﬁrms experience positive stock
returns before announcements, especially for acquisitions with stock payments. Panel
A reports the CAR for high-, medium-, and low-liquidity portfolios constructed ac-
cording to ∆L/S. There is a signiﬁcant trend that pre-announcement CARs decrease
in aggregate liquidity demand ∆L/S for both event windows. Over event window
(−40,−1), mergers announced in high-liquidity demand periods have a higher CAR
(4.28%) than those initiated in low-liquidity demand markets. The return diﬀerential
between high- and low-liquidity portfolios is 4.95%, which is statistically signiﬁcant
at the 1% level. Panel B shows the results for various liquidity supply portfolios.
The diﬀerences in CAR between high- and low-liquidity supply portfolios are also
positive and statistically signiﬁcant.
Although pre-announcement CARs are signiﬁcantly positive for the whole sample
over both event windows, acquisitions in states of low aggregate liquidity (demand
and supply) have negative CARs on average. These results suggest that the posi-
tive abnormal returns for acquiring ﬁrms before merger announcements are mostly
driven by mergers announced in high-liquidity M&A markets. Figure 4.4 depicts the
pre-announcement CARs of acquiring ﬁrms. Panel A (Panel B) shows the average
CAR for aggregate liquidity demand (supply) portfolios. The return diﬀerences be-
tween high- and low-liquidity portfolios are positive and larger for ∆L/S partitioned
portfolios. Moreover, Panel A shows a strictly positive correlation between aggregate
liquidity demand and acquirers’ pre-announcement CARs.
To control for known deal characteristics factors, I separate the sample of merg-
ers according to both aggregate liquidity and one other distinct deal character-
istic, and re-examine whether mergers announced in high-liquidity markets have
larger pre-announcement returns than low-liquidity mergers. Table 4.6 shows the
pre-announcement CAR for each subsample, together with the diﬀerences in CAR
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Table 4.5: Pre-Announcement Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR)
This table presents the acquiring firms’ pre-announcement cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for various aggregate liquidity portfolios. The sample of
mergers contains 4, 162 completed U.S. domestic acquisitions between 1980 and 2003 listed on SDC, where the publicly traded acquiring firm is listed on
the NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq, and gains control of a public, private, or subsidiary target firm whose transaction value is at least $100 million. Merger
deals announced in the next year (t + 1) of the lowest (or highest) 30% aggregate corporate liquidity demand (∆L/S) and aggregate market liquidity
supply (Debt/GDP ) years (t) are put into the low (or high) liquidity demand portfolios and liquidity supply portfolios, respectively. Panel A (Panel
B) shows the results for liquidity demand portfolios based on ∆L/S (liquidity supply portfolios based on Debt/GDP ). To calculate CAR, the daily
abnormal returns (AR) for acquiring firm over days (−40,−1) are calculated: ARit = Rit − Rmt, where Rit is firm i’s stock return on date t and Rmt
is the return for the equally-weighted CRSP index on date t. Then CAR are calculated by summing the daily AR over event windows (−20,−1) and
(−40,−1), where day 0 is the announcement date. The CAR differentials between high liquidity portfolios and low liquidity portfolios are reported,
where statistical significance is obtained using two sample t-tests. t-statistics are provided in parenthesis. Superscripts a, b, and c indicate significant
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Event High Medium Low Differences
Windows All (30%) (40%) (30%) (High-Low)
Panel A: Liquidity Demand (∆L/S)
(−20,−1) 1.38%a 2.57%a 0.88%a −0.63%c 3.19%a
(6.30) (6.32) (3.16) (−1.84) (6.03)
(−40,−1) 2.48%a 4.28%a 1.76%a −0.67% 4.95%a
(7.70) (7.39) (4.47) (−0.99) (5.58)
Panel B: Liquidity Supply (Debt/GDP )
(−20,−1) 1.38%a 0.64%a 2.78%a −0.69% 1.34%a
(6.30) (2.60) (6.69) (−1.53) (2.59)
(−40,−1) 2.48%a 1.38%a 4.54%a −0.40% 1.77%b
(7.70) (3.80) (7.69) (−0.47) (1.95)
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Figure 4.4: Pre-Announcement Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR)
This figure presents the acquiring firms’ pre-announcement cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for various aggregate liquidity portfolios. The sample
of mergers contains 4, 162 completed U.S. domestic acquisitions between 1980 and 2003 listed on SDC, where the publicly traded acquiring firm is listed
on the NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq, and gains control of a public, private, or subsidiary target firm whose transaction value is at least $100 million.
Merger deals announced in the next year (t + 1) of the lowest (or highest) 30% aggregate corporate liquidity demand (∆L/S) and aggregate market
liquidity supply (Debt/GDP ) years (t) are put into the low (or high) liquidity demand portfolios and liquidity supply portfolios, respectively. Panel A
(Panel B) shows the results for liquidity demand portfolios based on ∆L/S (liquidity supply portfolios based on Debt/GDP ). To calculate CAR, the
daily abnormal returns (AR) for acquiring firm over days (−40,−1) are calculated: ARit = Rit −Rmt, where Rit is firm i’s stock return on date t and
Rmt is the return of the equally-weighted CRSP index on date t. Then CAR is calculated by summing the daily AR over event windows (−20,−1)
and (−40,−1), where day 0 is the announcement date. The CAR differentials between high and low liquidity portfolios are reported and labeled as
“Difference”.
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Table 4.6: Pre-Announcement CAR sorted by Deal Characteristics
This table presents the acquiring firms’ pre-announcement cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for various aggregate liquidity portfolios, which are
further divided into target firms’ public status (i.e. public, private, subsidiary) in Panel A, method of payment (i.e. cash, stock, mixed) in Panel B, and
transaction value (i.e. large (30%), medium (40%), small (30%)) in Panel C. The sample of mergers contains 4, 162 completed U.S. domestic acquisitions
between 1980 and 2003 listed on SDC, where the publicly traded acquiring firm is listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq, and gains control of a
public, private, or subsidiary target firm whose transaction value is at least $100 million. Merger deals announced in the next year (t+ 1) of the lowest
(or highest) 30% aggregate corporate liquidity demand (∆L/S) and aggregate market liquidity supply (Debt/GDP ) years (t) are put into the low (or
high) liquidity demand portfolios and liquidity supply portfolios, respectively. In each panel, the left (right) subpanel reports the results for aggregate
liquidity demand (supply) portfolios based on ∆L/S (Debt/GDP ). To calculate CAR, the daily abnormal returns (AR) for acquiring firm over days
(−40,−1) are calculated: ARit = Rit − Rmt, where Rit is firm i’s stock return on date t and Rmt is the return for the equally-weighted CRSP index
on date t. Then CAR are calculated by summing the daily AR over event windows (−20,−1) and (−40,−1), where day 0 is the announcement date.
The CAR differentials between high liquidity portfolios and low liquidity portfolios are reported, where statistical significance is obtained by using two
sample t-tests. t-statistics are provided in parenthesis. Superscripts a, b, and c indicate significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Liquidity Demand (∆L/S) Liquidity Supply (Debt/GDP )
Event High Medium Low Differences High Medium Low Differences
Windows All (30%) (40%) (30%) (H-L) (30%) (40%) (30%) (H-L)
Panel A: Target Firms’ Public Status
Public (−20,−1) 1.22%a 2.22%a 2.05%c −0.36% 2.57%a 0.55% 2.21%a −0.04% 0.58%
(3.67) (3.62) (1.85) (−0.62) (3.06) (1.41) (3.68) (−0.05) (0.63)
(−40,−1) 2.35%a 3.83%a 0.88%a −0.78% 4.61%a 1.71%a 3.70%a −0.09% 1.80%
(5.15) (4.69) (3.28) (−0.98) (4.04) (3.01) (4.68) (−0.08) (1.36)
Private (−20,−1) 3.00%a 5.19%a 1.52%a −1.25%c 6.44%a 1.14%b 5.72%a −0.29% 1.43%
(5.80) (5.69) (2.65) (−1.86) (5.69) (2.12) (5.75) (−0.33) (1.38)
(−40,−1) 5.60%a 9.21%a 2.66%a −0.07% 9.28%a 2.26%a 10.14%a 0.75% 1.50%
(6.89) (6.83) (3.26) (−0.03) (3.46) (2.80) (6.93) (0.32) (0.60)
Subsidiary (−20,−1) 0.37% 0.58% 0.57% −0.49% 1.06% 0.47% 1.03%c −1.45%b 1.93%b
(1.18) (1.03) (1.19) (−0.89) (1.36) (1.19) (1.73) (−2.09) (2.40)
(−40,−1) 0.32% 0.28% 0.90% −0.86% 1.14% 0.40% 0.94% −1.35% 1.75%
(0.71) (0.35) (1.38) (−1.03) (0.98) (0.71) (1.11) (−1.33) (1.50)
(continued)
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Table 4.6—Continued
Liquidity Demand (∆L/S) Liquidity Supply (Debt/GDP )
Event High Medium Low Differences High Medium Low Differences
Windows All (30%) (40%) (30%) (H-L) (30%) (40%) (30%) (H-L)
Panel B: Method of Payment
All Cash (−20,−1) −0.23% −0.28% 0.52% −1.75%a 1.46%c 0.32% −0.22% −1.73%b 2.04%b
(−0.64) (−0.44) (0.91) (−2.83) (1.64) (0.65) (−0.35) (−1.98) (2.04)
(−40,−1) −0.16% 0.51% 0.74% −3.25%a 3.76%a 0.34% 0.43% −3.14%a 3.48%a
(−0.31) (0.57) (0.97) (−3.60) (2.97) (0.54) (0.49) (−2.64) (2.58)
All Stock (−20,−1) 4.63%a 6.81%a 1.93%a 1.12% 5.69%a 1.92%a 7.42%a 0.49% 1.43%
(7.72) (7.25) (2.62) (1.19) (4.26) (3.20) (7.22) (0.22) (0.62)
(−40,−1) 8.16%a 11.30%a 4.34%a 2.92%b 8.39%a 4.65%a 12.66%a −5.18%c 9.83%a
(9.59) (8.56) (3.95) (2.25) (4.53) (5.12) (8.93) (−1.68) (3.06)
Mixed (−20,−1) 0.57%c 1.28%b 0.35% −0.74% 2.01%b 0.34% 1.63%b −0.80% 1.14%
(1.67) (2.07) (0.77) (−1.30) (2.40) (0.81) (2.27) (−1.33) (1.56)
(−40,−1) 1.13%b 1.51%c 1.01% 0.47% 1.03% 0.40% 1.91%c 1.30% −0.89%
(2.12) (1.69) (1.58) (0.31) (0.59) (0.69) (1.83) (0.95) (−0.60)
Panel C: Transaction Value
Large (−20,−1) 2.15%a 2.87%a 1.95%a −0.03% 2.90%a 0.90%b 3.57%a 0.30% 0.60%
(5.61) (4.47) (3.82) (−0.04) (3.22) (2.21) (5.28) (0.35) (0.63)
(−40,−1) 3.36%a 4.94%a 2.64%a −0.65% 5.58%a 1.29%b 5.79%a −0.08% 1.36%
(6.01) (5.29) (3.62) (−0.63) (4.04) (2.15) (5.91) (−0.06) (0.98)
Medium (−20,−1) 0.97%a 2.20%a 0.36% −0.87%c 3.08%a 0.22% 2.11%a −0.43% 0.66%
(2.69) (3.24) (0.82) (−1.66) (3.58) (0.52) (3.16) (−0.63) (0.81)
(−40,−1) 1.73%a 3.30%a 1.30%b −1.15% 4.44%a 0.82% 3.33%a −0.35% 1.17%
(3.51) (3.56) (2.06) (−1.47) (3.67) (1.36) (3.66) (−0.34) (0.98)
Small (−20,−1) 1.11%a 2.70%a 0.58% −0.75% 3.45%a 0.94%b 2.77%a −1.60%c 2.53%a
(2.58) (3.36) (1.17) (−1.22) (3.41) (2.13) (3.25) (−1.96) (2.73)
(−40,−1) 2.62%a 4.88%a 1.57%b −0.10% 4.98%b 2.14%a 4.62%a −0.65% 2.79%
(4.14) (4.07) (2.26) (−0.06) (2.53) (3.21) (3.68) (−0.36) (1.44)
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between corresponding high- and low-liquidity portfolios. I ﬁnd that the positive
correlation between aggregate liquidity and the pre-announcement CAR of acquiring
ﬁrms remains strong. For each subsample, acquiring ﬁrms in high-liquidity portfolios
have a positive CAR; however, the values are mostly negative or indiﬀerent from zero
for low-liquidity portfolios. As shown in the table, the diﬀerences in return between
high- and low-liquidity mergers are positive. These patterns are more obvious for
liquidity demand (∆L/S) portfolios.
Panel B of Table 4.6 shows that acquiring ﬁrms using stock payments have signif-
icantly positive abnormal returns in the two months before a merger announcement,
and acquirers with cash payments have returns indiﬀerent from zero. This pattern is
consistent with many empirical evidences in the M&A literature. Myers and Majluf
(1984) argue that the method of payment forms an information signal. The signalling
hypothesis argues that if the acquiring ﬁrm believes that its shares are overvalued,
it will ﬁnance the acquisition with stock to take advantage of such an overvalua-
tion. Therefore, it is reasonable to observe larger positive abnormal returns for stock
oﬀers. My intention here is to examine whether the positive CAR diﬀerences be-
tween high- and low-liquidity mergers remain robust after controlling for the method
of payment. For both aggregate liquidity measures, acquiring ﬁrms in high-liquidity
markets signiﬁcantly outperform those in low-liquidity markets. Moreover, evidences
also indicate that cash oﬀers have smaller diﬀerences in returns between high- and
low-liquidity markets, while the diﬀerences are much larger for stock oﬀers. For event
window (−40,−1), the CAR diﬀerences for mergers with stock payment are 8.39%
and 9.83% for liquidity demand portfolios and liquidity supply portfolios, respec-
tively. However, the corresponding diﬀerences in CAR for cash payment mergers
are only 3.76% and 3.48%. Mixed payment oﬀers provide signiﬁcant positive returns
in high-liquidity states and medium-liquidity states, but only have close to zero or
negative returns in low-liquidity states.
Figure 4.5 depicts the results of pre-announcement CARs for cash and stock
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oﬀering acquisitions. Subsamples of cash oﬀers and stock oﬀers are further classiﬁed
into liquidity portfolios. The large diﬀerences in returns between high- and low-
liquidity portfolios are driven by diﬀerences in stock payment acquisitions. Cash
oﬀers have small abnormal returns in high liquidity states and negative CARs in low
liquidity states. Stock is considered an ‘acquisition currency’ in the period of high
aggregate liquidity, because it is more reasonable to use overvalued stock as payment
rather than cash. Panel C of Table 4.6 shows the results of CAR after controlling
for aggregate liquidity and the level of transaction value. Acquisitions in all three
subsamples have similar positive abnormal returns before an announcement. I also
ﬁnd that the diﬀerences in CAR are positive and signiﬁcant, especially for liquidity
demand portfolios.
B Around Announcement Date
As indicated in Table 4.7, I ﬁnd that all acquisitions in my sample have statisti-
cally signiﬁcant positive returns of 0.75% and 0.84% over event periods (−1,+1)
and (−5,+5), respectively. Table 4.8 shows that these results are driven by ac-
quisitions with private or subsidiary targets, which experience signiﬁcant abnormal
performances of 2.56% and 2.58% over event window (−2,+2), respectively. Acqui-
sitions with public targets have a signiﬁcantly negative return of −1.89%. Further,
Table 4.8 also shows the performance of acquiring ﬁrms with various methods of
payment. Over period (−1,+1), cash acquisitions and mixed oﬀers exhibit signiﬁ-
cantly positive returns of 1.17% and 1.32%, respectively. However, stock acquisitions
deliver a negative 1.08% return, which is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. These results
are consistent with many previous studies.16
For the whole sample, Panel A of Table 4.7 shows that high- and medium-liquidity
acquirers experience higher abnormal returns than low-liquidity acquirers. Although
the diﬀerences in CAR between high- and low-liquidity portfolios are positive for
16See Bruner (2002) for a comprehensive literature review on shareholder returns for M&A.
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Figure 4.5: Pre-Announcement CAR sorted by Aggregate Liquidity Demand and Method of Payment
This figure presents the acquiring firms’ pre-announcement cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for various aggregate liquidity portfolios, which are
divided into method of payment (cash and stock). The sample of mergers contains 4, 162 completed U.S. domestic acquisitions between 1980 and 2003
listed on SDC, where the publicly traded acquiring firm is listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq, and gains control of a public, private, or subsidiary
target firm whose transaction value is at least $100 million. Merger deals announced in the next year (t + 1) of the lowest (or highest) 30% aggregate
corporate liquidity demand (∆L/S) and aggregate market liquidity supply (Debt/GDP ) years (t) are put into the low (or high) liquidity demand
portfolios and liquidity supply portfolios, respectively. Panel A and Panel B show the results of CAR over event windows (−20,−1) and (−40,−1),
respectively. To calculate CAR, the daily abnormal returns (AR) for acquiring firm over days (−40,−1) are calculated: ARit = Rit−Rmt, where Rit is
firm i’s stock return on date t and Rmt is the return of the equally-weighted CRSP index on date t. Then CAR is calculated by summing the daily AR
over event windows (−20,−1) and (−40,−1), where day 0 is the announcement date. The CAR differentials between high and low liquidity portfolios
are reported and labeled as “Difference”.
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Table 4.7: Announcement Period Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR)
This table presents the acquiring firms’ announcement period cumulative abnormal returns (CAR)
for various aggregate liquidity portfolios. The sample of mergers contains 4, 162 completed U.S.
domestic acquisitions between 1980 and 2003 listed on SDC, where the publicly traded acquiring
firm is listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq, and gains control of a public, private, or subsidiary
target firm whose transaction value is at least $100 million. Merger deals announced in the next
year (t + 1) of the lowest (or highest) 30% aggregate corporate liquidity demand (∆L/S) and
aggregate market liquidity supply (Debt/GDP ) years (t) are put into the low (or high) liquidity
demand portfolios and liquidity supply portfolios, respectively. Panel A (Panel B) shows the results
for liquidity demand portfolios based on ∆L/S (liquidity supply portfolios based on Debt/GDP ).
To calculate CAR, the daily abnormal returns (AR) for acquiring firm over days (−5,+5) are
calculated: ARit = Rit−Rmt, where Rit is firm i’s stock return on date t and Rmt is the return for
the equally-weighted CRSP index on date t. Then CAR are calculated by summing the daily AR
over event windows (−1,+1), (−2,+2), and (−5,+5), where day 0 is the announcement date. The
CAR differentials between high liquidity portfolios and low liquidity portfolios are reported, where
statistical significance is obtained using two sample t-tests. t-statistics are provided in parenthesis.
Superscripts a, b, and c indicate significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Event High Medium Low Differences
Windows All (30%) (40%) (30%) (High-Low)
Panel A: Liquidity Demand (∆L/S)
(−5,+5) 0.89%a 0.71%c 1.42%a 0.14% 0.57%
(3.92) (1.69) (4.91) (0.37) (1.02)
(−2,+2) 0.84%a 0.52% 1.39%a 0.37% 0.15%
(4.29) (1.43) (5.74) (1.19) (0.31)
(−1,+1) 0.75%a 0.47% 1.23%a 0.39% 0.08%
(4.22) (1.39) (5.70) (1.37) (0.19)
Panel B: Liquidity Supply (Debt/GDP )
(−5,+5) 0.89%a 1.51%a 0.55% 0.04% 1.46%a
(3.92) (5.54) (1.28) (0.1) (2.83)
(−2,+2) 0.84%a 1.44%a 0.42% 0.24% 1.20%a
(4.29) (6.18) (1.12) (0.69) (2.89)
(−1,+1) 0.75%a 1.37%a 0.34% 0.09% 1.28%a
(4.22) (6.74) (0.98) (0.28) (3.47)
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Table 4.8: Announcement Period CAR sorted by Deal Characteristics
This table presents the acquiring firms’ announcement period cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), which are further divided into target firms’ public
status (i.e. public, private, subsidiary), method of payment (i.e. cash, stock, mixed), and transaction value (i.e. large (30%), medium (40%), small
(30%)). The left subpanel reports the results for the whole sample. The middle (right) subpanel reports the differences in CAR between high and low
liquidity demand (supply) portfolios. The sample of mergers contains 4, 162 completed U.S. domestic acquisitions between 1980 and 2003 listed on SDC,
where the publicly traded acquiring firm is listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq, and gains control of a public, private, or subsidiary target firm
whose transaction value is at least $100 million. Merger deals announced in the next year (t + 1) of the lowest (or highest) 30% aggregate corporate
liquidity demand (∆L/S) and aggregate market liquidity supply (Debt/GDP ) years (t) are put into the low (or high) liquidity demand portfolios
and liquidity supply portfolios, respectively. To calculate CAR, the daily abnormal returns (AR) for acquiring firm over days (−5,+5) are calculated:
ARit = Rit − Rmt, where Rit is firm i’s stock return on date t and Rmt is the return for the equally-weighted CRSP index on date t. Then CAR
are calculated by summing the daily AR over event windows (−1,+1), (−2,+2), and (−5,+5), where day 0 is the announcement date. The CAR
differentials between high liquidity portfolios and low liquidity portfolios are reported, where statistical significance is obtained using two sample t-tests.
t-statistics are provided in parenthesis. Superscripts a, b, and c indicate significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Deal Whole Sample Differences in CAR (by ∆L/S) Differences in CAR (by Debt/GDP )
Characteristics (−5,+5) (−2,+2) (−1,+1) (−5,+5) (−2,+2) (−1,+1) (−5,+5) (−2,+2) (−1,+1)
Sorted by Target Firms’ Public Status
Public −1.67%a −1.89%a −1.71%a −0.76% −1.82%b −1.60%b −0.58% −0.58% 0.03%
(−5.58) (−7.29) (−7.38) (−0.96) (−2.54) (−2.45) (−0.64) (−0.77) (0.05)
Private 2.66%a 2.56%a 2.21%a 1.45% 0.76% 0.31% 3.37%a 2.63%a 2.69%a
(5.69) (6.87) (6.81) (1.26) (0.86) (0.39) (3.44) (3.33) (4.14)
Subsidiary 2.51%a 2.58%a 2.38%a 1.27% 1.75%c 1.76%b 2.67%a 2.40%a 2.03%a
(5.75) (6.72) (6.51) (1.18) (1.87) (1.97) (3.12) (3.72) (3.61)
Sorted by Method of Payment
All Cash 0.96%a 1.26%a 1.17%a 1.08% 0.87% 0.78% 2.25%b 1.71%b 1.24%c
(2.69) (4.35) (4.92) (1.16) (1.11) (1.15) (2.24) (2.18) (1.83)
All Stock −0.52% −1.09%b −1.08%a 0.29% −0.50% −0.41% 2.35% 0.82% 2.42%
(−0.96) (−2.39) (−2.67) (0.21) (−0.42) (−0.37) (1.17) (0.49) (1.41)
Mixed 1.30%a 1.48%a 1.32%a −0.16% 0.16% 0.03% 1.24%c 1.55%b 1.71%a
(3.06) (3.88) (3.61) (−0.15) (0.18) (0.04) (1.65) (2.54) (3.26)
Sorted by Transaction Value
Large 0.19% −0.35% −0.28% −0.10% −1.03% −0.45% −0.25% −0.18% 0.49%
(0.38) (−0.76) (−0.64) (−0.09) (−1.00) (−0.45) (−0.29) (−0.26) (0.72)
Medium 0.91%a 1.06%a 0.84%a 0.73% 0.60% 0.23% 0.71% 1.05% 0.96%
(2.88) (3.95) (3.84) (0.92) (0.87) (0.41) (0.84) (1.49) (1.60)
Small 1.58%a 1.72%a 1.67%a 1.22% 1.17% 0.82% 3.87%a 2.68%a 2.54%a
(4.22) (5.88) (6.3) (1.27) (1.57) (1.21) (4.20) (3.88) (4.11)
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three event windows, none of them is statistically signiﬁcant. As indicated in Panel
B, the diﬀerences between three-day, ﬁve-day, and ten-day CARs for high- and low-
liquidity acquirers are 1.28%, 1.20%, and 1.46%, which are all statistically signiﬁcant
at 1% level. Consistent with previous results for pre-announcement period abnormal
returns, these results suggest that the market is less welcoming of acquisitions during
low-liquidity M&A markets than during high-liquidity markets.
When the entire sample is partitioned by aggregate liquidity and target ﬁrms’
public status, as shown in Table 4.8, the results indicate that the diﬀerences in CAR
between high- and low-liquidity acquirers are positive and signiﬁcant for acquisitions
with subsidiary targets. However, the return diﬀerences between high- and low-
liquidity demand (supply) portfolios are signiﬁcantly negative (indiﬀerent from zero)
for acquisitions with public targets. Table 4.8 also shows abnormal performances
for cash, stock, and mixed acquisitions. These results indicate that diﬀerences in
returns, when partitioned by aggregate liquidity supply, are positive across all pay-
ment methods and event windows; stock payment oﬀers do not have larger return
diﬀerence when compared to cash payment acquisitions.
In summary, the results for pre-announcement CARs strongly suggest that merg-
ers announced in high-liquidity markets are substantially diﬀerent from those initi-
ated in low-liquidity markets, where high- and medium-liquidity acquisitions expe-
rience signiﬁcantly positive abnormal returns, while low-liquidity acquisitions have
signiﬁcantly lower CARs. There is a strong positive correlation between aggregate
liquidity and pre-announcement CARs for acquiring ﬁrms, and this pattern remains
signiﬁcant even after controlling for various deal characteristics. It seems that the
commonly recognised positive abnormal returns for acquiring ﬁrms before the an-
nouncement date are mostly driven by high-liquidity mergers. For abnormal perfor-
mance measured around the announcement period, the results indicate that high-
liquidity acquirers outperform low-liquidity acquirers over three event windows. In
general, the market seems to look more favourably upon high-liquidity acquisitions
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than low-liquidity acquisitions in the periods before and around merger announce-
ment dates.
4.5.2 Post-Merger Long-term Performance Analysis
It is equally important to investigate the long-term performance of acquirers, which
has been widely recognised in the literature to have negative abnormal returns up
to three (or even ﬁve) years after acquisitions. In this section, I intend to examine
whether the long-term underperformance of acquirers can be explained by aggregate
liquidity factors. In particular, I examine whether the long-term performance of
acquisitions announced in high-liquidity markets is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from that
announced in low-liquidity markets. I partition the whole merger sample and each
merger subsample, which are sorted by deal characteristics, into corresponding high-,
medium-, and low-liquidity portfolios. Following this, the long-run stock returns of
acquiring ﬁrms are estimated and compared.
There have been many debates about the proper estimation of long-term ab-
normal returns. Started by Ritter (1991), the most popular method for measuring
long-term abnormal performance is the buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR). Al-
though this method has been met with a number of concerns, it is nevertheless
supported by many researchers and widely used in empirical research. Another well-
recognised methodology is the calendar-time portfolio regression (CTPR) approach,
which is strongly supported by Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Staﬀord (2000). To
avoid any bias in methodology, I therefore apply both methods to estimate long-run
abnormal performance.
A Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR)
Estimating long-term abnormal performance with buy-and-hold abnormal returns
(BHAR) is advocated by Barber and Lyon (1997) and Kothari and Warner (1997).
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The long-term BHAR is calculated as the long-term buy-and-hold return (BHR) of
a sample ﬁrm less the long-term BHR of a reference portfolio:
BHAR(T1,T2) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(BHRi,(T1,T2) − BHRpi,(T1,T2)) (4.2)
where
BHRi,(T1,T2) =
T2∏
t=T1
(1 +Rit)− 1. (4.3)
BHRpi,(T1,T2) =
T2∏
t=T1
[
1 +
∑Nt
j=1Rjt
Nt
]
− 1 (4.4)
BHRi,(T1,T2) is the BHR for ﬁrm i over period T1 to T2. BHRpi,(T1,T2) is the BHR for
ﬁrm i’s size and book-to-market reference portfolio over period T1 to T2. N is the
number of ﬁrms in the sample. T2−T1 is the horizon in months over which abnormal
returns are calculated. 12 months, 24 months, and 36 months post-merger BHAR
are measured over months (+1,+12), (+1,+24), and (+1,+36), respectively, where
month 0 is the completion month of acquisitions. Size and book-to-market refer-
ence portfolios are constructed by following Fama and French (1993). The equally-
weighted monthly returns of 25 reference portfolios formed on size and book-to-
market (5 × 5) are downloaded from Kenneth French’s website.17 Acquiring ﬁrms
are assigned to 25 reference portfolios using the breakpoints for size and book-to-
market. The BHAR captures the value of investing in acquiring ﬁrms relative to a
matched benchmark over the estimation period.
Table 4.9 shows the BHAR results for the whole sample of mergers. On average,
acquirers in mergers have a signiﬁcantly negative abnormal performance in the long-
horizon after the completion of acquisitions. As indicated in Table 4.9, acquisitions
have a negative return of −6.02% over a one-year post-merger period, while two-year
and three-year post-merger BHARs are −9.38% and −11.62%, respectively. Each
17Data is downloaded from Kenneth French’s website (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/
pages/faculty/ken.french/).
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Table 4.9: Post-Merger Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR)
This table presents the acquiring firms’ post-merger buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) for
various aggregate liquidity portfolios. The sample of mergers contains 4, 162 completed U.S. domes-
tic acquisitions between 1980 and 2003 listed on SDC, where the publicly traded acquiring firm is
listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq, and gains control of a public, private, or subsidiary target
firm whose transaction value is at least $100 million. Merger deals announced in the next year
(t+1) of the lowest (or highest) 30% aggregate corporate liquidity demand (∆L/S) and aggregate
market liquidity supply (Debt/GDP ) years (t) are put into the low (or high) liquidity demand
portfolios and liquidity supply portfolios, respectively. Panel A (Panel B) shows the results of
liquidity demand portfolios based on ∆L/S (liquidity supply portfolios based on Debt/GDP ). To
calculate BHAR, I first calculate the buy-and-hold returns (BHR) for each event firm for a period
ranging from 1 month to 12, 24, or 36 month, respectively, where month 0 is the effective month in
mergers: BHRiT =
∏T
t=1(1 + Rit) − 1, where i is the event-firm index, Rit is the month t simple
return on firm i, and T is the horizon over which the BHRiT is computed. Then the BHR for a
reference portfolio is calculated as BHRpi,T =
∏T
t=1[1 +
∑Nt
j=1Rjt/Nt] − 1, where pi is the index
for the reference portfolio of the event firm i, Nt is the number of firms in the reference portfolio
in month t, and Rjt is the return for firm j in the reference portfolio pi during the event-month t
for event firm i. The mean BHAR are then calculated as BHART =
1
N
∑N
i=1(BHRiT −BHRpiT ),
where N is the number of event firms that have valid BHR for event period 12, 24, or 36 months.
The differentials between high liquidity portfolios and low liquidity portfolios are reported, where
statistical significance is obtained using two sample t-tests. t-statistics are provided in parenthesis.
Superscripts a, b, and c indicate significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Event High Medium Low Differences
Windows All (30%) (40%) (30%) (High-Low)
Panel A: Liquidity Demand (∆L/S)
All Firms 1 Year −6.02%a −9.88%a −4.86%a 1.34% −11.22%a
(−7.11) (−7.05) (−3.74) (0.83) (−5.27)
2 Years −9.38%a −13.14%a −9.97%a 1.49% −14.63%a
(−7.70) (−7.22) (−4.98) (0.53) (−4.39)
3 Years −11.62%a −16.06%a −11.92%a 0.29% −16.35%a
(−7.51) (−7.43) (−4.59) (0.07) (−3.64)
Panel B: Liquidity Supply (Debt/GDP )
All Firms 1 Year −6.02%a −5.08%a −8.47%a −1.61% −3.48%c
(−7.11) (−3.89) (−6.14) (−1.01) (−1.68)
2 Years −9.38%a −13.38%a −7.45%a −3.26% −10.12%a
(−7.70) (−6.12) (−4.63) (−1.3) (−3.04)
3 Years −11.62%a −17.90%a −7.96%a −4.54% −13.35%a
(−7.51) (−6.42) (−4.00) (−1.28) (−2.96)
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of these BHARs is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. These results are consis-
tent with previous ﬁndings in the M&A literature, where acquiring ﬁrms experience
signiﬁcantly negative long-term stock performance after acquisitions.
When the sample of mergers is partitioned by aggregate liquidity, I ﬁnd strong
evidence that aggregate liquidity does aﬀect acquirers’ long-term performance. Panel
A of Table 4.9 reports BHAR results for various liquidity demand portfolios. Acquisi-
tions in high-liquidity demand portfolios exhibit the largest negative performance of
−9.88%, −13.14%, and −16.06% in one-year, two-year, and three-year post-merger
periods, respectively. However, the degree of underperformance is much smaller
for mergers initiated in low-liquidity periods. For instance, even acquiring ﬁrms in
low-liquidity portfolios have a positive BHAR of 0.29% over three years after ac-
quisition. The strikingly large diﬀerences in post-merger BHARs between high- and
low-liquidity demand portfolios (−11.22% for 12 months, −14.63% for 24 months
and −16.35% for 36 months) suggest that the commonly recognised long-run un-
derperformance of acquiring ﬁrms is mainly driven by acquisitions announced in
high-liquidity markets. Panel B of Table 4.9 shows the BHAR results for various
liquidity supply portfolios. I ﬁnd that high- and medium-liquidity acquirers have
statistically signiﬁcant negative returns after acquisitions, while low-liquidity acquir-
ers only have returns indiﬀerent from zero. The diﬀerences in BHAR are −3.48%
for 12 months, −10.12% for 24 months, and −13.35% for 36 months, which are all
statistically signiﬁcant.
The results in Table 4.9 show that mergers announced in the high-liquidity pe-
riods destroy the value for shareholders of acquiring ﬁrms in the long run, while
low-liquidity mergers do not. Long-term BHARs are negatively related to aggre-
gate liquidity demand and supply. Figure 4.6 depicts the patterns of abnormal re-
turns across aggregate liquidity and post-merger event windows. The ‘ladder’-shaped
BHAR reﬂects that the magnitude of negative BHAR is positively correlated with
the length of post-merger period and the degree of aggregate liquidity. In addition,
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Figure 4.6: Post-Merger Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns
This figure presents the acquiring firms’ post-merger buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) for various aggregate liquidity portfolios. The sample of
mergers contains 4, 162 completed U.S. domestic acquisitions between 1980 and 2003 listed on SDC, where the publicly traded acquiring firm is listed on
the NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq, and gains control of a public, private, or subsidiary target firm whose transaction value is at least $100 million. Merger
deals announced in the next year (t + 1) of the lowest (or highest) 30% aggregate corporate liquidity demand (∆L/S) and aggregate market liquidity
supply (Debt/GDP ) years (t) are put into the low (or high) liquidity demand portfolios and liquidity supply portfolios, respectively. Panel A (Panel B)
shows the results of liquidity demand portfolios based on ∆L/S (liquidity supply portfolio based on Debt/GDP ). To calculate BHAR, I first calculate
the buy-and-hold returns (BHR) for each event firm for a period ranging from 1 month to 12, 24, or 36 month, respectively, where month 0 is the
effective month in mergers: BHRiT =
∏T
t=1(1+Rit)−1, where i is the event-firm index, Rit is the month t simple return on firm i, and T is the horizon
over which the BHRiT is computed. Then the BHR for a reference portfolio is calculated as BHRpi,T =
∏T
t=1[1 +
∑Nt
j=1Rjt/Nt] − 1, where pi is the
index for the reference portfolio of the event firm i, Nt is the number of firms in the reference portfolio in month t, and Rjt is the return for firm j in
the reference portfolio pi during the event-month t for event firm i. The mean BHAR are then calculated as BHART =
1
N
∑N
i=1(BHRiT −BHRpiT ),
where N is the number of event firms that have valid BHR for event period 12, 24, or 36 months. The differentials between high and low liquidity
portfolios are reported and labeled as “Difference”.
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the large positive diﬀerences in long-term returns between high- and low-liquidity
mergers are clearly shown.
To further investigate these correlations, I examine the abnormal returns of ac-
quisitions in subsamples classiﬁed by aggregate liquidity and various deal character-
istics. In general, as shown in Table 4.10, acquiring ﬁrms’ post-merger BHARs are
negatively correlated with aggregate liquidity, which suggests that the main pattern
remains robust after controlling for common deal characteristics. Panel A of Ta-
ble 4.10 reports the results of BHAR when the sample of mergers is partitioned by
aggregate liquidity and target ﬁrms’ public status (i.e. public, private, subsidiary).
Acquirers purchasing public and private targets have larger negative abnormal re-
turns in the long horizon. For instance, three-year BHARs are−15.95% and−13.49%
for acquisitions with public and private targets, respectively, while the abnormal re-
turns are only −4.43% for buying subsidiary ﬁrms. Regardless of target ﬁrms’ public
status and aggregate liquidity measures, acquisitions in low-liquidity portfolios have
the smallest negative post-merger returns. The diﬀerences in BHAR between high-
liquidity portfolios and corresponding low-liquidity portfolios are negative and mostly
statistically signiﬁcant.
Panel B of Table 4.10 shows the results of subsamples partitioned on the ba-
sis of aggregate liquidity and the method of payment. The evidence shows that
all acquiring ﬁrms with stock payment experience much larger negative long-term
returns than cash payment acquisitions. The three-year BHAR is −26.14% for ac-
quirers using pure stock as a payment method. However, the corresponding return
is only −3.12% for cash payment acquisitions. Recall that, in pre-announcement
periods, stock oﬀers are found to have larger positive abnormal returns than cash
oﬀers. Considering the pre-announcement CAR in conjunction with the post-merger
BHAR, these results suggest the existence of active timing of valuation in M&A,
that stock oﬀers are carried out when pre-announcement stock returns are positive.
Managers take advantage of this high valuation before merger announcements with
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Table 4.10: Post-Merger BHAR sorted by Deal Characteristics
This table presents the acquiring firms’ post-merger buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) for various aggregate liquidity portfolios, which are further
divided into target firms’ public status (i.e. public, private, subsidiary) in Panel A, method of payment (i.e. cash, stock, mixed) in Panel B, and
transaction value (i.e. large (30%), medium (40%), small (30%)) in Panel C. The sample of mergers contains 4, 162 completed U.S. domestic acquisitions
between 1980 and 2003 listed on SDC, where the publicly traded acquiring firm is listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq, and gains control of a public,
private, or subsidiary target firm whose transaction value is at least $100 million. Merger deals announced in the next year (t + 1) of the lowest (or
highest) 30% aggregate corporate liquidity demand (∆L/S) and aggregate market liquidity supply (Debt/GDP ) years (t) are put into the low (or high)
liquidity demand portfolios and liquidity supply portfolios, respectively. In each panel, the left (right) subpanel reports the results for aggregate liquidity
demand (supply) portfolios based on ∆L/S (Debt/GDP ). To calculate BHAR, I first calculate the buy-and-hold returns (BHR) for each event firm for
a period ranging from 1 month to 12, 24, or 36 month, respectively, where month 0 is the effective month in mergers: BHRiT =
∏T
t=1(1 + Rit) − 1,
where i is the event-firm index, Rit is the month t simple return on firm i, and T is the horizon over which the BHRiT is computed. Then the BHR
for a reference portfolio is calculated as BHRpi,T =
∏T
t=1[1 +
∑Nt
j=1Rjt/Nt]− 1, where pi is the index for the reference portfolio of the event firm i, Nt
is the number of firms in the reference portfolio in month t, and Rjt is the return for firm j in the reference portfolio pi during the event-month t for
event firm i. The mean BHAR are then calculated as BHART =
1
N
∑N
i=1(BHRiT − BHRpiT ), where N is the number of event firms that have valid
BHR for event period 12, 24, or 36 months. The differentials between high liquidity portfolios and low liquidity portfolios are reported, where statistical
significance is obtained using two sample t-tests. t-statistics are provided in parenthesis. Superscripts a, b, and c indicate significant at the 1, 5, and 10
percent levels, respectively.
Liquidity Demand (∆L/S) Liquidity Supply (Debt/GDP )
Event High Medium Low Differences High Medium Low Differences
Windows All (30%) (40%) (30%) (High-Low) (30%) (40%) (30%) (High-Low)
Panel A: Target Firms’ Public Status
Public 1 Year −7.37%a −8.25%a −7.57%a −4.67%c −3.58% −8.73%a −7.50%a −2.13% −6.59%b
(−6.04) (−4.13) (−4.01) (−1.89) (−1.13) (−4.47) (−4.06) (−0.83) (−2.04)
2 Years −11.77%a −13.50%a −11.65%a −7.74%c −5.76% −18.18%a −6.80%a −6.93% −11.25%b
(−6.13) (−4.60) (−3.69) (−1.83) (−1.12) (−5.39) (−2.73) (−1.53) (−1.99)
3 Years −15.95%a −17.09%a −17.79%a −9.12% −7.97% −25.86%a −8.23%a −9.66% −16.20%b
(−6.62) (−5.26) (−4.27) (−1.46) (−1.13) (−6.27) (−2.57) (−1.56) (−2.18)
(continued)
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Table 4.10—Continued
Liquidity Demand (∆L/S) Liquidity Supply (Debt/GDP )
Event High Medium Low Differences High Medium Low Differences
Windows All (30%) (40%) (30%) (High-Low) (30%) (40%) (30%) (High-Low)
Private 1 Year −6.65%a −11.84%a −3.79% 3.95% −15.79%a −2.54% −12.06%a −2.27% −0.27%
(−3.36) (−3.67) (−1.32) (1.09) (−3.25) (−0.90) (−3.51) (−0.67) (−0.06)
2 Years −13.30%a −17.00%a −12.15%a −3.46% −13.54%b −14.26%a −15.63%a −3.36% −10.90%c
(−5.52) (−5.12) (−2.82) (−0.64) (−2.14) (−3.18) (−5.09) (−0.69) (−1.64)
3 Years −13.49%a −18.65%a −10.64%c −2.85% −15.80%c −16.28%a −14.73%a −2.12% −14.16%
(−4.37) (−4.45) (−1.94) (−0.37) (−1.79) (−2.72) (−4.00) (−0.32) (−1.58)
Subsidiary 1 Year −3.85%a −10.01%a −2.40% 6.24%b −16.25%a −2.50% −6.94%a −0.10% −2.40%
(−2.81) (−4.61) (−1.08) (2.39) (−4.79) (−1.12) (−3.25) (−0.04) (−0.70)
2 Years −2.89% −7.91%b −6.13%c 14.58%a −22.49%a −6.35%c −0.34% 0.02% −6.37%
(−1.37) (−2.39) (−1.89) (2.93) (−3.76) (−1.68) (−0.12) (0.01) (−1.17)
3 Years −4.43%c −11.91%a −5.39% 13.07%c −24.97%a −8.35%c −1.15% −2.42% −5.93%
(−1.64) (−2.94) (−1.29) (1.92) (−3.16) (−1.71) (−0.32) (−0.42) (−0.79)
Panel B: Method of Payment
All Cash 1 Year −4.54%a −6.10%b −2.98% −5.20%b −0.90% −2.36% −6.08%a −6.02%c 3.66%
(−3.13) (−2.27) (−1.37) (−2.01) (−0.24) (−1.01) (−2.72) (−1.87) (0.92)
2 Years −5.81%a −10.81%a −2.95% −3.10% −7.71% −6.94%c −3.77% −8.41%c 1.47%
(−2.55) (−2.80) (−0.81) (−0.74) (−1.36) (−1.66) (−1.26) (−1.75) (0.23)
3 Years −3.12% −8.44%c 1.37% −2.87% −5.57% −1.61% −2.13% −9.83% 8.23%
(−0.99) (−1.65) (0.28) (−0.43) (−0.66) (−0.28) (−0.52) (−1.58) (0.97)
All Stock 1 Year −11.41%a −17.49%a −4.52% −2.21% −15.28%a −4.31% −18.89%a −3.50% −0.80%
(−5.04) (−5.74) (−1.07) (−0.48) (−2.76) (−1.24) (−5.92) (−0.57) (−0.11)
2 Years −18.48%a −23.16%a −12.42%b −13.84%c −9.32% −9.60%c −26.41%a −21.03%b 11.40%
(−6.33) (−6.64) (−2.03) (−1.84) (−1.12) (−1.75) (−9.22) (−2.32) (1.08)
3 Years −26.14%a −29.16%a −26.15%a −12.70% −16.40% −20.16%a −29.84%a −39.60%a 19.50%
(−7.97) (−7.75) (−4.15) (−1.05) (−1.30) (−3.14) (−9.85) (−3.48) (1.49)
(continued)
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Table 4.10—Continued
Liquidity Demand (∆L/S) Liquidity Supply (Debt/GDP )
Event High Medium Low Differences High Medium Low Differences
Windows All (30%) (40%) (30%) (High-Low) (30%) (40%) (30%) (High-Low)
Mixed 1 Year −6.36%a −7.49%a −11.32%a 7.58%a −15.07%a −10.15%a −5.78%b 0.80% −10.95%a
(−4.08) (−3.36) (−6.01) (2.71) (−4.22) (−5.19) (−2.30) (0.36) (−3.67)
2 Years −10.35%a −9.28%a −21.20%a 10.52%b −19.81%a −24.55%a 0.17% 0.56% −25.11%a
(−5.15) (−2.94) (−7.32) (2.10) (−3.35) (−7.67) (0.05) (0.15) (−5.13)
3 Years −11.70%a −12.01%a −21.49%a 10.27% −22.28%a −29.07%a −0.08% 1.53% −30.59%a
(−4.45) (−3.16) (−5.10) (1.53) (−2.88) (−6.76) (−0.02) (0.29) (−4.45)
Panel C: Transaction Value
Large 1 Year −7.20%a −10.60%a −5.88%a 1.41% −12.02%a −7.24%a −9.34%a −1.03% −6.20%c
(−4.54) (−4.04) (−2.57) (0.52) (−3.18) (−3.01) (−3.74) (−0.41) (−1.78)
2 Years −12.26%a −14.49%a −11.87%a −2.71% −11.78%b −17.90%a −9.34%a −2.27% −15.64%a
(−5.99) (−4.70) (−3.68) (−0.61) (−2.18) (−4.73) (−3.55) (−0.56) (−2.82)
3 Years −15.31%a −18.67%a −13.66%a −4.44% −14.22%b −27.46%a −10.38%a −0.75% −26.72%a
(−6.19) (−5.74) (−3.15) (−0.69) (−1.96) (−6.27) (−3.26) (−0.13) (−3.68)
Medium 1 Year −6.60%a −11.00%a −6.16%a 1.17% −12.17%a −4.46%b −9.66%a −2.11% −2.34%
(−5.22) (−5.34) (−3.17) (0.42) (−3.51) (−2.25) (−4.76) (−0.80) (−0.71)
2 Years −7.99%a −13.35%a −7.58%b 2.33% −15.68%a −8.97%b −8.52%a −5.66% −3.30%
(−4.13) (−4.61) (−2.31) (0.52) (−2.96) (−2.54) (−3.49) (−1.38) (−0.61)
3 Years −10.61%a −16.17%a −9.99%b 0.49% −16.66%b −11.25%b −8.93%a −7.83% −3.42%
(−4.17) (−4.60) (−2.27) (0.07) (−2.22) (−2.34) (−2.80) (−1.38) (−0.46)
Small 1 Year −4.02%b −7.57%a −2.16% 1.48% −9.05%b −3.73% −5.86%b −1.56% −2.17%
(−2.50) (−2.76) (−0.83) (0.54) (−2.33) (−1.50) (−2.11) (−0.49) (−0.54)
2 Years −8.28%a −11.44%a −11.15%a 4.76% −16.20%b −14.59%a −3.96% −1.14% −13.46%b
(−3.47) (−3.25) (−2.85) (0.83) (−2.41) (−3.58) (−1.17) (−0.23) (−2.08)
3 Years −9.10%a −13.17%a −12.65%a 4.99% −18.17%b −16.83%a −3.99% −4.44% −12.39%
(−3.01) (−2.98) (−2.68) (0.68) (−2.12) (−3.28) (−1.00) (−0.62) (−1.41)
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stock payment, which subsequently leads to the long-term negative performance of
acquiring ﬁrms.
As indicated in Panel B, the diﬀerences in BHAR between high- and low-liquidity
portfolios are largely negative for acquisitions with stock or mixed payments. For
instance, in a three-year period, high-liquidity stock oﬀers substantially underper-
form against low-liquidity acquirers with stock payment by −16.40%, while high-
liquidity mixed oﬀers signiﬁcantly underperform against low-liquidity mixed oﬀers
by −24.97%. However, for acquisitions with pure cash payments, the diﬀerences
are much smaller, although they do, admittedly, remain negative. These results are
related to previous ﬁndings relating to pre-announcement CARs. In general, stock
payment acquisitions have stronger a correlation with aggregate liquidity in both
pre-merger and post-merger periods.
Panel C of Table 4.10 shows the results for acquisitions classiﬁed by the level of
transaction value. Acquirers’ long-term BHAR are signiﬁcantly negative across large,
medium, and small transaction groups. Moreover, by comparing performance of
high- and low-liquidity mergers, all mergers announced in high-liquidity markets have
statistically signiﬁcant negative BHAR, while low-liquidity acquirers have returns
close to zero. Although the diﬀerences in BHAR between high- and low-liquidity
acquisitions are negative, the results are larger and more statistically signiﬁcant for
portfolios constructed by aggregate liquidity demand.
To sum up, the post-merger performance of acquiring ﬁrms measured by BHAR
generates signiﬁcant results indicating that aggregate liquidity strongly aﬀects ac-
quiring ﬁrms’ long-term performance. In general, mergers announced in high-liquidity
markets deliver a worse performance than those announced in low-liquidity markets.
These major results remain robust, even after controlling for various deal character-
istics. Mergers with stock payments are found to have a stronger correlation with
aggregate liquidity than cash oﬀers. Moreover, the results of high-low BHAR diﬀer-
entials stand in sharp contrast to the diﬀerences in stock market reaction before and
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around the announcement of mergers. Thus, high-liquidity acquisitions outperform
(underperform) low-liquidity acquisitions in pre-announcement (post-acquisition) pe-
riods.
B Calendar-Time Portfolio Regression (CTPR)
In this section, I apply the calendar-time portfolio regression (CTPR) approach to
measure the long-term performance of acquisitions. This methodology is strongly
suggested by Fama and French (1993) and Mitchell and Staﬀord (2000). Instead of
using the traditional ordinary least square (OLS) regression, I apply the weighted
least square (WLS) regression, which weights the results in each calendar month with
the number of securities in that month. When using OLS regression, event months
with heavily weighted securities are treated the same as others, which reduces the
importance of ‘hot’ periods of merger activity. The time-series of portfolio returns,
net of the risk-free returns over the sample period, is regressed on the three Fama
and French (1993) factors:
Rpt −Rft = αp + βp(Rmt −Rft) + spSMBt + hpHMLt + ǫt (4.5)
where Rpt is the equally-weighted return of the event portfolio, Rft is the risk-free
rate, (Rmt − Rft) represents excess return on the market, SMB is the diﬀerence
between a portfolio of ‘small’ and ‘big’ stocks, and HML is the diﬀerence between a
portfolio of ‘high’ and ‘low’ book-to-market stocks. Within this framework, the inter-
cept αp measures the average monthly abnormal return on the portfolio of acquiring
ﬁrms.
Table 4.11 shows the results of calendar-time regression for acquisitions through-
out the entire sample and various liquidity portfolios. Calendar-time returns are
calculated for 12, 24, and 36 months of post-merger periods. Panel A and Panel
B of Table 4.11 show the calendar-time regression results of aggregate liquidity de-
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Table 4.11: Calendar-Time Three-Factor WLS Regression
This table presents the results of three-factor calendar-time portfolio regression (CTPR) approach
with weighted least square (WLS) regressions. The sample of mergers contains 4, 162 completed U.S.
domestic acquisitions between 1980 and 2003 listed on SDC, where the publicly traded acquiring
firm is listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq, and gains control of a public, private, or subsidiary
target firm whose transaction value is at least $100 million. Merger deals announced in the next
year (t + 1) of the lowest (or highest) 30% aggregate corporate liquidity demand (∆L/S) and
aggregate market liquidity supply (Debt/GDP ) years (t) are put into the low (or high) liquidity
demand portfolios and liquidity supply portfolios, respectively. Panel A (Panel B) shows the results
of liquidity demand portfolios based on ∆L/S (liquidity supply portfolios based on Debt/GDP ).
Each monthly abnormal return is calculated using a time-series regression, where the dependent
variables is the equally weighted portfolio return in each calendar month of all bidders within each
subgroup that completed an acquisition in the previous 12, 24, or 36 months. The independent
variables are the Fama-French (1993) factors, where the regression equation is:
Rpt −Rft = αp + βp(Rmt −Rft) + spSMBt + hpHMLtǫt.
where Rpt is the event portfolio return, Rft is the risk-free rate, (Rmt − Rft) represents excess
return on the market, SMB is the difference between a portfolio of “small” and “big” stocks, HML
is the difference between a portfolio of “high” and “low” book-to-market stocks. The intercept of
the time-series regression is the monthly abnormal return (in percentage). t-statistics are provided
in parenthesis. Superscripts a, b, and c indicate significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels,
respectively.
Event Windows High (30%) Medium (40%) Low (30%) All
Panel A: Liquidity Demand (∆L/S)
1 Year −0.596%c −0.404%a −0.339%b −0.630%a
(−1.80) (−2.75) (−2.07) (−3.56)
2 Years −0.393% −0.387%a −0.228%c −0.476%a
(−1.37) (−2.71) (−1.77) (−2.71)
3 Years −0.016% −0.226%c −0.137% −0.225%
(−0.06) (−1.73) (−1.18) (−1.36)
Panel B: Liquidity Supply (Debt/GDP )
1 Year −0.609%a −0.101% −0.001% −0.630%a
(−3.52) (−0.33) (0.00) (−3.56)
2 Years −0.569%a 0.299% −0.004% −0.476%a
(−2.99) (1.10) (−0.03) (−2.71)
3 Years −0.342%c 0.422%c 0.037% −0.225%
(−1.75) (1.69) (0.33) (−1.36)
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mand (∆C/S) and aggregate liquidity supply (Debt/GDP ) constructed portfolios.
As shown in Panel A, for 12 months after the completion of an acquisition, low-
liquidity mergers have a signiﬁcant return of −0.596% per month, which corresponds
to −7.152% over one year. Conversely, the abnormal return for low-liquidity acqui-
sitions is only −0.339% per month. For 12-month and 24-month periods, I ﬁnd that
mergers announced in low-liquidity periods outperform corresponding high-liquidity
acquisitions. Panel B shows that high-liquidity acquirers have statistically signiﬁcant
negative returns over three years after the completion of mergers, while low-liquidity
acquirers have calendar-time returns indiﬀerent from zero.
In summary, the abnormal results measured by CTPR support the negative cor-
relation between aggregate liquidity and long-term post-merger acquisition perfor-
mance, although the magnitude of abnormal returns is quite diﬀerent from BHAR.18
The diﬀerences in calendar-time returns between high- and low-liquidity acquisitions
are signiﬁcant for the two-year post-merger period, while the three-year performance
diﬀerences are statistically insigniﬁcant.
4.5.3 Multivariate Regression Analysis
In this section, I run multivariate regressions to control for various factors that may
aﬀect the abnormal performance of acquisitions. Many previous studies have demon-
strated that acquisition performance can be explained by a number of market or ﬁrm
factors. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) show that an acquirer’s own valuation (market-
to-book) aﬀects post-acquisition performance. Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins (1983)
and Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) ﬁnd that the size of an acquisition rela-
tive to the size of acquirer has an impact on the abnormal returns of the acquisition.
Further, using multivariate regression analysis can avoid the small sample problems
18It is notable that CTPR might reduce the power of abnormal returns by weighting each time
period equally, and bias results toward market efficiency. Loughran and Ritter (2000) argue that
there should be differences in abnormal return estimates across different methodologies.
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that can arise in the univariate analysis, where the sample of mergers is split into
many subgroups.
The dependent variables in the regression analysis are the forty-day pre-announcement
CAR, the ﬁve-day announcement CAR and the two-year BHAR.19 I estimate the fol-
lowing model:
AR = a0 + a1HighLiqDummy + a2MediumLiqDummy + a3CashDummy
+ a4StockDummy + a5HighMBDummy + a6MediumMBDummy
+ a7LogRelSize+ a8PreAnnReturn (4.6)
whereAR is the forty-day CAR, ﬁve-day CAR and two-year BHAR.HighLiqDummy
(MediumLiqDummy) equal to one if the acquisition was announced in a high-
liquidity (medium-liquidity) market and zero otherwise. CashDummy (StockDummy)
equals one if the total transaction value of acquisition was paid in cash (stock) and
zero otherwise. HighMBDummy (MediumMBDummy) equals one if the acquirer
belongs to the high (medium) M/B category and zero otherwise. LogRelSize is
deﬁned as the logarithm of the transaction value at the time of the acquisition an-
nouncement, divided by the acquirer’s market value of equity one month prior to the
announcement date. As explained earlier, these factors are included to control for
their aﬀects on acquisitions. PreAnnReturn is the cumulative pre-announcement
stock return (measured from 150 days until 31 days prior to the announcement date).
Since pre-announcement run-ups could aﬀect both announcement results and long-
run post-merger results, PreAnnReturn is used to ensure that my ﬁndings do not
capture short-term stock price persistence, as in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993).
Table 4.12 shows the multivariate regression results, which conﬁrm the previous
ﬁndings from the univariate analysis. It is clear that the pre-announcement forty-day
returns of lowM/B, mixed payment acquisitions that are announced in a low-liquidity
19The results are similar when using abnormal returns in different event periods.
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Table 4.12: Regression Analysis of Short-Run and Long-Run Returns
This table presents ordinary least squares regressions of the acquirer’s forty-day pre-announcement CAR, five-day CAR, and two-year BHAR on the
following variables. The sample of mergers contains 4, 162 completed U.S. domestic acquisitions between 1980 and 2003 listed on SDC, where the publicly
traded acquiring firm is listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq, and gains control of a public, private, or subsidiary target firm whose transaction value
is at least $100 million. HighLiqDummy (MediumLiqDummy) equals one if the acquisition was announced in a high-liquidity (medium-liquidity)
market and zero otherwise. CashDummy (StockDummy) equals one if the total transaction value of acquisition was paid in cash (stock) and zero
otherwise. Acquirers are divided into subsamples of high (30%), medium (40%), and low (30%) M/B firms based on their market-to-book ratio one
month prior to the acquisition announcement. HighMBDummy (MediumMBDummy) equals one if the acquirer belongs to the high (medium)
firm-valuation category and zero otherwise. LogRelSize is the log of the transaction value at the time of the acquisition announcement divided by
the acquirer’s market value of equity one month prior to the announcement. PreAnnReturn is the firm’s cumulative abnormal stock return measured
over [−150,−31]. In all subpanels, the intercept represents a low M/B, mixed payment merger and was announced in a low-liquidity merger market.
t-statistics are provided in parenthesis. Superscripts a, b, and c indicate significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Liquidity Demand (∆L/S) Liquidity Supply (Debt/GDP )
Dependent Dependent Dependent Dependent Dependent Dependent
Variable= Variable= Variable= Variable= Variable= Variable=
(−40,−1) (−2,+2) Two-Year (−40,−1) (−2,+2) Two-Year
CAR CAR BHAR CAR CAR BHAR
Intercept −3.08%a −0.28% −8.66%b −2.45%a −0.32% −12.68%a
(−3.80) (−0.50) (−2.43) (−2.95) (−0.55) (−3.54)
HighLiqDummy 2.64%a 0.44% −12.47%a 1.04% 1.28%b −10.19%a
(3.24) (0.78) (−3.59) (1.19) (2.12) (−2.76)
MediumLiqDummy 1.98%b 0.90% −10.99%a 2.24%b 0.13% −4.29%
(2.41) (1.59) (−3.14) (2.55) (0.22) (−1.15)
CashDummy −0.20% −0.19% −1.91% −0.37% −0.16% −1.57%
(−0.28) (−0.38) (−0.64) (−0.53) (−0.32) (−0.52)
StockDummy 3.47%a −3.45%a −15.46%a 3.46%a −3.53%a −15.24%a
(4.80) (−6.90) (−4.96) (4.77) (−7.05) (−4.87)
HighMBDummy 2.95%a 2.28%a 31.27%a 2.79%a 2.27%a 31.62%a
(4.00) (4.48) (9.88) (3.76) (4.45) (9.92)
MediumMBDummy 0.72% 0.73% 11.63%a 0.73% 0.67% 12.25%a
(1.06) (1.55) (3.95) (1.07) (1.42) (4.15)
LogRelSize 0.41%a 0.56%a 1.15% 0.40%a 0.561%a 1.36%
(5.29) (10.68) (1.10) (5.24) (10.66) (1.29)
PreAnnReturn 21.93%a 0.87% −16.62%a 21.96%a 1.058% −18.53%a
(19.30) (1.10) (−3.33) (19.30) (1.34) (−3.70)
Adjusted R2 14.60% 4.60% 3.70% 14.50% 4.80% 3.60%
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demand (supply) market are statistically signiﬁcantly negative at −3.08% (−2.45%).
The coeﬃcient on the high- and medium-liquidity dummy (∆L/S) is positive and
signiﬁcant (2.64% and 1.98%, respectively). Thus, as in the univariate analysis, ac-
quisitions initiated in high-liquidity markets have signiﬁcantly higher CARs. The
abnormal returns are signiﬁcantly higher if the merger is paid for in stock (3.47%),
and when the acquirer’s M/B ratio is high at the time of the acquisition announce-
ment (2.95%).20 Moreover, CARs are higher if the relative size is larger (0.41%), and
are signiﬁcantly higher if the acquirer experiences larger pre-announcement stock re-
turns (21.93%). When using a ﬁve-day CAR around the announcement, the results
are consistent with previous univariate tests. The coeﬃcient on the liquidity dum-
mies is insigniﬁcantly positive. While coeﬃcients on other factors are similar to those
for the forty-day CAR, the stock dummy is signiﬁcant and negative (−3.45%)
Table 4.12 also shows the regression results when the dependent variable is a two-
year BHAR. The two-year BHAR of low M/B, mixed payment acquisitions that are
announced in a low-liquidity demand (supply) market are statistically signiﬁcantly
negative at −8.66% (−12.68%). BHARs are signiﬁcantly lower if the acquisition is
announced in a high-liquidity demand or supply market (−12.47% and −10.19%,
respectively). Similar to the announcement CAR, the BHAR is signiﬁcantly lower if
it is paid for in stock (−15.46%) and higher if the acquirer has a higher M/B ratio
(31.27%). Consistent with the long-run stock price reversal as in Jegadeesh and
Titman (1993), BHARs are signiﬁcantly negatively related to pre-announcement
price run-ups (−16.62%).
In summary, the size and signiﬁcance of these coeﬃcients suggest that aggre-
gate liquidity factors are an important determinant of both the short- and long-run
performances of acquisitions, even after controlling for various factors. They aﬀect
the performance of acquirers over the method of payment used and acquirers’ own
valuations and stock price run-ups. The results from multivariate regression further
20These findings are consistent with results in Rau and Vermaelen (1998).
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support previous ﬁndings on univariate analysis, and indicate that acquisitions ini-
tiated in low-liquidity markets have a better performance than those announced in
high-liquidity markets.
4.5.4 Summary
Figure 4.7 summarises the results of merger performance, which are consistent with
most of the previous studies in the literature. Since my sample of mergers covers an
extensive time period (from 1980 to 2003), these results deliver further support to
previous evidence in the literature.
Figure 4.7: Summary of Merger Performance
This figure presents the summary of acquisition performance. The sample of mergers contains 4, 162
completed U.S. domestic acquisitions between 1980 and 2003 listed on SDC, where the publicly
traded acquiring firm is listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq, and gains control of a public,
private, or subsidiary target firm whose transaction value is at least $100 million. CAR 1 (CAR 2)
is the pre-announcement (announcement) CAR.
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The major ﬁnding in this section is that, when applying aggregate liquidity into
the analysis, most of these abnormal performances are generated by high-liquidity
acquisitions. While high-liquidity acquirers experience signiﬁcantly higher announce-
ment and pre-announcement returns (CAR) than low-liquidity acquisitions, their
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long-term post-merger performances (BHAR and calendar-time return) are substan-
tially lower. In contrast, acquisitions initiated in low-liquidity markets often have
short-run and long-run returns indiﬀerent from zero. These patterns are clearly
demonstrated in univariate analysis, where the sample of mergers is split into various
subgroups based on aggregate liquidity (∆L/S or Debt/GDP ) and deal character-
istics. The diﬀerences in performance between high- and low-liquidity acquisitions
are signiﬁcantly positive for pre-announcement and announcement period CARs, but
signiﬁcantly negative for post-merger BHARs and CTPRs. The results of the mul-
tivariate regression analysis further demonstrate that, after controlling for various
factors that may impact on the abnormal performance of acquirers, aggregate liq-
uidity factors are positively correlated with pre-announcement CARs and negatively
correlated with post-merger BHARs.
4.6 Conclusion
Motivated by prior theoretical and empirical research that suggests the importance
of liquidity in corporate investment and ﬁnancing activity, in this research I ques-
tion whether mergers announced when aggregate liquidity is high are fundamentally
diﬀerent from those initiated during low aggregate liquidity periods. In particular, I
examine whether the activity and performance of acquisitions are diﬀerent in various
liquidity markets. Previous studies seldom investigate the importance of the aggre-
gate liquidity and its implications for corporate takeover activities. Considering that
many predictors for stock market returns have been successfully applied to explain
anomalies in M&A, I expect aggregate liquidity factors to have strong explanation
powers on merger activity and quality.
Through empirical investigation, I ﬁnd evidence that aggregate liquidity substan-
tially inﬂuences aggregate merger activity and the performance of acquiring ﬁrms.
The results demonstrate that merger activity tends to be higher when aggregate liq-
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uidity demand or supply is higher, while stock-ﬁnanced acquisitions show stronger
responses to the changing of aggregate liquidity than cash-ﬁnanced acquisitions. The
performance of acquiring ﬁrms in the announcement period is signiﬁcantly better
for acquisitions announced in high-liquidity markets relative to those announced in
low-liquidity markets. However, this ﬁnding is reversed in long-term performance,
where acquirers buying in high-liquidity markets signiﬁcantly underperform relative
to acquirers buying during low-liquidity markets in the three years after the acqui-
sition. These results on acquisition performance are valid in a univariate analysis
and multivariate regression setting. The correlations between aggregate liquidity
and acquisition performance remain clear after controlling for various other factors
that may aﬀect acquirer performance including targets’ public status, the method of
payment, and the acquirer’s own M/B ratio.
Overall, the results in this research strongly suggest that acquisitions undertaken
during the period of low aggregate liquidity are better in quality. These ﬁndings are in
line with previous explanations in Harford (1999) that cash-rich ﬁrms are more likely
to undertake value-decreasing acquisitions. The aggregate liquidity factors measure
the entire market’s liquidity level. When there are more than suﬃcient liquidity
ﬂowing in the markets, ﬁrms can easily acquire “cheap” money to initiate irrational
investment projects, most of which will decrease the beneﬁts of shareholders. In the
contrast, only ﬁrms with serious investment considerations and suﬃcient liquidity
holdings are more like to initiate takeovers in low-liquidity markets; such acquisitions
in low liquidity status can beneﬁt these ﬁrms’ performance in the long-term.
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Chapter 5
Equity Issue Puzzles and Aggregate
Liquidity
5.1 Introduction
There is a considerable body of literature on public equity issuance including initial
public oﬀerings (IPOs) and seasoned equity oﬀerings (SEOs). In academic research,
several major empirical patterns for IPOs and SEOs have been documented. First,
both the numbers of IPOs and SEOs and the total proceeds raised in these oﬀerings
vary substantially over time (e.g. Ibbotson and Jaﬀe (1975), Ibbotson, Sindelar, and
Ritter (1988, 1994), and Lowry (2003)). Lowry (2003) argues that the variation of
IPO volume is far in excess of the variation in capital expenditure by corporations,
suggesting that other potential factors have a substantial eﬀect on the time of a ﬁrm’s
IPO. Second, there is severe underpricing of IPOs (e.g. Smith (1986) and Ritter and
Welch (2002)) and signiﬁcant discounting of SEOs (e.g. Smith (1977) and Loderer,
Sheehan, and Kadlec (1991)). The degree of underpricing (or discounting) changes
over time, and has a positive correlation with equity oﬀering volume. Third, a
substantial amount of research has documented that equity issuers suﬀer post-issue
long-run stock underperformance over a one- to ﬁve-year horizon (e.g. Ritter (1991),
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Loughran and Ritter (1995), and Spiess and Aﬄeck-Graves (1995)).
These equity issue puzzles attract a large amount of attention in the academic
literature. A number of theoretical and empirical studies investigate the cause and
eﬀect of corporate ﬁnancing decisions, and explore potential explanations for abnor-
mal phenomena. For instance, Lowry (2003) investigates the determinants of IPO
waves, Baker and Wurgler (2000) explore the importance of time series patterns
in SEOs, Loughran and Ritter (2004) examine three hypotheses for the change in
IPO underpricing, and Brav, Geczy, and Gompers (2000), Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli
(2000), and Lyandres, Sun, and Zhang (2008) investigate whether other factors can
explain the long-run underperformance of oﬀering ﬁrms.
While fully recognising the achievements of prior research in providing explana-
tions for puzzles on equity issues, my primary objective in this chapter is to explore
whether aggregate liquidity factors can explain the observed abnormal phenomena in
association with IPOs and SEOs. In particular, this research will empirically address
the following questions: Can aggregate liquidity factors explain equity issue waves?
Are IPOs and SEOs occurring in high aggregate liquidity markets fundamentally
diﬀerent from those that occur in low aggregate liquidity markets?
Liquidity is an important and special asset for ﬁrms operating in imperfect capital
markets (see, e.g., Kim, Mauer, and Sherman (1998) and Opler, Pinkowika, Stulz,
and Williamson (1999)). Despite the importance of corporate liquidity reserves and
market liquidity supply to companies in practice, and to theories in corporate ﬁ-
nance, limited attention has been given to exploring the inﬂuence of liquidity on
corporate external ﬁnancing activity and quality. Moreover, no previous research
has investigated the eﬀects of aggregate liquidity on public equity issuance, or exam-
ined whether the quality and performance of IPOs and SEOs are related to aggregate
liquidity factors. Considering liquidity factors at aggregate level allow us to investi-
gate the existence of IPO and SEO anomalies and the inﬂuence of aggregate liquidity
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on corporate external ﬁnancing.1
In this research, I use a sample of 5, 529 IPOs and a sample of 6, 100 SEOs
announced between January 1, 1972 and December 31, 2004 to investigate the corre-
lation between aggregate liquidity and equity oﬀerings. The sample size and period
are among the largest in the literature. I examine whether fundamental diﬀerences
exist in the quality and performance of issuances between IPOs and SEOs made un-
der high aggregate liquidity markets and those occurring in low aggregate liquidity
periods. The factors of aggregate liquidity include aggregate corporate liquidity de-
mand (ACLD) and aggregate market liquidity supply (AMLS). In order to measure
the aggregate corporate liquidity demand, by following the methodology in Green-
wood (2005), I use data reported in the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds to construct
a measure of the aggregate corporate accumulation of liquid asset as a fraction of
total corporate investment spending. To construct the aggregate market liquidity
supply measure, I apply the U.S. Debt/GDP ratio by following Krishnamurthy and
Vissing-Jorgensen (2008).
Based on time-series aggregate liquidity factors, I partition the sample periods
of IPOs and SEOs into times of high-, medium-, and low aggregate liquidity periods
(30%, 40%, 30%) based on the prior year’s aggregate liquidity. Then IPOs and SEOs
announced under diﬀerent aggregate liquidity periods are put into high-, medium-,
and low-liquidity portfolios, respectively. In this research, I investigate the explana-
tions of aggregate liquidity on the three major patterns of IPOs and SEOs, namely
waves of equity oﬀerings, the existing and changing of underpricing and the long-run
underperformance of issuing ﬁrms. In order to capture these patterns and their cor-
relations with aggregate liquidity, I calculate IPO underpricing, SEO discounting,
ﬁrst-month returns, and long-run buy-and-hold abnormal returns.
The main ﬁndings of this research suggest that aggregate liquidity measures are
1Brav, Geczy, and Gompers (2000) and Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2000) study the existence of
equity issuance anomalies.
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strongly related to the activity and performance of equity issuances. Firstly, IPOs
(SEOs) activity, measured by the number and proceeds of IPOs (SEOs), are posi-
tively correlated with aggregate liquidity factors including liquidity demand (∆L/S)
and supply (Debt/GDP ). Secondly, changes to IPO and SEO underpricing can
be explained by aggregate liquidity. I apply three proxies for underpricing. The
underpricing of IPOs and SEOs in the whole sample is driven by that of equity oﬀer-
ings occurring in high aggregate liquidity markets. The diﬀerences of underpricing
between high- and low-liquidity portfolios are highly positive and statistically signif-
icant. Finally, consistent with the results for short-term underpricing, the long-run
underperformance of issuing ﬁrms only exists for IPOs and SEOs in high aggregate
liquidity periods. The positive correlation between aggregate liquidity and the degree
of negative BHAR is clearly presented by the negative diﬀerences of BHAR between
high- and low-liquidity portfolios.
This research contributes to the literature in the following two ways. First, it
establishes the importance of aggregate liquidity in explaining the activity of equity
oﬀerings and, more importantly, the performance of issuing ﬁrms. The potential
inﬂuence of liquidity on IPOs and SEOs has been limited in its documentation.
Lowry (2003) propose and examine the capital demands hypothesis, which suggests
that ﬂuctuations in IPO volume are driven by changes in private ﬁrms’ aggregate
demand for capital (cash). He concludes that IPO volume is positively related to
companies’ demands for capital. DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2007) argue that
the fundamental need for cash to resolve a near-term liquidity squeeze is the primary
motivation for selling stock, instead of market timing.
Second, this research complements current ﬁndings in the literature that refer to
the “window of opportunity”. The observed clustering of equity issues is consistent
with the widely held belief that certain periods oﬀer a “window of opportunity” for
raising funds in capital markets (see Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993), Bayless and
Chaplinsky (1996), and Helwege and Liang (2004)). Prior research in this stream usu-
176
ally classiﬁes the period of time with macroeconomic criteria, the aggregate volume
of equity issues and even market valuations. This research adds to current ﬁndings
by using aggregate liquidity to identify Hot markets and Cold markets. Even though
empirical evidence strongly suggests that there are fundamental diﬀerences in the
IPOs and SEOs between equity oﬀering periods identiﬁed by aggregate liquidity, I
cannot rule out market timing as a secondary inﬂuence that systematically impacts
on IPO and SEO decisions.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 discusses the sample
selection and the empirical methodology used in the empirical analysis. Section 5.3
presents the empirical results for IPO ﬁrms and Section 5.4 presents the empirical
results for SEO ﬁrms. Finally, Section 5.5 concludes this chapter and summarises
empirical ﬁndings.
5.2 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
In this section, I describe the criteria for the IPO sample (in Section 5.2.1) and the
SEO sample (in Section 5.2.2). Section 5.2.3 introduces the empirical strategy that
links aggregate liquidity to IPOs and SEOs, and the rationales for choosing such an
empirical methodology.
5.2.1 IPO Sample
The sample of initial public oﬀerings (IPOs) is collected from the Thomson One
Banker New Issues Database for the period of 1972 to 2004.2 The New Issues
Database in Thomson One Banker is exactly the same as the Securities Data Cor-
poration (SDC) New Issues Database, which is the commonly-used data source for
studies in IPOs and SEOs. Both Thomson One Banker and SDC are maintained
2Thomson One Banker is derived from the well-known Thomson Financial sources, including
SDC Platinum, I/B/E/S, Worldscope and many more.
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by the Thomson Financial Services.3 In the following discussion, the source of data
is referred to as ‘SDC’ for simplicity. For the IPO sample, daily stock prices and
monthly returns for IPO ﬁrms are extracted from the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP). Accounting information is collected from the COMPUSTAT Annual
Industrial Files. Since SDC does not report the CRSP PERMNO for equity oﬀering
ﬁrms, I search for PERMNO by matching on CUSIP. The data items obtained from
SDC include the issue date, the oﬀer price, the proceeds amount, the amount of
shares oﬀered, and the CUSIP of the oﬀering ﬁrms.
By following some previous studies, IPOs have to satisfy the following criteria to
be included in the IPO sample:
1. Equity oﬀering must be performed by a U.S. ﬁrm listed in the CRSP database.
2. IPOs should issue ordinary common stocks and not be a unit oﬀering, which
represents a combination of securities such as common stocks and warrants.
3. Equity oﬀerings must include at least some primary shares (following Brav,
Geczy, and Gompers (2000)). Both pure primary share oﬀerings and a combi-
nation of primary and secondary share oﬀerings are included.
4. The equity oﬀering of ﬁrms that trade on exchanges other than the American
Stock Exchange (AMEX), New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and Nasdaq are
excluded.
5. Issues by closed-end funds, unit investment trusts, real estate investment trusts
(REITs), and American Depository Receipts (ADRs) are excluded.
6. Issues by utility ﬁrms (SIC codes 4910 through to 4949) are excluded from the
sample (following Loughran and Ritter (1995)).4
3Discussion with Thomson One Banker employee verified that both databases are the same.
4Utility offerings tend to be different from those of other operating companies.
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Table 5.1: Number, Gross Proceeds, Underpricing, First-month Returns,
and Amount of Money Left on the Table of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs)
by Year, 1972 to 2004
This table presents the distribution of IPOs across years. The sample of IPOs consists of 5, 529 IPOs
by U.S. firms subsequently listed on AMEX, NYSE, or Nasdaq from 1972 to 2004, excluding units,
offers without primary shares, issues by closed-end funds, unit investment trusts, REITs, ADRs,
and utilities. Gross proceeds is the amount raised from investors in millions (2004 purchasing power
using the CPI, local market offering amount, excluding overallotment options). The equal-weighted
(EW) mean IPO underpricing is measured as the percent price change between the first CRSP-
listed closing price and the offer price, relative to the offer price. The EW mean first-month return
is measured as the percent price change between the 21st trading day’s closing price and the offer
price, relative to the offer price. Money left on the table (millions of dollars, 2004 purchasing power)
is calculated as the number of shares issued times the change from the offer price to the first-day
closing prices.
Number Average Average
of IPOs Gross Mean Money Left
Number in NYSE Proceeds Mean IPO First-month on the Table
Year of IPOs /AMEX ($ millions) Underpricing Return ($ millions)
1972 20 9 41.92 4.12% −3.39% 2.19
1973 20 13 23.67 3.63% −10.68% 2.56
1974 4 3 20.37 0.79% −19.62% 0.26
1975 2 2 39.94 11.69% 27.56% 3.35
1976 12 9 35.85 4.07% −2.88% 1.25
1977 11 4 18.87 13.99% 17.42% 1.65
1978 18 6 30.14 16.10% 12.93% 4.72
1979 29 13 18.58 10.77% 11.79% 2.34
1980 52 18 28.63 33.02% 40.06% 7.45
1981 114 33 24.76 11.76% 17.29% 1.87
1982 53 4 29.46 14.31% 23.04% 5.28
1983 311 62 48.32 10.99% 14.18% 4.40
1984 124 20 25.74 4.50% 4.05% 0.80
1985 147 26 44.49 7.86% 14.14% 2.86
1986 321 57 56.22 8.80% 10.46% 3.49
1987 223 53 43.44 7.90% 5.02% 2.96
1988 86 19 40.55 6.91% 7.74% 1.64
1989 79 18 43.35 7.88% 8.46% 2.54
1990 94 15 35.45 11.72% 12.12% 3.40
1991 237 39 53.71 12.34% 18.78% 6.39
1992 334 62 61.14 11.15% 12.90% 5.36
1993 417 59 64.02 12.86% 16.20% 7.97
1994 315 47 44.02 9.83% 12.77% 4.46
1995 364 43 58.25 21.12% 28.69% 11.70
1996 538 70 53.88 16.43% 21.42% 9.67
1997 358 66 61.42 14.44% 16.50% 9.69
1998 239 51 59.97 22.89% 26.82% 12.47
1999 391 29 109.13 75.45% 106.14% 73.96
2000 301 17 145.06 58.26% 68.08% 70.27
2001 58 18 259.60 15.57% 10.63% 39.86
2002 54 17 139.02 8.01% 4.72% 12.94
2003 52 14 131.41 14.40% 16.96% 18.13
2004 151 37 113.01 11.46% 15.03% 15.14
Total 5, 529 953 65.98 19.89% 25.29% 15.51
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The initial sample of IPOs generated from the SDC with these criteria consists
of 5, 711 IPOs from 1972 to 2004. Among them, 18 IPO ﬁrms without matched
PERMNO and 20 IPO ﬁrms with replicated CUSIP are excluded from the IPO
sample. Although SDC data extends back to 1970, the sample of IPO starts in 1972
because the data coverage in SDC before 1972 appears to be less comprehensive. In
addition, Nasdaq did not start until 1971 and the CRSP Nasdaq tape did not start
until late 1972. Yung, Çolak, and Wang (2008) apply the starting point of 1973
under similar considerations when using an SDC database. The reason for ending
the IPO sample in 2004 is to have at least three years’ post-issue stock returns for
equity oﬀering ﬁrms from CRSP. Although SDC provides a comprehensive coverage
of IPO data, its equity oﬀer date is not an accurate indicator of the actual oﬀer day.
To overcome this problem and the potential mismatching of ﬁrms’ PERMNO codes
in CRSP, I follow the procedure in Helwege and Liang (2004). If a ﬁrm is matched
on CRSP, I require that the ﬁrst trading date is no more than 10 days after the IPO
date from SDC; or if it appeared before the IPO date, then with non-missing trading
prices no more than two days before the IPO date. This requirement further reduces
the IPO sample by 144 deals. Nearly half of these rejected deals (71 ﬁrms) are taken
out because of the limited CRSP coverage of Nasdaq stocks in 1972.
Thus, the ﬁnal sample of IPOs contains 5, 529 ﬁrms after the screening process,
resulting in one of the largest samples in the literature. For comparison, Loughran
and Ritter’s (1995) sample contains 4, 753 IPOs and Brav, Geczy, and Gompers’s
(2000) sample includes 4, 622 IPOs. Table 5.1 reports the annual breakdown of the
IPO sample. Column 2 in the table shows the number of IPOs that occurred in each
sample year. It is clear that the volume of IPOs changes substantially through time,
and the IPO market experienced a large boom in the 1990s, which contains 3, 494
equity oﬀerings in between 1991 and 2000. Column 3 of Table 5.1 shows the number
of IPOs listed on the NYSE and AMEX, where only 953 IPOs are listed in these
two exchanges. In the U.S., most ﬁrms went public on the Nasdaq market. The
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number of IPOs in NYSE/AMEX varies widely and is particularly low during the
period 1974–1978. Panel A of Figure 5.1 presents the annual number of ﬁrms that
went public from 1972 to 2004, separated by listing exchanges (i.e. NYSE/AMEX
or Nasdaq). It is obvious that most IPOs went public on the Nasdaq, and that the
IPO market has two booms over the sample period.
Table 5.1 also reports the average gross proceeds raised from IPOs, mean IPO
underpricing, mean ﬁrst-month return, and average amount of money left on the
table. Gross proceeds is the amount of capital in millions raised from investors in
U.S. local markets. Gross proceeds exclude over-allotment options and are adjusted
into 2004 purchasing power using the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Similar to the
number of IPOs, the IPO activity measured by annual gross proceeds is modest in
the 1980s (about $38 million per year). In the 1990s, the issuing volume roughly
doubled to $60 million per year during 1990–1999, and then tripled to $202 million
per year during 2000–2001, before falling to $139 million in 2002.
IPO underpricing (or IPO ﬁrst-day return), denoted by U = (P1 − P0)/P0, is
deﬁned as the percentage price change between the CRSP-listed ﬁrst trading day
closing price (P1) and the oﬀer price (P0), relative to the oﬀer price. The IPO
ﬁrst-month return, denoted by Rm = (P21 − P0)/P0, is measured as the percentage
price change between the twenty-ﬁrst trading day closing price (P21) and the oﬀer
price, relative to the oﬀer price. The mean underpricing for the whole IPO sample
is about 20% and the mean ﬁrst-month return is 25.3%, which is slightly larger than
the ﬁrst-day return. This evidence shows that the degree of IPO underpricing is
mostly reﬂected by the market price at end of the ﬁrst trading day. Average IPO
underpricing for each year within the sample period ranges from 0.79% in 1974 to
75.45% in 1999. The IPO sample also has the largest and smallest mean ﬁrst-month
returns in these two years (−19.62% and 106.14%, respectively). Table 5.1 indicates
that the time series pattern of the average ﬁrst-day returns in the IPO sample is very
similar to that shown in Ritter and Welch (2002). For example, the average ﬁrst-day
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Figure 5.1: Number, Underpricing, Money Left on the Table of IPOs
This figure presents the annual number (in Panel A), underpricing, and money left on the table (in
Panel B) of IPOs. The sample of IPOs consists of 5, 529 IPOs by U.S. firms subsequently listed on
AMEX, NYSE, or Nasdaq from 1972 to 2004, excluding units, offers without primary shares, issues
by closed-end funds, unit investment trusts, REITs, ADRs, and utilities. The IPO underpricing
is measured as the percent price change between the first CRSP-listed closing price and the offer
price, relative to the offer price. Money left on the table (millions of dollars, 2004 purchasing power)
is calculated as the number of shares issued times the change from the offer price to the first-day
closing prices.
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returns are 11.0% in 1983, 11.7% in 1990, 21.1% in 1995, and 75.5% in 2000. The
corresponding underpricing for these four years are 10.1%, 10.8%, 21.5%, and 71.7%,
respectively, in Ritter and Welch (2002).
The last column in Table 5.1 shows the amount of money left on the table, which
is calculated as the number of shares issued multiplied by the change from the oﬀer
price to the ﬁrst trading day closing price and adjusted into 2004 purchasing power
using CPI. Similar to IPO underpricing and ﬁrst-month return, the annual value of
money left on the table changes substantially from year to year. Panel B of Figure
5.1 shows the performance of mean and median IPO underpricing and the amount
of money left on the table. The time series patterns of all three series are similar,
and the average IPO underpricing is larger than median underpricing for most of the
time. The diﬀerences reached their peak in 1999 when the amount of money left on
the table was at its largest.
Table 5.2 presents the distribution of IPO sample classiﬁed by 15 industry groups.
I follow the industry classiﬁcation in Lowry (2003). IPOs in the sample are separated
based on the SIC codes of ﬁrms going public, which are shown in Table 1 in Lowry
(2003). The distribution of IPOs is similar to that shown in Lowry (2003), where
the communications, computer, and electronics industries have the largest amount
of IPOs (1, 751). More than 1, 200 ﬁrms in the ﬁnance and trade industries went
public between 1972 and 2004. Table 5.2 also shows the average gross proceeds and
mean underpricing of IPOs in each industry. The food industry has the largest mean
gross proceeds of $132 million, while the communications industry has the highest
ﬁrst-day return of 34.9%.
5.2.2 SEO Sample
The sample of seasoned equity oﬀerings (SEOs) is collected from the Thomson One
Banker New Issues Database over the period of 1972 to 2004. Similar to the IPO
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Table 5.2: Sample of IPOs and SEOs classified by Industry
This table presents descriptive statistics for the IPO sample and SEO sample classified by 15 industry groups. The sample of IPOs (SEOs) consists of
5, 529 IPOs (6, 100 SEOs) by U.S. firms subsequently listed on AMEX, NYSE, or Nasdaq from 1972 to 2004, excluding units, offers without primary
shares, issues by closed-end funds, unit investment trusts, REITs, ADRs, and utilities. Percent of sample is the percent of the number of equity offerings
in each industry to the total number of IPOs or SEOs in the sample. Gross proceeds is the amount raised from investors in millions (2004 purchasing
power using the CPI, local market offering amount, excluding overallotment options). The equal-weighted (EW) mean IPO underpricing is measured
as the percent price change between the first CRSP-listed closing price and the offer price, relative to the offer price. The EW mean SEO discounting
is measured as the percent price change between prior day’s closing price and the offer price, relative to the offer price.
Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs)
Average Average
Gross Gross
Number Percent Proceeds Mean IPO Number Percent Proceeds Mean SEO
Industry of IPOs of Sample ($ millions) Underpricing of SEOs of Sample ($ millions) Discounting
Agriculture, Mining 32 0.59% 96.94 1.58% 68 1.13% 111.26 2.18%
Apparel 80 1.47% 65.81 6.83% 78 1.30% 57.26 3.55%
Communication, Computer, 1, 751 32.10% 66.73 34.95% 1, 469 24.46% 133.51 3.97%
Electronics
Construction 55 1.01% 57.73 7.57% 60 1.00% 56.95 2.94%
Finance 632 11.59% 94.55 8.79% 842 14.02% 118.13 5.38%
Food 63 1.16% 132.09 12.41% 55 0.92% 91.33 1.84%
Healthcare 504 9.24% 47.84 10.69% 672 11.19% 78.11 5.86%
Manufacturing 408 7.48% 60.59 8.29% 598 9.96% 111.41 3.97%
Oil, Gas 111 2.04% 99.87 9.19% 339 5.65% 131.26 4.30%
Printing, Publishing 40 0.73% 92.29 10.40% 34 0.57% 48.90 3.37%
Recreation 112 2.05% 69.81 16.95% 139 2.31% 137.22 4.55%
Scientific Instruments 478 8.76% 48.16 17.68% 464 7.73% 65.92 4.11%
and Research
Services 343 6.29% 63.96 25.67% 240 4.00% 95.83 5.24%
Trade 634 11.62% 51.64 14.24% 657 10.94% 76.75 2.63%
Transportation 211 3.87% 72.30 10.86% 290 4.83% 120.05 2.10%
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sample, data on stock returns and accounting information is collected from CRSP and
COMPUSTAT, respectively. Again, all oﬀering ﬁrms are matched with a PERMNO
code by using CUSIP from SDC. To be included in the sample of SEOs, ﬁrms issuing
seasoned equity have to satisfy the following criteria:
1. Equity oﬀering must be performed by a U.S. ﬁrm which has been listed on the
CRSP database.
2. SEOs should issue ordinary common stocks and not be a unit oﬀering, which
represents a combination of securities, such as common stocks and warrants.
3. Equity oﬀerings must include at least some primary shares (following Corwin
(2003)). Both pure primary share oﬀerings and combination of primary and
secondary share oﬀerings are included.
4. Equity oﬀering of ﬁrms that trade on exchanges other than the American Stock
Exchange (AMEX), New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and Nasdaq are ex-
cluded.
5. Issues by closed-end funds, unit investment trusts, real estate investment trusts
(REITs), and American Depository Receipts (ADRs) are excluded.
6. Issues by utility ﬁrms (SIC codes 4910 through to 4949) are excluded from the
sample (following Loughran and Ritter (1995)).
The initial SEO sample generated from SDC includes 6, 454 SEOs from 1972 to
2004. Fifteen SEO deals without matched PERMNO in CRSP are excluded. Based
on reasons similar to those used for the IPO sample, I choose 1972 and 2004 as the
starting and ending points of my SEO sample, respectively. By following Corwin
(2003), I require oﬀering ﬁrms to have at least 30 days’ prior trading data available
on CRSP, which further excludes 339 oﬀerings. The purpose of such restrictions is
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Table 5.3: Number, Gross Proceeds, Discounting, First-month Returns,
and Amount of Money Left on the Table of Seasoned Equity Offerings
(SEOs) by Year, 1972 to 2004
This table presents the distribution of SEOs across years. The sample of SEOs consists of 6, 100
SEOs by U.S. firms subsequently listed on AMEX, NYSE, or Nasdaq from 1972 to 2004, excluding
units, offers without primary shares, issues by closed-end funds, unit investment trusts, REITs,
ADRs, and utilities. Gross proceeds is the amount raised from investors in millions (2004 purchasing
power using the CPI, local market offering amount, excluding overallotment options). The equal-
weighted (EW) mean SEO discounting is measured as the percent price change between prior day’s
closing price and the offer price, relative to the offer price. The EW mean first-month return is
measured as the percent price change between the 21st trading day’s closing price and the offer
price, relative to the offer price. Money left on the table (millions of dollars, 2004 purchasing power)
is calculated as the number of shares issued times the change from the offer price to the prior day’s
closing price.
Number Average Average
of SEOs Gross Mean Money Left
Number in NYSE Proceeds Mean SEO First-month on the Table
Year of IPOs /AMEX ($ millions) Discounting Return ($ millions)
1972 43 40 109.41 4.41% 6.34% 1.46
1973 22 18 141.26 3.15% −4.33% 2.93
1974 14 12 110.70 2.27% −1.66% 4.27
1975 36 34 212.70 1.42% 4.78% 2.78
1976 55 48 168.05 −0.07% −0.34% 0.31
1977 23 16 171.05 2.43% 2.93% −0.05
1978 63 45 49.89 1.54% 2.40% 0.44
1979 54 42 58.58 1.03% 3.40% 0.42
1980 157 114 64.58 3.62% 4.34% 2.32
1981 138 87 81.53 3.21% 2.77% 1.85
1982 128 87 84.95 0.70% 7.61% 0.07
1983 407 241 62.79 1.85% 6.07% 1.17
1984 85 48 53.11 0.94% 2.28% 0.17
1985 208 87 74.42 3.17% 6.33% 1.57
1986 286 115 78.94 2.42% 4.98% 1.15
1987 172 97 95.28 9.71% 3.57% 6.91
1988 61 29 77.40 1.67% 6.49% 0.88
1989 120 44 59.93 1.58% 4.49% 0.55
1990 96 49 84.90 2.02% 1.33% 0.80
1991 296 125 91.70 3.48% 9.93% 3.36
1992 264 119 95.28 4.01% 6.08% 2.23
1993 369 132 80.94 5.04% 5.89% 3.60
1994 211 71 81.13 6.86% 6.15% 4.54
1995 347 77 82.36 4.42% 7.73% 2.35
1996 424 113 92.67 5.22% 7.54% 3.30
1997 355 92 104.98 5.04% 5.83% 3.02
1998 235 83 132.22 3.70% 7.80% 4.01
1999 281 70 188.08 5.02% 8.72% 10.80
2000 283 48 241.98 6.21% 3.11% 13.94
2001 200 70 152.16 5.18% 5.60% 5.26
2002 183 83 132.13 3.69% 7.45% 5.45
2003 238 89 131.64 5.92% 13.31% 7.45
2004 246 93 131.63 5.45% 4.47% 4.75
Total 6, 100 2, 518 106.31 4.17% 6.18% 3.87
186
to reduce potential mismatching in CUSIP-to-PERMNO and to make sure the SEO
sample only contains follow-on equity oﬀerings.
The ﬁnal sample of SEOs contains 6, 100 follow-on public equity oﬀerings once
the aforementioned criteria have been satisﬁed. Data coverage for the SEO sample
is one of the largest in the literature. For comparison, the samples in Loughran and
Ritter (1995), Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2000), and Brav, Geczy, and Gompers
(2000) consist of 3, 702, 4, 766, and 4, 526 SEOs, respectively. Table 5.3 reports the
annual breakdown of the SEO sample. Similar to IPOs, the number of SEOs varies
greatly within the sample period. Panel A of Figure 5.2 graphs the annual number
of SEOs listed on the NYSE/AMEX or Nasdaq. By comparing this with Panel A
of Figure 5.1, it is clear that the annual numbers of IPOs and SEOs are correlated,
and most transactions happened in the 1990s. However, diﬀerent from IPOs, almost
half of the SEOs (2, 518) in the sample were carried out by ﬁrms listed on the NYSE
and AMEX. Table 5.2 also reports the distribution of an SEO sample classiﬁed by
ﬁfteen industry groups. The distribution of the SEO sample is very similar to that of
the IPO sample, where the communication industry has the largest amount of SEO
deals (1, 469).
The annual mean gross proceeds raised from SEOs, mean SEO discounting, mean
ﬁrst-month return, and the average amount of money left on the table are shown in
column 4 to column 7 in Table 5.3. The gross proceeds from the SEOs also exclude
overallotment options and are adjusted into 2004 purchasing power using CPI. The
average gross proceeds for the sample of SEOs is $106.3 million, which is smaller
than that of the IPO sample ($66 million). The calculation for SEO discounting
and money left on the table is diﬀerent from that used for IPOs. SEO discounting,
denoted by D = (P
−1 − P0)/P0, is deﬁned as the percentage price change between
the prior oﬀer day’s closing price (P
−1) and the oﬀer price (P0), relative to the oﬀer
price. By following Mola and Loughran (2004), the SEO money left on the table is
measured as the dollar discount (P
−1−P0) multiplied by the number of shares in the
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oﬀering, expressed in millions of constant 2004 dollars. Although IPO underpricing
and SEO discounting are both measured as close-to-oﬀer returns, the closing price
for IPO underpricing and SEO discounting is the ﬁrst available closing price (P1)
and the prior day’s closing price (P
−1), respectively.5
For the sample of SEOs, the mean SEO discounting is 4.17%, the mean ﬁrst-
month return is 6.18% and the average amount of money left on the table is $3.87
million. The corresponding values of these variables are 19.89%, 25.29%, and $15.51
million for the IPO sample, which are about four times larger than those for the
SEOs. Panel B of Figure 5.2 depicts SEO discounting (both mean and median) and
SEO money left on the table. SEO discounting trends upward during the sample
period. Similarly, the average amount of money left on the table also increases
through time.
Although the time series variations of SEO discounting and IPO underpricing are
quite similar, there are certainly more outliers in the results of the SEO sample, as the
diﬀerences between the mean and median SEO discounting are abnormally large in
certain years (e.g. 1972, 1987, and 1994). For instance, the equally-weighted mean
discounting is 9.71% in 1987 and 6.86% in 1994, while the corresponding median
discounting is only 0.54% and 2.59%. Such huge diﬀerences might be caused by data
errors. Indeed, as recognised in some studies on SEO discounting or underpricing, the
oﬀer date of follow-on equity oﬀerings provided by SDC is not an accurate indicator of
the actual oﬀer-day. If the oﬀer date is incorrect, then the measured SEO discounting
and money left on the table cannot fully reﬂect the really values, as the prior day’s
closing price is incorrect as well.
Lease, Masulis, and Page (1991) note that SDC-stated oﬀer dates for SEOs are
often inappropriate for analysing price eﬀects because some oﬀers take place after
the close of trading. They ﬁnd that 25% of oﬀers from 1981 to 1983 took place
5SEO underpricing has been widely studied in the literature. Table 1 in Altınkılıç and Hansen
(2003) provides a summary of studies on SEO underpricing and discounting. The percentages of
underpricing and discounting are similar and economically and statistically significant.
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Figure 5.2: Number, Discounting, Money Left on the Table of SEOs
This figure presents the annual number (in Panel A), discounting, and money left on the table (in
Panel B) of SEOs. The sample of SEOs consists of 6, 100 SEOs by U.S. firms subsequently listed on
AMEX, NYSE, or Nasdaq from 1972 to 2004, excluding units, offers without primary shares, issues
by closed-end funds, unit investment trusts, REITs, ADRs, and utilities. The SEO discounting is
measured as the percent price change between prior day’s closing price and the offer price, relative
to the offer price. Money left on the table (millions of dollars, 2004 purchasing power) is calculated
as the number of shares issued times the change from the offer price to the prior day’s closing price.
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after the close of business. Saﬁeddine and Wilhelm (1996) suggest a volume-based
correction method that exploits the enormous trading volume surge on the oﬀer-
day. In particular, if trading volume on the day following the SDC-stated oﬀer
date is more than twice the trading volume on the SDC oﬀer date, or more than
twice the average daily volume over the previous 250 trading days, then the day
following the SDC oﬀer date is designated as the oﬀer date. Some recent papers follow
Saﬁeddine and Wilhelm (1996) to correct the oﬀer date provided by SDC. Altınkılıç
and Hansen (2003) ﬁnd that over 50% of the oﬀer dates stated in SDC are incorrect.
Corwin (2003) ﬁnds that a volume-based correction method results in an oﬀer date
change for 35.1% of the sample oﬀers. Such a large amount of incorrectly stated
oﬀer dates in SDC will certainly aﬀect the results of SEO discounting. This also
partially explains the large diﬀerences between mean and median SEO discounting
in certain years. Although the potentially incorrect SDC-stated oﬀer date might
aﬀect following analyses associated with aggregate liquidity, I have not applied such
method to correct SEO oﬀer dates. This is because I have applied both the mean and
median values of SEO discounting into the analysis. The median SEO discounting
of the sample should be less likely to be aﬀected, even though there might be some
unusual large or small returns due to an incorrect oﬀer date.
5.2.3 Empirical Design
The purpose of this chapter is to examine potential aggregate liquidity-based expla-
nations for “abnormal” phenomena in the market of public equity oﬀerings. Specif-
ically, I want to examine whether public equity oﬀerings (i.e. IPOs and SEOs)
initiated in high-liquidity markets are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from those carried out
in low-liquidity markets. In order to achieve this aim, I apply the aggregate corporate
liquidity demand (ACLD), ∆L/S, and aggregate market liquidity supply (AMLS),
Debt/GDP . Firstly, the IPO (SEO) market in a particular year (t) is classiﬁed
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as a high-liquidity (30%), medium-liquidity (40%), or low-liquidity (30%) market
based on the aggregate liquidity measures in the prior year (t − 1). Since the sam-
ples of IPOs and SEOs both cover the same period from 1972 to 2004, I construct
time series of aggregate liquidity measures for 1971–2003.6 Therefore, the whole
sample period (24 years) of IPOs and SEOs is partitioned into 10 high-liquidity, 13
medium-liquidity, and 10 low-liquidity years (equity oﬀering markets). Under this
classiﬁcation, there are two sets of high-, medium-, and low-liquidity IPO (or SEO)
markets, based on ACLD (∆L/S) and AMLS (Debt/GDP ), respectively.7 Secondly,
initial (seasoned) equity oﬀerings announced in high-, medium-, and low-liquidity
markets are classiﬁed as high-, medium-, and low-liquidity IPOs (SEOs), and placed
into corresponding liquidity portfolios.
To sum up, I separate the samples of IPOs and SEOs by using the aggregate
liquidity in the prior year of equity oﬀerings. Since there are two samples of equity
issuance and two measures of aggregate liquidity, such classiﬁcations create four
sets of high-, medium-, and low-liquidity portfolios including IPO liquidity demand
portfolios, IPO liquidity supply portfolios, SEO liquidity demand portfolios, and
SEO liquidity supply portfolios.
In this research, I use aggregate liquidity to identify diﬀerent equity oﬀering mar-
kets, based on the expectation that the aggregate liquidity plays an important role
in explain “puzzling” phenomena related to IPOs (SEOs). In the literature relating
to IPOs and SEOs, many studies also apply this empirical classiﬁcation method to
examine the inﬂuences of market conditions on equity oﬀerings. Started by Ibbot-
6I have performed statistic and correlation analysis for both aggregate liquidity measures. The
statistic results, which have not been tabulated here, are similar to those discussed in Section 3.2
due to a similar sample period.
7For ACLD (∆L/S), high-liquidity markets include the years: 2000, 2004, 2001, 1977, 1976,
1984, 1972, 1990, 1999, 1997; medium-liquidity markets include the years: 1993, 2002, 1983, 1974,
1986, 1992, 1973, 1996, 1985, 1987, 1994, 1998, 1980; and low-liquidity markets include the years:
1995, 1979, 2003, 1981, 1978, 1988, 1975, 1982, 1989, 1991. For AMLS (Debt/GDP ), high-liquidity
markets include the years: 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1993, 1998, 1992, 1999, 1991, 1989; medium-
liquidity markets include the years: 1990, 1988, 2000, 1987, 1986, 2004, 2001, 1985, 2003, 2002,
1984, 1983, 1977; and low-liquidity markets include the years: 1972, 1978, 1973, 1979, 1981, 1974,
1982, 1980, 1976, 1975.
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son and Jaﬀe (1975), many papers now investigate the phenomenon of “hot” issue
markets, which are commonly deﬁned as periods of IPO or SEO markets that have
unusually high volume and/or large initial returns. Ritter (1984) deﬁnes hot IPO
markets as periods of high initial returns. Based on National Bureau of Economic
Research (NBER) business cycle data, Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993) classify
periods of expansionary phases and contractionary phases of the business cycle us-
ing the dates of cycle peaks and troughs, and examine the security issuance activity
across these periods.
The following studies often deﬁne “hot” IPO or SEO markets based on volume.
For hot IPO markets, Loughran and Ritter (1995) describe the 1980s as hot compared
to the 1970s. Helwege and Liang (2004) deﬁne hot (cold) months as periods with
at least three consecutive months that have a moving average IPO count scaled by
business formations of more than 30 (less than 10.5) IPOs. Yung, Çolak, and Wang
(2008) deﬁne IPO quarters as hot (cold) periods if the moving average of IPOs is 50%
above (below) the historical average. For hot SEO markets, Bayless and Chaplinsky
(1996) apply the aggregate volume of equity issues to identify periods of hot and
cold markets. They argue that a price reaction to equity issue announcements in
hot periods (high equity issue volume) is lower on average than in cold periods (low
equity issue volume).
The mentioned studies and this research share the similarity that, instead of
separating the IPO (or SEO) sample cross-sectionally, the sample period of IPOs (or
SEOs) is partitioned based on certain market conditions through time. Therefore,
the classiﬁcation method applied in this research, dividing issuance years into high-,
medium-, or low-liquidity markets based on aggregate liquidity in the year prior to
oﬀerings, is almost the same as those methods used in studies on hot IPO (or SEO)
markets. The major diﬀerence is that I apply aggregate liquidity measures to classify
IPO and SEO markets instead of using volume or the underpricing of equity issues.
Although most of these studies classify hot or cold market periods quarterly, I can
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only separate markets on an annual basis due to the limitation of aggregate liquidity
data. Moreover, since accounting and economic data, like ACLD and AMLS, is
not instantly observable to corporations, I apply the prior year’s aggregate liquidity
measures to classify IPO and SEO markets.
5.3 Empirical Results for IPO firms
In this section, the correlation between aggregate liquidity and public equity issues
is examined with the sample of IPOs.
5.3.1 Volume and Proceeds of IPOs
Compared to the vast literature on IPOs, the variation of IPO volume has received
relatively less attention. Ibbotson and Jaﬀe (1975) and Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter
(1988, 1994) show substantial ﬂuctuations in IPO volume and identify signiﬁcant
autocorrelation of the monthly number of IPOs. However, these studies do not
examine the underlying cause of this variation. Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998)
systematically test the relative power of several potential determinants of IPOs.
They ﬁnd that companies are more likely to have IPOs when average market-to-
book ratio of public ﬁrms in their industry is higher. They interpret their ﬁnding
as an indication that companies time their IPOs to take advantage of industry-wide
overvaluations. Lowry (2003) explores three potential explanations for the variation
in IPO volume. He ﬁnds that ﬁrms’ demands for capital and investor sentiment are
important determinants of IPO volume, in both statistical and economic terms.
Table 5.4 presents the volume of IPOs, measured by number and gross proceeds,
within diﬀerent aggregate liquidity portfolios. Considering the number of IPOs,
there are 1, 520 initial oﬀerings in the period of high aggregate corporate liquidity
demand. However, this number drops to 1, 034 for low liquidity IPOs. The positive
correlation between aggregate liquidity and the number of issues is even strong for
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Table 5.4: IPO Activity versus Aggregate Liquidity
This table presents the number of IPOs and gross proceeds within different aggregate liquidity
portfolios for the IPO sample. Panel A (Panel B) reports the results for liquidity demand (supply)
portfolios. The sample of IPOs consists of 5, 529 IPOs by U.S. firms subsequently listed on AMEX,
NYSE, or Nasdaq from 1972 to 2004, excluding units, offers without primary shares, issues by
closed-end funds, unit investment trusts, REITs, ADRs, and utilities. IPOs announced in next
year of (t + 1) the lowest (or highest) 30% aggregate corporate liquidity demand (∆L/S) and
aggregate market liquidity supply (Debt/GDP ) years (t) are put into the corresponding low (or
high) liquidity demand portfolios and liquidity supply portfolios, respectively. Gross proceeds is
the amount raised from investors in millions (2004 purchasing power using the CPI, local market
offering amount, excluding overallotment options). Statistical significance on mean and median
values are based on t-tests and Wilcoxon tests, respectively. p-values are reported in brackets.
Superscripts a, b, and c indicate significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
High Medium Low Differences
All (30%) (40%) (30%) H-L p-value
Panel A: Liquidity Demand (∆L/S)
Number of IPOs 5,529 1,520 2,975 1,034 486
Gross Proceeds ($ millions)
Mean 65.98 97.66 54.84 51.47 46.19a [0.000]
Median 37.03 51.77 31.47 32.84 18.93a [0.000]
Panel B: Liquidity Supply (Debt/GDP )
Number of IPOs 5,529 3,272 1,933 324 2,948
Gross Proceeds ($ millions)
Mean 65.98 63.06 77.42 27.34 35.72a [0.000]
Median 37.03 39.29 35.06 17.67 21.62a [0.000]
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AMLS (Debt/GDP ). The diﬀerence in the IPO number between high- and low-
liquidity markets is 2, 948, which is larger than 486 for ACLD (∆L/S).
Table 5.4 also shows the distribution of IPO volume by measuring the gross
proceeds in various aggregate liquidity portfolios. Gross proceeds are the amount
raised from investors in millions, which have been adjusted for inﬂation by CPI. The
empirical evidence for gross proceeds is the same as for the number of IPOs. For
aggregate liquidity demand (∆L/S), the mean (median) value diﬀerence between
high- and low-liquidity IPOs is 46.19 (18.93) and statistically signiﬁcant. The cor-
responding diﬀerences are 35.72 and 21.62 for portfolios constructed by aggregate
liquidity supply (Debt/GDP ).
Thus, the results show that aggregate liquidity and IPO activity are positively
correlated, and IPO volume increases in both aggregate liquidity factors. These
results share some similarity with those found in Lowry (2003), where IPO volume
is positively related to companies’ demand for capital. Although Lowry (2003) uses
diﬀerent proxies for ﬁrms’ capital demands in his research, both studies reveal the
importance of liquidity (capital) in corporate ﬁnancing activity.
To further explore whether this positive correlation is driven by other factors, I
classify the sample of IPOs by exchange listing and gross proceeds. Subsamples of
IPOs consist of oﬀering ﬁrms listed on the Nasdaq or NYSE/AMEX. In addition, the
sample of IPOs is partitioned into subsamples with large (30%), medium (40%), and
small (30%) gross proceeds levels. Panel A of Table 5.5 shows the frequency distribu-
tion of IPOs across aggregate liquidity portfolios (∆L/S or Debt/GDP ) and oﬀering
characteristics. The left sub-panel presents the frequency distribution created by the
intersection between aggregate liquidity demand and exchange listing (i.e. Nasdaq
or NYSE/AMEX) or gross proceeds value (i.e. large (30%), medium(40%), or small
(30%)).
The Nasdaq is the main place to be for ﬁrms wishing to go public,8, with over
8See, for example, Loughran (1993).
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Table 5.5: Frequency Distribution of IPOs and SEOs across Aggregate
Liquidity and Offering Characteristics
This table presents the frequency distribution across aggregate liquidity portfolios and offering
characteristics for the sample of IPOs (in Panel A) and the sample of SEOs (in Panel B). The
sample of IPOs (SEOs) consists of 5, 529 IPOs (6, 100 SEOs) by U.S. firms subsequently listed
on AMEX, NYSE, or Nasdaq from 1972 to 2004, excluding units, offers without primary shares,
issues by closed-end funds, unit investment trusts, REITs, ADRs, and utilities. Equity issues (both
IPOs and SEOs) announced in next year of (t+1) the lowest (or highest) 30% aggregate corporate
liquidity demand (∆L/S) and aggregate market liquidity supply (Debt/GDP ) years (t) are put
into the corresponding low (or high) liquidity demand portfolios and liquidity supply portfolios,
respectively. The frequency distribution is defined as the ratio (in percentage) of the number of
observations in a given subgroup divided by the total number of observations (5, 529 for IPO sample,
6, 100 for SEO sample). In each panel, the left subpanel presents the frequency distribution created
by intersection of aggregate liquidity demand portfolios (∆L/S) with exchange listing (i.e. Nasdaq
or NYSE/AMEX) or gross proceeds (i.e. large (30%), medium (40%), small (30%)). The right
subpanel presents the frequency distribution created by intersection of aggregate liquidity supply
portfolios (Debt/GDP ) with exchange listing or gross proceeds.
Panel A: Initial Public Offerings (IPOs)
Liquidity Demand Liquidity Supply
(∆L/S) (Debt/GDP )
Exchange Listing All High Med Low High Med Low
All 100.00 27.49 53.81 18.70 59.18 34.96 5.86
Nasdaq 82.76 23.44 44.08 15.25 50.43 28.47 3.87
NYSE/AMEX 17.24 4.05 9.73 3.45 8.75 6.49 1.99
Gross Proceeds All High Med Low High Med Low
All 100.00 27.49 53.81 18.70 59.18 34.96 5.86
Large (30%) 30.02 12.43 13.02 4.58 17.87 11.61 0.54
Medium (40%) 39.99 10.63 21.58 7.78 27.42 11.00 1.57
Small (30%) 29.99 4.43 19.21 6.35 13.89 12.35 3.74
Panel B: Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs)
Liquidity Demand Liquidity Supply
(∆L/S) (Debt/GDP )
Exchange Listing All High Med Low High Med Low
All 100.00 27.33 48.39 24.28 47.57 40.79 11.64
Nasdaq 58.72 17.92 27.33 13.48 32.39 23.33 3.00
NYSE/AMEX 41.28 9.41 21.07 10.80 15.18 17.46 8.64
Gross Proceeds All High Med Low High Med Low
All 100.00 27.33 48.39 24.28 47.57 40.79 11.64
Large (30%) 30.03 11.89 12.18 5.97 13.82 13.57 2.64
Medium (40%) 39.98 10.34 19.49 10.15 21.05 14.61 4.33
Small (30%) 29.98 5.10 16.72 8.16 12.70 12.61 4.67
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Table 5.6: Gross Proceeds of IPOs and SEOs across Aggregate Liquidity and Offering Characteristics
This table presents gross proceeds value of IPOs (in Panel A) and SEOs (in Panel B) classified by aggregate liquidity portfolios, exchange listing (i.e.
Nasdaq or NYSE/AMEX), and gross proceeds (i.e. large (30%), medium (40%), small (30%)). The sample of IPOs (SEOs) consists of 5, 529 IPOs
(6, 100 SEOs) by U.S. firms subsequently listed on AMEX, NYSE, or Nasdaq from 1972 to 2004, excluding units, offers without primary shares, issues
by closed-end funds, unit investment trusts, REITs, ADRs, and utilities. Equity issues (both IPOs and SEOs) announced in next year of (t + 1)
the lowest (or highest) 30% aggregate corporate liquidity demand (∆L/S) and aggregate market liquidity supply (Debt/GDP ) years (t) are put into
the corresponding low (or high) liquidity demand portfolios and liquidity supply portfolios, respectively. Gross proceeds is the amount raised from
investors in millions (2004 purchasing power using the CPI, local market offering amount, excluding overallotment options). The differentials between
high-liquidity portfolios and low-liquidity portfolios for each category are reported, where statistical significance is obtained by using two sample t-tests.
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Superscripts a, b, and c indicate significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Liquidity Demand (∆L/S) Liquidity Supply (Debt/GDP )
High Medium Low Differences High Medium Low Differences
All (30%) (40%) (30%) H-L t-stat (30%) (40%) (30%) H-L t-stat
Panel A: Initial Public Offerings (IPOs)
Exchange Listing
Nasdaq 47.59 67.83 39.76 39.12 28.71a (7.95) 46.36 52.72 25.98 20.37a (8.02)
NYSE/AMEX 154.30 270.20 123.14 106.00 164.20a (3.08) 159.30 185.70 29.98 129.30a (9.89)
Gross Proceeds
Large (30%) 156.74 177.70 145.97 130.53 47.10b (2.41) 139.84 184.80 112.00 27.80c (1.75)
Medium (40%) 37.50 39.48 36.78 36.81 2.67a (4.44) 37.81 37.21 34.28 3.52a (3.50)
Small (30%) 13.10 12.92 13.35 12.45 0.47 (1.00) 14.13 12.22 12.15 1.98a (4.55)
Panel B: Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs)
Exchange Listing
Nasdaq 77.53 128.71 53.60 57.98 70.73a (10.86) 73.71 88.77 31.32 42.39a (14.12)
NYSE/AMEX 147.26 193.90 133.95 132.62 61.20a (3.72) 161.86 151.93 112.14 49.70a (4.09)
Gross Proceeds
Large (30%) 256.95 286.00 233.61 246.70 39.30b (1.97) 242.77 267.70 275.90 −33.10 (−1.26)
Medium(40%) 58.77 61.15 58.05 57.74 3.41a (3.47) 59.05 58.73 57.54 1.51 (1.26)
Small (30%) 18.81 19.35 18.52 19.08 0.26 (0.45) 19.43 18.38 18.32 1.11b (2.11)
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82% of the oﬀerings undertaken in the Nasdaq market in my sample of IPOs. The
percentage of IPOs (number of IPOs) is higher when aggregate liquidity is high,
regardless of exchange listing. However, the positive correlation between aggregate
liquidity and the number of IPOs is much stronger for the Nasdaq listing. For liq-
uidity supply portfolios, which are shown in the right sub-panel, the diﬀerences in
between high- and low-liquidity IPOs are also larger for the Nasdaq listing. Consid-
ering the high variations in volume of IPOs in the Nasdaq market, which are shown
in Panel A of Figure 5.1, it is reasonable to observe larger diﬀerences for the Nasdaq
listing IPOs.
Panel A of Table 5.5 also reports the frequency distribution across aggregate
liquidity and gross proceeds. Overall, the positive correlation between aggregate liq-
uidity and the number of oﬀerings remains signiﬁcant throughout the high-, medium-,
and low-proceeds groups. Note that only 4.58% (0.54%) of IPOs are located in the
high-proceed group when the liquidity demand (supply) condition is low. These re-
sults suggest the important inﬂuence of aggregate liquidity on the proceed amounts
in IPOs.
Panel A of Table 5.6 shows the proceeds value of IPOs classiﬁed by aggregate
liquidity, exchange listing, and proceed levels. Even though most of the issuing
ﬁrms went public via Nasdaq, the scale of IPOs is much larger for those listed on
NYSE/AMEX. The diﬀerences in gross proceeds between high- and low-liquidity
IPOs are positive and statistically signiﬁcant for all subsamples. For instance, high
minus low is $164.20 million for liquidity demand portfolios and $129.30 million for
liquidity supply portfolios, where both values are signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Overall, I have found a strong positive correlation between aggregate liquidity and
IPO activity, measured in the number of IPOs and IPO gross proceeds. This cor-
relation is unaﬀected by exchange listing and the amount of proceeds. The ﬁndings
here for the IPO sample are closely related to the documented positive correlation
between ﬁrms’ capital demand and IPO volume in Lowry (2003).
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5.3.2 Underpricing of IPOs
The best-known pattern in the IPO literature is the widely-recognised IPO under-
pricing, which reﬂects the price change measured from the oﬀering price to the mar-
ket closing price on the ﬁrst trading day. Early research based on data from the
1970s and 1980s shows that the shares oﬀered in IPOs tend to be underpriced (e.g.
Logue (1973), Ibbotson (1975), and Smith (1986)). Ljungqvist (2006) and Ritter
and Welch (2002) provide thorough reviews on IPO underpricing. In this section, I
test whether aggregate liquidity inﬂuences the performance of IPOs in the short-run,
which is reﬂected by underpricing proxies.
Motivated by a number of studies on underpricing, I apply three proxies for IPO
underpricing: IPO underpricing, ﬁrst-month return, and money left on the table.
The IPO underpricing (or IPO ﬁrst-day return), denoted by U = (P1 − P0)/P0, is
deﬁned as the percentage price change between the CRSP-listed ﬁrst trading day
closing price (P1) and the oﬀer price (P0), relative to the oﬀer price. In general, it is
widely recognised that the full extent of underpricing can be realised by the end of the
ﬁrst day of trading in the capital market without restrictions on daily price volatility.
This is why the ﬁrst-day return is used as a measure of underpricing. However, it
is also very likely that the degree of underpricing cannot be fully reﬂected in the
markets by the end of the ﬁrst trading day. Therefore, I calculate the ﬁrst-month
return, which is measured as the percentage price change between the twenty-ﬁrst
trading day’s closing price and the oﬀer price, relative to the oﬀer price. The money
left on the table is calculated as the number of shares issued multiplied by the
change from the oﬀer price to the ﬁrst trading day closing price and adjusted in 2004
purchasing power with CPI. This proxy represents the underpricing in an absolute
amount of money.
Table 5.7 presents the underpricing of IPOs, ﬁrst-month returns, and the amount
of money left on the table within diﬀerent aggregate liquidity portfolios for the
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Table 5.7: Underpricing of IPOs versus Aggregate Liquidity
This table presents the underpricing of IPOs, first-month returns, and amount of money left on the table within different aggregate liquidity portfolios
for the IPO sample. Panel A (Panel B) reports the results for liquidity demand (supply) portfolios. The sample of IPOs consists of 5, 529 IPOs by U.S.
firms subsequently listed on AMEX, NYSE, or Nasdaq from 1972 to 2004, excluding units, offers without primary shares, issues by closed-end funds,
unit investment trusts, REITs, ADRs, and utilities. IPOs announced in next year of (t + 1) the lowest (or highest) 30% aggregate corporate liquidity
demand (∆L/S) and aggregate market liquidity supply (Debt/GDP ) years (t) are put into the corresponding low (or high) liquidity demand portfolios
and liquidity supply portfolios, respectively. In each panel, the left subpanel reports the mean value and the right subpanel reports the median value.
The IPO underpricing is measured as the percent price change between the first CRSP-listed closing price and the offer price, relative to the offer price.
The first-month return is measured as the percent price change between the 21st trading day’s closing price and the offer price, relative to the offer price.
Money left on the table (millions of dollars, 2004 purchasing power) is calculated as the number of shares issued times the change from the offer price
to the first-day closing prices. Statistical significance on mean and median values are based on t-tests and Wilcoxon tests, respectively. t-statistics are
reported in parentheses. p-values are reported in brackets. Superscripts a, b, and c indicate significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Mean Median
High Medium Low Differences High Medium Low Differences
All (30%) (40%) (30%) (High-Low) All (30%) (40%) (30%) (High-Low)
Panel A: Liquidity Demand (∆L/S)
Underpricing 19.89%a 37.36%a 12.73%a 14.80%a 22.56%a 7.14%a 12.50%a 5.15%a 8.21%a 4.29%a
(34.26) (20.99) (27.52) (22.81) (11.91) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
First-Month Return 25.29%a 48.13%a 15.47%a 20.25%a 27.88%a 10.71%a 18.32%a 7.81%a 12.50%a 5.82%a
(31.35) (19.55) (23.76) (19.28) (10.42) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Money Left on the 15.51 38.57 6.52 7.46 31.12a 1.90 5.57 1.29 2.03 3.54a
Table ($ millions) (11.27) [0.000]
Panel B: Liquidity Supply (Debt/GDP )
Underpricing 19.89%a 22.13%a 17.03%a 14.35%a 7.78%a 7.14%a 9.17%a 4.46%a 5.40%a 3.77%a
(34.26) (27.51) (18.94) (8.28) (4.07) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
First-Month Return 25.29%a 29.35%a 19.65%a 17.68%a 11.67%a 10.71%a 12.90%a 7.27%a 5.00%a 7.90%a
(31.35) (26.29) (15.88) (7.05) (4.25) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Money Left on the 15.51 16.22 16.32 3.56 12.66a 1.90 2.89 1.09 0.74 2.15a
Table ($ millions) (11.50) [0.000]
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sample of IPOs. Both the mean and median values for the whole sample and each
aggregate liquidity portfolio are reported. The mean IPO underpricing is 19.89%
and the median IPO underpricing is 7.14% for all IPOs. Such large underpricing is
consistent with the widely documented pattern in the literature that denotes severe
IPO underpricing. Ritter and Welch (2002) document an average ﬁrst-day return
of 18.8% for their sample of IPOs in the period from 1980 to 2001. In contrast to
the situation where the full extent of underpricing is realised by the end of the ﬁrst
trading day, I ﬁnd that the mean (median) ﬁrst-month return for the IPO sample
is 25.29% (10.71%), larger than the corresponding ﬁrst-day returns. This evidence
suggests that the degree of IPO underpricing in the oﬀer price is not fully reﬂected
in the ﬁrst-trading day; the market gradually adjusts the underpriced stock through
time.
The positive correlations between aggregate liquidity factors and the three prox-
ies for IPO underpricing are obvious. For portfolios separated based on liquidity
demand, the underpricing of high-liquidity IPOs is signiﬁcantly larger than for those
of medium- and low-liquidity IPOs. The diﬀerence in ﬁrst-day returns between high-
and low-liquidity IPOs is 22.56% and signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Measured in the
absolute amount of money, IPOs announced in high-liquidity markets, on average,
leave about $31 million more on the table than IPOs initiated in low-liquidity mar-
kets. For the entire IPO sample, because the median values of underpricing proxies
are smaller than the corresponding mean values, the diﬀerences in median under-
pricing are relatively smaller in magnitude as well. However, all three diﬀerences
are statistically signiﬁcantly positive. Panel B of Table 5.7 shows the results of
underpricing proxies for all IPOs and IPOs announced in various liquidity supply
(Debt/GDP ) markets. The results suggest a positive correlation between aggregate
liquidity supply and the underpricing of IPOs, where all the diﬀerences are positive
and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Table 5.8 presents the underpricing of IPOs (in Panel A), ﬁrst-month returns (in
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Table 5.8: Underpricing of IPOs across Aggregate Liquidity and Offering Characteristics
This table presents the underpricing of IPOs (in Panel A), first-month returns (in Panel B), and amount of money left on the table (in Panel C) within
different aggregate liquidity portfolios, which is further classified by exchange listing (i.e. NASDAQ or NYSE/AMEX) or gross proceeds (i.e. large
(30%), medium (40%), small (30%)). The sample of IPOs consists of 5, 529 IPOs by U.S. firms subsequently listed on AMEX, NYSE, or Nasdaq from
1972 to 2004, excluding units, offers without primary shares, issues by closed-end funds, unit investment trusts, REITs, ADRs, and utilities. IPOs
announced in next year of (t + 1) the lowest (or highest) 30% aggregate corporate liquidity demand (∆L/S) and aggregate market liquidity supply
(Debt/GDP ) years (t) are put into the corresponding low (or high) liquidity demand portfolios and liquidity supply portfolios, respectively. In each
panel, the left subpanel reports the results for liquidity demand portfolios based on ∆L/Sources and the right subpanel reports the results for liquidity
supply portfolios based on Debt/GDP . The IPO underpricing is measured as the percent price change between the first CRSP-listed closing price and
the offer price, relative to the offer price. The first-month return is measured as the percent price change between the 21st trading day’s closing price
and the offer price, relative to the offer price. Money left on the table (millions of dollars, 2004 purchasing power) is calculated as the number of shares
issued times the change from the offer price to the first-day closing prices. The differentials between high liquidity portfolios and low liquidity portfolios
for each category are reported where statistical significance is obtained using two sample t-tests. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Superscripts
a, b, and c indicate significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Liquidity Demand (∆L/S) Liquidity Supply (Debt/GDP )
High Medium Low Differences High Medium Low Differences
All (30%) (40%) (30%) H-L p-value (30%) (40%) (30%) H-L p-value
Panel A: IPO Underpricing
Exchange Listing
NASDAQ 21.98%a 41.92%a 13.44%a 16.01%a 25.91%a [0.000] 24.19%a 19.01%a 14.94%a 9.25%a [0.000]
(32.12) (20.46) (25.62) (21.25) (11.87) (26.01) (17.59) (8.18) (4.52)
NYSE/AMEX 9.87%a 10.99%a 9.55%a 9.47%a 1.52% [0.370] 10.25%a 8.33%a 13.20%a −2.95% [0.432]
(15.18) (8.28) (10.16) (9.02) (0.90) (13.96) (9.78) (3.59) (−0.79)
Gross Proceeds
Large (30%) 31.67%a 56.39%a 13.95%a 14.97%a 41.42%a [0.000] 33.42%a 29.78%a 14.49%a 18.93%a [0.000]
(21.06) (17.21) (17.22) (11.28) (11.72) (16.47) (12.92) (3.59) (4.19)
Medium (40%) 18.12%a 27.36%a 13.98%a 16.96%a 10.40%a [0.000] 20.86%a 12.16%a 11.96%a 8.90%a [0.000]
(23.38) (12.43) (16.88) (15.67) (4.24) (20.11) (11.72) (5.97) (3.94)
Small (30%) 10.46%a 7.98%a 10.51%a 12.03%a −4.05%a [0.004] 10.10%a 9.38%a 15.33%a −5.23%b [0.044]
(19.99) (7.87) (14.76) (12.36) (−2.88) (17.42) (12.13) (6.10) (−2.03)
(continued)
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Table 5.8—Continued
Liquidity Demand (∆L/S) Liquidity Supply (Debt/GDP )
High Medium Low Differences High Medium Low Differences
All (30%) (40%) (30%) H-L p-value (30%) (40%) (30%) H-L p-value
Panel B: First-Month Return
Exchange Listing
NASDAQ 28.14%a 54.27%a 16.47%a 21.99%a 32.27%a [0.000] 32.27%a 21.85%a 20.44%a 11.83%a [0.000]
(29.65) (19.16) (22.42) (17.95) (10.46) (25.03) (14.80) (6.83) (3.63)
NYSE/AMEX 11.57%a 12.28%a 10.93%a 12.57%a −0.29% [0.906] 12.55%a 10.04%a 12.28%a 0.27% [0.954]
(12.36) (6.85) (8.04) (7.60) (−0.12) (11.74) (6.67) (2.71) (0.06)
Gross Proceeds
Large (30%) 38.48%a 68.20%a 16.59%a 20.18%a 48.02%a [0.000] 43.02%a 32.49%a 16.56%a 26.46%a [0.000]
(18.77) (15.18) (13.34) (10.45) (9.82) (15.29) (10.75) (3.40) (4.71)
Medium (40%) 24.97%a 39.92%a 17.98%a 24.04%a 15.88%a [0.000] 29.26%a 15.80%a 14.10%a 15.16%a [0.000]
(22.62) (12.70) (15.90) (13.79) (4.42) (20.59) (9.04) (4.07) (4.05)
Small (30%) 12.44%a 10.14%a 11.89%a 15.64%a −5.51%b [0.044] 11.92%a 10.99%a 19.34%a −7.43%b [0.046]
(15.60) (4.82) (11.98) (9.06) (−2.02) (12.40) (9.20) (5.40) (−2.00)
Panel C: Money Left on the Table
Exchange Listing
NASDAQ 15.49 39.80 5.55 6.86 32.94a [0.000] 15.84 16.46 3.90 11.94a [0.000]
NYSE/AMEX 15.58 31.47 10.92 10.09 21.38a [0.005] 18.41 15.67 2.89 15.52a [0.000]
Gross Proceeds
Large (30%) 40.61 74.66 16.29 17.39 57.27a [0.000] 39.60 43.36 15.24 24.37a [0.000]
Medium (40%) 7.42 12.08 5.40 6.66 5.43a [0.000] 8.56 5.04 4.32 4.23a [0.000]
Small (30%) 1.16 0.97 1.16 1.28 −0.31c [0.057] 1.26 0.93 1.54 −0.28 [0.222]
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Panel B), and the amount of money left on the table (in Panel C) within diﬀerent
aggregate liquidity portfolios, which are further classiﬁed by exchange listing or value
of gross proceeds. The positive correlation between aggregate liquidity and IPO
underpricing remains strong for most of the cases. For instance, as shown in Panel A,
the diﬀerence in IPO underpricing between high- and low-liquidity demand portfolios
is 25.91% for IPOs listed on the Nasdaq, while this value drops to only 1.52% for
IPOs listed on the NYSE/AMEX. However, considering that most of the ﬁrms choose
the Nasdaq as the place to go public in preference to the NYSE/AMEX (almost
a 6 to 1 ratio), it is not surprising that issuing ﬁrms on the Nasdaq have larger
ﬁrst-day returns. The bottom half of each panel shows the results of underpricing
proxies when IPO deals are classiﬁed into three subgroups based on the level of gross
proceeds. I ﬁnd that the amount of proceeds in public equity oﬀerings has a strong
inﬂuence on the degree of IPO underpricing, where IPOs with higher (lower) gross
proceeds experience larger (smaller) ﬁrst-day and ﬁrst-month returns. Moreover,
the diﬀerences in underpricing between high- and low-liquidity portfolios are mostly
concentrated in IPOs with large values of gross proceeds.
In summary, the underpricing of IPO, measured as ﬁrst-day return, ﬁrst-month
return, and money left on the table, is strongly increased with the measures of ag-
gregate liquidity demand and liquidity supply. These results further support the
explanation power of aggregate liquidity on IPO activity, since the volume and un-
derpricing of IPOs are positively correlated (see Yung, Çolak, and Wang (2008)).
Thus, aggregate liquidity does have a substantial inﬂuence on the activity of initial
equity oﬀerings, as measured by IPO volume and underpricing.
5.3.3 Post-Issue Performance of IPOs
Perhaps the most attractive research area in IPOs, as well as in SEOs, is the long-run
stock price performance of issuing ﬁrms after public oﬀering. Equity issuing ﬁrms are
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found to have signiﬁcantly negative performance over a ﬁve-year post-issue period,
which is commonly recognised as the “new issue puzzle”. The underperformance of
IPOs after public oﬀering has been documented in many studies such as Ritter (1991),
Loughran and Ritter (1995), and Spiess and Aﬄeck-Graves (1995). However, many
of the following studies argue that the long-run underperformance of issuing ﬁrms is
not a special phenomenon for IPOs, but simply a consequence of an inappropriate
methodology (see Brav and Gompers (1997) and Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2000))
or just a pattern in stock markets (see Brav, Geczy, and Gompers (2000)).
In this section, I use the factors of aggregate liquidity to partition the sample of
IPOs into high-, medium-, and low-liquidity IPOs, and investigate whether the long-
run underperformance “indeed” is the common pattern for all IPOs. In particular, I
question whether IPOs announced when aggregate liquidity is high are substantially
diﬀerent from those announced in low-liquidity markets. To measure long-run per-
formance, I use the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR), which is advocated by
Barber and Lyon (1997) and Kothari and Warner (1997). The long-term BHAR is
calculated as following:
BHAR(T1,T2) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(BHRi,(T1,T2) − BHRpi,(T1,T2)) (5.1)
where
BHRi,(T1,T2) =
T2∏
t=T1
(1 +Rit)− 1. (5.2)
BHRpi,(T1,T2) =
T2∏
t=T1
[
1 +
∑Nt
j=1Rjt
Nt
]
− 1 (5.3)
Note that BHRi,(T1,T2) is the buy-and-hold return (BHR) for ﬁrm i over period T1 to
T2. BHRpi,(T1,T2) is the BHR for ﬁrm i’s size and book-to-market reference portfolio
over period T1 to T2. N is the number of ﬁrms in the sample. T2− T1 is the horizon
in the months over which abnormal returns are calculated. 12 months, 36 months,
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Table 5.9: One-Year Post-Issue BHAR of IPOs versus Aggregate Liquidity
This table presents the one-year post-issue equal-weighted (in Panel A and C) and value-weighted (in Panel B and D) buy-and-hold abnormal returns
(BHAR) of IPO sample compared with alternative benchmarks, and across various aggregate liquidity portfolios. The sample of IPOs consists of 5, 529
IPOs by U.S. firms subsequently listed on AMEX, NYSE, or Nasdaq from 1972 to 2004, excluding units, offers without primary shares, issues by
closed-end funds, unit investment trusts, REITs, ADRs, and utilities. IPOs announced in next year of (t + 1) the lowest (or highest) 30% aggregate
corporate liquidity demand (∆L/S) and aggregate market liquidity supply (Debt/GDP ) years (t) are put into the corresponding low (or high) liquidity
demand portfolios and liquidity supply portfolios, respectively. Row 1 to 6 of each panel present BHAR using the S&P 500, CRSP value-weighted index,
and CRSP equal-weighted index as benchmarks. Row 7 to 8 of each panel presents BHAR measured relative to size and book-to-market portfolios
(25, 5*5). To calculate BHAR, I first calculate the 12 months buy-and-hold returns (BHR) for each firm starting in the month following the IPO:
BHRiT =
∏T
t=1(1 +Rit)− 1, where i is the event-firm index, Rit is the month t return on firm i, and T is the horizon over which BHR is computed. If
the IPO delists before the first anniversary, I compound the return up until the delisting. Then I compute the BHR as BHRpiT =
∏T
t=1(1 +Rpit)− 1
for benchmark index, or as BHRpiT =
∏T
t=1
[
1 +
∑nit
j=1R
pi
jt/nit
] − 1 for size and book-to-market matched portfolios, where pi is the index for the
reference portfolio of the event firm i, nit is the number of firms in the reference portfolio of the event firm i in month t, and R
pi
jt is the return for
firm j in the reference portfolio pi during the event-month t. The BHAR are then calculated as BHART =
∑NT
i=1 ωi(BHRiT −BHRpiT ). When equal
weighted ωi = 1/NT and when value weighted ωi = MVi/MV , where MVi is the firm i’s common stock market value (in 2004 dollars by CPI) and
MV =
∑
iMVi. NT is the number of event firms that have BHRs for event period. Since some firms lack the accounting information necessary for
the attribute matching, I report results for 5, 090 firms for size and book-to-market benchmark. The differentials between high liquidity portfolios and
low liquidity portfolios for each category are reported where statistical significance is obtained using two sample t-tests. t-statistics are reported in
parentheses. Superscripts a, b, and c indicate significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
All High Liquidity Medium Liquidity Low Liquidity Differences
Raw IPO Abnormal Raw IPO Abnormal Raw IPO Abnormal Raw IPO Abnormal (High
Benchmarks Return BHAR Return BHAR Return BHAR Return BHAR -Low)
Panel A: Liquidity Demand (∆L/S) and Equal-Weighted BHAR
S&P 500 index 9.19% −1.35% −2.55% −8.04%a 9.93% −2.10% 24.21% 10.59%a −18.63%a
(t-statistic) (−1.21) (−3.05) (−1.57) (4.46) (−5.25)
CRSP VW index 9.19% −2.91%a −2.55% −9.63%a 9.93% −3.13%b 24.21% 7.56%a −17.19%a
(t-statistic) (−2.63) (−3.69) (−2.36) (3.20) (−4.89)
CRSP EW index 9.19% −1.39% −2.55% −10.81%a 9.93% 1.08% 24.21% 5.27%b −16.08%a
(t-statistic) (−1.27) (−4.14) (0.82) (2.25) (−4.59)
Size and Book-to-Market 9.03% 2.06%c −4.15% −10.62%a 10.06% 5.57%a 25.34% 10.60%a −21.22%a
(t-statistic) (5090 obs) (1.75) (−3.85) (3.94) (4.22) (−5.69)
(continued)
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Table 5.9—Continued
All High Liquidity Medium Liquidity Low Liquidity Differences
Raw IPO Abnormal Raw IPO Abnormal Raw IPO Abnormal Raw IPO Abnormal (High
Benchmarks Return BHAR Return BHAR Return BHAR Return BHAR -Low)
Panel B: Liquidity Demand (∆L/S) and Value-Weighted BHAR
S&P 500 index −4.57% −8.70%b −20.19% −17.91%a 13.61% 1.89% 22.27% 7.49%b −25.40%a
(t-statistic) (−2.48) (−3.09) (0.53) (2.26) (−3.80)
CRSP VW index −4.57% −10.04%a −20.19% −19.26%a 13.61% 0.98% 22.27% 4.95% −24.21%a
(t-statistic) (−2.89) (−3.35) (0.28) (1.51) (−3.66)
CRSP EW index −4.57% −13.26%a −20.19% −26.51%a 13.61% 4.41% 22.27% 3.14% −29.64%a
(t-statistic) (−3.66) (−4.42) (1.24) (0.92) (−4.30)
Size and Book-to-Market −5.31% −10.02%a −21.20% −23.50%a 13.57% 7.90%b 22.53% 8.26%b −31.77%a
(t-statistic) (5090 obs) (−2.84) (−4.08) (2.18) (2.47) (−4.77)
Panel C: Liquidity Supply (Debt/GDP ) and Equal-Weighted BHAR
S&P 500 index 9.19% −1.35% 14.19% −1.11% −1.94% −5.66%a 25.51% 22.54%a −23.65%a
(t-statistic) (−1.21) (−0.71) (−3.61) (4.92) (−4.89)
CRSP VW index 9.19% −2.91%a 14.19% −2.28% −1.94% −7.22%a 25.51% 16.92%a −19.20%a
(t-statistic) (−2.63) (−1.46) (−4.65) (3.75) (−4.02)
CRSP EW index 9.19% −1.39% 14.19% −0.34% −1.94% −5.06%a 25.51% 10.20%b −10.54%b
(t-statistic) (−1.27) (−0.22) (−3.20) (2.36) (−2.30)
Size and Book-to-Market 9.03% 2.06%c 13.73% 2.66%c −3.11% −1.81% 27.76% 17.83%a −15.17%a
(t-statistic) (5090 obs) (1.75) (1.67) (−1.00) (3.78) (−3.05)
Panel D: Liquidity Supply (Debt/GDP ) and Value-Weighted BHAR
S&P 500 index −4.57% −8.70%b 12.40% 0.65% −29.87% −23.21%a 12.62% 12.31%b −11.66%
(t-statistic) (−2.48) (0.13) (−4.83) (2.26) (−1.57)
CRSP VW index −4.57% −10.04%a 12.40% −1.33% −29.87% −23.44%a 12.62% 6.94% −8.26%
(t-statistic) (−2.89) (−0.26) (−5.01) (1.22) (−1.09)
CRSP EW index −4.57% −13.26%a 12.40% −3.21% −29.87% −28.38%a 12.62% 0.13% −3.35%
(t-statistic) (−3.66) (−0.63) (−5.52) (0.02) (−0.43)
Size and Book-to-Market −5.31% −10.02%a 11.71% −1.32% −31.10% −23.64%a 13.77% 8.60% −9.92%
(t-statistic) (5090 obs) (−2.84) (−0.25) (−5.68) (1.38) (−1.21)
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and 60 months post-issue BHAR are measured over months (+1,+12), (+1,+36),
and (+1,+60), respectively, where month 0 is the announcement month for the
IPOs. Size and book-to-market reference portfolios are constructed by following
Fama and French (1993). The equally-weighted monthly returns of 25 reference
portfolios formed on size and book-to-market (5× 5) are downloaded from Kenneth
French’s website. Issuing ﬁrms are assigned to 25 reference portfolios using the
breakpoints for size and book-to-market.
By following Brav, Geczy, and Gompers (2000), various benchmarks are utilised
to measure IPO and SEO long-run performance throughout this chapter. The per-
formance of issuing ﬁrms is matched to the following broad market indexes: the S&P
500, the CRSP value-weighted index and the CRSP equal-weighted index. Moreover,
I also construct benchmark portfolios by matching issuing ﬁrms with size and book-
to-market reference portfolios. Besides calculating the equally-weighted BHAR, I
also measure the value-weighted BHAR. For each issuing ﬁrm, I use the monthly
data and follow each oﬀering beginning in the month after the event for the earlier
60 months or the delisting month.
Table 5.9 presents long-run BHAR for all IPOs in the sample over a one-year pe-
riod after issues. The buy-and-hold returns and the BHAR for issuing ﬁrms are both
shown in the table. Panel A and Panel B show the results by measure of aggregate
liquidity demand, while Panel C and Panel D show the results by measure of aggre-
gate liquidity supply. For the whole IPO sample, the one-year post-issue abnormal
returns are negative for all four benchmarks, and the degree of underperformance is
much larger for value-weighted BHAR. For example, the one-year equally-weighted
BHAR for the size and book-to-market reference portfolio is 2.06%. However, this
value decreases to −10.02% for the value-weighted BHAR. Such a diﬀerence con-
ﬁrms the long existing debates in the research on the topic of empirical results being
aﬀected by the methodology applied.
More importantly, Table 5.9 shows the raw BHR and BHAR of IPO ﬁrms in
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Table 5.10: Three-Year Post-Issue BHAR of IPOs versus Aggregate Liquidity
This table presents the three-year post-issue equal-weighted (in Panel A and C) and value-weighted (in Panel B and D) buy-and-hold abnormal returns
(BHAR) of IPO sample compared with alternative benchmarks, and across various aggregate liquidity portfolios. The sample of IPOs consists of 5, 529
IPOs by U.S. firms subsequently listed on AMEX, NYSE, or Nasdaq from 1972 to 2004, excluding units, offers without primary shares, issues by
closed-end funds, unit investment trusts, REITs, ADRs, and utilities. IPOs announced in next year of (t + 1) the lowest (or highest) 30% aggregate
corporate liquidity demand (∆L/S) and aggregate market liquidity supply (Debt/GDP ) years (t) are put into the corresponding low (or high) liquidity
demand portfolios and liquidity supply portfolios, respectively. Row 1 to 6 of each panel present BHAR using the S&P 500, CRSP value-weighted index,
and CRSP equal-weighted index as benchmarks. Row 7 to 8 of each panel presents BHAR measured relative to size and book-to-market portfolios
(25, 5*5). To calculate BHAR, I first calculate the 36 months buy-and-hold returns (BHR) for each firm starting in the month following the IPO:
BHRiT =
∏T
t=1(1 +Rit)− 1, where i is the event-firm index, Rit is the month t return on firm i, and T is the horizon over which BHR is computed. If
the IPO delists before the first anniversary, I compound the return up until the delisting. Then I compute the BHR as BHRpiT =
∏T
t=1(1 +Rpit)− 1
for benchmark index, or as BHRpiT =
∏T
t=1
[
1 +
∑nit
j=1R
pi
jt/nit
] − 1 for size and book-to-market matched portfolios, where pi is the index for the
reference portfolio of the event firm i, nit is the number of firms in the reference portfolio of the event firm i in month t, and R
pi
jt is the return for
firm j in the reference portfolio pi during the event-month t. The BHAR are then calculated as BHART =
∑NT
i=1 ωi(BHRiT −BHRpiT ). When equal
weighted ωi = 1/NT and when value weighted ωi = MVi/MV , where MVi is the firm i’s common stock market value (in 2004 dollars by CPI) and
MV =
∑
iMVi. NT is the number of event firms that have BHRs for event period. Since some firms lack the accounting information necessary for
the attribute matching, I report results for 5, 090 firms for size and book-to-market benchmark. The differentials between high liquidity portfolios and
low liquidity portfolios for each category are reported where statistical significance is obtained using two sample t-tests. t-statistics are reported in
parentheses. Superscripts a, b, and c indicate significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
All High Liquidity Medium Liquidity Low Liquidity Differences
Raw IPO Abnormal Raw IPO Abnormal Raw IPO Abnormal Raw IPO Abnormal (High
Benchmarks Return BHAR Return BHAR Return BHAR Return BHAR -Low)
Panel A: Liquidity Demand (∆L/S) and Equal-Weighted BHAR
S&P 500 index 31.11% −7.12%a 9.66% −3.43% 37.47% −9.98%a 44.20% −4.27% 0.84%
(t-statistic) (−2.58) (−0.51) (−2.94) (−0.88) (0.10)
CRSP VW index 31.11% −12.86%a 9.66% −9.93% 37.47% −14.61%a 44.20% −12.12%b 2.20%
(t-statistic) (−4.68) (−1.47) (−4.32) (−2.55) (0.27)
CRSP EW index 31.11% −6.61%b 9.66% −23.10%a 37.47% 2.23% 44.20% −7.91%c −15.19%c
(t-statistic) (−2.41) (−3.39) (0.66) (−1.70) (−1.84)
Size and Book-to-Market 30.55% 4.57% 6.31% −15.23%b 38.41% 12.59%a 43.59% 10.68%b −25.91%a
(t-statistic) (5090 obs) (1.54) (−2.10) (3.44) (2.14) (−2.95)
(continued)
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Table 5.10—Continued
All High Liquidity Medium Liquidity Low Liquidity Differences
Raw IPO Abnormal Raw IPO Abnormal Raw IPO Abnormal Raw IPO Abnormal (High
Benchmarks Return BHAR Return BHAR Return BHAR Return BHAR -Low)
Panel B: Liquidity Demand (∆L/S) and Value-Weighted BHAR
S&P 500 index −2.87% −16.28%a −37.77% −24.15%a 45.27% −2.21% 35.78% −16.66%b −7.49%
(t-statistic) (−4.33) (−4.61) (−0.33) (−2.33) (−0.85)
CRSP VW index −2.87% −21.16%a −37.77% −29.19%a 45.27% −6.57% 35.78% −22.24%a −6.95%
(t-statistic) (−5.64) (−5.57) (−0.99) (−3.24) (−0.80)
CRSP EW index −2.87% −32.00%a −37.77% −58.10%a 45.27% 7.43% 35.78% −12.86%b −45.24%a
(t-statistic) (−7.14) (−8.57) (1.14) (−2.18) (−5.04)
Size and Book-to-Market −4.19% −16.73%a −39.56% −36.69%a 46.20% 13.67%c 34.14% −0.57% −36.12%a
(t-statistic) (5090 obs) (−4.22) (−6.64) (1.95) (−0.09) (−4.16)
Panel C: Liquidity Supply (Debt/GDP ) and Equal-Weighted BHAR
S&P 500 index 31.11% −7.12%a 33.55% −14.00%a 21.09% −3.49% 67.10% 41.90%a −55.90%a
(t-statistic) (−2.58) (−3.60) (−0.88) (3.99) (−4.99)
CRSP VW index 31.11% −12.86%a 33.55% −16.75%a 21.09% −12.18%a 67.10% 23.30%b −40.10%a
(t-statistic) (−4.68) (−4.33) (−3.09) (2.24) (−3.61)
CRSP EW index 31.11% −6.61%b 33.55% −8.13%b 21.09% −5.66% 67.10% 3.40% −11.60%
(t-statistic) (−2.41) (−2.10) (−1.42) (0.34) (−1.07)
Size and Book-to-Market 30.55% 4.57% 33.12% 2.99% 19.05% 2.95% 68.60% 30.90%a −27.90%b
(t-statistic) (5090 obs) (1.54) (0.74) (0.65) (2.79) (−2.36)
Panel D: Liquidity Supply (Debt/GDP ) and Value-Weighted BHAR
S&P 500 index −2.87% −16.28%a 5.26% −18.93%a −16.90% −14.22%a 44.30% 19.50%c −38.40%a
(t-statistic) (−4.33) (−3.55) (−2.67) (1.74) (−3.10)
CRSP VW index −2.87% −21.16%a 5.26% −22.05%a −16.90% −20.97%a 44.30% 1.20% −23.20%c
(t-statistic) (−5.64) (−4.12) (−3.99) (0.10) (−1.74)
CRSP EW index −2.87% −32.00%a 5.26% −27.45%a −16.90% −39.22%a 44.30% −18.60% −8.80%
(t-statistic) (−7.14) (−4.53) (−5.67) (−1.35) (−0.59)
Size and Book-to-Market −4.19% −16.73%a 3.90% −11.99%b −18.46% −25.00%a 44.90% 10.60% −22.60%c
(t-statistic) (5090 obs) (−4.22) (−2.11) (−4.59) (0.90) (−1.72)
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Table 5.11: Five-Year Post-Issue BHAR of IPOs versus Aggregate Liquidity
This table presents the five-Year post-issue equal-weighted (in Panel A and C) and value-weighted (in Panel B and D) buy-and-hold abnormal returns
(BHAR) of IPO sample compared with alternative benchmarks, and across various aggregate liquidity portfolios. The sample of IPOs consists of 5, 529
IPOs by U.S. firms subsequently listed on AMEX, NYSE, or Nasdaq from 1972 to 2004, excluding units, offers without primary shares, issues by
closed-end funds, unit investment trusts, REITs, ADRs, and utilities. IPOs announced in next year of (t + 1) the lowest (or highest) 30% aggregate
corporate liquidity demand (∆L/S) and aggregate market liquidity supply (Debt/GDP ) years (t) are put into the corresponding low (or high) liquidity
demand portfolios and liquidity supply portfolios, respectively. Row 1 to 6 of each panel present BHAR using the S&P 500, CRSP value-weighted index,
and CRSP equal-weighted index as benchmarks. Row 7 to 8 of each panel presents BHAR measured relative to size and book-to-market portfolios
(25, 5*5). To calculate BHAR, I first calculate the 60 months buy-and-hold returns (BHR) for each firm starting in the month following the IPO:
BHRiT =
∏T
t=1(1 +Rit)− 1, where i is the event-firm index, Rit is the month t return on firm i, and T is the horizon over which BHR is computed. If
the IPO delists before the first anniversary, I compound the return up until the delisting. Then I compute the BHR as BHRpiT =
∏T
t=1(1 +Rpit)− 1
for benchmark index, or as BHRpiT =
∏T
t=1
[
1 +
∑nit
j=1R
pi
jt/nit
] − 1 for size and book-to-market matched portfolios, where pi is the index for the
reference portfolio of the event firm i, nit is the number of firms in the reference portfolio of the event firm i in month t, and R
pi
jt is the return for
firm j in the reference portfolio pi during the event-month t. The BHAR are then calculated as BHART =
∑NT
i=1 ωi(BHRiT −BHRpiT ). When equal
weighted ωi = 1/NT and when value weighted ωi = MVi/MV , where MVi is the firm i’s common stock market value (in 2004 dollars by CPI) and
MV =
∑
iMVi. NT is the number of event firms that have BHRs for event period. Since some firms lack the accounting information necessary for
the attribute matching, I report results for 5, 090 firms for size and book-to-market benchmark. The differentials between high liquidity portfolios and
low liquidity portfolios for each category are reported where statistical significance is obtained using two sample t-tests. t-statistics are reported in
parentheses. Superscripts a, b, and c indicate significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
All High Liquidity Medium Liquidity Low Liquidity Differences
Raw IPO Abnormal Raw IPO Abnormal Raw IPO Abnormal Raw IPO Abnormal (High
Benchmarks Return BHAR Return BHAR Return BHAR Return BHAR -Low)
Panel A: Liquidity Demand (∆L/S) and Equal-Weighted BHAR
S&P 500 index 52.93% −7.92% 7.74% −5.46% 57.88% −18.29%b 104.80% 18.30% −23.80%c
(t-statistic) (−1.53) (−0.76) (−2.37) (1.47) (−1.65)
CRSP VW index 52.93% −18.86%a 7.74% −16.49%b 57.88% −26.77%a 104.80% 0.40% −16.90%
(t-statistic) (−3.66) (−2.31) (−3.46) (0.04) (−1.18)
CRSP EW index 52.93% −12.37%b 7.74% −50.14%a 57.88% 0.55% 104.80% 5.70% −55.90%a
(t-statistic) (−2.39) (−6.96) (0.07) (0.46) (−3.89)
Size and Book-to-Market 53.45% 6.61% 4.57% −34.73%a 60.43% 17.48%b 105.00% 36.10%a −70.80%a
(t-statistic) (5090 obs) (1.17) (−4.46) (2.07) (2.69) (−4.56)
(continued)
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Table 5.11—Continued
All High Liquidity Medium Liquidity Low Liquidity Differences
Raw IPO Abnormal Raw IPO Abnormal Raw IPO Abnormal Raw IPO Abnormal (High
Benchmarks Return BHAR Return BHAR Return BHAR Return BHAR -Low)
Panel B: Liquidity Demand (∆L/S) and Value-Weighted BHAR
S&P 500 index 14.63% −16.13%a −34.06% −27.17%a 74.70% −2.18% 88.80% −0.20% −27.00%c
(t-statistic) (−3.41) (−4.25) (−0.26) (−0.02) (−1.89)
CRSP VW index 14.63% −26.20%a −34.06% −37.49%a 74.70% −10.16% 88.80% −15.00% −22.50%
(t-statistic) (−5.51) (−5.79) (−1.24) (−1.18) (−1.57)
CRSP EW index 14.63% −53.16%a −34.06% −100.50%a 74.70% 13.58% 88.80% −4.80% −95.80%a
(t-statistic) (−7.75) (−9.54) (1.54) (−0.39) (−5.95)
Size and Book-to-Market 13.84% −24.31%a −35.90% −57.51%a 76.90% 21.61%b 89.70% 15.60% −73.10%a
(t-statistic) (5090 obs) (−4.64) (−7.90) (2.56) (1.15) (−4.74)
Panel C: Liquidity Supply (Debt/GDP ) and Equal-Weighted BHAR
S&P 500 index 52.93% −7.92% 57.00% −15.73%b 36.69% −3.29% 110.20% 44.50%b −60.20%a
(t-statistic) (−1.53) (−2.11) (−0.48) (2.19) (−2.78)
CRSP VW index 52.93% −18.86%a 57.00% −21.44%a 36.69% −18.88%a 110.20% 8.00% −29.50%
(t-statistic) (−3.66) (−2.88) (−2.76) (0.40) (−1.37)
CRSP EW index 52.93% −12.37%b 57.00% −14.34%c 36.69% −9.57% 110.20% −9.10% −5.30%
(t-statistic) (−2.39) (−1.92) (−1.39) (−0.46) (−0.25)
Size and Book-to-Market 53.45% 6.61% 56.65% 4.97% 36.91% 2.99% 113.70% 45.10%b −40.10%c
(t-statistic) (5090 obs) (1.17) (0.63) (0.38) (2.11) (−1.76)
Panel D: Liquidity Supply (Debt/GDP ) and Value-Weighted BHAR
S&P 500 index 14.63% −16.13%a 21.68% −21.88%a 1.73% −9.04% 70.30% 8.50% −30.40%
(t-statistic) (−3.41) (−3.75) (−1.10) (0.47) (−1.59)
CRSP VW index 14.63% −26.20%a 21.68% −29.06%a 1.73% −22.04%a 70.30% −27.10% −1.90%
(t-statistic) (−5.51) (−4.90) (−2.71) (−1.35) (−0.09)
CRSP EW index 14.63% −53.16%a 21.68% −51.76%a 1.73% −55.60%a 70.30% −44.90%b −6.80%
(t-statistic) (−7.75) (−5.79) (−4.97) (−2.24) (−0.31)
Size and Book-to-Market 13.84% −24.31%a 20.91% −18.78%a 0.65% −33.81%a 71.30% 4.50% −23.30%
(t-statistic) (5090 obs) (−4.64) (−2.74) (−3.99) (0.24) (−1.18)
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various liquidity portfolios. The one-year BHAR is negatively correlated with aggre-
gate liquidity factors. Even the raw IPO buy-and-hold returns show some degree of
correlation with aggregate liquidity. The diﬀerences between high- and low-liquidity
portfolios are all negative and mostly signiﬁcant, regardless of the measures of ag-
gregate liquidity measures and calculation of BHAR. Across the table, the BHAR
results reveal that aggregate liquidity, especially liquidity demand, has a strong nega-
tive correlation with long-run post-issue performance. In other words, the commonly
recognised IPO long-run underperformance is actually driven, in part, by issuing
ﬁrms going public in a period of high aggregate liquidity. Those IPOs in low ag-
gregate liquidity markets even have signiﬁcantly positive abnormal returns over one
year after issues.
Table 5.10 and Table 5.11 show the long-run BHAR over a three-year and ﬁve-
year horizon, respectively. In general, the results show that IPO ﬁrms suﬀer serious
long-run underperformance, measured by four diﬀerent benchmarks. The degree
of underperformance increases with the horizon of the post-issue period. Second,
the negative correlation between aggregate liquidity and post-issue BHAR becomes
stronger when the time-horizon increases. IPOs announced in periods of high aggre-
gate liquidity have large and signiﬁcantly negative abnormal returns. However, IPOs
announced in periods of low aggregate liquidity have positive post-issue abnormal
returns.
To sum up, in addition to IPO activity and IPO underpricing, aggregate corpo-
rate liquidity demand (∆L/S) and aggregate corporate liquidity supply (Debt/GDP )
both show a strong correlation with long-run post-issue abnormal returns. Moreover,
post-issue returns are only “abnormal” for IPOs announced in high aggregate liquidity
markets. Issuing ﬁrms going public in a low aggregate liquidity environment event
have long-term positive abnormal returns. These results are generally consistent
throughout the four diﬀerent benchmarks. Further, as the degree of underperfor-
mance increases with the post-issue time period, the diﬀerences of buy-and-hold
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abnormal returns between high- and low-liquidity portfolios increase as well. These
results suggest the existence of a “window of opportunity”. Other than identifying
these opportunities with volume of equity oﬀerings, I ﬁnd that aggregate liquidity
factors turn out to be a stronger identiﬁer, since IPOs in periods of low aggregate
liquidity beneﬁts in the long-run via positive stock returns.
5.4 Empirical Results for SEO firms
In this section, the correlation between aggregate liquidity and public equity issues
is examined with the sample of SEOs.
5.4.1 Volume and Proceeds of SEOs
In the SEO literature, Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993) document pro-cyclical SEO
activity. Table 5.12 reports the number of SEOs and gross proceeds within diﬀerent
aggregate liquidity portfolios for the SEO sample. Panel A shows the results for
aggregate liquidity demand portfolios, while panel B shows the results for aggregate
liquidity supply portfolios. Similar to empirical results for the IPO sample, the
aggregate liquidity also signiﬁcantly inﬂuences the activity of SEOs. It seems that
managers choose the timing for additional public oﬀerings by considering the level
of aggregate liquidity.
The diﬀerence between the number of SEOs for high- and low-liquidity demand
portfolios is 186. This value increases to 2, 192 when comparing liquidity supply
portfolios. SEO proceeds are also used as a proxy for SEO activity. Mean and
median proceeds values for the whole SEO sample and various liquidity portfolios are
calculated. The diﬀerences between median value of high- and low-liquidity portfolios
are positive and signiﬁcant at 1%. The results of SEO proceeds, consistent with the
SEO number, suggest a positive correlation between aggregate liquidity and SEO
activity. SEO volume increases in both aggregate liquidity factors.
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Table 5.12: SEO Activity versus Aggregate Liquidity
This table presents the number of SEOs and gross proceeds within different aggregate liquidity
portfolios for the SEO sample. Panel A (Panel B) reports the results for liquidity demand (supply)
portfolios. The sample of SEOs consists of 6, 100 SEOs by U.S. firms subsequently listed on AMEX,
NYSE, or Nasdaq from 1972 to 2004, excluding units, offers without primary shares, issues by
closed-end funds, unit investment trusts, REITs, ADRs, and utilities. SEOs announced in next
year of (t + 1) the lowest (or highest) 30% aggregate corporate liquidity demand (∆L/S) and
aggregate market liquidity supply (Debt/GDP ) years (t) are put into the corresponding low (or
high) liquidity demand portfolios and liquidity supply portfolios, respectively. Gross proceeds is
the amount raised from investors in millions (2004 purchasing power using the CPI, local market
offering amount, excluding overallotment options). Statistical significance on mean and median
values are based on t-tests and Wilcoxon tests, respectively. p-values are reported in brackets.
Superscripts a, b, and c indicate significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
High Medium Low Differences
All (30%) (40%) (30%) H-L p-value
Panel A: Liquidity Demand (∆L/S)
Number of SEOs 6,100 1,667 2,952 1,481 186
Gross Proceeds ($ millions)
Mean 106.31 151.14 88.58 91.19 59.95a [0.000]
Median 56.89 82.34 49.07 49.58 32.76a [0.000]
Panel B: Liquidity Supply (Debt/GDP )
Number of SEOs 6,100 2,902 2,488 710 2,192
Gross Proceeds ($ millions)
Mean 106.31 101.84 115.8 91.31 10.53 [0.159]
Median 56.89 58.57 58.14 42.2 16.37a [0.000]
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To further explore whether this positive correlation is driven by other factors,
I classify the sample of SEOs by exchange listing and gross proceeds. Subsamples
of SEOs listed on the Nasdaq or NYSE/AMEX are created. In addition, the sam-
ple of SEOs is partitioned into subsamples with highest (30%), medium (40%), and
lowest (30%) gross proceeds levels. Panel B of Table 5.5 shows the frequency distri-
bution of issuing ﬁrms across aggregate liquidity portfolios (∆L/S or Debt/GDP )
and oﬀering characteristics for the sample of SEOs. The left sub-panel presents the
frequency distribution created by the intersection between the aggregate liquidity
demand portfolios (∆L/S) and exchange listing (i.e. Nasdaq or NYSE/AMEX) or
gross proceeds value (i.e. highest(30%), medium(40%), lowest(30%)). Unlike IPOs,
the distribution of seasoned equity oﬀerings across the Nasdaq and NYSE/AMEX
is similar, with slightly more SEO undertaken in the Nasdaq. The distribution of
the number of SEOs across high-, medium-, and low-liquidity portfolios is similar to
that of the IPO sample. The number of SEOs is positively correlated with aggregate
liquidity measures.
5.4.2 Discounting of SEOs
While IPO underpricing has received extensive attention in the literature, SEO dis-
counting has attracted relatively less attention. In general, discounting if the oﬀer
price in ﬁrm underwritten SEOs is economically large and common, remained stable
around 3% throughout the 1990s (Altınkılıç and Hansen (2003)). Mola and Loughran
(2004) ﬁnd that the average oﬀering of new equity has a 3% discounting level, which
rises steadily over time. They also ﬁnd evidence of the increased clustering of oﬀer
prices at integers and conclude that clustering is a signiﬁcant determinant of SEO
discounting. Corwin (2003) examine the relative importance of various hypotheses in
explaining the cross-section of SEO discounting. Corwin ﬁnd that discounting is pos-
itively related to oﬀer size, price uncertainty, and underwriter pricing conventions.
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To be consistent with the IPO sample, I also apply three proxies for SEO dis-
counting. The discounting of IPO is also called ‘underpricing’ in some studies
(e.g. Corwin (2003)). To distinguish between them, SEO discounting, denoted
by D = (P
−1 − P0)/P0, is deﬁned as the percentage price change between the prior
oﬀer day’s closing price (P
−1) and the oﬀer price (P0), relative to the oﬀer price. By
following Mola and Loughran (2004), the SEO money left on the table is measured
as the dollar discount (P
−1− P0) multiplied by the number of shares in the oﬀering,
and expressed in millions of constant 2004 dollars. Although IPO underpricing and
SEO discounting are both measured as close-to-oﬀer returns, the close price for IPO
underpricing and SEO discounting is the ﬁrst available closing price and the prior
day’s closing price, respectively.
Table 5.13 presents the discounting of SEOs, ﬁrst-month returns, and the amount
of money left on the table within diﬀerent aggregate liquidity portfolios for the
SEO sample. Panel A (Panel B) reports the results for liquidity demand (supply)
portfolios. Both the mean and median values for the whole sample and each aggregate
liquidity are reported. The SEO discounting (4.17%) is much smaller than the IPO
underpricing (19.89%), while the SEO ﬁrst-month return (6.18%) is only slightly
larger than the SEO discounting. For the sample of SEOs, the diﬀerence between
high- and low-liquidity portfolios in SEO discounting is 1.33% and signiﬁcant at the
1% level. Again, this value is smaller for the SEO sample in magnitude than the IPO
underpricing diﬀerences (22.56%). The results in Table 5.13 show that all diﬀerences
(mean and median) between high- and low-liquidity portfolios are positive, except
for the diﬀerence of SEO ﬁrst-month return between liquidity demand portfolios,
which is negative (−2.87%) and signiﬁcant.
Overall, these results suggest a positive correlation between aggregate liquidity
and SEO discounting. To avoid potential data problems with the SDC, the median
values of SEO discounting are also examined. Although median values are usually
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Table 5.13: Discounting of SEOs versus Aggregate Liquidity
This table presents the discounting of SEOs, first-month returns, and amount of money left on the table within different aggregate liquidity portfolios
for the SEO sample. Panel A (Panel B) reports the results for liquidity demand (supply) portfolios. The sample of SEOs consists of 6, 100 SEOs by U.S.
firms subsequently listed on AMEX, NYSE, or Nasdaq from 1972 to 2004, excluding units, offers without primary shares, issues by closed-end funds,
unit investment trusts, REITs, ADRs, and utilities. SEOs announced in next year of (t + 1) the lowest (or highest) 30% aggregate corporate liquidity
demand (∆L/S) and aggregate market liquidity supply (Debt/GDP ) years (t) are put into the corresponding low (or high) liquidity demand portfolios
and liquidity supply portfolios, respectively. In each panel, the left subpanel reports the mean value and the right subpanel reports the median value.
The SEO discounting is measured as the percent price change between prior day’s closing price and the offer price, relative to the offer price. The
first-month return is measured as the percent price change between the 21st trading day’s closing price and the offer price, relative to the offer price.
Money left on the table (millions of dollars, 2004 purchasing power) is calculated as the number of shares issued times the change from the offer price
to the prior day’s closing price. Statistical significance on mean and median value are based on t-tests and Wilcoxon tests, respectively. t-statistics are
reported in parentheses. p-values are reported in brackets. Superscripts a, b, and c indicate significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Mean Median
High Medium Low Differences High Medium Low Differences
All (30%) (40%) (30%) (High-Low) All (30%) (40%) (30%) (High-Low)
Panel A: Liquidity Demand (∆L/S)
Discounting 4.17%a 4.71%a 4.26%a 3.38%a 1.33%a 1.70%a 2.63%a 1.35%a 1.54%a 1.09%a
(19.40) (14.55) (11.32) (11.44) (3.05) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
First-Month Return 6.18%a 4.95%a 6.05%a 7.82%a −2.87%a 4.17%a 2.97%a 4.10%a 5.44%a −2.48%a
(23.18) (9.32) (15.56) (15.80) (−3.95) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Money Left on the 3.87 6.27 3.06 2.78 3.48a 0.76 1.68 0.57 0.61 1.07a
Table ($ millions) (3.78) [0.000]
Panel B: Liquidity Supply (Debt/GDP )
Discounting 4.17%a 4.62%a 4.19%a 2.24%a 2.38%a 1.70%a 2.38%a 1.31%a 0.52%a 1.86%a
(19.40) (18.83) (10.01) (4.55) (4.32) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
First-Month Return 6.18%a 7.16%a 5.72%a 3.77%a 3.39%a 4.17%a 4.80%a 3.94%a 3.12%a 1.68%a
(23.18) (21.00) (11.59) (6.96) (5.29) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Money Left on the 3.87 3.86 4.58 1.38 2.48a 0.76 1.21 0.50 0.16 1.05a
Table ($ millions) (4.68) [0.000]
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Table 5.14: Discounting of SEOs across Aggregate Liquidity and Offering Characteristics
This table presents the discounting of SEOs (in Panel A), first-month returns (in Panel B), and amount of money left on the table (in Panel C) within
different aggregate liquidity portfolios, which is further classified by exchange listing (i.e. NASDAQ or NYSE/AMEX) or gross proceeds (i.e. large
(30%), medium (40%), small (30%)). The sample of SEOs consists of 6, 100 SEOs by U.S. firms subsequently listed on AMEX, NYSE, or Nasdaq from
1972 to 2004, excluding units, offers without primary shares, issues by closed-end funds, unit investment trusts, REITs, ADRs, and utilities. SEOs
announced in next year of (t + 1) the lowest (or highest) 30% aggregate corporate liquidity demand (∆L/S) and aggregate market liquidity supply
(Debt/GDP ) years (t) are put into the corresponding low (or high) liquidity demand portfolios and liquidity supply portfolios, respectively. In each
panel, the left subpanel reports the results for liquidity demand portfolios based on ∆L/Sources and the right subpanel reports the results for liquidity
supply portfolios based on Debt/GDP . The SEO discounting is measured as the percent price change between prior day’s closing price and the offer
price, relative to the offer price. The first-month return is measured as the percent price change between the 21st trading day’s closing price and the
offer price, relative to the offer price. Money left on the table (millions of dollars, 2004 purchasing power) is calculated as the number of shares issued
times the change from the offer price to the prior day’s closing price. The differentials between high liquidity portfolios and low liquidity portfolios for
each category are reported where statistical significance is obtained using two sample t-tests. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Superscripts a, b,
and c indicate significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Liquidity Demand (∆L/S) Liquidity Supply (Debt/GDP )
High Medium Low Differences High Medium Low Differences
All (30%) (40%) (30%) H-L p-value (30%) (40%) (30%) H-L p-value
Panel A: SEO Discounting
Exchange Listing
NASDAQ 4.53%a 5.41%a 4.07%a 4.28%a 1.13%c [0.058] 5.15%a 4.08%a 1.36%c 3.79%a [0.000]
(24.31) (15.97) (17.80) (8.75) (1.90) (18.34) (16.89) (1.89) (4.92)
NYSE/AMEX 3.65%a 3.37%a 4.50%a 2.24%a 1.12% [0.122] 3.49%a 4.34%a 2.55%a 0.94% [0.228]
(8.16) (4.95) (5.54) (8.89) (1.55) (7.27) (4.70) (4.15) (1.21)
Gross Proceeds
Large (30%) 3.66%a 3.79%a 4.13%a 2.43%a 1.37%a [0.004] 3.25%a 4.52%a 1.41%b 1.85%b [0.012]
(7.96) (12.61) (3.82) (6.69) (2.90) (9.26) (4.78) (2.21) (2.54)
Medium(40%) 3.67%a 4.78%a 3.41%a 3.06%a 1.73%b [0.017] 4.20%a 3.32%a 2.30%b 1.90%c [0.076]
(12.96) (10.02) (7.73) (5.65) (2.40) (9.42) (10.24) (2.36) (1.78)
Small (30%) 5.33%a 6.69%a 5.34%a 4.47%a 2.22%c [0.099] 6.80%a 4.84%a 2.66%a 4.14%a [0.000]
(13.45) (5.35) (9.73) (9.04) (1.65) (17.96) (5.96) (3.55) (4.92)
(continued)
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Table 5.14—Continued
Liquidity Demand (∆L/S) Liquidity Supply (Debt/GDP )
High Medium Low Difference High Medium Low Difference
All (30%) (40%) (30%) H-L p-value (30%) (40%) (30%) H-L p-value
Panel B: First-Month Return
Exchange Listing
NASDAQ 7.22%a 5.70%a 7.09%a 9.50%a −3.80%a [0.000] 7.94%a 6.60%a 4.20%a 3.75%a [0.003]
(18.94) (7.68) (13.17) (12.42) (−3.57) (17.24) (9.45) (3.62) (3.01)
NYSE/AMEX 4.71%a 3.53%a 4.70%a 5.73%a −2.20%a [0.008] 5.49%a 4.55%a 3.63%a 1.86%b [0.012]
(13.48) (5.74) (8.47) (10.19) (−2.64) (13.28) (6.72) (5.95) (2.53)
Gross Proceeds
Large (30%) 4.98%a 3.85%a 5.67%a 5.83%a −1.98%c [0.070] 5.99%a 4.19%a 3.73%a 2.27%b [0.019]
(10.11) (4.53) (6.90) (8.54) (−1.82) (10.57) (4.60) (4.80) (2.36)
Medium (40%) 6.18%a 6.14%a 5.70%a 7.15%a −1.01% [0.376] 7.39%a 5.51%a 2.56%a 4.83%a [0.000]
(16.76) (7.17) (12.47) (9.40) (−0.89) (13.58) (9.43) (3.21) (4.99)
Small (30%) 7.39%a 5.13%a 6.74%a 10.12%a −5.00%a [0.001] 8.06%a 7.62%a 4.93%a 3.13%b [0.011]
(13.38) (4.74) (8.52) (10.07) (−3.38) (12.20) (7.17) (4.74) (2.55)
Panel C: Money Left on the Table
Exchange Listing
NASDAQ 3.60 6.94 1.87 2.68 4.25a [0.001] 3.35 4.39 0.26 3.09a [0.000]
NYSE/AMEX 4.24 4.98 4.60 2.90 2.08c [0.095] 4.95 4.85 1.77 3.18a [0.004]
Gross Proceeds
Large (30%) 9.21 11.52 7.86 7.37 4.15 [0.125] 8.66 11.04 2.70 5.96a [0.000]
Medium (40%) 2.09 2.72 1.93 1.73 0.99a [0.008] 2.28 1.98 1.53 0.74 [0.282]
Small (30%) 0.89 1.19 0.87 0.73 0.46b [0.011] 1.26 0.65 0.50 0.76a [0.000]
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smaller than mean values, they show consistent patterns in most of the cases. Ta-
ble 5.14 presents the discounting of SEOs, ﬁrst-month returns and the amount of
money left on the table within diﬀerent aggregate liquidity portfolios, which is fur-
ther classiﬁed by exchange listing (i.e. NASDAQ or NYSE/AMEX) or gross proceeds
value (i.e. highest(30%), medium(40%), lowest(30%)). Without exception, the ma-
jor results produce the same patterns and correlations after controlling for these deal
characteristics.
5.4.3 Post-Issue Performance of SEOs
This section investigates the correlation between aggregate liquidity and the long-run
post-issue performance of SEO ﬁrms. Equity oﬀering ﬁrms in SEOs are found to have
long-run negative abnormal returns (see Levis (1995), Loughran and Ritter (1995),
and Spiess and Aﬄeck-Graves (1995)). The long-run abnormal performance of SEOs
is measured by employing the same methodology for long-term returns (BHAR).
Table 5.15, Table 5.16, and Table 5.17 report the long-run BHAR for the sample
of SEOs over one-year, three-year, and ﬁve-year periods after the announcements of
SEOs, respectively. For the entire SEO sample, issuing ﬁrms underperform against
various benchmarks in the ﬁve-year period after equity oﬀerings. The degree of un-
derperformance increases with the length of post-issue period. Although SEO ﬁrms
have negative abnormal returns after public oﬀering, the degree of underperformance
is relatively smaller when related to IPO ﬁrms. These results are consistent with pre-
viously documented ﬁndings in the literature of SEO.9
In general, for the SEO sample, the return diﬀerentials between high- and low-
liquidity portfolios are negative and mostly signiﬁcant. When using reference portfo-
lios as benchmarks, the three-year equally-weighted (value-weighted) BHAR diﬀer-
ence between high- and low-liquidity SEO is −11.15% (−22.29) for liquidity demand
9See Ritter (2003) for reviews on IPO and SEO long-term performance.
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Table 5.15: One-Year Post-Issue BHAR of SEOs versus Aggregate Liquidity
This table presents the one-year post-issue equal weighted (in Panel A and C) and value weighted (in Panel B and D) buy-and-hold abnormal returns
(BHAR) of SEO sample compared with alternative benchmarks, and across various aggregate liquidity portfolios. The sample of SEOs consists of
6, 100 SEOs by U.S. firms subsequently listed on AMEX, NYSE, or Nasdaq from 1972 to 2004, excluding units, offers without primary shares, issues
by closed-end funds, unit investment trusts, REITs, ADRs, and utilities. SEOs announced in next year of (t+ 1) the lowest (or highest) 30% aggregate
corporate liquidity demand (∆L/S) and aggregate market liquidity supply (Debt/GDP ) years (t) are put into the corresponding low (or high) liquidity
demand portfolios and liquidity supply portfolios, respectively. Row 1 to 6 of each panel present BHAR using the S&P 500, CRSP value-weighted index,
and CRSP equal-weighted index as benchmarks. Row 7 to 8 of each panel presents BHAR measured relative to size and book-to-market portfolios
(25, 5*5). To calculate BHAR, I first calculate the 12 months buy-and-hold returns (BHR) for each firm starting in the month following the IPO:
BHRiT =
∏T
t=1(1 +Rit)− 1, where i is the event-firm index, Rit is the month t return on firm i, and T is the horizon over which BHR is computed. If
the IPO delists before the first anniversary, I compound the return up until the delisting. Then I compute the BHR as BHRpiT =
∏T
t=1(1 +Rpit)− 1
for benchmark index, or as BHRpiT =
∏T
t=1
[
1 +
∑nit
j=1R
pi
jt/nit
] − 1 for size and book-to-market matched portfolios, where pi is the index for the
reference portfolio of the event firm i, nit is the number of firms in the reference portfolio of the event firm i in month t, and R
pi
jt is the return for
firm j in the reference portfolio pi during the event-month t. The BHAR are then calculated as BHART =
∑NT
i=1 ωi(BHRiT −BHRpiT ). When equal
weighted ωi = 1/NT and when value weighted ωi = MVi/MV , where MVi is the firm i’s common stock market value (in 2004 dollars by CPI) and
MV =
∑
iMVi. NT is the number of event firms that have BHRs for event period. Since some firms lack the accounting information necessary for
the attribute matching, I report results for 5, 856 firms for size and book-to-market benchmark. The differentials between high liquidity portfolios and
low liquidity portfolios for each category are reported where statistical significance is obtained using two sample t-tests. t-statistics are reported in
parentheses. Superscripts a, b, and c indicate significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
All High Liquidity Medium Liquidity Low Liquidity Differences
Raw SEO Abnormal Raw SEO Abnormal Raw SEO Abnormal Raw SEO Abnormal (High
Benchmarks Return BHAR Return BHAR Return BHAR Return BHAR -Low)
Panel A: Liquidity Demand (∆L/S) and Equal-Weighted BHAR
S&P 500 index 9.77% −0.83% 3.54% −0.86% 5.66% −6.26%a 24.96% 10.02%a −10.88%a
(t-statistic) (−0.91) (−0.39) (−5.75) (5.81) (−3.88)
CRSP VW index 9.77% −3.15%a 3.54% −2.69% 5.66% −7.87%a 24.96% 5.73%a −8.42%a
(t-statistic) (−3.52) (−1.23) (−7.33) (3.36) (−3.04)
CRSP EW index 9.77% −4.28%a 3.54% −5.22%b 5.66% −5.19%a 24.96% −1.42% −3.80%
(t-statistic) (−4.88) (−2.44) (−4.91) (−0.84) (−1.40)
Size and Book-to-Market 9.79% −0.10% 3.18% −1.24% 5.80% −1.39% 25.12% 3.72%b −4.96%c
(t-statistic) (5856 obs) (−0.12) (−0.58) (−1.30) (2.18) (−1.82)
(continued)
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Table 5.15—Continued
All High Liquidity Medium Liquidity Low Liquidity Difference
Raw SEO Abnormal Raw SEO Abnormal Raw SEO Abnormal Raw SEO Abnormal (High
Benchmarks Return BHAR Return BHAR Return BHAR Return BHAR -Low)
Panel B: Liquidity Demand (∆L/S) and Value-Weighted BHAR
S&P 500 index 9.20% 1.74% 2.39% 3.11% 9.34% −2.13% 22.55% 5.00%b −1.89%
(t-statistic) (0.89) (0.75) (−1.39) (2.31) (−0.40)
CRSP VW index 9.20% −1.09% 2.39% 0.82% 9.34% −4.03%b 22.55% −0.35% 1.17%
(t-statistic) (−0.57) (0.21) (−2.54) (−0.14) (0.25)
CRSP EW index 9.20% −7.13%a 2.39% −7.14%c 9.34% −2.97% 22.55% −13.52%a 6.38%
(t-statistic) (−3.36) (−1.80) (−1.62) (−2.85) (1.03)
Size and Book-to-Market 9.23% −1.44% 2.34% 0.71% 9.36% −3.64%c 22.95% −2.37% 3.08%
(t-statistic) (5856 obs) (−0.75) (0.18) (−1.92) (−0.96) (0.67)
Panel C: Liquidity Supply (Debt/GDP ) and Equal-Weighted BHAR
S&P 500 index 9.77% −0.83% 15.59% −1.07% −0.48% −4.91%a 21.89% 14.46%a −15.53%a
(t-statistic) (−0.91) (−0.67) (−4.78) (6.25) (−5.53)
CRSP VW index 9.77% −3.15%a 15.59% −2.36% −0.48% −7.22%a 21.89% 7.89%a −10.26%a
(t-statistic) (−3.52) (−1.50) (−7.13) (3.49) (−3.72)
CRSP EW index 9.77% −4.28%a 15.59% −0.22% −0.48% −9.56%a 21.89% −2.39% 2.17%
(t-statistic) (−4.88) (−0.15) (−9.42) (−1.10) (0.81)
Size and Book-to-Market 9.79% −0.10% 15.67% 3.20%b −0.97% −5.02%a 22.09% 2.96% 0.25%
(t-statistic) (5856 obs) (−0.12) (2.08) (−4.96) (1.33) (0.09)
Panel D: Liquidity Supply (Debt/GDP ) and Value-Weighted BHAR
S&P 500 index 9.20% 1.74% 23.02% 9.37%b −5.19% −5.97%a 16.20% 4.91% 4.47%
(t-statistic) (0.89) (2.33) (−2.62) (1.51) (0.86)
CRSP VW index 9.20% −1.09% 23.02% 7.28%c −5.19% −8.16%a 16.20% −1.75% 9.04%c
(t-statistic) (−0.57) (1.85) (−3.81) (−0.51) (1.73)
CRSP EW index 9.20% −7.13%a 23.02% 5.66% −5.19% −15.46%a 16.20% −15.43%b 21.09%a
(t-statistic) (−3.36) (1.51) (−6.08) (−2.36) (2.80)
Size and Book-to-Market 9.23% −1.44% 23.07% 8.06%b −5.27% −8.76%a 16.13% −4.53% 12.58%b
(t-statistic) (5856 obs) (−0.75) (2.04) (−4.01) (−1.47) (2.51)
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Table 5.16: Three-Year Post-Issue BHAR of SEOs versus Aggregate Liquidity
This table presents the three-year post-issue equal weighted (in Panel A and C) and value weighted (in Panel B and D) buy-and-hold abnormal returns
(BHAR) of SEO sample compared with alternative benchmarks, and across various aggregate liquidity portfolios. The sample of SEOs consists of
6, 100 SEOs by U.S. firms subsequently listed on AMEX, NYSE, or Nasdaq from 1972 to 2004, excluding units, offers without primary shares, issues
by closed-end funds, unit investment trusts, REITs, ADRs, and utilities. SEOs announced in next year of (t+ 1) the lowest (or highest) 30% aggregate
corporate liquidity demand (∆L/S) and aggregate market liquidity supply (Debt/GDP ) years (t) are put into the corresponding low (or high) liquidity
demand portfolios and liquidity supply portfolios, respectively. Row 1 to 6 of each panel present BHAR using the S&P 500, CRSP value-weighted index,
and CRSP equal-weighted index as benchmarks. Row 7 to 8 of each panel presents BHAR measured relative to size and book-to-market portfolios
(25, 5*5). To calculate BHAR, I first calculate the 36 months buy-and-hold returns (BHR) for each firm starting in the month following the IPO:
BHRiT =
∏T
t=1(1 +Rit)− 1, where i is the event-firm index, Rit is the month t return on firm i, and T is the horizon over which BHR is computed. If
the IPO delists before the first anniversary, I compound the return up until the delisting. Then I compute the BHR as BHRpiT =
∏T
t=1(1 +Rpit)− 1
for benchmark index, or as BHRpiT =
∏T
t=1
[
1 +
∑nit
j=1R
pi
jt/nit
] − 1 for size and book-to-market matched portfolios, where pi is the index for the
reference portfolio of the event firm i, nit is the number of firms in the reference portfolio of the event firm i in month t, and R
pi
jt is the return for
firm j in the reference portfolio pi during the event-month t. The BHAR are then calculated as BHART =
∑NT
i=1 ωi(BHRiT −BHRpiT ). When equal
weighted ωi = 1/NT and when value weighted ωi = MVi/MV , where MVi is the firm i’s common stock market value (in 2004 dollars by CPI) and
MV =
∑
iMVi. NT is the number of event firms that have BHRs for event period. Since some firms lack the accounting information necessary for
the attribute matching, I report results for 5856 firms for size and book-to-market benchmark. The differentials between high liquidity portfolios and
low liquidity portfolios for each category are reported where statistical significance is obtained using two sample t-tests. t-statistics are reported in
parentheses. Superscripts a, b, and c indicate significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
All High Liquidity Medium Liquidity Low Liquidity Differences
Raw IPO Abnormal Raw IPO Abnormal Raw IPO Abnormal Raw IPO Abnormal (High
Benchmarks Return BHAR Return BHAR Return BHAR Return BHAR -Low)
Panel A: Liquidity Demand (∆L/S) and Equal-Weighted BHAR
S&P 500 index 25.82% −10.41%a 10.20% −2.92% 25.94% −19.40%a 43.15% −0.93% −1.99%
(t-statistic) (−6.40) (−0.84) (−8.80) (−0.29) (−0.42)
CRSP VW index 25.82% −18.81%a 10.20% −11.21%a 25.94% −26.12%a 43.15% −12.77%a 1.56%
(t-statistic) (−11.74) (−3.24) (−12.04) (−4.12) (0.34)
CRSP EW index 25.82% −20.87%a 10.20% −31.11%a 25.94% −15.13%a 43.15% −20.80%a −10.31%b
(t-statistic) (−13.26) (−8.99) (−7.18) (−6.88) (−2.25)
Size and Book-to-Market 25.92% −9.24%a 9.28% −15.80%a 26.73% −7.77%a 43.25% −4.66% −11.15%b
(t-statistic) (5856 obs) (−5.78) (−4.64) (−3.55) (−1.52) (−2.43)
(continued)
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Table 5.16—Continued
All High Liquidity Medium Liquidity Low Liquidity Differences
Raw IPO Abnormal Raw IPO Abnormal Raw IPO Abnormal Raw IPO Abnormal (High
Benchmarks Return BHAR Return BHAR Return BHAR Return BHAR -Low)
Panel B: Liquidity Demand (∆L/S) and Value-Weighted BHAR
S&P 500 index 19.83% −2.16% −9.78% −8.21%b 31.52% −7.62%a 60.80% 18.33%a −26.54%a
(t-statistic) (−0.89) (−1.97) (−2.80) (3.13) (−3.69)
CRSP VW index 19.83% −12.35%a −9.78% −17.86%a 31.52% −15.18%a 60.80% 2.99% −20.84%a
(t-statistic) (−4.81) (−3.62) (−5.27) (0.70) (−3.19)
CRSP EW index 19.83% −30.42%a −9.78% −52.59%a 31.52% −11.64%a 60.80% −15.15%b −37.40%a
(t-statistic) (−7.55) (−6.38) (−3.74) (−2.49) (−3.65)
Size and Book-to-Market 19.99% −12.86%a −9.87% −19.62%a 31.53% −14.08%a 62.30% 2.68% −22.29%a
(t-statistic) (5856 obs) (−5.35) (−4.67) (−3.90) (0.66) (−3.81)
Panel C: Liquidity Supply (Debt/GDP ) and Equal-Weighted BHAR
S&P 500 index 25.82% −10.41%a 24.24% −24.77%a 21.06% −3.36% 48.93% 23.54%a −48.32%a
(t-statistic) (−6.40) (−9.53) (−1.56) (4.92) (−8.88)
CRSP VW index 25.82% −18.81%a 24.24% −28.17%a 21.06% −13.88%a 48.93% 2.19% −30.36%a
(t-statistic) (−11.74) (−10.95) (−6.52) (0.46) (−5.65)
CRSP EW index 25.82% −20.87%a 24.24% −20.48%a 21.06% −19.07%a 48.93% −28.81%a 8.33%
(t-statistic) (−13.26) (−8.12) (−9.02) (−6.16) (1.57)
Size and Book-to-Market 25.92% −9.24%a 24.53% −10.18%a 20.94% −9.44%a 48.73% −4.65% −5.53%
(t-statistic) (5856 obs) (−5.78) (−3.98) (−4.47) (−0.97) (−1.02)
Panel D: Liquidity Supply (Debt/GDP ) and Value-Weighted BHAR
S&P 500 index 19.83% −2.16% 20.06% −7.87%c 9.39% −5.84%b 50.10% 23.49%a −31.36%a
(t-statistic) (−0.89) (−1.85) (−2.00) (3.15) (−3.65)
CRSP VW index 19.83% −12.35%a 20.06% −12.28%a 9.39% −17.26%a 50.10% 2.02% −14.30%b
(t-statistic) (−4.81) (−3.00) (−4.15) (0.47) (−2.41)
CRSP EW index 19.83% −30.42%a 20.06% −20.72%a 9.39% −37.73%a 50.10% −33.80%a 13.00%
(t-statistic) (−7.55) (−5.12) (−5.20) (−3.05) (1.11)
Size and Book-to-Market 19.99% −12.86%a 20.19% −8.37%b 9.48% −20.66%a 50.60% −1.47% −6.90%
(t-statistic) (5856 obs) (−5.35) (−2.31) (−5.16) (−0.34) (−1.22)
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Table 5.17: Five-Year Post-Issue BHAR of SEOs versus Aggregate Liquidity
This table presents the five-year post-issue equal-weighted (in Panel A and C) and value-weighted (in Panel B and D) buy-and-hold abnormal returns
(BHAR) of SEO sample compared with alternative benchmarks, and across various aggregate liquidity portfolios. The sample of SEOs consists of
6, 100 SEOs by U.S. firms subsequently listed on AMEX, NYSE, or Nasdaq from 1972 to 2004, excluding units, offers without primary shares, issues
by closed-end funds, unit investment trusts, REITs, ADRs, and utilities. SEOs announced in next year of (t+ 1) the lowest (or highest) 30% aggregate
corporate liquidity demand (∆L/S) and aggregate market liquidity supply (Debt/GDP ) years (t) are put into the corresponding low (or high) liquidity
demand portfolios and liquidity supply portfolios, respectively. Row 1 to 6 of each panel present BHAR using the S&P 500, CRSP value-weighted index,
and CRSP equal-weighted index as benchmarks. Row 7 to 8 of each panel presents BHAR measured relative to size and book-to-market portfolios
(25, 5*5). To calculate BHAR, I first calculate the 60 months buy-and-hold returns (BHR) for each firm starting in the month following the IPO:
BHRiT =
∏T
t=1(1 +Rit)− 1, where i is the event-firm index, Rit is the month t return on firm i, and T is the horizon over which BHR is computed. If
the IPO delists before the first anniversary, I compound the return up until the delisting. Then I compute the BHR as BHRpiT =
∏T
t=1(1 +Rpit)− 1
for benchmark index, or as BHRpiT =
∏T
t=1
[
1 +
∑nit
j=1R
pi
jt/nit
] − 1 for size and book-to-market matched portfolios, where pi is the index for the
reference portfolio of the event firm i, nit is the number of firms in the reference portfolio of the event firm i in month t, and R
pi
jt is the return for
firm j in the reference portfolio pi during the event-month t. The BHAR are then calculated as BHART =
∑NT
i=1 ωi(BHRiT −BHRpiT ). When equal
weighted ωi = 1/NT and when value weighted ωi = MVi/MV , where MVi is the firm i’s common stock market value (in 2004 dollars by CPI) and
MV =
∑
iMVi. NT is the number of event firms that have BHRs for event period. Since some firms lack the accounting information necessary for
the attribute matching, I report results for 5, 856 firms for size and book-to-market benchmark. The differentials between high liquidity portfolios and
low liquidity portfolios for each category are reported where statistical significance is obtained using two sample t-tests. t-statistics are reported in
parentheses. Superscripts a, b, and c indicate significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
All High Liquidity Medium Liquidity Low Liquidity Differences
Raw IPO Abnormal Raw IPO Abnormal Raw IPO Abnormal Raw IPO Abnormal (High
Benchmarks Return BHAR Return BHAR Return BHAR Return BHAR -Low)
Panel A: Liquidity Demand (∆L/S) and Equal-Weighted BHAR
S&P 500 index 53.87% −5.26%c 23.72% 9.53%b 47.55% −25.03%a 100.40% 17.52%c −7.99%
(t-statistic) (−1.65) (2.39) (−6.09) (1.92) (−0.80)
CRSP VW index 53.87% −20.83%a 23.72% −5.08% 47.55% −36.96%a 100.40% −6.39% 1.31%
(t-statistic) (−6.58) (−1.29) (−9.04) (−0.70) (0.13)
CRSP EW index 53.87% −25.74%a 23.72% −50.95%a 47.55% −16.59%a 100.40% −15.63%c −35.30%a
(t-statistic) (−8.10) (−12.79) (−4.07) (−1.70) (−3.52)
Size and Book-to-Market 54.30% −7.66%b 22.10% −23.86%a 49.24% −5.98% 100.79% 7.48% −31.30%a
(t-statistic) (5856 obs) (−2.34) (−6.20) (−1.40) (0.79) (−3.05)
(continued)
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Table 5.17—Continued
All High Liquidity Medium Liquidity Low Liquidity Differences
Raw IPO Abnormal Raw IPO Abnormal Raw IPO Abnormal Raw IPO Abnormal (High
Benchmarks Return BHAR Return BHAR Return BHAR Return BHAR -Low)
Panel B: Liquidity Demand (∆L/S) and Value-Weighted BHAR
S&P 500 index 50.79% 6.89%b 6.03% 0.54% 63.33% −1.99% 120.70% 33.23%a −32.70%a
(t-statistic) (2.06) (0.11) (−0.44) (3.50) (−3.08)
CRSP VW index 50.79% −12.27%a 6.03% −17.43%a 63.33% −15.68%a 120.70% 3.28% −20.70%c
(t-statistic) (−3.60) (−3.39) (−3.52) (0.35) (−1.95)
CRSP EW index 50.79% −45.78%a 6.03% −89.60%a 63.33% −7.79% 120.70% −17.00% −72.60%a
(t-statistic) (−6.03) (−6.71) (−1.30) (−0.88) (−3.08)
Size and Book-to-Market 50.89% −14.95%a 6.07% −24.61%a 63.53% −13.36%a 121.70% 2.07% −26.70%b
(t-statistic) (5856 obs) (−4.28) (−5.08) (−2.65) (0.21) (−2.42)
Panel C: Liquidity Supply (Debt/GDP ) and Equal-Weighted BHAR
S&P 500 index 53.87% −5.26%c 59.96% −14.52%b 39.98% −0.68% 77.70% 16.51%b −31.03%a
(t-statistic) (−1.65) (−2.49) (−0.20) (2.56) (−3.57)
CRSP VW index 53.87% −20.83%a 59.96% −22.12%a 39.98% −18.33%a 77.70% −24.29%a 2.17%
(t-statistic) (−6.58) (−3.80) (−5.56) (−3.83) (0.25)
CRSP EW index 53.87% −25.74%a 59.96% −19.79%a 39.98% −20.92%a 77.70% −66.95%a 47.16%a
(t-statistic) (−8.10) (−3.39) (−6.32) (−10.50) (5.46)
Size and Book-to-Market 54.30% −7.66%b 60.23% −1.99% 40.39% −9.47%a 77.15% −25.10%a 23.12%a
(t-statistic) (5856 obs) (−2.34) (−0.33) (−2.85) (−3.92) (2.64)
Panel D: Liquidity Supply (Debt/GDP ) and Value-Weighted BHAR
S&P 500 index 50.79% 6.89%b 54.15% 4.41% 31.65% 1.67% 98.80% 28.76%a −24.30%b
(t-statistic) (2.06) (0.67) (0.46) (3.35) (−2.25)
CRSP VW index 50.79% −12.27%a 54.15% −5.50% 31.65% −17.26%a 98.80% −14.95%c 9.50%
(t-statistic) (−3.60) (−0.88) (−4.04) (−1.69) (0.87)
CRSP EW index 50.79% −45.78%a 54.15% −36.98%a 31.65% −42.24%a 98.80% −79.00%b 42.00%
(t-statistic) (−6.03) (−3.71) (−5.03) (−2.30) (1.17)
Size and Book-to-Market 50.89% −14.95%a 54.22% −4.18% 31.41% −22.73%a 100.00% −20.00%c 15.80%
(t-statistic) (5856 obs) (−4.28) (−0.68) (−5.67) (−1.77) (1.23)
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portfolios, which is shown in Panel A of Table 5.16. The corresponding diﬀerences
increase to −31.30 and −26.70% for the ﬁve-year post-issue periods, respectively.
Although the degree of underperformance and the high and low diﬀerentials vary ac-
cording to the length of post-issue period, the benchmark returns, and the measure-
ment methods, the majority supports the existence of positive correlation between
aggregate liquidity and post-issue underperformance of SEOs.10
Similar to early ﬁndings on IPO underpricing and SEO discounting, the results
for SEO sample appear to be weaker compared with the IPO results. In the literature
of public equity oﬀerings, the discounting and underpformance of SEO are smaller
related to that of IPO. For those ﬁrms listed on exchange issuing addition securities,
their performances are subjected to more strict monitoring and their information is
available to public investors more easily. SEO by public ﬁrms therefore should suﬀer
less information asymmetric, and, consequently, less SEO discounting and long-term
underperformance that IPO ﬁrms. Thus, when the SEO sample is partitioned by
aggregate liquidity factors, the diﬀerentials in performance are smaller compared
with IPO sample. Consistent with previous studies, the variations of SEO anomalies
are relatively smaller throughout diﬀerent time periods.
5.5 Summary and Conclusion
While fully recognising the achievements of prior research in explaining abnormal
phenomena in association with public equity oﬀerings, this research intends to explore
whether aggregate liquidity factors can explain the observed abnormal phenomena
with IPO and SEO samples. Motivated by prior studies in this trend of research and
the importance of aggregate liquidity, I question whether IPOs and SEOs announced
in high aggregate liquidity periods are fundamentally diﬀerent from those that occur
10Previous studies already suggested that the magnitudes of IPO and SEO underperformance are
significantly affected by empirical methodology. See Brav, Geczy, and Gompers (2000) and Eckbo,
Masulis, and Norli (2000), and Gompers and Lerner (2003).
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in low aggregate liquidity periods.
Based on the empirical evidence, I can hereby conclude that they are. I ex-
amine the activity, underpricing, and long-run BHAR of equity oﬀerings initiated
when aggregate liquidity is high (high-liquidity markets) and when they are low
(low-liquidity market). The main ﬁndings are summarised as follows: First, ACLD
(∆L/S) and AMLS (Debt/GDP ) both have a positive correlation with the volume
of equity issuing, measured in the number and gross proceeds of oﬀerings. This
positive correlation remains obvious and signiﬁcant after controlling exchange listing
and value of proceeds. The ﬁndings for the sample of IPOs are closely related to the
documented positive correlation between ﬁrms’ capital demand and IPO volume in
Lowry (2003).
Second, aggregate liquidity factors also show a strong positive correlation with
IPO underpricing and SEO discounting. I have used underpricing (discounting), ﬁrst-
month returns, and the amount of money left on the table for the sample of IPOs
(SEOs). The positive diﬀerences in these measures between high- and low-liquidity
markets suggest that IPOs (SEOs) occurring in high-liquidity periods have greater
underpricing problems. These results further support the explanation abilities of
aggregate liquidity on IPO (SEO) activity, since the volume and underpricing of
IPO (SEO) are positively correlated (see Yung, Çolak, and Wang (2008)). Therefore,
aggregate liquidity should have a positive correlation with volume and underpricing.
Third, in addition to the activity and underpricing of equity issues, ACLD
(∆L/S) and AMLS (Debt/GDP ) both show a strong correlation with long-run post-
issue abnormal returns, measured by buy-and-hold abnormal returns. More impor-
tantly, the post-issue returns are only “abnormal” for those IPOs (SEOs) announced
in high aggregate liquidity markets. Issuing ﬁrms going public in low aggregate
liquidity environment events have positive long-term abnormal returns. Therefore,
the commonly documented underperformance of IPO and SEO actually is driven by
some deals initiated in certain periods instead of a widely phenomenon for public
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equity issuances. In additions, these results suggest the existence of a “window of
opportunity”. Rather than identifying these windows with volume of equity oﬀerings,
I ﬁnd that aggregate liquidity factors oﬀer a stronger identiﬁer at macro level.
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Chapter 6
The Influence of Aggregate Liquidity
on Asset Sales
6.1 Introduction
In the U.S., there is a large and active market for corporate assets; the amount of
mergers, acquisitions, and asset sales in the overall markets increase substantially
through time. While academic research into corporate takeovers has attracted a
substantial amount of attention, far less is known about corporate asset sales. Early
empirical studies show that the announcements of asset sales are associated with
positive stock returns.1 Many studies in asset sales investigate the motives behind
these transactions and suggest that ﬁrms divest assets to increase eﬃciency, focus by
reducing their degree of diversiﬁcation, or have their assets operated by other more
eﬃcient ﬁrms.2
A stream of research in the literature of asset sales reveals the importance of asset
sales for the purpose of ﬁnancing (see Shleifer and Vishny (1992) and Lang, Poulsen,
1For studies on valuation effects, see Alexander, Benson, and Kampmeyer (1984), Jain (1985)
and Hite, Owers, and Rogers (1987).
2For the focusing explanation, see John and Ofek (1995) and Berger and Ofek (1999). For the
efficiency explanation, see Hite, Owers, and Rogers (1987) and Maksimovic and Phillips (2001).
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and Stulz (1995)). In fact, unlike other divestiture methods, corporate divesting
ﬁrms typically receive payment at the eﬀective date of a sale, with a substantial part
of this in cash. The average cash compensation is about 92% of the transaction value
in asset sales announced between 1985 and 2004.3 By examining market reactions in
association with the use of proceeds from asset sales, evidence shows that markets
react favourably to ﬁrms undertaking asset sales, but only when the ﬁrms plan to
retain proceeds (Bates (2005)) or payout proceeds (Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz (1995)).
Moreover, in relation to capital liquidity, Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling (2002)
show that industry-speciﬁc asset liquidity is important in determining whether, and
which, assets will be divested. Therefore, the liquidity consideration certainly plays
an important role in the decision making process involving corporate asset sales.
Given the existence of market anomalies associated with asset sales and the im-
portance of liquidity consideration in decision making, the chapter takes the next
logical step by investigating the inﬂuence of aggregate liquidity on the activity and
performance of divesting ﬁrms. Considering the universal need to hoard liquid as-
sets, I observe that aggregate liquidity express cyclical variations. Similarly, such
ﬂuctuations are also found in the aggregate activity of asset sales and divesting ﬁrm
performance. As an important macro factor, aggregate liquidity should carry poten-
tially important implications on corporate divestitures. The purpose of this chapter
is, therefore, to explore whether aggregate liquidity factors can explain the varia-
tions in asset sales markets and the relative valuation phenomena associated with
asset sales. In particular, I want to investigate whether there are fundamental diﬀer-
ences between the quality and performance of divestitures undertaken during high
aggregate liquidity periods and those occurring in low aggregate liquidity periods.
In this study, I use a sample of 2, 793 asset sales, each with a transaction value in
excess of $1 million to divesting ﬁrms, announced between January 1, 1985 and De-
3This result is based on the sample of asset sales used in this chapter. Bates (2005) shows that
the fraction paid in cash is 95% for a sample of subsidiary sales between 1990 and 1998.
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cember 31, 2004. The measures of aggregate liquidity consist of aggregate corporate
liquidity demand (ACLD) and aggregate market liquidity supply (AMLS). In order
to measure the ACLD, following the methodology in Greenwood (2005), I use data
reported in the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds to construct a measure of aggregate
corporate accumulation of liquid assets as a fraction of total corporate investment
spending. For AMLS, I follow Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2008) and
use the U.S. Debt/GDP ratio. The sample of asset sales is partitioned into high-,
medium-, and low-liquidity asset sales based on the aggregate liquidity the year be-
fore the announcement of the asset sales. Divesting ﬁrms in the sample are deﬁned
as high-, medium- and low-liquidity divesting ﬁrms accordingly.
The major results suggest the following points. First, more asset sales are under-
taken during high-liquidity periods, and with larger relative transaction size. Sec-
ond, divesting ﬁrms selling assets in high-liquidity periods have stronger short-term
and long-term growth opportunities, measured by asset growth and market-to-book
ratios, than divesting ﬁrms in low-liquidity periods. Third, high-liquidity divesting
ﬁrms have a positive and larger BHAR over the three years after asset sales than low-
liquidity divesting ﬁrms, which experience negative post-sale performance. Although
many evidences are realised for the inﬂuences of aggregate liquidity on asset sales,
some empirical results are relatively unclear. Results on short-term announcement
eﬀects show that the shareholders of divesting ﬁrms have signiﬁcant and positive
abnormal returns over the three-day interval around the announcement day of asset
sales. However, the diﬀerences in return between high- and low-liquidity portfolios
are inconsistent. The results from a multivariate analysis show signs of the corre-
lation between liquidity and performance of divesting ﬁrms after controlling other
factors; however, most of the coeﬃcients in regression are statistically insigniﬁcant.
Overall, empirical results suggest some correlations between aggregate liquidity
and asset sales, and seem to favour the ﬁnancing explanation. Divesting ﬁrms in
high aggregate liquidity periods have better investment opportunities and experi-
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ence positive post-sale performance in the long-term. In line with previous evidence
in Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz (1995) and Bates (2005), the results in this research
suggest that high-liquidity asset sales are more likely to be in the interests of share-
holders, which consequently lead to more favourable market reactions. In addition,
the variation of asset sales in association with aggregate liquidity is less than those
of acquisitions and issuances.4 Because the decisions on corporate divestitures are
less likely be made based on taking advantage of business cycle,5 the activity of asset
sales express weaker co-movement with macro economic factors such as aggregate
liquidity.
The chapter explicitly examine the inﬂuence of aggregate liquidity on the per-
formance of asset sales measured by ﬁrm characteristics and stock returns. It con-
tributes to previous studies in the path of discovering the motivations for asset sales
by exploring liquidity factors at aggregate level. The ﬂuctuation of asset sales and
the variation of divesting ﬁrms’ performance have been largely overlooked. Further-
more, the analyses of aggregate liquidity and asset sales also provide supplementary
evidences, from diﬀerent angles, for previous ﬁndings in M&A and equity issuances.
Corporate asset sales are investigated because of their unique relations with both
M&A and equity issuances. Divesting ﬁrms in asset sales are similar to target ﬁrms
in acquisitions. The major diﬀerence is that divesting ﬁrms remain controls of the
company after corporate divestitures. In terms of corporate external ﬁnancing, as-
set sales are an alternative path for ﬁrms to raise funds in capital markets other
than IPOs and SEOs. In equity issuances, ﬁrms sell securities (equity or bond) to
outside investors to obtain funds, while ﬁrms sell subsidiary assets (company divi-
sions, plants) to obtain capital. Therefore, the sample of asset sales allows us to
have further understandings of the importance of aggregate liquidity on corporate
4See Chapter 4 and 5 for evidences on acquisitions and public equity issuances, respectively.
5For studies on the motivations for asset sales, see, for example, Hite, Owers, and Rogers (1987),
Brown, James, and Mooradian (1994), John and Ofek (1995) Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz (1995),
Maksimovic and Phillips (2001), and Bates (2005).
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decisions.
The reminder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 describes the
data and Section 6.3 discusses the empirical methodology. Section 6.4 presents the
results. Finally, Section 6.5 concludes this chapter.
6.2 Data
This section describes the sample of asset sales (in Section 6.2.1) and provides sum-
mary statistics for the sample (in Section 6.2.2).
6.2.1 Sample Selection
The data on asset sales is obtained from the Thomson One Banker Mergers and
Acquisitions (M&A) Database, which contains information on the sales of operating
units by ﬁrms. This database is exactly the same as the Securities Data Corpo-
ration (SDC) Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) Database, and both databases are
maintained by Thomson Financial Services.6 With this in mind, I will refer to this
database as the ‘SDC’ in the following discussion. In the SDC, each transaction
is categorized as one of the ten diﬀerent forms of deal.7 Since I only require asset
sales transactions, the sample of asset sales in this chapter consists of deals listed in
the categories of ‘Acquisition of Assets’ and ‘Acquisition of Certain Assets’. Stock
returns data and accounting information for divesting ﬁrms are collected from the
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat fundamental annual
ﬁles, respectively.
The sample consists of successful (completed) asset sales transactions with an-
nouncement date and completed date from the beginning of 1985 to the end of 2004.
6Discussion with Thomson One Banker employee verified that both databases are the same.
7The form of deal in the SDC Mergers and Acquisitions database includes: Acquisition, Ac-
quisition of Assets, Acquisition of Certain Assets, Acquisition of Majority Interest, Acquisition of
Partial Interest, Acquisition of Remaining Interest, Buyback, Exchange Offer, Merger, and Recap-
italisation.
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Since the SDC has only very limited coverage of asset sales transactions before 1985,
especially for information on deal transaction values, I choose 1985 as the starting
point of the sample. Warusawitharana (2008) also choose 1985 as the starting point
of his sample when using the SDC database. Ending the sample with completed
date before the end of 2004 can ensure all divesting ﬁrms have at least three years
post-sale data for stock returns. By following previous studies, asset sales have to
satisfy the following criteria to be included in the sample:
1. Both divesting ﬁrms and acquiring ﬁrms are publicly-traded ﬁrms listed on
U.S. exchanges (following Warusawitharana (2008)).
2. All transactions are subsidiary sales with transaction values over one million
U.S. dollars.
3. Divesting ﬁrms with SIC codes between 6000 and 6999 (ﬁnancial services in-
dustry), or between 4900 and 4999 (regulated utilities) are excluded (following
Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling (2002)).
4. Divesting ﬁrms that cannot be found in the CRSP and Compustat databases
are eliminated.
As discussed previously, asset sales are typical means for ﬁrms to raise liquidity
or cash, especially when other external sources are hard to reach. Firms selling
higher value assets are more likely to be driven by their liquidity demands, since
a smaller amount of funds can be easily raised from other sources such as credit
lines, bank loans, etc. In order to capture the liquidity raising aspect of asset sales,
I eliminate transactions with deal values of less than $1 million. Divesting ﬁrms
from ﬁnancial services and utility industry are also excluded, because their business
involves inventories of marketable securities and liquid assets. Furthermore, divesting
ﬁrms are linked to the CRSP stock ﬁles and Compustat fundamental annual ﬁles via
the CUSIP codes from SDC.
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Table 6.1: Yearly Distribution of Asset Sales Sample
This table presents the yearly distribution of the sample of asset sale firms. The sample of asset sales
consists of 2, 793 subsidiary sales between 1985 to 2004 by public listed non-financial corporations
(excludes firms with SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) and non-utility corporations (excludes
firms with SIC codes between 4900 and 4999), where the transaction entails a minimum payment of
one million U.S. dollar in transaction value to the divesting firm. Transactions include only those
where the divesting firms can be identified on CRSP and Compustat. Transaction characteristics
are obtained from SDC. Transaction value is the amount raised from asset sales in millions (2002
purchasing power by using CPI). Fraction paid in cash measures the amount of cash payable at the
effective date of the sale divided by the transaction value.
Mean Median Fraction
Transaction Transaction paid in
Year Number Percent ($ million) ($ million) Cash
1985 73 2.61% 281.0 153.8 96.9%
1986 85 3.04% 298.0 111.6 97.6%
1987 79 2.83% 178.9 79.2 93.5%
1988 85 3.04% 357.9 74.5 96.3%
1989 99 3.54% 197.7 47.9 91.9%
1990 86 3.08% 99.9 46.1 91.0%
1991 73 2.61% 72.5 15.9 92.3%
1992 115 4.12% 81.7 15.4 91.1%
1993 128 4.58% 163.8 36.5 90.9%
1994 156 5.59% 102.6 26.8 90.3%
1995 171 6.12% 114.1 30.7 91.7%
1996 225 8.06% 152.2 32.1 93.3%
1997 273 9.77% 218.9 42.6 92.4%
1998 241 8.63% 159.3 37.0 92.3%
1999 205 7.34% 269.3 45.4 93.1%
2000 152 5.44% 256.6 49.0 89.0%
2001 168 6.02% 650.1 33.5 92.3%
2002 146 5.23% 109.1 28.2 92.3%
2003 115 4.12% 158.8 37.9 93.5%
2004 118 4.22% 192.2 72.1 96.3%
Total 2, 793 100.00% 208.5 40.5 92.6%
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The ﬁnal sample of asset sales after this screening process contains 2, 793 asset
sell-oﬀ transactions, each with a transaction value in excess of $1 million to divesting
ﬁrms. Table 6.1 shows the yearly distribution of asset sell-oﬀ transactions. The
number of asset sales vary from the lowest 73 (in 1985 and 1991) to the highest 273
(in 1997). 1996 to 1999 is a relative boom period for asset sales activity, with about
32% of transactions happening in this period. Column 4 and column 5 show the
changes of mean and median transaction value through the years, respectively. All
transaction values and the value of cash components are adjusted into 2002 dollars
by using the Consumer Price Index (CPI). The average transaction value ($208.5) is
larger than the median transaction value ($41.1) for the whole sample, which suggests
that there are more asset sales with small transaction values. For the whole sample,
there are 860 (1, 933) deals with an adjusted transaction value over (below) $100
million, and an average of $611 ($30) million. The average amount paid in cash for
the whole sample is 92.6%. This high percentage of cash payment is also commonly
recorded in the literature. Bates (2005), by using a sample of subsidiary sales over
$75 million, shows that divesting ﬁrms receive a substantial cash component (95%
on average in his sample) at the eﬀective date of a sale. Oﬃcer (2007) also captures
a high cash ratio of 94% with his sample of subsidiary sales.
Before continuing to a description of the statistics, some deﬁnitions associated
with the players in asset sales and some potential errors in the SDC database need
to be clariﬁed. In every asset sale deal there are three participants: acquiring ﬁrms,
target ﬁrms, and target ﬁrms’ parents. Acquiring ﬁrms, without doubt, are the com-
panies that buy the assets, subsidiaries, or divisions in transactions. The divesting
ﬁrms in the above criteria are actually the target ﬁrms’ parents, that sell their assets,
subsidiaries, or divisions in asset sales.8 In this study, since I only consider subsidiary
sales, a target ﬁrm will be named as a ‘subsidiary of a divesting ﬁrm’, or an ‘asset of
8Some papers may refer to target firms as ‘divesting firms’ and refer to target firms’ parents as
‘divesting parents’.
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a divesting ﬁrm’. In short, divesting ﬁrms represent the target ﬁrms’ parents, which
sell-oﬀ their subsidiary assets.
The potential for data errors in the SDC has been recognised in the literature.
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) provide a discussion of SDC errors regarding initial
public oﬀerings. Warusawitharana (2008), in the area of asset purchases and sales,
argues that data errors in the SDC on asset transactions are relatively small and
should not materially impact statistical inference. Warusawitharana (2008) ﬁnds
that the SDC dates are accurate within a business day for 92% of his sample, and
88% of the sample have deal values within 5% of the value reported in the SDC.
Since my sample shares the same period and similar criteria as his,9 I can expect
data errors in the sample of asset sales for this chapter to be relatively small as well.
6.2.2 Summary of Transactions
Table 6.2 provides a summary of the transactions in the sample of asset sales, delin-
eated by industry classiﬁcation. I classify the transactions based on divesting ﬁrms’
industry and acquiring ﬁrms’ industry separately. The distribution of buyers and
sellers in asset sales by industry classiﬁcation can help to explore the potential illiq-
uidity of assets in certain industries. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) suggest that when
a ﬁrm in ﬁnancial distress needs to sell assets, its industry peers are likely to be
experiencing problems themselves. Such illiquidity makes assets cheap in bad times.
The purpose of Table 6.2 is to provide an initial feeling of the distribution of asset
sales by industry classiﬁcation.
By following the industry classiﬁcation in Lowry (2003), I separate asset divesting
ﬁrms and acquiring ﬁrms into 14 industries, respectively. The results in Table 6.2
show that the distributions of transactions based on divesting ﬁrms’ industry are
similar to the distributions based on acquiring ﬁrms’ industry. Based on this, it is
9In Warusawitharana (2008), the sample consists of all buyers and sellers from 1985 to the end
of 2005, which are either publicly listed firms or subsidiaries of listed companies.
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Table 6.2: Industry Classification of Asset Sales Sample
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the samples of asset sales classified by industry. Panel A shows the separation based on divesting firms’
industry. Panel B shows the separation based on acquiring firms’ industry. The sample of asset sales consists of 2, 793 subsidiary sales between 1985 to
2004 by public listed non-financial corporations (excludes firms with SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) and non-utility corporations (excludes firms with
SIC codes between 4900 and 4999), where the transaction entails a minimum payment of one million U.S. dollar in transaction value to the divesting
firm. Transactions include only those where the divesting firms can be identified on CRSP and Compustat. Transaction characteristics are obtained
from SDC. Mean (median) transaction values are the average (median) proceeds amount raised from asset sales in millions (2002 purchasing power by
using CPI). Fraction paid in cash measures the amount of cash payable at the effective dates of the sale divided by the transaction value.
Divesting Firms Acquiring Firms
Mean Median Fraction Mean Median Fraction
Tran. Tran. Paid in Tran. Tran. Paid in
Number Percent ($ mil) ($ mil) Cash Number Percent ($ mil) ($ mil) Cash
Agriculture, Mining 22 0.79% 119.4 32.3 75.1% 24 0.95% 169.8 54.9 67.7%
Apparel 33 1.19% 64.6 37.6 91.9% 29 1.15% 112.3 36.1 92.7%
Communication, 779 28.10% 160.6 29.0 84.3% 817 32.31% 154.0 34.5 84.7%
Computer, Electronics
Construction 29 1.05% 41.2 25.5 82.8% 20 0.79% 89.0 33.4 75.2%
Food 52 1.88% 224.6 74.3 86.7% 60 2.37% 413.4 163.9 87.4%
Healthcare 222 8.01% 131.8 26.4 90.3% 172 6.80% 158.8 28.4 88.1%
Manufacturing 425 15.33% 212.7 55.8 89.5% 358 14.16% 163.3 61.4 90.1%
Oil, Gas 284 10.25% 192.6 55.6 92.4% 254 10.04% 187.5 44.5 91.6%
Printing, Publishing 60 2.16% 294.8 39.8 91.3% 41 1.62% 257.1 89.7 93.6%
Recreation 102 3.68% 209.6 64.2 87.6% 60 2.37% 114.7 39.2 84.5%
Scientific Instruments 217 7.83% 105.3 21.5 82.7% 221 8.74% 130.7 23.2 86.4%
and Research
Services 100 3.61% 116.9 29.8 84.7% 110 4.35% 110.3 26.2 83.3%
Trade 241 8.69% 161.0 34.5 87.1% 208 8.22% 153.4 35.6 87.9%
Transportation 206 7.43% 188.8 77.3 90.8% 155 6.13% 248.2 74.4 90.5%
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very likely that most of the sales occur between companies within the same industry.
For both divesting ﬁrms and acquiring ﬁrms, most of the transactions come from the
communications, computer, and electronics sectors between 1985 and 2004, which
take up over 28 and 34 percent of the sample, respectively. The second and third
largest groups in the classiﬁcation for divesting ﬁrms are manufacturing (425) and oil
and gas (284). Regarding the faction paid in cash, except for agriculture and mining,
most industries have asset sales transactions proceeded with over 85% of cash.
6.3 Empirical Methodology
In this research, I examine and compare the performance of divesting ﬁrms announced
in high-, medium-, and low-liquidity periods by studying the short-run stock return
surrounding the announcement, the characteristics of divesting ﬁrms, and the long-
run post-sale stock performance of acquiring ﬁrms. Section 6.3.1 and Section 6.3.2
discuss measures of short-run returns (CAR) and long-run performance (BHAR).
Section 6.3.3 describes various ﬁrm characteristics commonly used in asset sales
literature. Section 6.3.4 explains the empirical design.
6.3.1 Announcement Returns
Following the event-study methodology described in Brown and Warner (1985), I
use the market-adjusted model to estimate cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for
the three-day (−1,+1) event window surrounding the announcement of asset sales,
and for the twenty-day and forty-day windows before or after announcements (i.g.
(−20,−1), (−40,−1), (+1,+20), (+1,+40)). The daily abnormal returns for a ﬁrm
are calculated by deducting the index return from the ﬁrm’s return:
ARit = Rit −Rmt (6.1)
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where Rit is ﬁrm i’s daily stock return on date t and Rmt is the return for the equally-
weighted (or value-weighted) CRSP index on date t. The CAR over event windows
is calculated as:
CAR(T1,T2) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
T2∑
t=T1
ARit (6.2)
6.3.2 Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns
The long-term stock returns of divesting ﬁrms are calculated with buy-and-hold
abnormal returns (BHAR) as follows:10
BHAR(T1,T2) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(BHRi,(T1,T2) − BHRpi,(T1,T2)) (6.3)
where
BHRi,(T1,T2) =
T2∏
t=T1
(1 +Rit)− 1. (6.4)
BHRpi,(T1,T2) =
T2∏
t=T1
[
1 +
∑Nt
j=1Rjt
Nt
]
− 1 (6.5)
Note that BHRi,(T1,T2) is the buy-and-hold return (BHR) for ﬁrm i over the period
T1 to T2. BHRpi,(T1,T2) is the BHR for ﬁrm i’s size and book-to-market reference
portfolio over the period T1 to T2. N is the number of ﬁrms in the sample.
I calculate the 12-, 24-, and 36-month BHAR of divesting ﬁrms after the an-
nouncement of asset sales. Size and book-to-market reference portfolios are con-
structed by following Fama and French (1993). The equally-weighted monthly re-
turns of 25 reference portfolios formed on size and book-to-market (5× 5) are down-
loaded from Kenneth French’s website. Divesting ﬁrms are assigned to 25 reference
portfolios using the breakpoints for size and book-to-market.
10This method is supported by Barber and Lyon (1997) and Kothari and Warner (1997) because
it represents the value of investing in the average sample firms relative to an appropriate benchmark
over the period of interest.
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6.3.3 Firm Characteristics
Many studies in the literature of asset sales explore ﬁrm characteristic factors which
might aﬀect corporate divestiture decisions. In this section, I describe some com-
monly used factors for ﬁrm characteristics, especially for those used in asset sales
research. Table 6.3 provides a detailed summary of the methods used to construct
these ﬁrm characteristic variables. In particular, typical ﬁrm characteristic factors
are considered and classiﬁed into categories of size (in Panel A), cash and cash ﬂow
(in Panel B), leverage (in Panel C), growth rates (in Panel D), and investment and
growth opportunities (in Panel E). These ﬁrm characteristics are widely used in re-
search on asset sales with diﬀerent focuses.11 The construction methods for these
characteristics are chosen by following these major papers.
Data used to construct these ﬁrm characteristics is collected from Compustat
in WRDS, except for the transaction costs of asset sales, which are obtained from
the SDC. Table 6.4 provides descriptive statistics of ﬁrm characteristic variables for
the sample of asset sales. Column 2 shows the number of ﬁrms with valid data.
For the whole sample, divesting ﬁrms have similar total assets and market value
of equity. This section generally discusses why these variables are constructed and
used to examine the performance of divesting ﬁrms. The characteristics of divesting
ﬁrms will be examined together with aggregate liquidity measures to explore whether
divesting ﬁrms selling assets in high-liquidity periods are substantially diﬀerent from
those selling in low-liquidity periods. Such an analysis can determine which type of
ﬁrms respond to aggregate liquidity more actively and positively.
A Firm Size
Firm size is a typical variable used in corporate ﬁnance studies. Small and large
ﬁrms have substantial diﬀerences in ﬁnancing preferences. Firm size is an important
11See, for example, Brown, James, and Mooradian (1994), Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz (1995),
Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling (2002), and Bates (2005).
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Table 6.3: Summary of Firm Characteristic Variables
This table presents the summary of firm characteristic variables and data items used to construct them. Firm characteristic variables are classified into
five categorizes: firm size (in Panel A), cash and cash flow (in Panel B), leverage (in Panel C), growth rates (in Panel D), and investment and growth
opportunities (in Panel E). Total assets, market value of equity, and sales are expressed in billions of dollar. All accounting data for firm characteristics
are collected from COMPUSTAT Fundamental Annual Database. Only transaction values are obtained from SDC.
Variables Construction Method Data Items (Name : Label)
Panel A: Size
Total Assets Total Assets is the book value of assets in millions of dollars. AT: Assets - Total
Market Value of Equity Market Value of Equity is the market value of total common equity.
MVE = CSHO ∗ PRCCF
PRCCF : Price Close - Annual - Fiscal & CSHO
: Common Shares Outstanding
Sales Sales represent gross sales. SALE: Sales/Turnover (Net)
Relative Tran. Size Relative Transaction Size is computed as reported value of the deal trans-
action by SDC divided by the total assets of the firm one year prior to
asset sales or equity issues. RT = TV/AT
TV: Transaction Values & AT: Assets - Total
Panel B: Cash and Cash Flow
Cash/Assets Cash/Assets is the level of cash and marketable securities held by the
firm normalized by total assets. Cash/Assets = CHE/AT
CHE: Cash and Short-Term Investments & AT:
Assets - Total
Cash Flow/Assets Cash Flow/Assets is estimated as operating income before depreciation
minus interest expense, dividends, and taxes paid, divided by total as-
sets. CashF low/Assets = (OIBDP − XINT − DV T − TXT )/AT ,
where DV T = DV C +DV P
OIBDP: Operating Income Before Depreciation
& XINT: Interest and Related Expense - Total
& DVT: Dividends - Total & DVP: Dividends
- Preferred/Preference & DVC: Dividends Com-
mon/Ordinary & TXT: Income Taxes - Total
Panel C: Leverage
Debt/Assets Debt/Assets is the ratio of short-term and long-term debt (total liabili-
ties) to total assets. Debt/Assets = (DLC +DLTT )/AT
DLC: Debt in Current Liabilities - Total & DLTT:
Long-Term Debt - Total & AT: Assets - Total
Coverage Ratio Coverage Ratio is calculated as operating income before depreciation,
divided by interest expense. CoverageRatio = OIBDP/XINT
OIBDP: Operating Income Before Depreciation
& XINT: Interest and Related Expense - Total
(continued)
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Table 6.3—Continued
Variables Construction Method Data Items (Name : Label)
Panel D: Growth Rates
Sales Growth Sales Growth is the percentage change in sales. SG = (Salet/Salet−1)−
1
SALE: Sales/Turnover (Net)
Assets Growth Asset Growth is the percentage change in total assets. AG =
(ATt/ATt−1)− 1
AT: Assets - Total
Panel E: Investment and Growth Opportunities
Market-to-Book Following Fenn and Liang (2001), the market-to-book assets ratio of
firms proxies for the extent and quality of investment opportunities.
Market-to-book assets ratio is the market value of assets divided by the
book value of assets, where the market value of assets is the book value
of assets plus the market value of equity minus the book value of equity.
MKTtoBOOK = (BV A +MVE − BV E)/BV A = (AT + (CSHO ∗
PRCCF )− CEQ)/AT
AT: Assets - Total & CEQ: Common/Ordinary
Equity - Total & PRCCF : Price Close - Annual
- Fiscal & CSHO : Common Shares Outstanding
Capital Investment Following Bates(2005), growth opportunities is estimated using the cap-
ital expenditures—a measure that under rational expectations provides
an ex post proxy for anticipated investment. Capital investment is
measured as capital expenditures net of sales of property plant and
equipment, and scaled by the firm’s total assets. CapitalInvestment =
(CAPX − SPPE)/AT
CAPX: Capital Expenditures & SPPE: Sale of
Property & AT: Assets - Total
Market Value of Equity
245
Table 6.4: Descriptive Statistics of Firm Characteristics
This table presents the descriptive statistics for firms in both asset sales and equity issues samples
the fiscal year prior to transaction. The sample of asset sales consists of 2, 793 subsidiary sales
between 1985 to 2005 by public listed non-financial corporations (excludes firms with SIC codes
between 6000 and 6999) and non-utility corporations (excludes firms with SIC codes between 4900
and 4999), where the transaction entails a minimum payment of one million U.S. dollar in trans-
action value to the divesting firm. Transactions include only those where the divesting firms can
be identified on CRSP and Compustat. Transaction characteristics are obtained from SDC. The
sample firms are lined to Compustat data set using CUSIP numbers, and accounting data are col-
lected from Compustat. Total Assets is the book value of assets in billions of dollars. Market Value
of Equity is the market value of total common equity in billions of dollars. Relative transaction
size is the market value of the transaction divided by the divesting firm’s pre-sale total assets.
Cash/Assets is the level of cash and marketable securities held by the firm normalized by total
assets. Cash Flow/Assets is estimated as operating income before depreciation minus interest ex-
pense, dividends, and taxes paid, divided by total assets. Debt/Assets is the ratio of short-term and
long-term debt (total liabilities) to total assets. Coverage Ratio is calculated as operating income
before depreciation, divided by interest expense. Sales Growth is the percentage change in sales.
Asset Growth is the percentage change in total assets. Market-to-book assets ratio is the market
value of assets divided by the book value of assets, where the market value of assets is the book
value of assets plus the market value of equity minus the book value of equity. Capital investment
is measured as capital expenditures net of sales of property plant and equipment, and scaled by the
firm’s total assets. Total assets, market value of equity, and sales are expressed in billions of dollar.
First Third Standard
Variables Number Mean Quartile Median Quartile Deviation
Panel A: Size
Total Assets 2580 13.452 0.204 1.355 7.881 47.34
Market Value of Equity 2551 11.970 0.130 1.039 6.260 37.00
Sales 2579 8.823 0.198 1.200 6.941 22.09
Relative Transaction 2580 0.167 0.007 0.037 0.157 0.50
Panel B: Cash and Cash Flow
Cash/Assets 2580 0.106 0.015 0.042 0.126 0.16
Cash Flow/Assets 2559 0.007 0.013 0.055 0.091 0.35
Panel C: Leverage
Total Debt/Assets 2464 0.326 0.176 0.293 0.424 0.24
Coverage Ratio 2450 13.700 1.800 4.500 9.100 328.60
Panel D: Growth Rates
Sales Growth 2558 0.174 −0.088 0.040 0.187 1.46
Assets Growth 2565 0.171 −0.079 0.031 0.174 0.85
Panel E: Investment and Growth Opportunities
Market-to-Book 2547 1.778 1.119 1.416 1.931 1.52
Capital Investment 2533 0.056 0.021 0.045 0.076 0.09
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proxy for transaction costs in external ﬁnancing, as well as for the level of ﬁnancial
constraints. Empirical evidence shows that the transaction costs of new issues de-
crease with issue size, which makes external funds relatively more expensive for small
ﬁrms. Moreover, small ﬁrms get less monitoring coverage and may have less access to
external ﬁnancing because of adverse selection problems (Myers and Majluf (1984)).
Kim, Mauer, and Sherman (1998) contend that larger ﬁrms are able to better exploit
the scale economies because they raise large amounts of capital frequently. Almeida,
Campello, and Weisbach (2004) and Faulkender and Wang (2006) argue that large
ﬁrms have easier access to capital markets relative to small ﬁrms because they face
fewer constraints. For ﬁnancial constraints, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) ﬁnd that
smaller ﬁrms face more constraints in accessing external capital markets, and are
less likely to be able to exploit the scale economies.
Because asset sales, compared to public oﬀerings, are more like a private external
fund ﬁnancing source, larger ﬁrms should have substantial preference over smaller
ﬁrms. Following previous studies, ﬁrm size is deﬁned as the natural log of the book
value of assets. For comparison purposes, I also include the market value of equity,
sales, and the relative transaction size of asset sales into the size category of ﬁrm
characteristics. Panel A of Table 6.3 presents the construction methods for each
variable and the data items used from Compustat.
B Cash and Cash Flow
Instead of seeking costly external ﬁnancing, ﬁrms can also ﬁnance investments by
using internally generated cash ﬂows, or by selling oﬀ substitute reserved liquid as-
sets. Therefore, companies with more internal liquid asset reserves or internal cash
ﬂow should be less aﬀected by aggregate liquidity to proceed asset sales. Harford
(1999) and Oﬃcer (2007), in the area of mergers and acquisitions, ﬁnd that corpo-
rate liquidity reserves have substantial eﬀects on corporate ﬁnancing and investment
decisions. Firms with less liquid asset holdings are more likely to raise funds through
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subsidiary divestitures. Panel B of Table 6.3 shows two variables for cash and cash
ﬂow. Cash/Assets is deﬁned as the level of cash and marketable securities held by
the ﬁrm, normalised by total assets. Cash Flow/Assets is estimated as operating
income before depreciation net of interest expense, dividends, and taxes paid, and
then divided by the total assets.
C Leverage
According to Lang, Ofek, and Stulz (1996), leverage may negatively aﬀect ﬁrm invest-
ment in a number of ways by reducing the amount of cash available for investment.
For highly leveraged ﬁrms, the requirement for accessing external ﬁnancing is higher.
Therefore, I apply Debt/Assets, which is the ratio of short-term and long-term debt
(total liabilities) to total assets (book value of assets), as the measure of leverage.
Bates (2005) ﬁnds that, consistent with the disciplinary role of debt, ﬁrms in
the debt-payout sample have a signiﬁcantly lower interest coverage and higher debt
to asset ratio compared to the ﬁrms in the retention sample. Coverage ratio (also
known as ‘interest coverage’) is also an important measure for ﬁrm ﬁnancial leverage.
Thus, I include coverage ratio as another measure of leverage, which is calculated as
operating income before depreciation, divided by interest expense. These two ratios
are discussed in Panel C of Table 6.3.
D Investment and Growth Opportunities
As discussed in D’Mello, Krishnaswami, and Larkin (2008), ﬁrms with valuable
growth opportunities are likely to demand greater funds in the future to ﬁnance
these investments. These ﬁrms are less likely to be able to consistently ﬁnance the
investments out of operating income, and hence are more likely to access external
capital markets. In the literature, many studies use the market-to-book assets ratio
as a measure of the extent and quality of growth opportunities, such as Smith and
Watts (1992), Fenn and Liang (2001), and Bates (2005). Following these papers, I
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deﬁne the variable as the ratio of market value of assets divided by the book value
of assets, where the market value of assets is the book value of assets plus the mar-
ket value of equity minus the book value of equity. Some papers may consider the
market-to-book assets ratio as a measure of long-term growth opportunities. Con-
trarily, Pinkowitz and Williamson (2005) argue that sales growth and asset growth
are measures of immediate investment opportunities. Sales growth and assets growth
are deﬁned as the percentage change in sales and assets respectively, which are shown
in Panel D of Table 6.3.
Following Bates (2005), investment activity or investment intensity is estimated
using the capital expenditures of the divesting ﬁrms following the sales. Denis (1994)
and Pilotte (1992) also argue that this is a measure that under rational expectations
provides an ex post proxy for anticipated investment. I deﬁne capital investment as
capital expenditure net of sales of property, plant, and equipment, and scaled by the
ﬁrm’s total assets. The measures of capital investment and market-to-book asset
ratio are discussed in Panel E of Table 6.3.
6.3.4 Aggregate Liquidity and Empirical Design
To examine the inﬂuence of aggregate liquidity on asset sales, I split the sample
period into high-, medium-, and low-liquidity periods, and compare the performance
of divesting ﬁrms that announce asset sales under diﬀerent aggregate liquidity condi-
tions. The measures of aggregate liquidity include aggregate corporate liquidity de-
mand (ACLD), ∆L/S, and aggregate market liquidity supply (AMLS), Debt/GDP .
Firstly, I separate the sample period (20 years, 1985 to 2004) into high-liquidity
(30%), medium-liquidity (40%), and low-liquidity (40%) periods based on the ag-
gregate liquidity in the prior year. Under this method, there are 6 high-liquidity,
8 medium-liquidity, and 6 low-liquidity years. Secondly, asset sales announced
in the high-, medium-, or low-liquidity periods are deﬁned as high-, medium-, or
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low-liquidity sales, respectively. To summarise, divesting ﬁrms are put into high-,
medium-, and low-liquidity portfolios based on the corresponding measures of aggre-
gate liquidity (demand or supply) in the year before the announcement of the asset
sales.
6.4 Empirical Results
6.4.1 Activity and Announcement Effects
The aggregate performance of corporate ﬁnancing and investment activity has been
studied extensively in the literature.12 However, such an analysis has been missed in
asset sales literature. The variation of the amount of asset sales is relatively smaller
compared to that of equity oﬀerings and takeovers. Table 6.5 presents the number
of asset sales, the transaction values, and the relative transaction sizes for divesting
ﬁrms. Panel A shows the results of various liquidity demand portfolios. The amount
of asset sales is higher (1, 002) when aggregate liquidity is highly related to low
aggregate liquidity periods (784). The diﬀerence between high- and low-liquidity
supply portfolios is even larger, about 500, which is shown in Panel B.
When comparing the mean and median values of the transactions, results for
the high-low diﬀerentials are mixed. Asset sales announced in high-liquidity demand
periods have larger transaction values than those undertaken in low-liquidity demand
periods. However, for aggregate liquidity supply, the diﬀerence becomes negative.
Although the diﬀerences in relative transaction size are positive for both aggregate
liquidity measures, neither of them are statistically signiﬁcant.
Many studies in the 1980s examined the announcement eﬀects of corporate di-
vestitures (see, e.g., Alexander, Benson, and Kampmeyer (1984), Hite, Owers, and
Rogers (1987), Klein (1986), and Rosenfeld (1984)). Without exception, these stud-
12See, for example, Harford (2005) in M&A and Lowry (2003) in IPOs.
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Table 6.5: Asset Sales Activity and Aggregate Liquidity
This table presents the number of asset sales, the mean (median) transaction values and relative transaction sizes for the divesting firms in the sample.
Data are delineated by the aggregate corporate liquidity demand (∆L/S) or aggregate market liquidity supply (Debt/GDP ). The sample of asset
sales consists of 2, 793 subsidiary sales between 1985 to 2004 by public listed non-financial corporations (excludes firms with SIC codes between 6000
and 6999) and non-utility corporations (excludes firms with SIC codes between 4900 and 4999), where the transaction entails a minimum payment
of one million U.S. dollar in transaction value to the divesting firm. Asset sales announced in the next year (t + 1) of the lowest (or highest) 30%
aggregate corporate liquidity demand (∆L/S) or aggregate market liquidity supply (Debt/GDP ) years (t) are put into the low (or high) liquidity
demand portfolios or liquidity supply portfolios, respectively. Transactions include only those where the divesting firms can be identified on CRSP
and Compustat. Transaction characteristics are obtained from SDC. The sample firms are linked to Compustat data set using CUSIP numbers, and
accounting data are collected from Compustat. Relative transaction size is the market value of the transaction divided by the divesting firm’s pre-sale
total assets. Statistical significant of the mean difference is based on a two-sample t test and the statistical significant of the median difference is based
on a Wilcoxon signed-rank test. Superscripts a, b, and c indicate significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Median values are reported
in brackets.
High (30%) Medium (40%) Low (30%) Differences
Variables Total Liquidity Liquidity Liquidity (H-L) p-value
Panel A: Liquidity Demand (∆L/S)
Number 2,793 1,002 1,007 784
Transaction 208.5 293.9 155.4 167.7 126.2 0.105
[40.5] [43.4] [41.1] [37.6] [5.8] 0.049
Relative Tran. 0.167 0.180 0.149 0.173 0.007 0.809
[0.037] [0.038] [0.038] [0.036] [0.002] 0.719
Panel B: Liquidity Supply (Debt/GDP )
Number 2,793 1,194 894 705
Transaction 208.5 158.2 203.2 301.0 −142.8 0.181
[40.5] [33.4] [43.5] [55.0] [−21.6] 0.000
Relative Tran. 0.167 0.163 0.190 0.143 0.020 0.279
[0.037] [0.038] [0.043] [0.031] [0.007] 0.176
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Table 6.6: CAR to Asset Sales and Aggregate Liquidity Demand
This table presents the divesting firms’ cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) within aggregate liq-
uidity portfolios. The sample of asset sales consists of 2, 793 subsidiary sales between 1985 to 2004
by public listed non-financial corporations (excludes firms with SIC codes between 6000 and 6999)
and non-utility corporations (excludes firms with SIC codes between 4900 and 4999), where the
transaction entails a minimum payment of one million U.S. dollar in transaction value to the di-
vesting firm. Transactions include only those where the divesting firms can be identified on CRSP.
Asset sales announced in the next year (t + 1) of the lowest (or highest) 30% aggregate corporate
liquidity demand (∆L/S) years (t) are put into the low (or high) liquidity demand portfolios. To
calculate CAR, firstly the daily abnormal returns (AR) for each event firm for period ranging from
-40 day to +40 day are calculated: ARit = Rit−Rmt, where Rit is firm i’s stock return on date t and
Rmt is the return for the Equal-weighted or Value-weighted CRSP index on date t. Then CAR are
calculated by summing the daily AR over each event window separately. The differentials between
high-liquidity portfolios and low-liquidity portfolios for each event window are reported, where sta-
tistical significance is obtained using two sample t-tests. t-statistics are provided in parenthesis.
Superscripts a, b, and c indicate significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Event All High (30%) Medium (40%) Low (30%) Differences
Windows Asset Sales Liquidity Liquidity Liquidity (High-Low)
Panel A: Equal-Weighted CRSP Index
(−40,−1) −1.08%c −1.89%c −0.88% −0.31% −1.59%
(−1.78) (−1.88) (−0.80) (−0.29) (−1.10)
(−20,−1) −0.26% −0.80% 0.17% −0.11% −0.69%
(−0.62) (−1.12) (0.24) (−0.15) (−0.69)
(−1,+1) 1.40%a 1.09%a 1.81%a 1.26%a −0.17%
(6.85) (2.87) (6.18) (3.23) (−0.30)
(+1,+20) −1.33%a −1.43%b −1.21%b −1.34%b −0.09%
(−3.86) (−2.10) (−2.56) (−2.19) (−0.10)
(+1,+40) −1.97%a −1.86%b −1.94%a −2.17%b 0.31%
(−4.26) (−2.08) (−3.04) (−2.47) (0.25)
Panel B: Value-Weighted CRSP Index
(−40,−1) 1.05%c 0.47% 1.68% 1.02% −0.55%
(1.72) (0.46) (1.54) (0.97) (−0.38)
(−20,−1) 0.84%b 0.38% 1.48%b 0.63% −0.26%
(2.00) (0.52) (2.00) (0.89) (−0.25)
(−1,+1) 1.55%a 1.28%a 2.00%a 1.31%a −0.03%
(7.54) (3.32) (6.82) (3.36) (−0.06)
(+1,+20) −0.38% −0.49% 0.05% −0.81% 0.32%
(−1.11) (−0.72) (0.09) (−1.31) (0.35)
(+1,+40) −0.13% 0.01% 0.40% −1.01% 1.02%
(−0.28) (0.01) (0.62) (−1.14) (0.81)
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Table 6.7: CAR to Asset Sales and Aggregate Liquidity Supply
This table presents the divesting firms’ cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) within aggregate liq-
uidity portfolios. The sample of asset sales consists of 2, 793 subsidiary sales between 1985 to 2004
by public listed non-financial corporations (excludes firms with SIC codes between 6000 and 6999)
and non-utility corporations (excludes firms with SIC codes between 4900 and 4999), where the
transaction entails a minimum payment of one million U.S. dollar in transaction value to the di-
vesting firm. Transactions include only those where the divesting firms can be identified on CRSP.
Asset sales announced in the next year (t + 1) of the lowest (or highest) 30% aggregate market
liquidity supply (Debt/GDP ) years (t) are put into the low (or high) liquidity supply portfolios.
To calculate CAR, firstly the daily abnormal returns (AR) for each event firm for period ranging
from -40 day to +40 day are calculated: ARit = Rit − Rmt, where Rit is firm i’s stock return
on date t and Rmt is the return for the equal-weighted or value-weighted CRSP index on date
t. Then CAR are calculated by summing the daily AR over each event window separately. The
differentials between high-liquidity portfolios and low-liquidity portfolios for each event window are
reported, where statistical significance is obtained using two sample t-tests. t-statistics are pro-
vided in parenthesis. Superscripts a, b, and c indicate significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels,
respectively.
Event All High (30%) Medium (40%) Low (30%) Differences
Windows Asset Sales Liquidity Liquidity Liquidity (High-Low)
Panel A: Equal-Weighted CRSP Index
(−40,−1) −1.08%c 0.64% −0.47% −4.71%a 5.35%a
(−1.78) (0.81) (−0.49) (−3.00) (3.05)
(−20,−1) −0.26% 0.78% 0.30% −2.68%b 3.46%a
(−0.62) (1.52) (0.46) (−2.36) (2.77)
(−1,+1) 1.40%a 1.55%a 0.96%a 1.72%a −0.16%
(6.85) (4.85) (2.77) (4.22) (−0.32)
(+1,+20) −1.33%a −1.12%a −2.09%a −0.67% −0.44%
(−3.86) (−2.57) (−2.85) (−1.01) (−0.56)
(+1,+40) −1.97%a −1.71%a −2.72%a −1.42% −0.29%
(−4.26) (−2.90) (−2.75) (−1.60) (−0.27)
Panel B: Value-Weighted CRSP Index
(−40,−1) 1.05%c 2.13%a 1.57% −1.37% 3.49%b
(1.72) (2.65) (1.63) (−0.87) (1.98)
(−20,−1) 0.84%b 1.43%a 1.45%b −0.90% 2.33%c
(2.00) (2.77) (2.20) (−0.79) (1.87)
(−1,+1) 1.55%a 1.62%a 1.11%a 2.01%a −0.39%
(7.54) (5.05) (3.20) (4.87) (−0.75)
(+1,+20) −0.38% −0.46% −0.97% 0.56% −1.02%
(−1.11) (−1.05) (−1.32) (0.84) (−1.28)
(+1,+40) −0.13% −0.46% −0.34% 0.76% −1.22%
(−0.28) (−0.77) (−0.34) (0.86) (−1.15)
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ies all found positive and statistically signiﬁcant abnormal returns surrounding the
announcement dates of asset sales. However, evidence for pre-announcement and
post-announcement CARs are inconsistent.13
Table 6.6 presents the results of abnormal returns to divesting ﬁrms for the four
months surrounding the announcement date of asset sales. I include both an equally-
weighted (EW) and value-weighted (VW) CRSP index to calculate CAR. Consistent
with previous ﬁndings, the average three-day CARs to divesting ﬁrms, the interval
around the day of the sale announcement, are 1.40% with the EW CRSP index
and 1.55% with the VW CRSP index, which are both statistically signiﬁcant at 1%
level.14 Moreover, average CAR over the pre-announcement and post-announcement
periods show that the shareholders of divesting ﬁrms gain positive abnormal returns
before the sale announcement and experience negative returns in a post-event period.
The diﬀerences in CAR between high- and low-liquidity demand (supply) sales
are shown in Table 6.6 (Table 6.7). In general, the pattern of abnormal returns before
and after announcements remains, sometimes weakly, across diﬀerent liquidity port-
folios. Divesting ﬁrms selling in high-liquidity states slightly underperform against
those selling in low-liquidity states over days (−1,+1), but the CAR diﬀerences
are insigniﬁcant. For aggregate liquidity supply, I ﬁnd evidence that high-liquidity
divesting ﬁrms experience signiﬁcantly larger returns than low-liquidity ﬁrms.
6.4.2 Divesting Firm Characteristics
Firm characteristic variables are commonly used in research on asset sales. I consider
the typical variables used in Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling (2002), Bates (2005),
and Warusawitharana (2008), and follow their methods to construct these variables,
which include total assets, market value of equity, cash/assets ratio, cash ﬂow/assets
13Table 2.3 in Chapter 2 summarises the findings of these studies.
14Recent research by Bates (2005) examines the announcement period of abnormal returns with
the market model. He finds the average CAR is 1.20% over (−1,+1).
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ratio, debt/assets ratio, coverage ratio, sales growth, assets growth, market-to-book
ratio, and capital investment.
Table 6.8 reports the results of ﬁrm characteristics for divesting ﬁrms. Columns
1 to 3 show the value of each variable from the ﬁscal year before the announcement
of asset sales to the ﬁscal year after this event. The last two columns provide the
diﬀerences in mean and median values of ﬁrm characteristics between year (t+1) and
year (t− 1). The results are consistent with previous ﬁndings in the literature. The
size of divesting ﬁrms increases over the three years and the increase in total assets
is $3.026 billion. Moreover, the results also show that divesting ﬁrms signiﬁcantly
increase their cash ratio from 0.097 to 0.118, and reduce their capital investment from
0.063 to 0.053. It is reasonable to assume that divesting ﬁrms accumulate liquidity
through sales of assets. Indeed, ﬁrms with less holdings of liquid assets are more
likely to raise funds through subsidiary divestitures.
Tables 6.9 and 6.10 show the values of ﬁrm characteristics across various liquid-
ity demand and liquidity supply portfolios, respectively. By comparing high- and
low-liquidity sales, I ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences in many variables. Firstly, divesting
ﬁrms announced in high-liquidity periods are larger in size than low-liquidity di-
vesting ﬁrms. The diﬀerence in total assets between high- and low-liquidity sales is
7.620, which is signiﬁcant at 1% level. This large diﬀerence in size is also supported
by a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the market value of equity of 8.965. These results are
consistent with previous ﬁndings of transaction values. As indicated in Table 6.9,
high-liquidity divesting ﬁrms have smaller leverage, measured by debt-to-asset ra-
tio. The mean and median diﬀerences are −0.023 and −0.022, respectively, and
statistically signiﬁcant.
In the literature, many studies apply the ratios of market-to-book assets as a
measure of growth opportunities. The M/B ratio is often considered as the measure
of long-term growth opportunities, while assets growth is suggested as the measure
of immediate investment opportunities (see Pinkowitz and Williamson (2005)). The
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Table 6.8: Comparison of Firm Characteristics through Time
This table presents the mean (median) total assets, market value of equity, cash/assets ratio, cash
flow/assets ratio, debt/assets ratio, coverage ratio, sales growth, assets growth, market-to-book
ratio, and capital investment for the divesting firms in the sample. Data are presented relative
to the fiscal year of the announcement date of the sale (t). The sample of asset sales consists of
2, 793 subsidiary sales between 1985 to 2004 by public listed non-financial corporations (excludes
firms with SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) and non-utility corporations (excludes firms with SIC
codes between 4900 and 4999), where the transaction entails a minimum payment of one million
U.S. dollar in transaction value to the divesting firm. Transactions include only those where the
divesting firms can be identified on CRSP and Compustat. Total Assets is the book value of assets
in billions of dollars. Market Value of Equity is the market value of total common equity in billions
of dollars. Cash/Assets is the level of cash and marketable securities held by the firm normalized
by total assets. Cash Flow/Assets is estimated as operating income before depreciation minus
interest expense, dividends, and taxes paid, divided by total assets. Debt/Assets is the ratio of
short-term and long-term debt (total liabilities) to total assets. Coverage Ratio is calculated as
operating income before depreciation, divided by interest expense. Sales Growth is the percentage
change in sales. Asset Growth is the percentage change in total assets. Market-to-book assets
ratio is the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets, where the market value of
assets is the book value of assets plus the market value of equity minus the book value of equity.
Capital investment is measured as capital expenditures net of sales of property plant and equipment,
and scaled by the firm’s total assets. Statistical significant of the mean difference is based on a
two-sample t test and the statistical significant of the median difference is based on a Wilcoxon
signed-rank test. Superscripts a, b, and c indicate significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels,
respectively. Median values are reported in brackets.
Year Year Year Differences
Variables (t− 1) (t) (t+ 1) (t− 1) to (t+ 1) p-value
Total Assets 11.994 13.452 15.020 3.026b 0.023
[1.178] [1.355] [1.620] 0.442a 0.000
Market Value of Equity 10.900 11.970 13.832 2.932a 0.008
[0.962] [1.039] [1.267] 0.305a 0.002
Cash/Assets 0.097 0.106 0.118 0.021a 0.000
[0.038] [0.042] [0.047] 0.009a 0.000
Cash Flow/Assets 0.026 0.007 0.009 −0.016c 0.051
[0.059] [0.055] [0.056] −0.003c 0.082
Debt/Assets 0.325 0.326 0.324 −0.001 0.928
[0.292] [0.293] [0.285] −0.007 0.235
Coverage Ratio 22.100 13.700 10.580 −11.520 0.185
[4.900] [4.500] [4.750] −0.150 0.528
Sales Growth 0.594 0.174 0.252 −0.342 0.166
[0.075] [0.040] [0.046] −0.029a 0.000
Assets Growth 1.530 0.171 0.274 −1.256 0.129
[0.070] [0.031] [0.017] −0.053a 0.000
Market-to-Book 1.758 1.778 1.843 0.085 0.263
[1.393] [1.416] [1.437] 0.044c 0.082
Capital Investment 0.063 0.056 0.053 −0.011a 0.000
[0.050] [0.045] [0.041] −0.008a 0.000
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Table 6.9: Characteristics of Divesting Firms and Aggregate Liquidity Demand
This table presents the mean (median) values of the following variables for divesting firms in the sample. Data are delineated by the aggregate corporate
liquidity demand (∆L/S) . The asset sales sample consists of 2, 793 subsidiary sales between 1985 to 2004 by public listed non-financial corporations
(excludes firms with SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) and non-utility corporations (excludes firms with SIC codes between 4900 and 4999), where
the transaction entails a minimum payment of one million U.S. dollar in transaction value to the divesting firm. Transactions include only those where
the divesting firms can be identified on CRSP. Total Assets is the book value of assets in billions of dollars. Market Value of Equity is the market
value of total common equity in billions of dollars. Cash/Assets is the level of cash and marketable securities held by the firm normalized by total
assets. Cash Flow/Assets is estimated as operating income before depreciation minus interest expense, dividends, and taxes paid, divided by total
assets. Debt/Assets is the ratio of short-term and long-term debt (total liabilities) to total assets. Coverage Ratio is calculated as operating income
before depreciation, divided by interest expense. Sales Growth is the percentage change in sales. Asset Growth is the percentage change in total assets.
Market-to-book assets ratio is the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets, where the market value of assets is the book value of assets
plus the market value of equity minus the book value of equity. Capital investment is measured as capital expenditures net of sales of property plant
and equipment, and scaled by the firm’s total assets. Statistical significant of the mean difference is based on a two-sample t test and the statistical
significant of the median difference is based on a Wilcoxon signed-rank test. Superscripts a, b, and c indicate significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent
levels, respectively. Median values are reported in brackets.
All High (30%) Medium (40%) Low (30%) Differences
Asset Sales Liquidity Liquidity Liquidity (High-Low) p-value
Total Assets 13.452 18.040 11.370 10.420 7.620a 0.001
[1.355] [1.540] [1.280] [1.240] 0.300c 0.070
Market Value of Equity 11.970 18.180 8.097 9.215 8.965a 0.000
[1.039] [1.410] [0.907] [0.857] 0.553a 0.000
Cash/Assets 0.106 0.119 0.096 0.100 0.019b 0.017
[0.042] [0.044] [0.043] [0.039] 0.004 0.467
Cash Flow/Assets 0.007 −0.017 0.018 0.024 −0.040b 0.036
[0.055] [0.054] [0.054] [0.057] −0.003 0.912
Debt/Assets 0.326 0.314 0.327 0.337 −0.023c 0.064
[0.293] [0.283] [0.299] [0.306] −0.022b 0.017
Coverage Ratio 13.700 8.020 23.200 8.490 −0.470 0.945
[4.500] [4.890] [4.300] [4.290] 0.600 0.241
Sales Growth 0.174 0.244 0.072 0.222 0.022 0.816
[0.040] [0.056] [0.011] [0.056] 0.000 0.139
Assets Growth 0.171 0.259 0.106 0.144 0.115b 0.012
[0.031] [0.054] [0.016] [0.031] 0.022a 0.009
Market-to-Book 1.778 2.034 1.604 1.682 0.352a 0.000
[1.416] [1.575] [1.370] [1.362] 0.213a 0.000
Capital Investment 0.056 0.057 0.058 0.053 0.004 0.398
[0.045] [0.046] [0.045] [0.046] 0.000 0.632
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Table 6.10: Characteristics of Divesting Firms and Aggregate Liquidity Supply
This table presents the mean (median) values of the following variables for divesting firms in the sample. Data are delineated by the aggregate market
liquidity supply (Debt/GDP ). The asset sales sample consists of 2, 793 subsidiary sales between 1985 to 2004 by public listed non-financial corporations
(excludes firms with SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) and non-utility corporations (excludes firms with SIC codes between 4900 and 4999), where
the transaction entails a minimum payment of one million U.S. dollar in transaction value to the divesting firm. Transactions include only those where
the divesting firms can be identified on CRSP. Total Assets is the book value of assets in billions of dollars. Market Value of Equity is the market
value of total common equity in billions of dollars. Cash/Assets is the level of cash and marketable securities held by the firm normalized by total
assets. Cash Flow/Assets is estimated as operating income before depreciation minus interest expense, dividends, and taxes paid, divided by total
assets. Debt/Assets is the ratio of short-term and long-term debt (total liabilities) to total assets. Coverage Ratio is calculated as operating income
before depreciation, divided by interest expense. Sales Growth is the percentage change in sales. Asset Growth is the percentage change in total assets.
Market-to-book assets ratio is the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets, where the market value of assets is the book value of assets
plus the market value of equity minus the book value of equity. Capital investment is measured as capital expenditures net of sales of property plant
and equipment, and scaled by the firm’s total assets. Statistical significant of the mean difference is based on a two-sample t test and the statistical
significant of the median difference is based on a Wilcoxon signed-rank test. Superscripts a, b, and c indicate significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent
levels, respectively. Median values are reported in brackets.
All High (30%) Medium (40%) Low (30%) Differences
Asset Sales Liquidity Liquidity Liquidity (High-Low) p-value
Total Assets 13.452 11.220 11.540 19.980 −8.760a 0.004
[1.355] [1.140] [1.330] [2.320] −1.180a 0.000
Market Value of Equity 11.970 9.928 11.440 16.310 −6.382a 0.002
[1.039] [1.080] [0.810] [1.530] −0.450 0.332
Cash/Assets 0.106 0.099 0.094 0.132 −0.032a 0.000
[0.042] [0.036] [0.038] [0.061] −0.025a 0.000
Cash Flow/Assets 0.007 0.028 −0.001 −0.018 0.046a 0.003
[0.055] [0.064] [0.048] [0.048] 0.016a 0.000
Debt/Assets 0.326 0.320 0.338 0.320 0.000 0.984
[0.293] [0.293] [0.307] [0.282] 0.011 0.192
Coverage Ratio 13.700 29.700 6.250 −5.190 34.890b 0.030
[4.500] [5.200] [3.890] [4.120] 1.080c 0.000
Sales Growth 0.174 0.273 0.106 0.089 0.183a 0.007
[0.040] [0.062] [0.032] [0.009] 0.053a 0.000
Assets Growth 0.171 0.229 0.179 0.056 0.173a 0.000
[0.031] [0.044] [0.023] [0.014] 0.030a 0.000
Market-to-Book 1.778 1.895 1.736 1.620 0.276a 0.000
[1.416] [1.532] [1.324] [1.298] 0.234a 0.000
Capital Investment 0.056 0.066 0.051 0.046 0.020a 0.000
[0.045] [0.050] [0.047] [0.037] 0.013a 0.000
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results in Table 6.9 demonstrate large diﬀerences in investment opportunities between
divesting ﬁrms selling in high- and low-liquidity markets. For instance, high-liquidity
divesting ﬁrms have a market-to-book ratio of 1.895, which is signiﬁcantly larger than
low-liquidity ﬁrms by 0.352. For liquidity supply portfolios, the diﬀerence in market-
to-book ratio is also positive (0.276) and signiﬁcant at 1% level.
Although both measures of aggregate liquidity deliver similar results in many
variables, as indicated in Tables 6.9 and 6.10, the results of some variables are in-
consistent. For example, although high-liquidity demand sales are larger in size,
high-liquidity supply sales are signiﬁcantly smaller in total assets and market value
of equity. Note that, although I investigate the inﬂuences of both aggregate liquidity
measures on the performance of asset sales and characteristics of divesting ﬁrms, it
is not necessary that both measures should always have coherent results.
Overall, by comparing ﬁrm characteristics, I ﬁnd strong evidence that divesting
ﬁrms selling assets in high-liquidity periods have better short-term and long-term
growth opportunities than those announcing asset sales in low-liquidity periods. The
diﬀerences in the market-to-book and assets growth across liquidity subsamples are
both positive and statistically signiﬁcant.
6.4.3 Long-Run Performance of Divesting Firms
In this section, I estimate the long-run abnormal returns to divesting ﬁrms after
the announcement of asset sales, and compare the average BHAR across diﬀerent
liquidity portfolios. To the best of my knowledge, only two papers in the literature
on asset sales have investigated the long-run performance of divesting ﬁrms. Bates
(2005) uses the factor model regressions for 24-month rolling event time portfolios
formed on asset sale observations. By using the factor speciﬁcation employed in
Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2000), Bates (2005) ﬁnds that only the subsample of
retaining ﬁrms has positive performance. Firms retaining sales proceeds outperform
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Table 6.11: Long-term Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns
This table presents the divesting firms’ post-sale buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) for various
aggregate liquidity portfolios. The sample of asset sales consists of 2, 793 subsidiary sales between
1985 to 2004 by public listed non-financial corporations (excludes firms with SIC codes between
6000 and 6999) and non-utility corporations (excludes firms with SIC codes between 4900 and 4999),
where the transaction entails a minimum payment of one million U.S. dollar in transaction value to
the divesting firm. Transactions include only those where the divesting firms can be identified on
CRSP and Compustat. Asset sales announced in the next year (t+1) of the lowest (or highest) 30%
aggregate corporate liquidity demand (∆L/S) or aggregate market liquidity supply (Debt/GDP )
years (t) are put into the low (or high) liquidity demand portfolios or liquidity supply portfolios,
respectively. Panel A (Panel B) shows the results of liquidity demand portfolios based on ∆L/S
(liquidity supply portfolio based on Debt/GDP ). To calculate BHAR, I first calculate the buy-and-
hold returns (BHR) for each event firm for a period ranging from 1 month to 12, 24, or 36 month
respectively, where month 0 is the effective month in divestitures: BHRiT =
∏T
t=1(1 + Rit) − 1,
where i is the event-firm index, Rit is the month t simple return on firm i, and T is the horizon
over which the BHRiT is computed. Then the BHR for a reference portfolio is calculated as
BHRpi,T =
∏T
t=1[1 +
∑Nt
j=1Rjt/Nt] − 1, where pi is the index for the reference portfolio of the
event firm i, Nt is the number of firms in the reference portfolio in month t, and Rjt is the return
for firm j in the reference portfolio pi during the event-month t for event firm i. The mean BHAR
are then calculated as BHART =
1
N
∑N
i=1(BHRiT − BHRpiT ), where N is the number of event
firms that have valid BHR for event period 12, 24, or 36 months. The differentials between high-
liquidity portfolios and low-liquidity portfolios are reported where statistical significance is obtained
using two sample t-tests. t-statistics are provided in parenthesis. Superscripts a, b, and c indicate
significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Median values are reported in brackets.
Event All High (30%) Medium (40%) Low (30%) Differences
Periods Asset Sales Liquidity Liquidity Liquidity (High-Low)
Panel A: Liquidity Demand (∆L/S)
1 Year −0.02% 2.01% −0.39% −1.97% 3.98%
(−0.01) (0.59) (−0.26) (−0.68) (0.89)
2 Year −0.22% −0.43% 3.98% −5.45% 5.03%
(−0.09) (−0.09) (1.34) (−1.21) (0.76)
3 Year 6.07% 2.64% 23.30% −12.32%a 14.96%b
(0.91) (0.44) (1.40) (−2.74) (2.00)
Panel B: Liquidity Supply (Debt/GDP )
1 Year −0.02% 2.45% −1.27% −3.18%c 5.63%b
(−0.01) (1.17) (−0.36) (−1.79) (2.05)
2 Year −0.22% 8.21%c −9.79%a −3.23% 11.44%b
(−0.09) (1.77) (−3.55) (−1.03) (2.04)
3 Year 6.07% 22.20% −13.31%a 1.85% 20.40%
(0.91) (1.55) (−3.98) (0.39) (1.35)
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by over one half of one percent per month, which is equal to an economically sig-
niﬁcant risk-adjusted return of 18.22%. Lee and Lin (2008) examine the long-run
performance of U.K. corporate sell-oﬀs, and observe signiﬁcantly negative abnormal
returns up to ﬁve years after sell-oﬀ announcements.
Table 6.11 shows the divesting ﬁrms’ post-sale BHAR in the long-horizon. For
the whole sample, unlike Lee and Lin (2008), I ﬁnd no evidence of post-sale under-
performance by divesting ﬁrms. On average, divesting ﬁrms seem to have post-sale
returns indiﬀerent from zero. However, I ﬁnd partial evidence that low-liquidity sell-
ers experience negative abnormal returns after asset sales. Moreover, the diﬀerences
in BHAR between high- and low-liquidity asset sales are signiﬁcantly positive, which
are shown in the last column in Table 6.11, and the degree of diﬀerences increases in
the length of post-event periods. The results of long-term BHAR suggest that high-
liquidity divesting ﬁrms signiﬁcantly outperform low-liquidity divesting ﬁrms in the
three years after asset sales. This correlation is consistent with earlier analyses of
the characteristics of divesting ﬁrms, which indicate that divesting ﬁrms selling in
high-liquidity periods have better short-term and long-term growth opportunities.
6.4.4 Multivariate Evidence on CAR and BHAR
Table 6.12 summarises the results of the multivariate regressions of three-day an-
nouncement period CAR and two-year post-sale BHAR on the following variables. To
evaluate the degree to which short-term and long-term abnormal returns are aﬀected
by factors of aggregate liquidity, each regression includes a high (medium) liquidity
dummy, which equals one if divesting ﬁrms announce sales in high- (medium-) liq-
uidity markets and zero otherwise. To capture the size eﬀect, the relative transaction
size is included, which is measured as the market value of the transaction divided by
the divesting ﬁrm’s pre-sale total assets. The high growth dummy, which takes the
value of one if divesting ﬁrms have a market-to-book ratio above the medium ﬁrm
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Table 6.12: OLS Regressions Analysis of BHAR and CAR
This table presents the results of ordinary least squares regressions of three-day CAR to asset sales announcements and two-year BHAR after asset
sales. The sample of asset sales consists of 2, 793 subsidiary sales between 1985 to 2004 by public listed non-financial corporations (excludes firms with
SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) and non-utility corporations (excludes firms with SIC codes between 4900 and 4999), where the transaction entails a
minimum payment of one million U.S. dollar in transaction value to the divesting firm. Transactions include only those where the divesting firms can be
identified on CRSP and Compustat. High Liquidity Dummy (Medium Liquidity Dummy) equals one if the asset sale was announced in a high-liquidity
(medium-liquidity) market and zero otherwise. Relative transaction size is the market value of the transaction divided by the divesting firm’s pre-sale
total assets. Dummy variables equal one for firms reporting a corresponding variables above that of the medium firm and zero otherwise. Table 6.3
details the variable construction. The independent variables are all measured at the end of the previous fiscal year before the sales, except for capital
investment which is measured in the fiscal year following the sales. t-statistics are provided in parenthesis. Superscripts a, b, and c indicate significant
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Median values are reported in brackets.
Liquidity Demand Liquidity Supply
Dependent Variables Two-Year BHAR Three-Day CAR Two-Year BHAR Three-Day CAR
Models (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept −0.100c −0.035 0.012a 0.008 −0.069 −0.017 0.016a 0.012b
(−1.94) (−0.54) (2.89) (1.38) (−1.24) (−0.26) (3.59) (2.18)
High Liquidity Dummy 0.016 −0.032 −0.003 0.002 0.108c 0.095 −0.002 0.000
(0.26) (−0.56) (−0.53) (0.46) (1.72) (1.62) (−0.30) (0.05)
Medium Liquidity Dummy 0.104c 0.074 0.004 0.004 −0.066 −0.072 −0.006 −0.006
(1.72) (1.35) (0.84) (0.88) (−0.99) (−1.18) (−1.19) (−1.14)
Relative Transaction −0.008 −0.024 0.038a 0.050a −0.017 −0.035 0.038a 0.050a
(−0.11) (−0.31) (6.24) (7.85) (−0.21) (−0.46) (6.23) (7.83)
High Growth Dummy 0.117b 0.095b −0.008b −0.007c 0.092c 0.065 −0.009b −0.008b
(2.37) (2.04) (−1.99) (−1.84) (1.89) (1.41) (−2.31) (−2.00)
High Investment Dummy −0.019 −0.001 −0.024 −0.001
(−0.42) (−0.35) (−0.54) (−0.35)
High Cash Dummy 0.044 0.005 0.048 0.005
(0.95) (1.30) (1.04) (1.27)
High Leverage Dummy −0.092b 0.002 −0.096b 0.002
(−1.99) (0.44) (−2.08) (0.43)
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.004 0.017 0.030 0.005 0.008 0.017 0.031
Number of Observations 2248 1993 2329 2024 2248 1993 2329 2024
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in the sample and zero if it is below the medium ﬁrm, is included to control for the
eﬀect of growth opportunities on the stock performance. To account for the market’s
expectation about the post-sale capital investment of a divesting ﬁrm, I also include
the high investment dummy. To incorporate capital structure and ﬁnancial ﬂexi-
bility considerations, I further include high cash dummy and high leverage dummy
measured for the divesting ﬁrm in the ﬁscal year preceding the sale.
The left sub-panel of Table 6.12 shows the regression results for the aggregate
liquidity demand dummy variable. The coeﬃcient on the high (medium) liquidity
dummy is positive, suggesting that high-liquidity sales experience positive post-sale
abnormal returns. However, these coeﬃcients become insigniﬁcant in Model 2 when
other dummies are included. For factor of liquidity demand, the liquidity dummy
only delivers a modest correlation with performance of asset sales. When liquidity
supply is applied, the coeﬃcients on the high liquidity dummy are positive and signif-
icantly diﬀerent from zero in Models 5 and 6. These results suggest that shareholders
react more favourably to asset sales announced in high-liquidity markets in the long-
run. However, no such pattern has been found for short-run CAR around asset sales
announcements. When the dependent variable is the three-day CAR, coeﬃcients
on high and medium liquidity dummies are close to zero. As indicated in Table
6.12, coeﬃcients on the high growth dummy are statistically signiﬁcantly positive
for regressions on the two-year post-sale BHAR and negative for regressions on the
three-day announcement CAR. These results imply that returns to sales, especially
in the long-term, are higher when growth opportunities are signiﬁcant.
6.5 Conclusion
Considering the existence of market anomalies associated with asset sales and the
importance of liquidity consideration in decision making, this chapter investigates
the correlation between aggregate liquidity and asset sales. As an important macro
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factor, aggregate liquidity should carry potentially important implications on cor-
porate divestitures. The purpose of this chapter is, therefore, to explore whether
aggregate liquidity factors can explain the variations in asset sales markets and the
relative valuation phenomena associated with asset sales. In particular, I want to
investigate whether there are fundamental diﬀerences between the quality of asset
sales announced under high aggregate liquidity periods and those occurring in low
aggregate liquidity periods.
The main results from this chapter suggest the following points. First, more
asset sales are undertaken during high-liquidity periods with larger relative trans-
action sizes. Second, divesting ﬁrms selling assets in high-liquidity periods have
stronger short-term and long-term growth opportunities, measured by asset growth
and market-to-book ratios, than divesting ﬁrms in low-liquidity periods. Third,
high-liquidity divesting ﬁrms have positive and larger BHAR over three years after
asset sales than low-liquidity divesting ﬁrms, which experience negative post-sale
performance. Overall, evidence has been found to support the notion that aggre-
gate liquidity does aﬀect the performance of asset sales, although some results are
inconsistent.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
Liquidity is an important and special asset for ﬁrms operating in imperfect capital
markets. At the aggregate level, corporate liquidity holdings and market liquidity
supply play important roles in capital markets. The variation of aggregate liquidity
aﬀects the activity of corporate investment and ﬁnancing, and even the performance
of event companies. Many studies on the importance of liquidity (at both ﬁrm-level
and aggregate-level) suggest that the level and variation of (aggregate) liquidity sub-
stantially inﬂuence the activity and quality of corporate investment and ﬁnancing.
Motivated by these previous studies, I investigated whether corporate investment
and external ﬁnancing occurring during high aggregate liquidity markets are funda-
mentally diﬀerent from those occurring during low aggregate liquidity environments.
Using M&A, IPO, SEO, and asset sales samples, I found strong empirical evi-
dence that the activities of these typical corporate investment and ﬁnancing events
are aﬀected by aggregate liquidity. Moreover, the quality of these investment and
ﬁnancing decisions and the performance of event ﬁrms, both in the short- and long-
term, are also inﬂuenced by aggregate liquidity. Moreover, many of the market
anomalies associated with corporate events only exist in certain aggregate liquidity
circumstances, and the diﬀerences in performance between corporate events initiated
in high- and low-liquidity markets are both economically and statistically signiﬁcant.
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The empirical results and patterns demonstrate that many of the widely documented
abnormal performances associated with event ﬁrms can be explained by aggregate
liquidity factors. For most of the cases, the abnormal performance of event ﬁrms in
the entire sample is mainly driven by those initiated in high aggregate liquidity mar-
kets, which suggests that market anomalies related with typical corporate ﬁnance
events are the consequences of deals in bad circumstances. Overall, in this thesis,
I ﬁnd that corporate investment and ﬁnancing events undertaken in high-liquidity
markets are fundamentally diﬀerent from those undertaken in low-liquidity markets.
This research is a preliminary eﬀort to analyse the importance of aggregate liq-
uidity for the activity and quality of corporate events. It is certain that there are
many prospects for improvement and future research. In this thesis, I employed
measures of aggregate corporate liquidity demand (ACLD) and aggregate market
liquidity supply (AMLS). Unfortunately, unlike the factors of market valuation used
in market timing theory, aggregate liquidity factors are constructed with ﬁnancial
and accounting data. These types of accounting and economic data are mostly up-
dated annually. Therefore, I can only construct annual time-series data of aggregate
liquidity in this research, and the sample period of each corporate investment and
ﬁnancing event can only be partitioned on an annual basis. Although I do not expect
aggregate liquidity data to change greatly with high frequency, employing liquidity
measures with a higher frequency might create stronger evidence.
Second, considering the importance of liquidity, it is reasonable to expect that
other corporate activities may also be aﬀected by aggregate liquidity. For instance,
existing research in corporate ﬁnance shows that ﬁrms might choose to pay out
dividends or repurchase stocks back when holding extra cash. The timing of ﬁ-
nancing decisions has attracted much attention for a relatively long time. Since the
undertaking of these behaviours has explicit and implicit correlations with liquid-
ity, examining the inﬂuences of aggregate liquidity on the quality of these dividend
payouts and stock repurchase events should create new insights.
266
Third, in the present thesis, acquiring ﬁrms in M&A, issuing ﬁrms in IPOs and
SEOs, and divesting ﬁrms in asset sales were considered separately in related to ag-
gregate liquidity factors. However, since the participants in M&A, IPOs, SEOs, and
asset sales are all connected in certain ways, it is worthy to have further investiga-
tions considering various event ﬁrms simultaneously. For instance, the target ﬁrms in
takeovers and the divesting ﬁrms in asset sales are similar; only that divesting ﬁrms
positively sell their assets without losing controls of their ﬁrms. The issuing ﬁrms in
IPOs or SEOs are potential candidates for corporate divestitures. When the external
public ﬁnancing are more costly, ﬁrms would prefer divestitures to equity issuances.
Therefore, some interesting questions include: When the external markets are short
of liquidity, how should acquiring ﬁrms select target ﬁrms in acquisitions? What
type of ﬁnancing methods should be used by various ﬁrms in low-liquidity periods?
Finally, most of the empirical tests in this thesis were carried out by separating
the sample of corporate events through time periods. However, making a further
analysis of cross-section examinations should generate interesting and fruitful results.
For example, it is interesting to ask: When there is an aggregate liquidity shortage
in capital markets, whether liquidity-rich ﬁrms will still spend cash lavishly in value-
decreasing acquisitions, or wether acquiring ﬁrms will prefer to takeover companies
with more liquidity reserves? Future research in this line could add contributions
to previous studies analysing ﬁrm characteristics and their inﬂuences on corporate
investment and ﬁnancing decisions.
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